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The papers in this volume are drawn from a conference on "The Role o f Internatio- 
nal Financial Institutions in Central and Eastern Europe" held on A pril 12-14, 
1994, at the castle o f Nymphenburg in Munich, Germany. The conference was 
organized and sponsored by the German Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft. We are grate- 
fui for the financial support o f the Joint Committee on Eastern Europe o f the 
American Council o f Learned Societies, New York, and the Social Science 
Research Council. The Carl Friedrich von Siemens Foundation kindly provided 
their magnificient conference facilities.
We wish to express our gratitude to Professor Josef C. Brada, Arizona State Uni- 
versity, who worked out the concept o f the conference and was a constant source o f 
help during the preparations. He and Professor Ben Slay, Bates College, contribu- 
ted greatly to the planning o f the conference and o f this volume. The editors 
gratefully acknowledge the assistance o f Ms. Rita Stumpf o f the Südosteuropa- 
Gesellschaft staff in the preparation o f this book.
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THE SUDOSTEUROPA-GESELLSCHAFT
The Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft (Southeast Europe Association) was established in 1952 
as a nonprofit and nonpartisan society o f scholars, politicians, journalists and busi- 
nessmen striving to improve the academic, cultural and economic relations with 
Albania, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Romania, Turkey and Yugoslavia, after 
the disaster o f the Second World War and the division o f Europe by an exacerbating 
confrontation between East and West. From the very beginning it has been committed 
to mutual understanding and international partnership.
Tasks: The Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft advances knowledge and fosters public discus- 
sion on historical and current political developments in Southeastern Europe, promotes 
the dialogue between academic specialists and policy makers, provides assistance to 
research and to Southeast European studies in Germany. To this end it holds regular 
international conferences, colloquia and lectures for scholars and experts from govern- 
ment, industry and media, in Germany and in Southeastern Europe. It disseminates 
research findings by means o f a broad publications program. It organizes hearings and 
seminars on trade and investment opportunities, international transportation, migration 
and guest workers employment. It invites politicians from Southeastern Europe to 
lecture in Germany. Through its fellowship program it fosters advanced research on 
Southeastern Europe in the humanities and social sciences by young scholars. The 
Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft helps to reestablish research and country studies at East 
German universities. It participates in the governmental negotiations on cultural ag- 
reements w ith Southeast European countries. The unification o f Germany and the 
accelerating pace o f change in Southeastern Europe has provided new opportunities of 
international cooperation and a considerable enlargement o f the association's activities.
Branches. Branch Offices o f the Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft in Berlin, Bonn, Dres- 
den/Freiberg, Göttingen, Hamburg, Jena, Leipzig, Mannheim/Heidelberg, Marburg, 
Münster, Nürnberg-Erlangen/Bamberg, Regensburg/Passau, Tübingen and Würzburg, 
mostly connected with universities or research institutes, arrange their own programs of 
public lectures and conferences.
Funding. The Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft is funded mainly by the German federal go- 
vernment through the Foreign Office and receives private contributions from industry 
and members.
Organization: The Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft is headed by a board o f directors, 
elected every two years by the general assembly o f members, and by its management. 
An academic council advises the association on all scholarly aspects o f its work. A 
board o f trustees consists o f banks, industrial and trade enterprises as well as govern- 
ment agencies. The executive office o f the Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft is located at 
D-80538 München, Widenmayerstrasse 49, phone 089/21 21 54-0, fax 089-228 94 69
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The Role of International Financial Institutions 
in Central and Eastern Europe
I. Introduction
The papers included in this volume deal with various aspects o f the role o f interna- 
tional financial institutions (IFIs) such as the International Monetary Fund (IM F), 
the W orld Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD) in supporting, both materially and with advice and technical assistance, 
the economic transition o f Central and Eastern Europe from socialism to capital- 
ism. The former two organizations in particular have been the main conduits o f 
official western assistance and policy advice to the region. It is therefore not sur- 
prising that they also have borne the brunt o f the criticism  and controversy that has 
followed in the wake o f the output declines, delays in privatization, and ongoing 
inflation that have, to differing degrees, plagued all countries in the region.
W hile the critiques o f the programs promoted by the IFIs are many and varied, 
they can be grouped into two categories. The first criticism  is essentially ideological 
in nature and charges that, because IFI programs embody a certain ideological 
agenda, one that reflects the conventional concepts o f neoclassical economics, the 
programs promoted by the IFIs are often divorced from the recipient countries’ 
economic realities, exact excessive socio-political costs, and may ultimately be self- 
defeating.1 Eastern Europe is only the latest venue in which such critiques have 
been made, and, to the extent that differing assessments o f IFI effectiveness stem 
from underlying ideological differences, prospects for developing a consensus on 
the IFIs' strengths and weaknesses in the region are doubtful at best. Second, even 
when there is basic agreement concerning the appropriateness o f stabilization and 
market liberalization as goals, IFIs and their programs have been criticized on 
technical grounds. Indeed, some o f the technical requirements for successful IFI 
programs, such as some insulation o f domestic policy makers from short-run pres- 
sures, imply a certain conflict between technical and ideological dimensions o f IFI 
programs. Moreover, the IFIs', and especially the IMF's, traditional role o f serving 
as lightning rods for domestic opposition to unpopular, but ultimately necessary 
and inevitable stabilization and structural adjustment programs indicates that even 
IFI programs that are successful from a technical point o f view can be expected to 
engender a healthy dose o f politically motivated criticism. It should also be noted 
that, even when there is basic agreement concerning goals, conflicting assessments
1 As one critic has aptly put this argument, "The economic transformations envisaged [in 
Eastern Europe]...implement an intellectual blueprint...drawn up within the walls of 
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o f IFI programs may stem from differing analytical frameworks. Thus, while аса- 
demies tend to emphasize optimal policy regimes and to judge stabilization 
programs against ideal standards, policy makers and the IFIs are more likely to 
view the successes and failures o f real-world IFI programs in the binary framework 
implied by some ad hoc measures o f success o f failure.2
Both types o f criticisms have appeared in the Eastern European context. The in- 
troduction o f the Balcerowicz Plan in January 1990 was followed almost 
immediately by ideological attacks on the Polish program and allegations o f sinis- 
ter motives behind the IMF and World Bank support it received.3 The IMF's failure 
to supply the Russian government with the foreign exchange deemed necessary to 
launch the ruble stabilization fund in m id-1992 has been roundly criticized by Jef- 
frey Sachs (1994) and others as a technical blunder that seriously undermined 
prospects for macroeconomic stabilization in Russia. More generally, it is now 
widely acknowledged that the IFIs were unprepared for some of the surprises served 
up by the largely unprecedented nature o f the post-communist economic transition, 
especially during 1990-1992.4
12 Josef C. Brada, Roland Schönfeld and Ben Slay
II. View from  the International Financial Institutions
In ligh t o f this, how can and should the IFIs' performance in Eastern Europe be 
assessed? The articles presented in this symposium seek to provide answers to this 
question. In this, the first part o f the symposium, representatives o f the IFIs present 
their views on the region's economic transition and their institutions' roles therein.3 
Markus Rodlauer, the IMF's senior resident representative in Warsaw, concludes 
that Fund-supported liberalization and macroeconomic stabilization programs in 
Central and Eastern Europe have produced the best results when rapid liberaliza- 
tion was accompanied by the introduction and maintenance o f tight financial 
policies. This combination has been essential for introducing tight budget 
constraints for state enterprises, as well as for reducing inflation to manageable 
levels. On the other hand, Rodlauer points out that, even in the Central European 
countries, structural reforms have proceeded relatively slowly, which has made 
liberalization and stabilization more difficult. However, Rodlauer argues that the 
slow pace o f structural reforms is not an argument for a more gradual approach to
2 See Âslund (1994) for some discussion of this point.
3 Such criticism was a major element of the populist, or more correctly, demagogic cam- 
paign of Stanislaw Tymiński, who eliminated incumbent Prime Minister Mazowiecki in 
the first round of Poland's presidential elections in late 1990.
4 This was recently acknowledged by World Bank President Lewis T. Preston (Carrington, 
1994). For a more specific list of mistakes and admissions of same, see Ellman (1994, pp. 
2-3). At the same time, the IFIs have encountered problems that are often identical to 
those faced by indigenous institutions, e.g., in finding creditworthy borrowers in the en- 
terprise sector. This point was raised at the conference by Volkhart Vincentz, Osteuropa- 
Institut, Munich.
5 Needless to say, the authors are writing as private individuals, presenting their own views 
rather than those of the institutions they represent. Roland Schönfeld - 978-3-95479-733-2
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liberalization and stabilization. Instead, it underscores the need to redouble efforts 
toward enterprise reform, fiscal restructuring, and financial sector reform.
W hile Rodlauer׳s article reflects what might be described as the standard IFI view 
on appropriate transition strategies, it does not detail these organizations' roles in 
supporting the transition programs introduced in various countries. Christine 
W allich, lead economist in the W orld Bank's Central European Department, takes 
up this issue, in terms o f the Bank's activities in her article. In emphasizing the 
unprecedented problems facing the Bank in the former Soviet bloc, W allich shows 
that perhaps the largest problem has been the scale o f the demands placed upon the 
Bank's technical and financial resources. Yearly World Bank lending to the region, 
including the former Soviet and Yugoslav republics, averaged S3 to $4 b illion  
during 1991-1993, a sum representing about one-sixth o f total Bank funding. Po- 
land received the largest share o f these loans, absorbing some 30% o f the funds 
loaned during 1990-1993. W allich also points out that, even though the Bank has 
been the largest supplier o f external finance for most o f the region, the challenges 
posed by transforming economic institutions inherited from the old system and 
creating new ones have meant that the need for technical assistance is even greater 
than the need for money. W hile Wallich positively assesses Bank programs pro- 
moting the reform and strengthening o f social safety nets and environmental 
policies, she views as less successful the Bank's role in supporting the development 
o f the private sector.
The article by Salvatore Zecchini of the OECD offers the most general assess- 
ment o f IFI activity in the region. Zecchini shows that most o f the IFIs' support for 
the region has not taken the form of direct financial assistance, largely reflecting 
the region's relatively weak capacity for absorbing that assistance. More important, 
Zecchini argues, was the IFIs' role in: (1) imposing and maintaining program and 
policy conditionality on recipient governments; (2) providing technical assistance; 
and (3) catalysing financial assistance from other external, usually governmental, 
rarely private, sources. W hile these four elements taken together have, in Zecchini's 
view, provided an important support package for many countries, none o f the pack- 
age's four elements has been a clear success or non-controversial. The IFIs' 
treatment o f these elements has therefore changed over time: conditionality at both 
the program and the project levels has undergone a certain evolution, and the IFIs 
have begun to pursue better coordination o f technical assistance programs.
III. Czechoslovakia and Hungary
In the second part o f the symposium, Zdenèk Drábek and László Csaba examine 
Czechoslovakia's and Hungary's relations with the IFIs. The article by Drábek ar- 
gues that, while IMF support was critical in mobilizing international financial 
resources for Czechoslovakia during 1990-1991, the significance o f the IMF's role 
declined precipitously thereafter. Indeed, following the execution o f two successful 
standby agreements with the IMF, the Klaus government in early 1994 decided not 
to draw down the remaining tranches on its third standby and to accelerate the 
repayment o f some o f its IMF loans. The activities o f the World Bank and EBRD
The Role o f  International Financial Institutions in Central and Eastern Europe 13
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seem to have been sim ilarly low-key; as o f early 1994, only two Bank projects were 
ongoing in the Czech Republic. Drábek ascribes the IFIs1 relative unimportance to 
the successes o f the Czechoslovak, and then Czech, stabilization programs, which 
have managed to reduce inflation to the lowest levels in Central and Eastern 
Europe, while simultaneously maintaining external balance, government surpluses, 
and low unemployment rates. In any case, according to Drábek, there has been 
little  substantive disagreement between Czech policy officials and the IMF.
László Csaba's chapter describes Hungary's relatively long relationship with the 
IMF, which began in 1982, and he criticizes the Fund for not making better use of 
its conditionality to encourage more rapid systemic reform. Csaba argues that, in 
the 1980's and the 1990’s, the Fund placed too much emphasis on Hungary's debt- 
servicing capability. As long as the Hungarian government has been able to main- 
tain external creditworthiness, the IMF has generally been unw illing to push 
systemic issues, even during those times, e.g., the 1982 international debt crisis, or 
the precipitate decline in the country's foreign exchange reserves in 1990, when the 
Fund's influence on Hungarian policy making was at its zenith. Also important has 
been the ability o f both communist and non-communist governments to dilute the 
IMF's influence through an array o f domestic economic and political filters. Csaba 
concludes that, while Hungary's twenty years o f systemic reform may have given 
the country a certain advantage relative to the region's other economies, Hungary's 
relationship w ith the IMF had little , i f  anything, to do with the advanced state of 
the reforms.
The counterpoising o f the Czechoslovak and Hungarian experiences also raises 
interesting questions regarding the dynamics o f the relationship between the IFIs 
and the client countries. For example, the IMF has had little  success in, and, in- 
deed, has shown little  enthusiasm for, pressing Hungary to reverse the gradual 
appreciation o f the forint in order to deal w ith its external disequilibrium. On the 
other hand, in the case o f the Slovak Republic, the Fund acted swiftly and deci- 
sively to induce a reluctant Mečiar regime to devalue the Slovak koruna. To what 
extent this difference in IMF advice and pressure reflects the possibility that the 
Hungarian client has captured IMF policy advisors and to what extent it reflects the 
greater economic sophistication and thus bargaining skill o f the Hungarian 
government relative to those o f the Slovak government is unclear.
IV. Poland and Beyond
In the th ird  part o f the symposium, the focus shifts to the Polish experience and to 
the lessons that can be drawn from it and applied to those countries in the region 
that continue to suffer from declining output and from high rates o f inflation. The 
article by Stanislaw Gomułka compares the Polish and Russian experiences with 
the IMF and W orld Bank. While the post-1989 relationship between the Polish 
governments and the IFIs has been fa irly harmonious, policy disagreements have 
existed over such issues as energy pricing, wage policy, and ta riff policy. Accord- 
ing to Gomułka, these relatively minor disagreements have generally been resolved 
with the IFIs accepting the Polish position. On the other hand, both the IMF and
Roland Schönfeld - 978-3-95479-733-2
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the Polish government committed serious errors in forecasting changes in GDP, 
inflation, enterprise profitability, and the fiscal deficit during 1990-1991, as well as 
the growth in investment spending in 1992. While both parties anticipated that any 
eventual resumption o f economic growth would be led by exports and investment 
spending, when recovery commenced in 1992, it was driven by consumption. In 
Russia, even larger forecasting and more significant policy mistakes were made 
while preparing and implementing the Gaidar program during 1991-1992. These 
were most evident in the dramatic underestimation o f the corrective inflation that 
followed price liberalization in January 1992 and in the IMF's insistence on pre- 
serving the ruble zone. S till, Gomułka assesses positively most o f Poland's IM F- 
approved stabilization programs, and he argues that the Russian program is a 
"macroeconomic failure but a transformation success." Perhaps the most interesting 
dimension o f Gomutka's article is his insider’s account o f the policy debates among 
the architects o f the 1990 Polish stabilization program and o f the 1992 Russian 
stabilization program.
Jan W iniecki's paper constitutes the strongest technical critique o f IFI activities, 
arguing that the standard IFI reform packages are partly inapplicable in Eastern 
Europe. This is because the packages are based upon a set o f institutional and be- 
havioral assumptions that are transplanted from developed or developing capitalist 
economies, and many o f these assumptions do not hold during the post-communist 
transition. Had the IFIs made better use o f the literature on (post-) Soviet-type 
economies in constructing their programs, W iniecki argues, some o f these mistakes 
could have been avoided.6 For example, Winiecki argues that state enterprise size 
tends to be negatively correlated with efficiency and positively correlated with 
bargaining power. The introduction of the high real interest rates encouraged by 
the IFIs therefore meant that large state enterprises crowded smaller but more effi- 
cient firms out o f credit windows. Likewise, the lim itations upon wage growth in 
state enterprises included in many IMF programs generally serve to politicize labor 
relations while reinforcing managers' resistance to higher wage demands to only a 
lim ited extent.
The Role o f  International Financial Institutions in Central and Eastern Europe 15
V. Lessons and Questions
An obvious contribution o f the symposium is the systematic description o f the pro- 
grams that the IFIs have deployed to aid the transition process in East Europe. 
Certainly few critics o f IFI policy could criticize the IFIs' support for the region's 
balance o f payments and for the creation o f a viable social safety net. The broad 
range o f World Bank programs clearly encompasses many activities that are sensi- 
ble when judged by criteria other than those o f neoclassical economics.
6 The lack of attention to the relevant literature was also raised at the Conference by Wolf- 
gang Schrettl, Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung, Berlin. At the same time, a 
close analysis of Winiecki's argument raises the question of whether a better understand- 
ing of the relevant literature would have resulted in different policies or only in gloomier 
forecasts of what such policies could achieve. Roland Schönfeld - 978-3-95479-733-2
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The symposium is unlikely to have closed the gap between critics and supporters 
o f IFI stabilization and market liberalization policies. On the stabilization question, 
the IFIs have two important advantages on their side. The firs t o f these is that there 
is now a number o f successful stabilization stories, including Albania, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Poland, Slovenia, and, at least for now, much to everyone’s sur- 
prise, Slovakia. In some o f these countries, stabilization has been accompanied by 
extensive liberalization o f markets and privatization, and in others by little  o f 
either. Instead, the common thread appears to be government adherence to stabili- 
zation policies o f a type advocated by the IFIs.7 The critics o f such orthodox 
stabilization policies, on the other hand, can point to no stabilization successes for 
countries following their approaches; the argument that their approaches have not 
been given a tria l strengthens rather than blunts the force o f this criticism.
One reason why countries have been reluctant to follow  the stabilization propos- 
als o f the critics o f the IFIs stems from the second advantage o f the IFIs' approach 
to stabilization. This is that it rests on a coherent and relatively transparent model 
o f the economy. O f course, such a model may be wrong, and the adherence o f 
western economists and policy advisers to such a model may be the result o f ideo- 
logically induced blindness, but it would be a brave Central and East European 
government that would cast aside such orthodoxy in favor o f homegrown icono- 
clasm. Moreover, with the notable exception o f McKinnon (1993), no coherent 
alternative stabilization policy has been put forward by the critics. Some have 
called for growth or exportoriented industrial policies, and others for Keynesian 
stimulation that, in small trade-dependent economies, would seem to be a prescrip־ 
tion based on the wrong model.
The symposium also raised a number o f questions that may be less controversial 
but that are worthy o f further research. One broad area is the political economy o f 
relations between the IFIs and their Central and East European clients. The IFIs, o f 
course, have their own objectives and motivations and, in the case o f Eastern 
Europe, they have been subject to considerable pressure from western governments. 
What these institutional agendas were, and how they were influenced by outside 
pressure, remains to be investigated by economists and political scientists.‘ Much 
the same can be said for the IFIs' relationships with their clients in the region. The 
application o f pressure on IFI clients is a sk ill that institutions such as the IMF 
have practiced for years, attempting to press upon reluctant governments austerity 
policies that may prove unpopular with the electorate without pushing so far as to 
lead to a fa ll o f the government. In the case o f Central and Eastern Europe, walking 
this tightrope is even more d ifficu lt because democracies are new and fragile and 
because the opposition party waiting in the wings is often the former Communist 
Party.
16 Josef C. Brada, Roland Schönfeld and Ben Slay
7 That market liberalization is not necessary for stabilization should not come as a surprise 
to students of these economies, since they were stabilized, if distorted, during most of the 
era of central planning.
In a conference contribution, Marie Lavigne ably demonstrated how the EBRD's lack of 
clarity over its goals led it to become marginalized in Central and Eastern Europe.
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Markus Rodlauer
The Experience with IMF-Supported Reform Programs in 
Central and Eastern Europe
The purpose o f this paper is to review the transition experience in Central and East- 
em Europe from the viewpoint o f the International Monetary Fund.1 The emphasis 
w ill thus be mainly on macroeconomic issues, although key issues o f structural 
reforms are also discussed, reflecting the close nexus between stabilization and 
structural change. The paper is organized as follows: first, a few comments on the 
extraordinary conditions faced by the countries on the eve o f starting the transition; 
second, an outline o f the reform strategy employed in the countries under review, 
third, an overview o f the progress made thus far; fourth, a discussion o f key issues 
that have emerged from the experience; fifth , a few words on the role o f the Fund; 
and sixth, a summary o f conclusions.
1. Starting conditions
Two points are worth recalling: (i) the exceptional nature o f the transition problem, 
and (ii) the considerable differences between individual country's starting condi- 
tions. Superficial comparison might note that most o f the countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe were middle-income countries facing the results o f prolonged 
maladjustment sim ilar to, say, Brazil, Mexico, or Israel. However, what makes the 
transition economies different is the sheer magnitude o f the change required in 
institutional circumstances at a time of sudden collapse o f the entire political and 
economic framework. These economies, therefore, began the process o f transfor- 
mation in circumstances o f deep crisis and vacuum. At the same time, the révolu- 
tionary political changes opened a window of opportunity for Governments to take 
dramatic measures to address the crisis, a period o f extraordinary politics as Profes- 
sor Balcerowicz (1993) would call it. This setting has both dictated and allowed a 
more comprehensive approach to the reform process than has ever been attempted 
before.
Regarding individual country's starting conditions, Table 1 provides an overview 
that illustrates the considerable diversity that influenced both the detailed shape o f 
programs as well as subsequent performance. While virtually all countries, except 
Albania, had embarked on partial reform efforts, only Hungary entered the dra- 
matic changes o f 1989-90 with some degree o f preparation in the form o f substan- 
tia lly  liberalized price and trade regimes, small-scale private ownership, a two-tier 
banking sector, some tax reform, and a corporate law. Poland, o f course, had also
1 The discussion in this paper includes the following countries: Albania, Bulgaria, Czecho- 
slovakia/Czech Republic and Slovak Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. It does 
not include the successor states to the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.Roland Schönfeld - 978-3-95479-733-2
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made progress in dismantling state control, allowing private sector activities, and 
looking for markets in the West, but it started comprehensive reforms in the midst 
o f hyperinflation, which undermined confidence in the national currency for years 
to come. Macroeconomic conditions, on the other hand, were perhaps most favor- 
able in Czechoslovakia, with a good inflation record and the absence o f both 
monetary overhang or large external debt problems. Poland, Bulgaria, and 
Hungary had to cope with large external debt, with Hungary nonetheless having 
retained access to international capital markets, while Romania and Czechoslova- 
kia did not. O f course, Albania's legacy o f decades o f strict isolation and most 




The transition strategy has three major elements: (i) dismantling controls, particu- 
larly on prices and trade, ( ii)  adjusting macroeconomic imbalances, and ( iii)  insti- 
tution building. Countries embarked on these elements simultaneously because they 
are interdependent and no single element could succeed without the other two. 
Differences across countries in the size o f imbalances and distortions dictated some 
differentiation in the speed and strength of reforms: while the most dramatic big- 
bang approach was necessary in Albania, programs in Poland, Czechoslovakia, 
Bulgaria, and Romania were also conceived as big-bang moves, whereas Hungary 
was able to go with a more gradualist program, although it was s till far more com- 
prehensive and front-loaded than anything Hungary had attempted in the past.
The firs t o f the three basic building blocks was to free the economy, mainly 
through liberalization o f prices and o f external economic relations so as to give 
undistorted signals to producers and consumers.2 The two should go hand in hand 
so that foreign relative prices, transmitted through an open trade system, can guide 
domestic price formation and import competition can constrain monopoly profits. 
Clear price signals, in turn, are critical for the reorientation and reconstruction of 
the economy, which invariably takes time, to begin as soon as possible. Price lib- 
eralization has also been the most efficient way to eliminate the liquid ity overhang 
that had built up in most o f these countries in the latter years o f central planning 
and to reduce the budgetary burden o f price subsidies.
This leads to the second challenge faced by transition countries, that o f stabi liz- 
ing the economy through appropriate monetary, fiscal, and incomes policies. In 
practice, this means early and decisive progress toward domestic price stability, 
together w ith sustainable external and internal balances. The attainment o f low 
inflation is viewed by the Fund not only as a goal in itself, but as essential for sev- 
eral reasons. Inflationary pressures tend to be especially virulent at the beginning 
o f the transition process, against the background o f large price distortions and the
2 In some countries, such as Albania, freeing the economy required even more fundamental 
measures such as the legalization of private economic activity which had been almost 
completely forbidden under the previous regime. Roland Schönfeld - 978-3-95479-733-2
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liquid ity overhang in shortage economies; the adverse effects o f inflation, such as 
the obfuscation o f price signals, tend to be especially destructive when the direction 
o f change needs to be clear; and confidence in the domestic currency, embodying 
much o f the new economic regime's credibility, is a critical, albeit tenuous, asset in 
an environment that is undergoing such vast change. The immediate task was thus 
to prevent the in itia l jump in the price level associated with liberalization from be- 
coming rampant inflation.
From the start, a tight fiscal policy was considered critical to this end, and coun- 
tries in itia lly  aimed at budget balance within a short period o f time, w ith the 
exception o f Albania where the in itia l imbalance was much larger. The strategy 
placed in itia l emphasis on short-term expenditure reduction combined with struc- 
turai measures to boost revenues. Major sources o f expenditure reduction were price 
and enterprise subsidies, investment and defense expenditures, as well as budgetary 
wage restraint. Tax reform included the replacement o f the old turnover tax w ith 
the VAT and o f direct profit transfers from enterprises with a transparent corporate 
tax structure. Monetary policy was designed in support o f the inflation and balance 
o f payments objectives, with either domestic credit or broad money as the chief tar- 
get variable depending on the type o f exchange rate regime. Introduction o f two- 
tier banking systems, an interest rate policy, and other market-oriented measures 
for monetary control were important ancillary reforms in this area. Typically, the 
programs have been heterodox in their approach to price stabilization, involving, in 
addition to the monetary and/or exchange rate anchor, an important second anchor 
in the form o f transitory incomes policies including wage controls in state enter- 
prises.
As noted above, the third component of the strategy has been systemic reform, 
that is not just the nurturing and strengthening o f market systems, but their whole- 
sale new construction. The range o f necessary changes includes laws to define and 
ensure ownership rights, contracts, resolution o f conflicts, accounting, and so forth; 
reforms to support the implementation o f macroeconomic policies, such as building 
a new tax administration, modernization o f statistical systems, and creation o f a 
macroeconomic database; policies that strengthen financial discipline and effi- 
ciency at the micro-level, particularly in state enterprises and banks. Also needed 
are an improved social safety net, targeted at the truly needy at acceptable budget- 
ary costs and measures to improve the functioning o f labor and capital markets.
W ithin these three components, liberalization, stabilization, and institution 
building, there are many strategic choices to be made according to national circum- 
stances: the choice o f exchange rate regime, the structure o f taxes and expenditures, 
the approach to privatization, and so on. Also, the strategy could not be fu lly  
mapped out in advance, and we all have learned continuously as the transformation 
has unfolded. I shall now turn to an overview o f how much progress has been made 
on each o f these three basic accounts before examining some issues in greater 
depth.
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Regarding liberalization, governments moved to free their economies more quickly 
and with more determination than many observers had expected. By now, prices 
have been almost completely liberalized; subsidies have been substantially reduced; 
currency convertibility has been established to a significant degree; and the trade 
regime has been largely liberalized. Although in 1992 some countries raised tariffs 
on some imported goods, most countries in the region are in the process o f harmo- 
nizing their trade tariffs to conform to EU levels. The broadly sustained level and 
scope o f this liberalization is unambiguous evidence for the irreversible rejection of 
central planning in favor o f market-based systems.
Regarding macroeconomic stabilization, the challenge doubtless has been more 
demanding than originally envisaged. Three unexpected developments stand out: 
(i) the decline in output was greater, ( ii)  inflation was higher, and ( iii)  fiscal bal- 
ance proved much more d ifficu lt to attain than programs and most observers had 
hoped. I shall return to the issue o f output in the next section. On inflation, the 
in itia l imbalances and repressed inflation hidden in the old systems were underes- 
timated. This applies particularly to the possible existence o f a larger unabsorbed 
monetary overhang in Bulgaria and partly Poland, underprediction o f the effects of 
in itia l devaluation in Poland, and to the monopolistic behaviour o f state enterprises 
Apart from the inertia effects o f the bigger in itia l price jump, subsequent stabiliza- 
tion was also complicated by the greater than expected output loss and fiscal d iffi- 
culties. On fiscal issues, more later on; for now, suffice to say that while programs 
at the very start seemed to do well, the structural problems o f public finances soon 
turned out to be much more intractable than expected.3 This, together with the 
greater output loss, made for sizeable budget deficits compared with the in itia l 
objective o f budget balance.
These major problems notwithstanding, significant progress has been made on 
the macroeconomic front (Table 2). There is reason to believe that the collapse of 
output is bottoming out, and some countries, notably Poland, experienced positive 
growth in 1993. This turnaround reflects mainly improved supply conditions in re- 
sponse to the reforms that have been implemented; in addition, the improvement 
was supported in 1992 by growing exports. More recently, exports have suffered 
from the recession in Western Europe, while rising domestic private demand has 
provided an impetus to economic growth in many countries. Inflation has been 
reduced substantially following the in itia l price corrections, and external positions 
also strengthened appreciably during 1991-92. Nevertheless, there have also been 
setbacks, such as in Poland in 1991/92 and more recently in Hungary, and where 
there is success there is no room for complacency. The emerging output recovery is 
fragile and needs to be underpinned by continued vigorous structural change as 
well as financial stability; inflation in most countries is s till significantly, and in 
some countries very far, above Western Europe, requiring inter alia continuing cur­
24 Markus Rodlauer
3 Mainly because of unexpectedly buoyant corporate income tax revenues reflecting infla- 
tion-related valuation gains on inventories: once these "paper profits" vanished, corporate 
tax collections declined with the onset of structural change.
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rency depreciation; and, as noted above, the external accounts deteriorated in 1993. 
In itia l strong improvements on the fiscal front have not been sustained, although in 
some countries, notably Poland, part o f the slippage has been reversed in the more 
recent past. Not unrelated to this, the social problems that have emerged during the 
transition have been immense, and it is argued that recent electoral trends in the 
region reflect in part the electorate’s desire for a more equitable distribution o f the 
burdens and benefits o f reforms. It is generally recognized, however, that these dis- 
tributional goals should be pursued w ithin the framework o f continued stabiliza- 
tion, as redistribution through higher inflation would simply make everybody worse 
off. In this context, as well as more generally, it has become clear that farther prog- 
ress in transforming toward stable market economies depends to an important 
extent on successful systemic reforms, the th ird  p illar o f the transformation 
strategy.
Systemic reform has clearly been the weakest element o f the strategy. It is o f 
course understandable that the microfoundations o f economies have proved most 
resistant to change because what is involved is no less than a complete overhaul o f 
society. It is also not that progress has been negligible or small, it has been far- 
reaching in many areas, but from what is required for a well-functioning market 
economy, there is s till a vast distance. A few examples are given below.
W hile considerable progress has been made in establishing the basic legal frame- 
work, the administrative and judicia l machinery for enforcement remains weak. For 
instance, while most countries have adopted bankruptcy laws, little  use has been 
made o f such laws to date except in Hungary.
Most Central and Eastern European countries have been successful in privatizing 
small-scale enterprises and, where necessary, farms, and there has been a prolifera- 
tion o f less formal private activity, the true magnitude o f which is not easy to 
gauge. But privatizing medium and large state enterprises has proven more d iffi- 
cult. In some countries, such as Hungary and Poland, an in itia l wave o f self-priva- 
tization generated a backlash against privatization that s till hampers progress. In 
Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania progress has been slow because o f political uncer- 
tainties and the d ifficu lt economic environment. Poland and the Czech and Slovak 
Republics have recently implemented, or are in the process o f adopting, measures 
to speed up this process, including mass privatization schemes. Until this process is 
much further advanced, markets w ill remain weak, the supply-side response tenu- 
ous, and the effectiveness o f macroeconomic policies impaired. Unreformed enter- 
prises tend to be unresponsive to interest rate policy and other price signals, and 
their aggregate financial losses have potentially serious implications for 
government budgets, the banking system, and macroeconomic stability. There is no 
doubt that enterprise reform is now a challenge o f the greatest importance.
A crucial area where progress generally has been good is the establishing o f ef- 
fective central banking institutions; at the same time, the creation o f modern 
commercial banking systems has turned out to be more difficult. Again, this should 
not come as a surprise as it involves, like enterprise reform, a much more 
decentralized approach than at the central banking level or, more generally, than 
the one entailed in stabilization.
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This section examines some of the most prominent issues in the transformation 
experience so far.
a. Was the output decline avoidable?
The reasons commonly given for the unexpectedly large output declines in virtually 
a ll the countries under review are numerous: (i) hoarding in anticipation o f price 
liberalization, with a subsequent drop in demand; ( ii)  the collapse o f the CMEA; 
( iii)  the supply side shock described by Bruno (1992) as comprehensive manage- 
ment shock, the near-chaos faced by producers and distribution channels as the old 
structures broke away; and (iv) the sharp contraction o f domestic demand that 
occurred in a ll countries in the in itia l stage o f transformation. While there is broad 
consensus that some output decline was unavoidable, the relative contribution o f the 
above factors to the actual decline is less clear. In addition, there is a debate 
whether official data fu lly  captured the supply response o f emerging private activi- 
ties. Nevertheless, it is a valid question whether particularly the latter two factors, 
management shock and demand contraction, might have been softened by a differ- 
ent set o f policies. Most often, this question is framed as a call for a more gradualist 
approach, both to systemic reforms and to macroeconomic stabilization. Before 
turning to this aspect, two points should be noted, one empirical and the other more 
hypothetical. Accumulating evidence suggests that output declines have been 
severe even in those countries that have tried alternative or more gradual strategies 
on these two accounts, while countries, notably Albania, the Czech Republic, Hun- 
gary, and Poland, that have pursued ambitious strategies, along the line of those 
mapped out above, appear to be among the first to experience renewed growth.4 The 
second point is, even i f  the output decline could have been softened, there is great 
uncertainty as to how much o f the productive base inherited from the past was 
viable in the long run, that is, whether the slower in itia l decline might not have 
translated into a prolonged period o f retrenchment.
b. Big-bang versus gradualism
As noted above, the speed o f price and trade liberalization in Central and Eastern 
Europe was unprecedented. Yet this process took place against the background of 
largely unreformed financial, factor and product markets where progress has been 
more d ifficu lt and subject to delays. The question o f sequencing follows naturally 
In particular, one might ask whether a more phased approach might not have 
cushioned the output decline, say, by liberalizing trade in tandem with the adjust-
26 Markus Rodlauer
4 The evidence is similar in neighboring countries, with strong, frontloaded programs such 
as those implemented in the Baltic States being relatively more successful.Roland Schönfeld - 978-3-95479-733-2
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ment speed in commodity and labor markets and with the reconstruction o f the 
productive and legal base.
However, in addition to the doubts mentioned above whether such a cushioning 
would have served to diminish the overall, cumulative output loss or perhaps even 
worsened it, it is doubtful whether such an approach was a realistic option. First, 
the basic strategic decisions were made at the outset, that is when the political 
commitment to freeing up was strongest. A more gradual and controlled approach 
simply was not on the policy makers' minds, particularly among those conscious o f 
the lim ited duration o f the period of extraordinary politics. Second, even i f  po liti- 
cally palatable, such an approach probably would not have been feasible given the 
lack o f political and administrative control. Third, in order to work, gradual liber- 
alization requires a credible forward commitment by the government, and it is 
doubtful whether any government would be able to carry such credibility in the 
extremely unstable conditions that characterize the transitions.
The second question here is whether more gradualism in macro-stabilization, say 
easier financial policies, might have been appropriate, particularly in cases like 
Poland where the unexpectedly high price shock caused tighter demand conditions 
than in itia lly  programmed. However, it is precisely the persistence o f strong infla- 
tionary pressures and external constraints that suggests that the room for a more 
relaxed stance o f policies was very limited. For example, in Poland, the deliberate 
easing o f policies in m id-1990 quickly lead to higher imports and prices, and it is 
not clear whether the slowdown in output decline reflected mostly higher demand 
or a normal abating o f the impact o f the in itia l shock. A sim ilar easing in Czecho- 
Slovakia was followed by continued sharp output declines; and the rapid build up of 
inter-enterprise arrears in Romania, which softened the measured output decline, 
clearly complicated the entire reform and adjustment process, and thus also post- 
poned, i f  not precluded, any early recovery.
c. Sustained fiscal adjustment
As noted above, the in itia l hopes o f achieving budget balance were soon frustrated 
by pressures on both revenues and expenditures. On the revenue side, difficulties 
included the steeper output decline as well as those o f building an entirely new tax 
system suitable to market economies. Perhaps even more d ifficu lt, the challenge on 
the expenditure side was that o f moving from an egalitarian, well-endowed welfare 
system to a market system with much wider differences in incomes and wealth, but 
also with all the adverse social side effects of capitalism, like unemployment, that 
need attention. In addition, there are other new claims that arise as part o f the 
transformation process, such as the tremendous infrastructure needs and the costs 
o f non-performing bank portfolios. Two principal questions arise: whether with all 
these difficulties, there is a case for a temporary widening o f the budget deficit, and 
how to solve the medium-term budget problem.
First, it has been recognized that budget balance was probably unrealistic in the 
early stage o f transformation, and programs have accommodated this. Particularly 
where the debt/GDP ratio is low and the deficit does not require undue reliance on
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the inflation tax, deficits might be expected to partly self-correct when output even- 
tually recovers and social spending cuts should become easier. However, one must 
also point to the frag ility  o f the stabilization gains made so far. The stakes are high 
because hard-won credibility can be lost quickly, and especially when the emerging 
private sector starts to put pressure on resources there is ever less room for non- 
inflationary deficit financing. This constraint is particularly tight in a country like 
Poland where confidence in the domestic currency still suffers from the lingering 
effects o f past hyperinflation. The resulting low level o f base money relative to GDP 
implies that even a small slippage from the deficit target can translate quickly into 
much higher inflation. For the medium and long term, the direction should be 
clear: approximate budget balance; continued tax reform; and reform o f the big 
traditional spending blocks such as education, health, and social welfare, while 
providing resources for critical aspects o f the transformation such as infrastructure, 
enterprise restructuring, and financial sector reforms. The overall budget constraint 
implies that strict expenditure priorities must be established both w ithin and across 
sectors. Reforming the major public expenditure programs into affordable yet ef- 
fective systems is now the key fiscal challenge for the countries under review. A 
crucial role is to be played by social reforms.
d. Social aspects
To make the transformation politically and socially sustainable, it was considered 
essential to incorporate into all programs some minimum protection for those that 
would suffer most, such as the newly unemployed. However, these social safety nets 
were mostly grafted onto the existing ones inherited from the command economies. 
It has become clear that those systems are not only unsustainable financially, but 
also not very effective as benefits are spread too th inly without clear focus on the 
most needy. At the same time, as noted above, recent electoral trends in countries 
like Poland imply a mandate for governments to address painful tensions in the 
transformation process, mainly by attempting to distribute the burdens and fruits of 
reforms somewhat more evenly.
For continued successful transition, governments w ill thus have to attempt to ree- 
oncile three concerns: the overarching goal o f maximizing their countries' longer 
term prospects for high growth and rising liv ing  standards; the mandate to aim for 
greater social equity; but also the need to prune back unsustainable social pro- 
grams. Three implications follow, (i) there is no real alternative to the overall path 
o f stabilization and market-oriented reforms; ( ii)  where policy options exist to bring 
about a better distribution o f the burden o f reforms, without breaking the financial 
framework o f programs, these options could be used, for instance, by making the 
tax system more progressive, casting the tax net more widely, and/or increasing 
minimum social benefits while holding back on other entitlements; and ( iii)  
reforms o f the existing social spending programs should no longer be delayed. In 
this context, it w ill be particularly important to establish clear social priorities, 
w ithin available resources, translate them into concrete spending decisions, and 
carry them out efficiently to make sure they reach the targeted beneficiaries. Better
28 Markus Rodlauer
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benefit administration, including decentralization to lower levels o f government, 
can make an important contribution here. The options for a more active policy of 
redistribution w ill probably widen as countries emerge from recession and admini- 
strations strengthen; however, governments should be cautioned against the temp- 
tation o f distributing the entire growth and reform dividend for social purposes; 
rather, part o f that dividend should be reserved for tackling the remaining large 
structural problems.
e. Enterprises governance, bad loans and arrears
While there is little  debate in principle about what to do w ith clearly non-viable en- 
terprises, which is not to say that it is not a d ifficu lt social issue, a few points are 
worth making about privatization, as well as more generally about that middle 
group o f enterprises that are too good to be liquidated, yet too bad to be privatized. 
First, there should not be any doubt that privatization is, as a strategic objective, 
fundamental to successful transformation. Even in countries w ith a tradition of 
strong administration, the experience has been that private ownership is the best 
way to tighten the budget constraint, to make managers responsive to that budget 
constraint, and to mobilize private savings for efficient investment. O f course, it is 
also one o f the most political issues in the transformation, and, as noted above, it 
has been one o f the points on the agenda most prone to delays. The basis and cir- 
cumstances for rapid large-scale privatization are also different from country to 
country, and some have chosen a deliberately fast-track approach and thereby 
favoured considerations o f speed over those related to finding the perfect solution. 
The trade-off between speed and efficiency is a particularly stark one in the various 
forms o f voucher privatization; there is the concern that this method could either 
result in a diffused ownership structure or essentially preserve the status quo o f de- 
facto ownership by large creditor banks, both o f course complicating effective en- 
terprise governance. The ju ry here is definitely s till out; I personally am attracted 
by the aspect o f speed and getting it done, and the hope is that financial markets 
w ill eventually deliver an appropriate ownership structure. In this regard, Poland's 
mass privatization program appears well-balanced as carefully selected investment 
funds should be able to embody ownership in an appropriate fashion. The hope now 
is that the program can indeed be implemented over the next year or so.
Regarding that middle group o f enterprises that w ill remain in state hands for 
some time, the key is to institute mechanisms that generate efficient behavior. 
Three elements are crucial here: (i) to create performance-oriented management 
incentives such as shares in future privatization; ( ii)  to maintain a hard budget con- 
straint in that sense, a tight monetary and fiscal policy stance is directly relevant to 
the structural transformation as well, and wage controls have their role as long as 
the control mechanisms o f the market are not yet fu lly  in place; and ( iii)  to shift 
enterprise control from workers to managers, often facilitated by making workers 
share more directly in the results o f enterprise performance.
A few words should also be said on the issue o f bad debts. Although in large 
measure an asset overhang from the past, the problem has worsened in many coun­
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tries since the start o f reforms, mainly reflecting the output decline as well as the 
perverse incentives for banks and enterprises in limbo between central control and 
market discipline. In general, countries have not dealt with this problem up-front, 
and while there are pros and cons for one-time solutions, in hindsight the balance 
o f risks appears against premature wholesale bail-outs mainly because o f the moral 
hazard problem and the large, and de facto open-ended, macroeconomic costs. 
Instead, an effective strategy should have three basic goals: (i) to strengthen enter- 
prise discipline w ith a view to avoiding new bad loans later on; ( ii)  to help create a 
new banking philosophy whereby banks chose and monitor clients carefully and 
learn to deal with nonperforming assets; and, o f course, ( iii)  to deal with the bad 
debts as such w ithin the overall macroframework, including bank recapitalization 
through the state budget. A comprehensive, well-circumscribed approach such as 
that being implemented in Poland under the Bank Restructuring Law appears to 
satisfy these criteria.
f  Choice o f exchange rate regime
A natural corollary o f price and trade liberalization was the unification o f the ex- 
change rate and the attainment o f at least current account convertibility in all coun- 
tries under review. Beyond that, the choice o f exchange rate regime reflected the 
particular circumstances o f individual countries. While a fixed exchange rate has 
an obvious value as a nominal anchor, particularly in the period immediately after 
domestic prices have been liberalized, it makes little  sense to try to peg the rate 
unless there is confidence that financial policies w ill be appropriately tight and 
there is an adequate level o f international reserves with which to defend the rate i f  
necessary. Thus, Czechoslovakia and Poland established fixed rate regimes at the 
outset o f the stabilization process, both after sizeable in itia l devaluations to afford a 
margin o f competitiveness.5 On the other hand, in Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania, 
the lack o f reserves, uncertainties about financial policies, and difficulties in 
determining an equilibrium exchange rate for any peg, suggested the adoption o f a 
floating exchange rate regime. Hungary adopted an adjustable peg as an intermedi- 
ate solution, as the external position, albeit reasonably strong, was considered 
vulnerable mainly to swings in the capital account. While the in itia l choice was 
thus influenced mainly by countries' starting conditions, later on, the sustainability 
o f fixed rates as well as the stability o f flexible rates was a function o f the consis- 
tency o f underlying financial policies. Poland, for instance, after experiencing poi- 
icy slippages and an erosion o f competitiveness, in m id-1991 changed toward a 
crawling peg system that accommodates persistent, albeit progressively narrowing, 
inflation differentials while preserving many o f the anchor functions o f a fixed 
regime.
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5. Role o f the IMF
The role o f the Fund in this historic process can only be lim ited, mainly because the 
countries, their populations and their political leaders, have to undertake and pur- 
sue the transition themselves, with all the risks and hardships involved. Also, we 
have been fortunate to be able to share our role with our colleagues from the W orld 
Bank, the EBRD, and other institutions. In a fundamental sense, the Fund's role 
here is little  different from that which its Articles o f Agreement intend it to fu lfill 
for all its 178 member countries: to support policies that promote macroeconomic 
stabilization and unrestricted trade and payments, and more generally, to promote 
international monetary cooperation. What we could do in practice falls broadly into 
two categories: ( i) financial support; and ( ii)  policy advice and technical assistance. 
As shown in Tables 3 and 4, all o f the countries under review have embarked in the 
last few years on stabilization programs supported by the use o f Fund resources. 
This support has come through the Fund's traditional facilities: Stand-by 
Arrangements, typically for 12-15 months; Extended Arrangements, involving a 
country's commitment to a medium-term adjustment framework, and Compensation 
for Export Shortfalls (CCFF), as well as through its concessional facility  (ESAF) 
for low income countries and the recently created Systemic Transformation Facility 
(STF).6 The use o f Fund resources by Central and Eastern European countries, as 
by any other member o f the Fund, typically has been conditioned on the member's 
adoption and implementation o f an economic program that promises progress to- 
ward sustained adequate growth and balance o f payments viability. This aspect o f 
the Fund's support, its so-called conditionality, has received its share o f criticism  as 
well as praise over the years, and I shall not attempt to add to this debate in this 
paper. Suffice to note here that perhaps the most critical condition o f a program's 
success has been the conviction and determination with which governments them- 
selves have undertaken its implementation. In that sense, outside conditionality can 
only play a rather lim ited role, supportive o f the right intentions, but hardly forcing 
countries to do much o f anything. In addition to its own contribution, the Fund has 
been actively involved in the mobilization and coordination o f financial support 
from other sources, mainly in the framework o f the Group o f 24 Donor Countries 
(G-24). Usually, this process would involve an assessment by the Fund o f a 
country's macropolicies and outlook, including, importantly, that for the balance o f 
payments. This assessment is then presented to other donors, with the Fund usually 
coming in w ith its own resources only when the financing o f the program is 
assured.
An important part o f the Fund's contribution is provided through technical assis- 
tance (Table 5). This revolves mainly around the design and implementation o f 
macroeconomic policies, fiscal administration, central banking, and economic and
The Experience with IMF 2 ן 
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financial statistics. After a first wave in the early years, this effort has recently be- 
come somewhat more focused, reflecting many countries' progress in carrying their 
systemic reform efforts to a broadly self-sustaining level. Last, but not least, the 
Fund is also involved in training o f senior government officials from transition 
economies, both in our Institute in Washington and, together with other Organiza- 
tions and governments, in the recently established Joint Vienna Institute.
6. Conclusions
W hile definite judgements on many accounts o f the transition w ill have to await 
further evidence, some general conclusions can certainly be drawn from this prog- 
ress report. Overall, the records o f such countries as the Czech Republic and Poland 
can be judged as impressive, and even Albania has achieved a measure o f macro- 
economic stabilization and an output response that few might have expected during 
the winter o f 1991. The main lessons are given below.
The best results have been achieved when both liberalization was rapid and finan- 
cial policies were tight from the outset and persistently thereafter. Key to such 
outcomes has been a fundamental commitment by policymakers to the adjustment 
program, including a genuine consensus among all principle parties to the policy 
process, including the government, the central bank, and the parliament.
Even in the most successful cases, other elements o f structural reforms have pro- 
ceeded more slowly. This has tended to hold up the pace o f both macroeconomic 
stabilization and structural transformation. Since gradualism rarely is an option, it 
follows that even greater emphasis must be placed on rapid institutional change. 
Enterprise reform, fiscal restructuring, and financial sector reform are the most 
critical challenges in this regard.
One o f the most important engines o f structural change has been the existence of 
tight budget constraints at the micro-level. This is, o f course, where tight financial 
policy and discipline at the micro-level are most closely intertwined: inflation can- 
not be beaten without micro-discipline, and structural change w ill be faint under 
weak monetary and budget policies. Important additional agents o f micro-discipline 
include rapid privatization, profit-orientation o f commercial banks, and credible 
bankruptcy procedures.
Popular support for rapid and comprehensive reforms remains, o f course, essen- 
tia l. Persuasive political leadership is certainly part o f what is needed, but it also 
implies a clear need for effective social safety nets. In addition, governments may 
be called upon by their electorates to reconcile the over-arching goal o f assuring 
high growth and rising liv ing  standards over the medium term, with a mandate o f 
providing for a more equitable transition mainly by distributing its burdens and 
fruits more evenly. Governments that wish to manage these mandates successfully 
w ill have to define and execute clear social priorities, and find a judicious balance 
between short-term social concerns and the need to invest in reforms and 
infrastructure.
A final word about the role o f government. After a period o f extraordinary poli- 
tics and rapid liberalization, it is only natural that the pendulum would tend to
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swing back at some point in time. Indeed, there is no doubt that markets often re- 
main far from perfect and that a hands-off approach by governments is neither 
politically possible nor, in certain cases, appropriate. However, there is always the 
temptation to fa ll back into old mistakes or replicate the mistakes o f others. What is 
needed instead is a clear vision o f the overall scope o f Government intervention, its 
benefits and risks, and its implications for the three essential pillars o f the new re- 
gime: freedom, stability, and well-functioning market institutions.
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Czechoslovakia Hungary 2/ Poland 3/ Romania
15.6 10.6 37.9 23.2
3450 2590 1790 1012
4.6 45 5.5 9.3
1.4 0.5 -0.7 1.8
100 15 All except 
food
60
Economy-wide 90 70 Economy-wide
0.7 0.4 0.6 0.6
19 65 77 3
23 57 56 NA
60 43 41 37
25 16 14 6
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Table t. Central and Eastern Europe: Starting Conditions
Albania 1/ Bulgaria
Population
(in millions, mid■ 1989) 3.2 9.0
GNP per capita 4/ 
(in 19Ѳ9 US$) 450 2320
GNP growth 
(average annual rate in 




(in percent of total) 100 100
State ownership Economy-wide Economy-wide





(1990 In percent) 35 50
External debtservice 
ratio (1990) 550 116
Exports to CMEA
(in percent of total exports) 67 69
(In percent 01ODP) 10 34
Source: M. Bruno. Stabilization and Reform, 1992; and IMF staff estimates. 
1/ The initial year for Albania is 1991; exports to CMEA are 1990 estimates. 
2/ External debt service ratio as a percent of merchandise exports.
3/ M2/GDP and exports to CMEA are 19Ѳ9 figures.
4/ These data are highly sensitive to the choice of exchange rates.
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Table 2. C m tri and Eastern Europ•: Selected Economic Indicators
1
1 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
(pr*U
1 GDP at conatam pnoe• (Percent chanoe)
Albana 9.8 •10.0 ־27.7 -9.7 11.0
Butgana -0.5 -9.1 -11.7 -Ś.4 -3.5
Czech A Slovak Republic 1/ 1.4 -1.6 -14.7 -7.1 «
Slovak Republic • a • « •6.0 -4.5
I Hungary 0.71 -3.5 -11.9 ־4.4 -2.0
I Poland 02 I -11.8 •72 1.51 4.0
Romania ; -5.8 •7.4 I •15.1 -15.4 Í *2.5
Conaumer/retari price• (end year) (Percent change)
Albania mm H 104.1 I 236.6 1 31.0
I Bulgaria 10.0 72.5 338.9 i 79.4 63.9
I Czech A Slovak Republic 1/ 1.5 18.4 53.6 i 12.7 182
Slovak Republic • .  J . . • » « ! 9.1 25.0
Hungary 184) I 33.4 32.2 I 21.6 222
----------------- *ГОНЮ 639.61 249.3 60.4 I 44.3 І 37.6
Romania .J ..J 222.8 I 198.5) 266.0
Recai balance 2/ (Percent of QDP) 1
Albana -5.5 ־3.7 43.7 ־21.8 -16.0
Bułgaria -1.4 -8.5 ■8.4 -6.9 -11.1
Czech A Slovak Republic 1/ -2.4 0.1 -2.0 0.4 0.3
Slovak Republic • •4 • • « *•< -13.1 -7.9
Hungary •0.8 0.8 -4.4 ־6.9 -7.0
^  » -----------------érotano -7.4 3.1 -5.6 ־6.9 -3.5
Romania 8.4 12 0.6 -6.1 -4.5
Broad money (Percent chan0•)
Afeania 14.8 23.4 104.4 152.7 75.0
Bulgaria 102 18.6 122.0 43.5 52.9
Czach A Slovak RepuMc 1/ 3.5 0.5 26 JB 22.8 17.7
Slovak Republic • • « • » « 4.7 15.3
**ngary 13.8 29.2 29.4 27.4 19.8
* ----------------- 1гОЯПО 236.0 121.9 47.4 57.5 36.0
Romania 5.8 22.0 101.2 74.8 130.0
External current aooount (convertible) (In bMona of USI)
Albania -0.1 -0.1 -02 •0.4 -0.3
Bulgaria -1.3 -0.9 -0.3 •0.4 -1.0
Czech A Slovak Repubttc 1/ 0.4 •1.1 0.4 ־0.1 OS
Slovak Republic ••• • ♦1 0.3 -02
Hinpay -1.4 0.1 0.3 03 -2.5
---------------- *п м га -1.8 0.7 ■22 -0.3 ־2.3
Romania 2.9 -1.8 •1.3 JS־1 -1.3
Ofttdaf torugn exchange reoorve• (stock) íinbittoneoíUSS)
Abarte 0.4 02 0.1
Bułgaria 0.3 0.3 0.6 12 1.0
Czech A Slovak RapubHc 1/ 1.1 OS 1.4 0.7 3.8
Slovak Republic » 4  I 0.4 0.4
Hungary 1.7 12 4.0 4.3 6 2
Poland 2.5 4.7 3.8 4.3 4.3
Romania 2.0 0.5І 0.5 0.7 0.7
Sovce: Intormefion provided by Ih• authorities. OECD, and staff шътжіж.
1/Datatortorm«rCzechoelovatoa until end-1991: Czech Republic from 1002.
2/ Data tor dtflerent oountilee ar• no« com parai• du• to difference•  In definition coverage.
Data tor Albania (entire period). Czechoslovakia (1989.1990.1991). and Romania (1969) are tor 
toe general government cash balance, and tor all other co u n t*• tor general government 
domeaac commwnent baala (exctuøng accrued but unpaid external obligations).
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August 1992•July 1993 
July 1993-July 1996
February 1991 
March 1991 - March 1992 
March 1992 
April 1992-April 1993





March 1990-March 1991 
February 1991 
February 1991 September 1993 
September 1993• December 1994
February 1990-March 1991 
April 1991 
April 1991-February 1993 
March 1993-March 1994
March 1991 
April 1991-Aprili 992 
Apnl 1991 
May 1992-March 1993 
June 1992
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Table 3. Central and Eastern Europe: Fund Financial Arrangements and Facilities










Former Czechoslovakia SBA 619.5
CCFF 466.0
SBA 236.0
Czech Republic SBA 117.0















1/ In the case of CCFF faculties, the date of approval of the first purchase. 
2/ Including contingency financing mechanism.
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Table 4. Central and Eastern Europe: Purchases from the Fund (1990-1993)
(in millions of SDRs)
Country 1990 1991 1992 1993 1990-1993
Albania • • י 9.7 11.9 1/ 21.6 1/
Bulgaria 289.2 200.3 31.0 520.5
Former Czechoslovakia 917.9 238.6 1,156.5
Czech Republic ♦ « 1 70.0 70.0
Slovak Republic 64.4 64.4
Hungary 127.4 703.8 118.4 56.7 1,006.3
Poland 357.5 239.1 •  •  4 •  •  4 596.6
Romania •  •  • 565.8 338.5 •  •  « 904.3
Memorandum items:
Membership Data:
Date of joining IMF Quota
SDR million US$ million 2/
Albania Joined October 15,1991 35.3 48.7
Bulgaria Joined Septemebr 25,1990 464.9 641.6
Former Czechoslovakia Joined September 20,1990 590.0 814.2
Czech Republic Member since January 1,1993 589.6 813.6
Slovak Republic Member since January 1,1993 257.4 355.2
Poland Rejoined June 12,1986 988.5 1,364.1
Romania Joined December 15,1972 754.1 1,040.7
1/ Includes a disbursement under the ESAF of SDR 8.5 million. 
21 Using an exchange rate of 1.38 US$ per 1 SDR.
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Table 5. Central and Eastern Europe: IMF Technical Assistance
Country Technical Assistance |
Albania IMF assistance has included help in the areas of tax policy and 1 
administration, price statistics, exchange system reform, and creation of an D 
indeoendent central bank. fl
Bulgana Since ft joined the IMF in the fal! of 1990, the IMF has provided technical 9 
assistance to help Bulgaria assess the overall quality of its database, 1 
develop monetary and national accounts statistics, improve the operation 1 
and income of the central banking system, and strengthen tax 1 
administration. Я
Czech Republic IMF technical assistance has helped in the modernization of central I 
banking, focussing on bank supervision, monetary policy instruments and 1 
operating procedures, foreign exchange operations, research and analysis, В 
organization and the legal framework for central and general banking; the 1 
IMF also assisted with a major tax reform. 1
R Hungary IMF technical assistance to Hungary has included advice on reform of the I 
banking system, help in establishing monetary and credit policy 1 
instruments, assistance in establishing an interbank foreign exchange 1 
market, the introduction of value-added and personal and corporate income 1 
taxes, and reform of the budqet, and social security. 1
1 Poland IMF technical assistance to Poland has included modernizing the operation 
of the National Bank 0 f Poland in areas such as monetary control 
procedures, banking supervision and statistical support to implement 
monetary policy; and aspects of budget reform such as the introduction of 
personal income and value-added taxes, tax administration and 
exoenditure management.
Romania IMF technical assistance has focussed on the creation of an independent 
central bank and tax reform. Specific areas of assistance have been: 
banking legislation, the foreign exchange market monetary management, 
payments system reform, bank supervision; design and the implementation 
of the value-added tax, profit and income tax policies, and the development 
of macroeconomic statistics.
Slovak Republic IMF technical assistance includes the development of the legal framework 
for central and commercial banking; advice on the design of corporate and 1 
personal income taxes; advice on policy and administrative aspects of the 1 
introduction of VAT; and advising the Slovak Central Bank on monetary U 
instruments, operation and analysis, foreign exchange operations, and 1 
banking suoervision. I
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What's Right and Wrong with World Bank Involvement 
in Eastern Europe1
The countries o f Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have undertaken a transi- 
tion from a centrally planned, closed economy to a market system, attempting simulta- 
neously to restructure their entire economic system; protect the well-being o f their 
citizens; stabilize prices and external balance; and introduce the legal, financial, and 
economic institutions needed for a market economy. This transformation is happening in 
an environment o f severe economic dislocation, and in many cases, in an environment of 
regional or internal instability.
While much has been achieved over the past four years, much still remains to be done. 
In some countries there is still a need to reduce the dominance o f state monopolies and 
monopsonies and to lim it heavy political and administrative interference. In others, sig- 
n ifi cant progress has already been made on both the institutional and policy front, espe- 
da lly  as regards privatization. A ll o f the countries involved, however, share a common 
need to restructure and privatize heavy industry and to establish a rich supply o f local, 
поп-traded goods and services characteristic o f market economies. A ll also have a need 
for continued fiscal retrenchment and watchfulness, especially on the expenditure side. 
Since these reforms have social as well as political dimensions, all need to integrate 
political economy considerations into the policy-making process.
To accomplish this policy transformation, Eastern European countries have sought fi- 
nancial and technical support from outside agencies. For many countries o f the region, 
the World Bank has become an increasingly important, and in some, the most impor- 
tant, single source o f external finance. While the World Bank has acted in its traditional 
role o f provider o f financial resources, it has also endeavored to help with policy advice, 
technical assistance, and to act as a catalyst for other sources o f support.
A  large and diverse institution, the World Bank is involved in a wide range o f activi- 
ties in the region. This paper discusses some dimensions o f the role it has played in East- 
em Europe and the former Soviet Union focussing on areas where, in the author’s 
opinion, the Bank's involvement has been noteworthy, on areas where Bank support is of 
necessity limited, and areas where its activities are controversial. The paper concentrates 
mostly on Eastern Europe, although some aspects o f the discussion also touch on the 
former Soviet Union. Although some o f the countries o f the former Eastern Bloc have 
been Bank members and borrowers for a far longer time, the focus o f this discussion is 
mainly on World Bank involvement following the political changes o f 1989.
C h r istin e  L. W a llich
1 The author is Lead Economist in the Central Europe and Central Asia Region of the 
World Bank. The views expressed in this paper are solely the author's and should not be 
attributed to the World Bank or its affiliates. The research assistance of Simone Wunsch 
and Caroline Freund is gratefully acknowledged. Thanks are also due to Jan Pakulski, 
Jane Loos, Kemal Derviç, Alex Preker, Hans Apitz, Bernard Montfort, Margret Thalwitz, 
Marcelo Selowsky, and Isabel Guerrero for helpful comments and ideas.Roland Schönfeld - 978-3-95479-733-2
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Following a short history o f the World Bank’s association with the countries in Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union, the World Bank's strategy in Eastern Europe is 
outlined. A brief review o f World Bank activities in Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union - amounts lent, sectoral composition o f lending, types o f nonfinancial sup- 
port - is then presented After a discussion o f Bank successes and shortcomings in 
specific programs in the social sectors, environment, privatization, and the reform o f the 
state, common criticisms of the Bank are discussed. A  concluding section provides a 
summary assessment o f World Bank activity in the former Eastern Bloc.
42 Christine L. Wallich
The History o f World Bank Involvement
Since 1989, political and economic changes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union have brought the total number o f World Bank members from this region to 25 
and have significantly changed the regional thrust and scope of the Bank's operations. 
The history o f World Bank involvement with the countries o f Eastern Europe is long, 
although by far the majority of countries in the region became members only after 1990 
(Table 1). While Poland and Czechoslovakia were founding members o f the Bank, both 
withdrew in the 1950s without having borrowed. Poland joined again in 1986 and 
Czechoslovakia in 1990. Yugoslavia, also a founding member, was an active borrower 
until its political breakup. Although Romania joined in 1972, it borrowed little from 1983 
to 1990. Hungary joined the Bank in 1982 and has been a steady borrower since then. 
More recent members, Albania joined in 1991 and the Baltic countries and eleven Soviet 
republics, including the Russian Federation, joined in 1992. Tajikistan, the most recent 
member, joined in 1993.
The World Bank's Strategy in Eastern Europe
For many countries in the former Eastern Bloc, for so long frozen out o f the free market 
world, their overriding objective is to jo in Europe, both economically and politically. 
Europe Agreements have been ratified for two countries, Hungary and Poland, and four 
other countries, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria, have signed 
Europe Agreements with interim trade arrangements until their Agreements are ratified. 
For this objective to be met, and for these hopes not to be dashed, many adaptations must 
be made by the European Union. However, the task ahead in the transition economies is 
also huge, to bring their per capita incomes up to a level where the prospect of joining 
Europe near the end o f the century, as equal partners, is a realistic one. The growth im- 
perative is equally strong in the former Soviet Union, where living standards are low and 
poverty is on the rise. Their productivity must rise, and their competitiveness must con- 
tinue to improve. This w ill require significant further economic restructuring.
The World Bank strategy and support differs from country to country, and is 
tailored to each country, based on individual needs, the stage o f transition, and the 
state o f the economy. In each case. W orld Bank support is designed, broadly, to 
support this ambitious growth goal, and process o f catching up. The transition 
economies must move ahead with far-reaching reforms that w ill increase their pro-
Roland Schönfeld - 978-3-95479-733-2
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 09:44:06AM
via free access
TABLE 1
THE WORLD BANK AND EASTERN EUROPE
What's Right and Wrong with World Bank Involvement in Eastern Europe 43
Population P a  Capita boome 
Date joined__________(in millions)__________ (in USS)"
Albania 10/15/91 3.3 289




Croatia 2/25/93 4.8 1 600'
Czech Republic 1/1/93f 10.4 2 440
[Czechoslovakia 12/27/45f
Hungary 7/7/82 10.2 3010
Macedonia1 2/25/93d 2.2 8521
Poland 1/10/46, 6/27/86* 38.4 1 960
Romania 12/15/72 22.9 1 090
Slovak Republic 1 /1 /93f 
*
5.4 1 920
Slovenia 2/ 25/93 2.0 6 330
Republic of Yugoslavia
•
Serbia, Montenegro applied 10.6 n.a.
Yugoslavia 12/27/45d
Armenia1 9/16/92 3.5 780
Azerbaijan 9/18/92 7.2 870
Belarus 7/10/92 10.4 2910
Estonia 6/23/92 1.6 2 750
Georgia* 8/7/92 5.5 850
Kazakhstan 7/23/92 17.0 1 680
Kyrgyzstan' 9/18/92 4.5 810J  Ш
Latvia 8/11/92 2.6 1 930
Lithuania 7/6/92 3.8 1 310
Moldova 8/12/92 4.4 1 260
Russian Federation 6/16/92 148.9 2 680
Tajikistan1* 6/4/93 5.6 480
Turkmenistan 9/22/92 3.9 1 270
Ukraine 9/3/92 52.1 1 670
Uzbekistan 9/21/92 21.3 860
* World Bank Atlas methodology, 1992 base period.
b ЮА-eligible Countries
0Estimated to be low-income ($675 or less).
*Yugoslavia ("Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia") ceased to be a member of 
IB RD/ID A/IFC effective February 25, 1993 and ceased to be a member of MIGA effec- 
tive March 19, 1993; succeeded by Croatia, Slovenia and fYRMacedonia as members of 
IBRD/IDA/IFC effective February 25, 1993. 
e Estimates
f Czech and Slovak Federal Republic ("Czechoslovakia") was an original member of the 
Bank but ceased to be a member on December 31, 1954; was readmitted as a member 
on September 20, 1990 and ceased to be a member effective January I, 1993; and was 
succeeded by the Czech Republic and Slovak Republic effective January 1, 1993. 
*Poland withdrew its membership on March 14, 1950, and rejoined on June 27, 1986. 
1,Estimated to be lower-middle-income ($676-$2,695).
1IBRD/IDA Blend Countries.
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duktivity and their competitiveness so that they can achieve their growth objectives 
without inflation. The economies o f the former eastern bloc, especially those in central 
Europe, begin with many pluses: locational advantages, low labor costs, and a highly 
skilled work force. Building on these advantages, the aim o f the World Bank’s assistance 
strategy in Eastern Europe is to promote sustainable economic growth, based on the 
development o f a strong private sector, and to smooth the transition from centralized to 
market economy. The structural policies and investment projects supported by the Bank 
are designed to achieve this objective by encouraging needed macroeconomic adjust- 
ment, including scaling down the budgetary needs o f the state, and by helping develop 
the economic, regulatory and physical infrastructure that supports greater efficiency in 
production and provides that basis for private sector growth.
A stable macroeconomic environment is key to achieving this growth objective. 
Hyperinflation is not conducive to growth, and virtually all studies of transition show 
that the output decline is reversed only when acceptable levels o f inflation have been 
reached (Bruno and Easterly, 1994). In most countries, the World Bank's first priority is 
to help countries restore solvency and macroeconomic stability. Quick disbursing bal- 
ance o f payments assistance, see below, helps fill the external financing gap and simul- 
taneously finances the state budget in a non-inflationary way. Such adjustment lending 
also provides a fiscal cushion that allows a less abrupt budgetary adjustment and thereby, 
softer overall landing, e.g., by providing resources for a social safety net that allows 
reform to remain politically feasible. For many countries, a longer run reduction in the 
size o f government and an increase in its efficiency is also fundamental to the growth 
objective. The suspicion that the heavy hand of government may have a heavy cost in 
terms o f growth has received validation in a recent study associating a one percent in- 
crease in economic growth with a ten percent decline in government spending, a striking 
finding for transition economies with expenditures as high as 60% of GDP (Easterly and 
Rebelo, 1993). Reduced government spending and borrowing can help to crowd־in 
private investment.
Retooling the state's macroeconomic, financial and regulatory institutions to make 
them more compatible with a market economy has been another strategic element. Sys- 
temic transformation from planning to markets requires not only a new central bank and 
banking system, but the regulatory regimes, the courts, legal systems, the payments 
system, the fiscal system and an effective civil service and well-trained public admini- 
stration. This economic infrastructure is critical i f  private enterprises are to function and 
true financial intermediaries to operate responsibly to support an expanding private 
sector. Strengthening and supporting the development o f such economic infrastructure 
through lending and technical assistance is a principal element o f the World Bank's 
strategy across Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.
Finally, raising growth rates by enhancing the efficiency o f both capital and labor in 
transition economies is also a major objective. I f  real wages, consumption and household 
income levels are to rise without an associated loss in comparative advantage, productiv- 
ity gains are necessary in these economies. Projects aimed at improving physical infra- 
structure and developing the key social sectors o f the economy are therefore critical. 
Removing structural barriers, such as exist in energy, transportation, and telecommuni- 
cations w ill significantly increase productivity and growth. Environmental projects serve 
to improve living standards. Social sector projects, for example, education and health
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development, can also improve living standards directly in the short run, while improv* 
ing, over time, the human capital needed to better position the Eastern European 
economies in the competitive world markets.
For each country, the combination o f support for stabilization, physical and social 
infrastructure investments, and economic infrastructure or institution-building w ill dif- 
fer. The strategy for each country is revised annually, and examines economic perform- 
ance, the external environment, and the government’s development objectives and 
policies, to identify which sectors should receive priority, and how cooperation with 
other institutions can be bettered. In Poland, for example, where the impact o f reform on 
the population has been severe, and the government has been fully committed to macro- 
stabilization, adjustment lending was initia lly the most important focus o f the World 
Bank. The economic restructuring that followed has been a long and difficult process, 
and Poland is now at a stage in this transition where lending is more targeted. Projects 
that help to establish a modern public administration, contribute to the development o f a 
private enterprise and financial sector, and improve the social sectors and physical infra- 
structure now absorb much of the World Bank's current assistance to Poland. In a 
country such as Albania, the support strategy has been quite different, focussed on the 
rebuilding o f that country's neglected infrastructure and on projects, such as in agncul- 
ture and rural credit, with direct poverty-alleviation effects. The Bank has also focussed 
on its role as a catalyst for mobilizing concessional donor funds for this, the poorest 
country in Europe.
In sum, there is no single recipe for World Bank support. The exact package o f sup- 
port depends on the country’s stage o f transition and the initial conditions o f the 
economy, as well as on government policies and programs.
World Bank Activities in Eastern Europe
World Bank lending during the transition is designed to support current and future re- 
form policies. Investment lending, which comprises the majority o f World Bank assis- 
tance to the region, provides funding for infrastructure that is necessary for sustainable 
growth. Adjustment lending is geared towards macrostabilization and advancing key 
sectors o f the economies. Other types o f lending equip the countries with the market 
oriented technical skills and education that were absent in centralized economies. In 
many cases the World Bank has been the largest source of external finance.
Types o f Involvement
The World Bank employs a variety o f instruments to support governmental reform and 
restructuring efforts. On the lending front, quick-disbursing structural adjustment loans 
(SALs), often undertaken in conjunction with IMF-supported programs, are designed to 
support countries' stabilization and economic liberalization programs and to help them 
tackle such macroeconomic imbalances as rising inflation, fiscal deficits, or balance of 
payments deficits. Typical adjustment policies supported by the World Bank involve re- 
ducing and reallocating public expenditures, opening the economy up to competition.
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freeing administered prices, and improving government delivery o f social and infra- 
structure services (Appendix, Box 1). Beginning with Hungary and Yugoslavia in 1990, 
and Czechoslovakia and Poland in 1991, the Bank has supported adjustment programs 
throughout Eastern Europe.
Sector adjustment loans (SECALS) support fundamental policy and institutional 
changes in specific sectors such as agriculture, financial institutions, energy, etc. These 
support such government programs as introducing a sector regulatory framework that 
promotes competition, establishing a new price setting regime, and designing strategies 
for commercialization and demonopolization o f state-owned enterprises. For countries 
where critical short-term needs range across many sectors, the rehabilitation loan has 
been developed as a new lending instrument. To support economic stabilization pro- 
grams, a policy-based, quick-disbursing, single tranche economic recovery loan (ERL) 
was developed to work in parallel with the IMF’s Structural Transformation Facility 
(STF), for countries where a fu ll IMF Standby Agreement is not yet in place. Both have 
been key to supporting stabilization programs at an early stage, giving new governments 
the breathing room to undertake difficult reforms, thereby helping to maintain the pace 
of economic reform.
The mainstay o f Bank lending is its investment lending, which has accounted, on 
average, for 75 percent o f total Bank commitments in recent years. Investment lending 
supports projects and finances a range o f specific investments such as the building of 
schools, infrastructure, environmental investments. Sector loans on the other hand, fi- 
nance a time slice o f investment expenditures in a given sector, such as railways or 
roads. Hybrid loans have features o f both types, financing specific investments and 
focussing on the overall policy regime needed to make those investments successful. 
Technical assistance loans, although a small proportion o f total lending, also deserve to 
be mentioned. They typically finance resident advisors and consultants, training, studies, 
and some equipment. Finally, World Bank guarantees can be used to support and 
enlarge member countries' capital market access.
Which o f these interventions is most important w ill vary across countries. On average, 
just under 40 percent of World Bank lending in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union has been adjustment, or nonproject, lending, including sector adjustment loans; 
about half has been investment lending; some 3 percent went to technical assistance 
loans and 8 percent were recovery and rehabilitation loans. Guarantees are, at this stage, 
de minimis.
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Sectoral Allocation o f Lending
The activities o f the World Bank have varied greatly within Eastern Europe and the for- 
mer Soviet Union, depending on sectoral needs and the situation o f the individual coun- 
try (Table 2). On average, the largest share o f World Bank commitments during 1990- 
93 has been for energy, including power, 22 percent; followed by agricultural develop- 
ment, 10 percent; transport, 10 percent; and the social sectors, education and health, 6 
percent.
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LENDING TO EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA*, BY SECTOR, 1990-1993
Sector % of total lending Mimons of U.S. $
Non-Project (Adjustment, Rehabilitation) 29 3 536.1
Energy (Oil, gas, coal) 12 1 469.0
Transportation 10 1 123.0
Energy (Power) 10 1 120.0
Agriculture and Rural Development 10 1 043.4
Developmait Finance Companies 6 740.0
Urban Development 4 485.0
Industry 4 451.0
Education 3 407.2
Public-sector Management 3 402.0
Water Supply and Sewerage 3 377.5
Population. Health, and Nutrition 3 371.0
Telecommunications 2 300.0
Technical Assistance 1 159.2
Small Scale Enterprises • 60.0
Total 100 12 044.4
*Data includes Turkey and Cyprus.
Other Support-to-Cowntry Programs
Economic and sector work provides the analysis o f each country's economic situation 
that serves as the basis for the policy dialogue with borrowers and for devising support- 
ing country strategies. For Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, country 
economic reports have addressed, inter alia, issues o f stabilization, the enterprise-finan- 
cial sector nexus, trade and external sector policies, the environment for private sector 
development, public finance, fiscal decentralization and public administration reform, 
and such social issues as the social safety net and poverty alleviation. Regional sector 
reports have concentrated on agriculture, energy, telecommunications, environmental 
strategies, and housing, areas where policy reform is essential to an early supply re- 
sponse. World Bank country economic memoranda and sector reports also provide the 
basis for wider donor information about countries' adjustment or investment needs and, 
as such, can be central to garnering donor support for these programs.
Finally, the World Bank’s research program for the former Eastern Bloc has addressed 
a range o f issues relating to economic and political transition such as enterprise behavior 
and governance, labor market and incomes policies, and different approaches to fi nan- 
cial sector restructuring. Coordination with local research institutes in both research and 
dissemination is important to the research process. The Economic Development Institute 
(EDI), as the Bank's training arm, offers training and regional workshops in areas 
ranging from macroeconomic management and economics o f the market to human 
resources development. In Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, there are now
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twelve World Bank field offices that maintain working contacts between Bank head- 
quarters and local governments and support project implementation.
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Magnitude o f Lending Support
In the past three years, overall lending to the former Eastern Bloc averaged about S3 to 
$4 billion per year. In fiscal 1993, the region received about 17 percent o f the World 
Bank Group's total commitments o f $23.6 billion and since 1989 to m id-1994, a total of 
$13.8 billion has been committed to the region, with Poland, Hungary, the Russian Fed- 
eration and Romania the largest recipients o f funds in that period.2 Today, the Slovak 
Republic, fYRMacedonia, Moldova, Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and the Baltic 
states are also borrowers, although because o f their smaller scale and more recent mem- 
bership, commitment levels to them are modest in the overall regional context (Table 3). 
In per capita terms, however, support for these smaller countries has been significant 
(Figure 1), with the World Bank often being their largest single source o f external 
finance. By contrast, the share of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union was 7.1 
percent o f total overseas development aid (ODA) flows in 1993 as compared to 1.4 per- 
cent in 1990. Over the same period, total ODA rose from $4.7 per capita to $12.2.3
How the World Bank Works
Given the magnitude and complexity o f its portfolio of operations in Eastern Europe and 
the former Soviet Union, it is not surprising that the World Bank has achieved notable 
success in some areas and only uncertain, and even controversial, results in others. The 
following discussion accepts the Bank's limited mandate as is given by its Articles of 
Agreement and its present organizational structure, and lays aside such theoretical ques- 
tions as whether or not the World Bank should be a fund or how it could be structured 
differently. It focuses below on some nuts-and-bolts aspects o f the World Bank's opera- 
tions in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.
A Quicker Response to Needs
While the World Bank is best known for investment projects that require extensive 
preparation, it has shown considerable speed in responding to special demands in East- 
em Europe and the former Soviet Union. Although not itself a relief agency and clearly 
without a comparative advantage in direct crisis intervention, the World Bank has 
nonetheless been able to mobilize support by providing emergency assistance, support
A
The Bank Group consists of four related but distinct entities, the World Bank itself, 
which lends on market terms to credit-worthy borrowers; IDA, the concessional window; 
IFC, the private sector arm of the group; and MIGA, which guarantees private direct in- 
vestments.
3 World Bank, IECAP projections. Roland Schönfeld - 978-3-95479-733-2
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THE WORLD BANK LENDING TO EASTERN EUROPE AND THE
FORMER SOVIET UNION 1989 - 1994
Commitments* 
% of total Million SUS
Poland 27.9 3 852
Russian Federation 21.0 2 895
Hungary 12.0 1 658




















Total 100 13 807
* 1990-ead February 1994; no lending had yet been committed to Croatia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and 
Tajikistan.
for debt work-outs, and by meeting critical import needs. The government o f Moldova, 
for example, was provided with a quick-disbursing loan for needed agricultural inputs to 
help alleviate declining incomes and poverty after a drought. The Bank’s in itia l lending 
instrument in Kyrgyzstan, in the three Baltic countries, and in Russia was a réhabilita- 
tion loan, a new quick-disbursing operation designed to finance imports critical to pro- 
duction and infrastructure while providing rapid support to the governments' ongoing 
stabilization and reform efforts. In all o f these cases, the elapsed time between project 
preparation and approval was approximately six weeks. W ithin weeks o f fYRMacedo- 
nia's request for World Bank membership, which had lapsed following the break-up o f 
the former Yugoslavia, the World Bank had designed a financial workout that enabled 
that country to clear its arrears and resume its membership in the Bank. At the same 
time, an economic recovery loan (ERL) assisted fYRMacedonia with critical imports and 
supported its stabilization program. A critical imports credit for Albania was prepared
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soon after that country joined the World Bank Group. This credit helped the Albanians 
get the imports needed to prevent further downward spiralling o f their country’s agri- 
cultural production and living standards. An IDA credit to Armenia following the earth- 
quake provided fest funds for the reconstruction o f housing and factory shells in 
devastated areas and supported liberaliza-tion o f the construction industry.
Additional Support for Country Programs Can Be Leveraged by the World 
Bank's Economic Work and Through Cofinancing
Other donors such as the EU, bilateral sources, and, to a lesser degree, other multilateral 
banks active in the region use the World Bank's economic analyses as a framework for 
aid coordination and as a compass for the policy measures that donor-supported pro- 
grams finance. A  World Bank-prepared public investment review o f Albania, for exam- 
pie, led to general donor and government agreement on a public investment program, 
and it is w ithin this program envelope that many other donors have now chosen to 
provide financial support. Such aid coordination is time-consuming, but is key to ensur- 
ing that policy advice, technical assistance, and investment financing w ill be concerted. 
Given constraints on the absorptive capacity o f many countries o f the region, aid coordi- 
nation is also needed to ensure that donor support w ill f it government priorities. The 
centerpiece o f aid coordination is the consultative group (CG) process. In Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union, the World Bank has participated in many EU- or 
G-24-led, country-specific coordination efforts designed to help reduce these countries' 
constrained external financing and to coordinate the overall program of foreign 
resources in a range o f countries, including, in 1993, Bulgaria, Romania, fYRMacedo- 
nia, and some nine countries o f the former Soviet Union. Sector-specific coordination 
meetings have also been held, as, for example, conferences on agriculture in Poland and 
Albania
World Bank lending can also be leveraged financially through cofinancing. In certain 
kinds o f project preparation, the World Bank arguably has a comparative advantage, 
given its diverse global experience and broadly trained staff. Yet World Bank resources, 
especially concessional resources for the poorest countries in the region, which must be 
spread across 75 IDA recipients, have been a severe constraint to the Bank’s ability to 
provide the needed support.4 Cofinancing o f Bank-prepared projects and adjustment 
loans has enabled bilateral donors, multilateral financiers, and, rare in Eastern Europe as 
yet, commercial financiers to disburse funds more easily. Region-wide, the direct fi nan- 
ria l leverage o f World Bank projects has ranged from 2:1 to 3:1 in recent years, with 
some projects as high as four to one.5
4 The Bank group presently has 60 IDA-only eligible countries and 15 IBRD/IDA-blend 
countries.
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World Bank Loans Provide Direct Foreign Financial Resources fo r the External 
Accounts
For sustained growth in output and private consumption to materialize in Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union, countries there w ill need to continue to invest in 
and to retool their productive apparatus. Sustained growth w ill therefore result in 
increased import requirements and the need for additional foreign finance. More gen- 
erally, the foreign resource transfer o f World Bank loans has, in many countries, been 
central to a stabilization program by providing balance of payments and fiscal finance in 
a non-inflationary way.
Predicting the provenance of these needed flows is problematic, the combination of 
official and private borrowing and direct investment w ill differ across countries, but for 
many countries, official creditors, bilateral and IFIs, w ill remain their main or only 
source o f external finance, and official, multilateral finance w ill play an important role 
for some time to come. While the World Bank is only one among many official credi- 
tors, in some countries o f Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet Union, its loans and 
credits cover a major share o f the country’s external financial requirements. In the 
Slovak Republic, Albania, and fYRMacedonia, for example, Bank Group funds con- 
tributed as much as 25 percent of external financing needs in a given year. In Poland, 
the Bank at one time provided some 90 percent of external finance. For some o f these 
countries, moreover, the Bank's resources have come on highly concessional (IDA) 
terms. Six countries of the region, Albania, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, Georgia, fYR-Mace- 
donia, and Tajikistan, are considered IDA-eligible and receive credits on 40 to 50-year 
terms at a zero interest rate (Table 1 ). The World Bank, furthermore, w ill help Poland 
and Bulgaria restore and normalize their international creditor relations by financing 
part o f the down-payment required under the commercial debt and debt service reduction 
(DDSR) agreements that these countries reached in 1994 with their London Club credi- 
tors. The Bank (IDA) w ill also support a similar debt-reduction exercise now planned for 
Albania.
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Financing the Fisc
World Bank borrowing, along with other prudent uses o f external finance, simultane- 
ously helps finance a country’s budget deficit, thereby permitting a smoother fiscal 
adjustment and a less abrupt stabilization/adjustment process. How and when Bank or 
any other external loans finance the budget depends upon the type o f loan and its dis- 
bursement schedule. Foreign loans made directly to the Ministry o f Finance, such as the 
World Bank's quick-disbursing SALs, SECALs, rehabilitation and recovery loans, 
simultaneously provide a foreign reserve boost and immediate and direct budgetary 
finance as the loan is disbursed and the corresponding local currency amount, so-called 
domestic counterpart funds, is credited to the budgetary accounts. Such foreign resource 
transfers can help governments finance a desired program of fiscal expenditure in a 
noninflationary way, that, moreover, does not crowd out domestic private sector borrow- 
ers. World Bank investment loans to state or parastatal enterprises, or to other entities 
that receive budgetary funding, or that, in the absence o f a Bank loan, would need it.Roland Schönfeld - 978-3-95479-733-2
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also directly finance the budget. In Poland, for example, as much as ten percent o f the 
fiscal deficit has been financed by World Bank disbursements in some recent years; in 
other countries, it has been far higher. As lending programs mature in Eastern Europe 
and with a stable disbursement profile, this level w ill become more significant over time, 
except in the very largest countries where the needs are that much larger in absolute 
terms.
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The World Bank as a Bank: IBRD Loans and the Alternatives
Because the World Bank's mandate is to support economic development, its interests are 
expected to go beyond the purely financial. Its loans finance projects and adjustment pro- 
grams and are not merely commercial transactions, but, as a financing vehicle, World 
Bank loans, with a seventeen to twenty-year maturity, have terms substantially longer 
than bilateral and commercial financing terms available from trade and export credit 
lines. The World Bank also offers a five-year grace period during which only interest is 
paid With respect to interest rates and costs, IBRD loans carry a pooled interest rate 
reflecting the IBRD’s past costs of borrowing; single currency loans are available on a 
limited basis.6 This means that the World Bank is not always the cheapest source o f fi- 
nancing. In a long-term declining interest rate environment such as the recent past, the 
World Bank's pooled rate, now about 7.27 percent, may well be higher than the market. 
In a rising interest rate environment, the pooled rate also lags behind the market. Over a 
fu ll market cycle, however, World Bank interest rates are less volatile than any single 
market rate, and the Bank's currency pool also analogously reduces the volatility of loan 
principal. In addition, the relative dependability o f the Bank's support has made the 
World Bank, and other IFIs loyal lenders as compared to the sometimes fickle financial 
markets. Even such credit- and market-worthy countries as Chile, China, and Indonesia, 
therefore, have made significant use o f IFIs, including the World Bank, to ensure a 
dependable inflow o f resources over time and to conserve their scarce sovereign market. 
Finally, IBRD lending can play a catalytic role by bolstering the confidence o f financial 
markets in private borrowers and thereby increase their market access. While its primary 
objective is to transfer resources, the World Bank is a bank and must also look to main- 
taining its strong financial base by avoiding undue risk and lending that could jeopard- 
ize its portfolio. This means that, in many circumstances or in certain countries, the 
World Bank's contribution w ill be severely limited.
Project Preparation and Cost Savings in Procurement
At a more micro level, but equally o f note, is the way World Bank projects are processed, 
using specific project-evaluation methodologies such as cost-benefit analysis and pro- 
curement procedures such as international competitive bidding. Both o f these have 
applications far beyond the implementation of Bank-financed projects, and exposure to 
them can have significant spill-over effects for government investment programming,
6 Single currency loans have hitherto been available on a limited basis.Roland Schönfeld - 978-3-95479-733-2
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particularly where investment planning is rudimentary and subject to political forces, 
and for the design o f government purchasing programs. In aggregate, the effects can be 
quite significant, particularly with regard to procurement. World Bank projects finance 
only goods and services that are competitively procured, either through international 
competitive bidding or through international shopping, except for very small contracts, 
where local competitive bidding or local shopping is accepted. The objective is to ensure 
the least-cost package for a given design. In many countries in Eastern Europe and 
elsewhere, procurement is traditionally done through sole source contracts, by purchas- 
ing from sources that provide associated finance, or by other less-competitive procure- 
ment practices. Studies o f international competitive bidding suggest that the cost-savings 
from competitive procurement may be as much as 30 percent.
A ll member countries are eligible to participate in bidding, which in turn can contrib- 
ute to enhanced market access for new exporters. It is interesting to note that it is 
fYRMacedonia's construction firms who have won a number o f civil works contracts in 
Albania Based on their experience with procurement requirements under World Bank 
projects, some countries have amended their procurement codes to make competitive 
procurement mandatory for government and other agencies that use public resources. 
The Czech Republic, for example, which recently borrowed from the World Bank for a 
major telecommunications project, acknowledged the contribution o f international 
competitive bidding in promoting economy and efficiency in procurement, while Po- 
land's soon-to-be introduced Procurement Code follows the World Bank's approach in 
many respects.
Where World Bank Support Has Worked Well
Since 1989, the World Bank has made an effort to support the full range o f reforms that 
member countries pursued in the transition to a market economy. World Bank assistance 
between 1990 and 1993 provided $9.8 billion in loans supporting such needs as macro- 
economic adjustment, oil exploration, and technical assistance for tax administration. 
Some sixty projects have been supported. Some have asked whether the World Bank's 
focus has not been too broad, and whether there should not have been a greater concen- 
tration o f efforts in key sectors, where a critical mass is needed for reforms to succeed. At 
the same time, the World Bank has been faulted for not being broad enough. Certain 
issues it does not address are discussed in a section that follows.
The focus below is on the World Bank's involvement in three key sectors: (i) the social 
sectors, supporting government policies designed to alleviate the economic and social 
costs o f transition; (ii) lending in support of government efforts to protect the environ- 
ment; and ( iii)  support to government efforts to restructure, rebuild and reform the public 
sector. Although these are traditional areas for Bank involvement, working in Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union has meant considerable on-the-job training and 
learning by doing, both for governments and for the World Bank. W ith greater involve- 
ment has come greater experience, but more time is needed before projects are completed 
and evaluated so that one can truly take stock.
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Social Sectors and Safety Nets: Critical to the Transformation
Strengthening the social sectors must be as much a cornerstone o f economic transforma- 
tion in Eastern Europe as the pursuit o f macroeconomic balance, privatization, and the 
creation o f modem financial markets. Restoration o f this region's economic growth and 
international competitiveness depend both on the restructuring o f industry, or physical 
capital, and on the restructuring o f human capital to meet the needs of a market econ- 
omy. The importance of human capital investments is now broadly acknowledged. A 
recent study of the East Asian Miracle has linked the extraordinary economic and export 
performance o f East Asian economies to their heavy investment in improving their 
human capital, especially through education (World Bank, 1993).7 Political stability, 
continued popular support, and further reforms also depend upon government's ability to 
ensure that core social services such as education, health, and social welfare do not 
deteriorate with economic transition.
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Redesigning Social Programs
Many Eastern Bloc countries have recognized the need to redesign and reorient their 
social sector programs in education, training, and health to make them more efficient 
and to ensure delivery of the right services over the longer term. This w ill require fun- 
damental changes in social programs' content, financing, management and delivery 
mechanisms, and w ill have to include a role for the private sector. In health, provision 
under the socialist command system was generally free. The system generally empha- 
sized more expensive, curative interventions rather than cheaper, primary health and 
preventive measures. In virtually all transition economies, major issues o f health finánc- 
ing need to be addressed. There is also an almost universal need to move away from the 
public sector monopoly in the ownership and provision of curative services, to strengthen 
primary care, and to improve and reorganize the pharmaceutical industry. Governments 
also want to make these changes for budgetary reasons, to improve incentives, and to 
improve efficiency (Barr et al., 1994).
In education, many countries see the need to move away from their present emphasis 
on narrowly-focussed vocational education and over-specialized training programs that 
no longer correspond to labor market needs and to move towards more general secon- 
dary and technical education. Tertiary education also receives a disproportionately large 
share o f spending in Eastern Europie and the former Soviet Union in view of these coun- 
tries' demographics and its small share o f overall enrollments. Transition countries also 
recognize that education that prepares workers well is necessary for a well-functioning 
labor market, which is the key to reducing the strains o f unemployment and enabling a 
supply response.
The redesign o f social-sector spending is also key for fiscal adjustment. Social pro- 
grams in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union now absorb as much as 30 percent 
of GDP, and, without policy reform, w ill grow beyond this in some countries, compro- 
mising macrostabilization. In sum, many countries are rethinking completely the alloca-
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tion o f resources, berth between sectors and within the social sectors and studying the 
cost-effectiveness and overall scale o f social service provision.
World Bank Support to the Social Sectors
Projects in the social sectors usually have high economic returns, but a low, or even zero 
financial rate o f return. Because the World Bank's mandate is to promote economic de- 
velopment its interests go beyond the purely financial. For this reason, the World Bank, 
unlike other lenders, w ill lend for projects that have a high economic rate of return even 
where the financial return is nonexistent.8 It is thus possible to borrow from the World 
Bank for investments in health, education, reforming cash-benefit systems, and modem- 
izing public sector administration although projects in these sectors do not directly 
generate income and need to be repaid from general government revenues and foreign 
exchange. Many countries have reservations about borrowing for such projects, prefer- 
ring to borrow only for more traditional investments such as infrastructure improvement. 
Key to deciding whether to borrow for social projects is the economic efficiency of the 
investment. In many circumstances, social program and public administration reform 
may have high economic returns. Poor health leads to low productivity and unemploy- 
ment. Poverty relief, basic education, and health status, therefore, all have a role to play 
in economic development.
The World Bank has a number o f vehicles for financing social sector policy reforms 
and associated investments, and has become more experienced over time in its approach. 
In some cases, such as operations in the former Czechoslovakia, the Slovak Republic, 
and fYRMacedonia, implementation o f selected social policies has been an integral part 
o f a Bank-supported structural adjustment program. In Hungary, a Pensions Admini- 
stration and Health Insurance Project has been designed to improve financial manage- 
ment and enhance efficiency and targeting o f benefits. Such policies include modifica- 
tion of the pension system or steps towards better cost-recovery in the health sector. In 
other cases. World Bank assistance has been provided through traditional investment.
In the labor area, the general goal is to support programs that w ill enhance labor 
mobility, introduce efficient employment information and services, make it easier to hire 
and to dismiss workers, decentralize wage determination and allow for wage differ- 
entiation, and introduce market-driven training programs for the unemployed. In 
Poland, for example, both the SAL and an employment services project are designed to 
minimize the effects o f mass layoffs, with proactive labor market policies focussing on 
the strengthening of governmental labor offices, retraining, providing micro-credit to 
start new businesses, and other supports. A similar project has been approved for Russia. 
The supporting environment, most notably housing policy, is clearly also key to 
improving labor mobility and choice.
In the health sector, the World Bank has supported similarly broad government objec- 
tives. In Hungary, a Social Insurance project is in place to help move the focus towards 
primary care and prevention, improve sector management, contain costs, and decentrai-
56 Christine L. Wallich
8 Economic returns differ from financial retums by incorporating both social benefits, a 
healthier, better educated population, and social costs, e.g., pollution and congestion.Roland Schönfeld - 978-3-95479-733-2
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 09:44:06AM
via free access
00063440
ize and demonopolize delivery. In Hungary and Romania, World Bank-supported 
projects have introduced more targeted and cost-effective public health interventions, 
rehabilitation of medical facilities, introduction of management information systems in 
hospitals, and technical assistance for health services management. Designing appropri- 
ate changes in the health sector however, has been difficult, since, world-wide, which 
models are best is still very much under debate ( World Development Report, 1993). It is 
also unclear i f  the time is right for payroll-contributions-based financing. Although it 
may improve efficiency, there are equity effects that need to be considered. In addition, 
the negative labor incentives of high payroll taxes may not offset the benefits from the 
reduction in commitments against the state. Formalizing the oft-encountered black mar- 
ket gratuities as official co-payments may be an alternative worth pursuing during the 
transition.
The World Bank also does substantial sector work, including poverty assessments and 
technical assistance. Social sector reviews are typically a prelude to project identification. 
They have been prepared recently for Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Ukraine, and earlier for 
Hungary and Poland. Poverty assessments based on statistical surveys o f household in- 
come and expenditure have been undertaken or are underway in Poland, Albania, fYR- 
Macedonia, and Russia These poverty assessments help to identify the new poor who 
have emerged in the course o f the transition, to analyze the incidence of social benefit 
programs and to determine who has benefitted from them. Policymakers can use World 
Bank poverty assessments to determine how changes in the structure or the level of 
benefits might affect their country’s poor so that they can design better, more targeted 
and fiscally sustainable programs. A recent Bank-supported project in Albania was 
designed to test approaches to rural public works and small-scale rural credit and to 
promote employment creation and improve the cash incomes of rural households. The 
project is now being replicated in urban areas of Albania. Although its mandate is to 
alleviate poverty, the World Bank, with its large scale projects, is never likely to be as 
effective at hands-on poverty relief as are the many smaller non-governmental organiza- 
tions now active and successful in this field.
What's Right and Wrong with World Bank Involvement in Eastern Europe 57
Environmental Policies
The system o f incentives used under the command regime has much to do with the cur- 
rent poor ecological situation in Eastern Europe. Across Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union, despite the fact that decreased output has reduced pollution levels, water 
and air pollution continue to undermine both livelihoods and health. Regionally, the 
main sources o f pollution are power generation, industry, motor vehicles, road transport, 
and municipal/industrial waste water. Lignite coal-fired power plants operate without 
pollution abatement equipment. With energy prices, particularly to household consum- 
ers, still much below costs and in some cases one-third to one-half of world prices, over- 
consumption remains the norm. The region's industrial structure is severely skewed and 
w ill remain so as long as prices do not change.
Roland Schönfeld - 978-3-95479-733-2
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 09:44:06AM
via free access
00063440
Support for Better Environmental Policies
In order to stop and eventually reverse environmental damage, know-how and financial 
means not presently available in most o f the region are needed. Lack o f funds and weak 
implementation capacities have impeded many kinds o f environmental improvements. 
Given this situation, the World Bank has tried to be responsive across a range o f areas. It 
has supported measures to raise public awareness and strengthen those institutions re- 
sponsible for supervising remedial action on the environment and has helped govern- 
ments establish better pricing, regulatory and fiscal incentives so that energy consump- 
tion w ill be reduced and more environment-friendly technologies adopted. Adjusting 
energy prices in relative terms, as between households and industry, and absolute terms, 
however, is key, and more rational resource pricing remains an important issue in most 
country dialogues. The World Bank supports countries' efforts to adjust energy prices 
through investment and adjustment operations, but such changes are neither quick nor 
easy. Price adjustments affect many households that benefitted from low energy prices. 
Some kind of social pricing or compensation mechanisms w ill almost certainly be 
needed to mitigate these effects. Price changes also call for major adjustments by indus- 
trial users, whose demand elasticities in the short run are low. Labor has also resisted 
industrial power price increases, fearing what these may do to enterprise profitability and 
employment. I f  these objections successfully slow price adjustments, reductions in pollu- 
tion w ill be slower too.
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World Bank Support for Environment Projects
While some environmental problems w ill be helped by price changes, others w ill need 
specific, targeted investments. Bank-supported environmental investment projects are 
underway in a number o f countries. An energy and environmental project in Hungary 
was developed to improve emission control, find a least-cost approach to pollution con- 
trol, and strengthen the power company's institutional capabilities to address environ- 
mental issues. In Slovenia an environmental project seeks to help both households and 
industry shift away from such polluting fuels as coal, to gas or district heating by finánc- 
ing gas-connection works and purchases o f gas-fired appliances. In Czechoslovakia an 
environmental project was designed to improve power system efficiency and reduce air 
pollution in northern Bohemia the most polluted region in Eastern Europe, and thereby 
to improve the environment and health o f the local population. Focussing also on an 
overall reform of the energy sector, the project aimed to reduce consumption of pollu- 
tion-causing lignite by making thermal power plants more efficient, to curtail power 
plant sulphur dioxide emissions with fiue-gas desulferization, to reduce power plant dust 
and fly-ash pollution, and to increase the reliability and efficiency o f the transmission 
system to facilitate inter-connections o f the Czech and German power grids.
The World Bank's involvement in this area also includes environment strategy studies, 
which have now been completed for most countries in the region. These try to rank envi- 
ronmental priorities on the basis o f their health impact and cost effectiveness. Nonethe- 
less, many important policy issues remain, such as defining environmental standards 
and deciding when to enforce them, determining the impact o f closing polluting enter­
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prises on workers and nearby towns, and, especially of concern to private investors, 
deciding who w ill be made liable for cleaning-up past pollution.
Generally, policy dialogue has emphasized the importance o f stopping ongoing pollu- 
tion first, before addressing the clean-up o f already polluted areas, which w ill have to be 
done over time and when resources become available. In other words, the focus should 
first be on the flow, not the stock. Ensuring that environmental policies are market 
friendly is also key. Past environmental damage is generally deemed the responsibility 
o f the government, while for privatization or joint venture investments, stricter pollution 
standards would typically apply only to future operations (Ackerman et al., 1994). Many 
environmental issues, however, remain unresolved.
At the World Bank, research is also ongoing regarding environmental taxes and other 
fiscal instruments. Vehicle taxes, fuel taxes, and improved traffic management, for 
instance, can contribute substantially to environmental improvement. Such economic 
policies often can make a difference at a lower cost than direct clean-up investments 
( World Development Report, 1992). These economic measures, i f  accompanied by the 
appropriate industrial investments, can go a long way toward reducing environment 
degradation that, over the long term, a rebound in economic growth would otherwise 
bring.
Given the magnitude o f the environmental problems in Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union, progress in this sector w ill be measured, and even significant World Bank 
involvement can contribute only a small fraction of what is needed. The backlog is so 
large and the sums required so huge, that steering clear o f lower-priority projects w ill be 
key. The decline in GDP and industrial output, which somewhat reduces pollution, gives 
a temporary respite for making these needed changes.
World Bank Support for International Environment Programs
In addition to efforts to support national programs, the World Bank and other multi lat- 
eral donors also take part in cooperative environmental efforts in the region such as 
environmental programs designed to restore the ecology o f the Black Sea, the Baltic, 
and the Danube river basin and to enhance cooperation among countries on the envi- 
ronment where there are cross-boarder issues. Here too, however, the problems are 
massive and complex, and no miracles can be expected from World Bank involvement 
alone.
Finally, in the nuclear energy sector, the World Bank has limited capacity and the 
lead role is with other agencies. The Bank has participated in a G-7 study o f environ- 
mental clean-up in nuclear projects to identify possibilities for phasing out and closing 
unsafe plants and replacing them with ones internationally certified as safe or with 
power plants based on alternative fuels. For some countries in the region this transfor- 
mation is problematic, for example, the Baltics, which are reliant on a sole source 
supplier o f gas and fear the vulnerability that gas conversion would imply. Financing of 
such operations is generally led by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Develop- 
ment (EBRD), European Investment Bank (EIB), or the private sector.
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The state apparatus inherited from the command system is not geared to fu lfill its vital 
role o f supporting the market economy. To meet the needs o f a market economy, the 
civil service, organization o f government, public finances, and regulatory frameworks all 
need to be modified. For example, the central bank, relieved o f its direct lending fune- 
tions in almost all countries, needs to be strengthened in new functions o f indirect mone- 
tary control, domestic debt and interest rate management, and bank supervision. 
Furthermore, many countries in the region have inherited highly centralized state struc- 
tures and now need to strengthen local governments so that they can mobilize resources 
and deliver services more efficiently. In most countries, the introduction o f market- 
economy tax systems brings with it a need to strengthen tax administration to ensure that 
it w ill be able to capture the newly emerging tax bases, consumption and private sector 
incomes. Better tax administration and a broader tax base would permit, in turn, lower 
and less distorting tax rates.
Due to stabilization-induced fiscal contraction, public investment is at an all-time low 
across the region. Today, neither the level nor the composition o f public investment is 
compatible with the growing needs of the private economy. While the previous regime’s 
general over-investment and support for questionable projects suggest that some decline 
is appropriate, current public investment levels, sometimes as low as 2 percent of GDP, 
mortgage the future. To ensure that scarce budgetary resources go where their returns 
w ill be highest, reform of public investment programming, rethinking its financing and 
accounting for the recurrent budget implications o f public investments are key.
Finally, fiscal stringency has led countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union to reconsider public expenditures meant to provide a social safety net for people 
affected by economic transition. These expenditures, the most explosive element of state 
budgets, are almost certainly fiscally unsustainable. Despite their expense and 
generosity, moreover, they are typically so poorly targeted that they fail to protect those 
most at risk. Poverty assessments confirm that there are both significant leakages and 
omissions. Across the region, countries are focusing on how to reform their social insur- 
ance programs, which in some countries now consume as much as 20% of GDP. 
Financed by payroll taxes that sometimes account for over 60% of wages, when health 
care is included, the system is highly distortional and is thought to affect international 
competitiveness. International comparisons suggest that these social expenditures are not 
well allocated, with some countries in Eastern Europe overspending on transfers and 
income-maintenance programs and underspending on education. On the positive side, a 
reallocation of expenditures within the social sectors should be relatively easier because 
its budget share is so large. Nevertheless, for fiscal, labor-market, efficiency, and inter- 
national competitiveness reasons, cutbacks are inevitable.
Given present fiscal constraints, better targeting o f social benefits is needed to 
protect the poor, and poverty-monitoring systems need to be developed or 
strengthened. There is evidence that the transition has given rise to many new poor, 
especially older people and families with many children, and that poverty is 
increasingly concentrated in areas where there is industrial restructuring. As it now 
stands, many social programs do not reach the poor, for example, fam ily allow- 
ances paid for children up to the age o f 26, i f  they are students, and the incidence
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o f social programs is not always progressive. Notable among mistargeted benefits 
are food subsidies from the pre-reform era. World Bank analysis o f who benefitted 
from these subsidies (W orld Bank, 1991a) has helped to break the grip o f the 
notion o f the efficiency o f these old policies.
From a budgetary perspective, pension reform, including raising retirement ages 
that are, in some cases, ten years lower than comparable retirement ages in indus- 
tria l countries, improving pension payroll tax collection, reducing the number o f 
special regimes for privileged worker groups, such as those in heavy industry, is 
also urgent. Moving toward a m ultitier pension system, which relies in part on 
contributory, funded, and even privately managed pension funds, could provide 
stimulus for capital market development, support privatization, and reduce budget- 
ary commitments.
Supporting a retooling o f the state
This d ifficu lt area o f World Bank activity involves issues that are politically and 
socially complex and extremely d ifficu lt to resolve. Bank support in this area, fur- 
thermore, is relatively recent and experience is s till being gained. To date, the 
W orld Bank has helped support adjustment in the public sector both by investment 
lending and quick-disbursing operations. In Albania and Hungary, tax administra- 
tion technical assistance projects have sought to strengthen tax and custom offices, 
train tax officials, and computerize tax records. Financial sector loans under 
implementation or planned in Poland, Slovenia, and the Slovak Republic provide 
technical assistance to improve central banking skills, bank supervision, and 
financial market regulation. This support for fiscal and monetary institutions helps 
create the economic infrastructure needed by a market economy. The World Bank 
has also financed specific investments in the social insurance system o f Hungary 
and Albania, assisting governments to control net pension expenditures and im- 
prove labor incentives. Nevertheless, policy reforms critical to efficiency and 
financial viability have sometimes remained elusive.
Retooling legal systems is also key to the transition process. In Eastern Europe, 
the existing legal frameworks have been analyzed for major gaps in legislation 
needed to support economic reforms, including definition o f property rights, com- 
mereiai and financial laws, and banking legislation and regulatory systems. For 
example, in the in itia l rehabilitation loans to Russia, Kazakhstan, the Baltic states, 
and the Kyrgyz Republic, loan conditionality encompassed the legal and institu- 
tional framework for private sector development, inclusive procompetition and 
antomonopoly policies, and the environment for foreign direct investment. In the 
Slovak Republic and Poland, adjustment operations have supported the introduc- 
tion o f bank and securities market regulation and antimonopoly policies. The Bank 
has also worked to establish law reform groups in the government to identify, 
prioritize, and coordinate a market-based law reform agenda. Finally, the Bank has 
provided direct financial support for law reform in several former Soviet republics, 
in the area o f privatization, energy legislation and banking, through both grants
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and loans for legal advisers, legal information systems, training, and judicial 
reform.
The Bank has also advised all o f the countries on the need to reform legislation 
dealing with international borrowing. Since many o f these countries did not exist 
prior to 1991 and those that did usually did not borrow in their own name, the 
Bank has provided advice on international best practice, which has resulted in con- 
stitutional provisions in some countries and special borrowing legislation in others. 
In Albania, legal assistance is also being provided in the context o f a debt- and 
debt-service-reduction operation.
In some countries, quick-disbursing public sector adjustment loans (PSAL) are 
under consideration to support improvements in public administration, reorganiza- 
tion o f ministries, and c iv il service reform. These could, for example, support the 
government's program to streamline c iv il service employment based on a job census 
and to raise and decompress c iv il service wages so that, in an increasingly 
competitive job market, skilled public employees can be retained. Such PSALs 
could also support the streamlining o f the transfer and income-maintenance budget 
and help design a program o f social expenditure reconfiguration to better meet 
equity objectives. A country needs to borrow for this purpose because the cost 
savings o f the expenditure adjustments are reaped only after a time; and budgetary 
support is needed from the World Bank to finance the temporary expenditure 
hump. PSALs can also be used to support the design o f fiscal decentralization 
programs and to strengthen and upgrade technical capacities w ithin local govern- 
ments, now responsible for many key public services.
World-Bank-financed technical assistance has also helped countries to prepare 
public investment reviews aimed at devising a market-friendly public investment 
program that supports economic recovery and private-sector growth. A public 
investment program thus identified can be partly financed by the World Bank, and 
it is often used as a framework for external financing by other donors. Rationaliz- 
ing and catching up with appropriate public investments is essential for developing 
private domestic industries, attracting foreign direct investment, and facilitating 
trade flows. There are presently, for example, severe capacity constraints in tele- 
communications, a sector that was systematically neglected in the past and that 
now also suffers from outdated technology. In many countries the transport sector 
needs reorientation to new markets, or a different geographic orientation, for 
example where countries have broken up. Greater emphasis on infrastructure main- 
tenance should also provide large payoffs i f  well designed.
Shortcomings and Сontroversies
It is generally accepted that the World Bank should be active on many fronts and 
address simultaneously the numerous issues crucial to the success o f economic 
reforms. S till, questions remain about its ability to respond in three key areas: (i) 
the World Bank's role in supporting the private sector ( ii)  the suitability o f World 
Bank's lending instruments to address problems relating to export markets and 
foreign direct investment; and ( iii)  whether the World Bank has the flex ib ility  to
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respond to the very special challenges o f Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union.
Can the World Bank Do More for the Private Sector?
In Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the World Bank has sometimes 
been faulted for involving itself mainly with governments, thereby supporting a 
continued economic hegemony by the state sector. For better or worse, as it is pres- 
ently designed, W orld Bank lending o f necessity involves the public sector. The 
World Bank's Articles o f Agreement require that any lending to private enterprises 
be supported by government guarantees o f both interest and principal. Such W orld 
Bank Group lending, as well as equity financing and other forms o f support, as is 
made directly and without guarantee to the private sector is carried out through the 
Bank's private sector arm, the International Finance Corporation (IFC). The IFC in 
1993 directly lent or invested resources amounting to USS419 m illion in 20 proj- 
ects in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, in financing packages 
amounting to some 21% o f its total commitments that year. The M ultilateral 
Investment Guarantee Agency (M IG A) is also available to provide guarantees for 
foreign direct investment against political risk.
Although amending the World Bank's Articles has been discussed over the years, 
there is presently no strong constituency for that, and therefore no likelihood o f 
change. Despite the fact that it has been faulted for providing insufficient support 
for private sector activities, even now the World Bank has a number o f options for 
making resources available to the private sector. First, the W orld Bank can and 
does lend directly to private entities with a government guarantee. Second, the 
World Bank can use financial intermediary loans to support the private sector, for 
example, through lines o f credit to domestic banks or other APEX institutions that 
are designed to be onlent to borrowers on commercial terms and that are fu lly  ac- 
cessible to the private sector. However, perhaps not surprisingly with hindsight, 
credit supply does not seem to have been the binding constraint. In Eastern Europe, 
World Bank-financed credit lines have in fact been remarkably slow to disburse. 
Weak economies and new and still inexperienced banks have created a poor envi- 
ronment for the emergence o f strong credit demand, and many credit lines remain 
untapped. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, however, there are the World 
Bank's indirect contributions, through its financing o f infrastructure that w ill sup- 
port private sector activity or through its support o f financial intermediaries and 
development o f financial markets and services. More generally, to the extent that 
the World Bank supports government programs that would have been undertaken 
anyway, the W orld Bank's financing frees up resources for the private sector since 
the government no longer has to tax or borrow domestically to fund these 
programs.
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Perhaps the greatest contribution the World Bank can make to private-sector devel- 
opment in the region today is financing for the development o f market-friendly 
regulatory systems and infrastructure. Strengthening Eastern Europe and the for- 
mer Soviet Union's physical and economic infrastructure systems may do more for 
the private sector and indeed, for attracting foreign investment, than direct World 
Bank financial support to the private sector. Catching up on the public investment 
backlog is key to attracting foreign direct investment and facilita ting trade flows, 
particularly in transport and other infrastructure sectors, the condition o f which 
affects the strength o f the supply response. World Bank infrastructure projects con- 
tribute to private sector development in three main ways: by enhancing, and 
sometimes actually making possible, private activities; by establishing a regulatory 
framework for both foreign and domestic economic activity; and by supporting the 
commercialization o f key enterprises, so they are readied for privatization.
In Poland for example, an energy-sector adjustment loan supports the govern- 
ment's efforts to develop an energy-sector regulatory and pricing framework and to 
restructure and commercialize public utilities. Thus, steps are needed to attract the 
approximately $3 b illion  in energy investment required by the gas and power sec- 
tors in the next years. In the Slovak Republic, a possible Bank-supported power- 
transmission investment project would permit the government's commercialization 
o f parts o f its power generation sector and the breakup o f the state-owned power 
company into individually privatizable parts. The project would also support the 
development o f an effective regulatory framework to enhance competition and 
define the tariffsetting process clearly. Sim ilar examples are investment projects to 
expand and modernize the telecommunications facilities in Hungary, the Slovak 
Republic, and the Czech Republic. Telecommunications, by some assessments, is 
Eastern Europe's most critical infrastructural bottleneck. Such projects typically 
include plans for commercialization o f the sector, readying it for privatization. 
W hile not providing direct support for the private sector, such loans to state-owned 




Another indirect means o f support for the private sector are World-Bank-supported 
projects that strengthen the financial sector and deepen intermediation. Ideally one 
would want to first build the supervisory and regulatory environment and create or 
import well-functioning financial intermediaries with the appropriate skills and, 
only then, let these new banks make credit allocation decisions influencing the path 
o f the economy. In reality no country has had this luxury, and there was little  
choice but to use the shell o f the old banking system. In the event, the old socialist 
central-cum-commercial monobanks were hastily split, and a two-tier banking sys-
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tern was established. The new regionally or functionally specialized, publicly owned 
banks continued to take deposits and make loans. W hile much was expected o f 
them in terms o f improved credit allocation, directed credit continued to play an 
important role, and little  in the incentive framework for the banks was, in fact, 
changed. Too rapidly, some thought, the door was also opened to a large number o f 
small private banks, even though the regulatory and supervisory framework could 
not be created overnight and was far from being adequate. A ll this took place 
simultaneously w ith restructuring, downsizing, and privatization in the enterprise 
sector, leading to continued accumulation o f nonperforming loans and deterioration 
o f the balance sheets o f the newly formed banks, public and private.
World Bank support to financial sector reform
While there are important differences among the countries in their financial sec- 
tors, there are enough sim ilarities to suggest a broad set o f common issues that 
need to be addressed strategically. These include: (i) improvements in the legal and 
regulatory systems, especially in the areas o f banking legislation and supervision; 
( ii)  modernization o f payment systems; ( iii)  restructuring and/or privatizing the 
former state banks: (iv) support for the emergance o f core o f good commercial 
banks; (v) provision o f extensive training in banking services, creditoperation, ac- 
counting, and auditing, etc; and (v i) moving to market-based credit allocation by 
phasing out directed credit and поп-budgeted interest rate subsidies.
Technical assistance and institution-building
Given in itia l conditions, World Bank support for financial sector development has 
naturally tended to have two distinct phases. In phase one, there is intense focus on 
technical assistance both to the future regulators and supervisors and to the staff o f 
the banks themselves. This involves developing the banking infrastructure via basic 
legislation, introducing improved accounting and auditing, encouraging prudential 
regulation, modernizing the payment system, and training staff and managers in 
project evaluation, corporate finance, and risk assessment techniques. One such 
project in Poland supported a program to strengthen financial institutions, the 
regulatory and supervisory capacity o f the central bank, and the policy and institu- 
tional environment. It included technical assistance and institution-building, using 
tw inning arrangements between Polish and European commercial banks. A sim ilar 
financial-institutions modernization operation was undertaken in Hungary. In 
Russia, the Bank's largest-ever technical assistance loan, a $200 m illion financial- 
institutions development project, aims to build the capacity o f a core group o f 30-40 
private commercial banks that w ill operate at higher banking standards; it also 
provides the basis for a private clearing system operating at the federal level. 
Technical assistance programs are also being supported in many o f the other FSU 
states.
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For the more advanced countries o f Eastern and Central Europe, the enterprise 
and financial sector adjustment loan (EFSAL) has become the vehicle o f choice for 
restoration o f banking system viab ility and more effective financial intermediation. 
These support government financial-sector policy reforms and are designed to 
resolve jo in tly  the debt overhang o f state-owned enterprises and the portfolio prob- 
lem o f state-owned banks. Both are needed to free up bank lending, much o f which 
is now tied up in ro lling  over nonperforming loans, so that credit can be redirected 
toward performing SOEs and, increasingly, the private sector. In such operations, 
as the experience o f Central and Eastern Europe shows, the need to address prob- 
lems in the banking system and in enterprises jo in tly  is paramount. Dealing with 
the bank problem alone would risk that future lending o f the newly sound and 
recapitalized banks would again be channeled to their traditional client base, 
including weak and debt-burdened or loss-making enterprises. Thus, solving the 
enterprise problem and insulating the financial system from its problems is a sine 
qua non for any lasting viability, as distinct from a one-time cleanup, o f the bank- 
ing system. Increasingly, the World Bank is taking the view that a lasting solution 
to the enterprise problem cannot be found without active involvement o f the banks 
that had lent to them in the first place. Banks, not the government, nor some cen- 
tralized debt collection agency or hospital for sick enterprises, may be the best, and 
indeed the only, agent o f change for troubled enterprises.
EFSALs support government policies aimed at strengthening bank management 
and governance and reforming bank supervision, accounting, licensing, and regu- 
lation. Typically EFSALs incorporate incentives for bankled conciliation and 
restructuring o f enterprise debt reduction. Such loans have already been made in 
Poland (Appendix 2) and Slovenia and are now under consideration in fYRMace- 
donia, Albania, and the Slovak Republic. In its loans supporting financial sector 
development, the World Bank has also provided technical assistance for capital 
market development, and the strengthening o f bank regulation and supervision.
The second phase o f the World Bank's financial sector support, therefore, focuses 
more on recapitalization and work-out strategies that should allow the newly 
reformed banks to function as competitive entities with positive net worth, most 
often at least partially privatized.10 Key questions relate to the most desirable form 
o f and tim ing o f the inevitable recapitalization and the degree o f its linkage to bank 
privatization. Another key issue is the linkage o f bank rehabilitation to restruetur- 
ing, liquidation, and privatization o f enterprises themselves, i.e., the degree to 
which the banks themselves can handle problem loans, or the carve-out o f problem 
enterprises into a central agency outside the banking system.
Between 1990 and 1994, there have been 11 financial sector operations totalling 
US$2 b illion  dollars in commitments, o f which one-fourth are in the form o f adjust- 
ment loans that can help cover the budgetary costs o f bank recapitalization or 
enterprise restructuring. Other operations have aimed at strengthening the banking 
system in two complementary ways: (i) directly through the finance o f equipment 
needs or technical assistance o f the banks themselves; and ( ii)  indirectly through
10 This draws on Dervis el al. (1994). Roland Schönfeld - 978-3-95479-733-2
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credit lines that provide resources that banks intermediate, and hence, 
supplementing domestic savings.
Technical assistance for the design of privatization programs
This is another vehicle o f support. While unable to lend to the private sector, the 
W orld Bank's support for privatization programs in Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union has been quite significant. Early support to the Chubias' privatization 
program in Russia, as well as policy advice and conditionality in the context of 
adjustment loans in the Slovak Republic, Poland, and fYRMacedonia, are exam- 
pies. The EFSAL in Poland, for example, directly supports the mass-privatization 
program. In the context o f EFSALs, there has also been significant work on dives- 
titure o f state-enterprises' social assets and on the design o f privatization programs, 
both for banks and enterprises.
Indirect support to the private sector through guarantees
The use o f the World Bank's guarantee facility, and in particular, its contractual 
compliance guarantees enlarge the scope o f World Bank support for the private 
sector. The W orld Bank's traditional guarantee instrument has been the sovereign 
guarantee, where the Bank guarantees a country's repayment o f borrowed principal 
and associated interest. Even though a conventional borrowing guaranteed by the 
Bank is on-budget, and therefore adds to the country’s external public debt, it is still 
attractive in a variety o f circumstances. Hungary recently made use o f this facility, 
for instance, for an international bond issue to lengthen a loan's maturity and 
improve its terms. By contrast, the contractual compliance guarantee instrument is 
designed to be responsive to governments that do not want to borrow on their own 
account but are seeking to encourage private financing for a project. The objective 
there is to minimize a government's potential exposure to the commercial risk it 
would encounter i f  it financed or borrowed for the investment itself.
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Contract compliance guarantees
These are designed to separate out commercial risk from contractual risk. They 
guarantee loans made by a private financier to a private project entity undertaking 
an investment desired by the government against the risk that the government w ill 
not meet certain agreed-upon undertakings critical to the project's viability. While 
no such operations have yet been completed in Eastern Europe, several have been 
discussed with reference to financing motorway projects in Poland and the Czech 
Republic and a proposed pipeline project in Poland. In the firs t o f these cases, pri- 
vate lenders to a private toll-road concession are beneficiaries o f the guarantee. The 
contractual risk protected against in this example is the government's agreement to 
maintain a preagreed to ll rate schedule increase, critical to financial viability o f the
Roland Schönfeld - 978-3-95479-733-2
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 09:44:06AM
via free access
00063440
concession. W ith this performance guarantee, private lenders can be attracted to the 
project, who otherwise might not offer loans w ith the long-term maturities needed 
for its financial viability. Getting private financing for the project would allow the 
government to focus its lim ited spending and borrowing capacity on other high 
priority and socially desirable projects that are not commercially viable. World 
Bank compliance guarantees cover none o f the commercial risks o f the project.
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How much is enough?
Whether all this is sufficient is d ifficu lt to say. Even i f  not, it is questionable 
whether the World Bank should use its publicly supported resources to compete 
with the private sector. Rather, one might argue that it should use its comparative 
advantage in the policy dialogue to work with governments to enable the private 
sector to operate more efficiently and to develop those aspects o f physical infra- 
structure as well as the economic infrastructure that are needed for the private 
sector to flourish.
Can the World Bank do M ore to Promote Trade Access and Private Investment?
The resumption o f growth in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union w ill 
depend on the region's ability to secure enhanced access for its exports to OECD 
markets and especially to West European markets. Eastern European countries are 
now much more open to price signals from international markets than in the past. In 
principle. Association Agreements with the European Union have opened up market 
access for many products from the region. However, other European Union policies 
have resulted in severe lim its on exports o f steel, textiles, and agricultural products 
where low labor costs could give Eastern Europe a competitive advantage 
(Kaminski and Walters, 1993)." These trade restrictions by the EU, especially those 
on agricultural products, lim it the World Bank's effektiveness in advising countries 
in the region since much best practice advice is not always reflected in the actions o f the 
role model countries in Western Europe. Presently, Eastern Europe accounts for less than 
2% o f share o f world trade, a very small participation that would seem even less threaten- 
ing with fester economic growth in Europe.
Better market access and consistent flows of private investment are the important long- 
term guarantees for successful transition to a market economy. Unfortunately the World 
Bank does not have either the political muscle or the instruments to address these issues. 
World Bank and IMF-supported stabilization policies, including appropriate exchange 
rate policies and investment projects, can help countries to attract direct investment and 
help create a supply response that encourages exports to growth, but direct instruments
11 The Europe Agreements between the European Union (EU) and Czechoslovakia, Hun- 
gary, and Poland were signed on March 1, 1992, and the latter two were ratified in 
February 1994; the Agreements between the EU and Romania and Bulgaria were signed 
on April 1, 1993 and in February 1994, respectively.
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are few. In some countries, the World Bank's support for infrastructure development may 
help promote trade, as in the Central Asian republics who w ill be able to diversify exports 
and attract investment once South Asian transport, pipeline, and telecommunication links 
are established.
Looking to the World Bank Group, the Multilateral Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and 
the International Finance Corporation (IFC) provide promotional assistance and advisory 
services to private investors and technical assistance to countries to help encourage direct 
private investment. The Foreign Investment Advisory Service, MIGA's joint facility with 
IFC, has completed projects aimed at identifying and removing legal, institutional, proce- 
dural, and other impediments to foreign investment and replacing them with appropriate 
incentives in a range o f countries. To date, MIGA has undertaken twenty operations, in 
the region, from the Czech Republic to Kyrgyzstan, guaranteeing some $300 million in 
foreign investments (Table 4).
TABLE 4
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M IGA GUARANTEE OPERATIONS IN EASTERN EUROPE AND THE




Czech Republic 3 83.0
Hungary 3 10.4
Poland 8 74.7




Is the World Bank Responding Well to the Challenge of Eastern Europe?
The World Bank has been accused of focusing so closely on long-term economic growth 
that it has failed to see the here and now. The Bank, it is said, tends to transplant models 
blindly from region to region without sufficient reference to their performance in each 
new context. In response to these criticisms, the World Bank has made considerable 
efforts to make its workings transparent to client countries and to pay more attention to 
noneconomic factors, as is evidenced by the increasing variety o f capabilities, eg., soci- 
ologists, political scientists, represented on its staff.
Yet the former Eastern Bloc, now in the process o f transforming a centrally- 
planned economy to the market model, poses unique problems. Neither the Bank, 
nor other institutions, can predict the precise outcome o f individual reforms. Para- 
doxically, however, when it comes to the former Eastern Bloc, the World Bank is
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criticized both for moving too quickly and for allowing institutions to crumble 
before substitutes can be put in place. Realizing that insufficient project prepara- 
tion, haste in developing projects, and making loans just for the sake o f dispensing 
money to the region could jeopardize Eastern Europe's economic future, it is likely 
that the Bank w ill proceed with the same deliberate speed it has used in the past, 
supplemented by occasional loans for emergency aid, for some time to come.
Finally, the World Bank has been accused o f becoming politicized, a real danger par- 
ticularly when the G7 exercises pressures to step up loans, as it did in the case o f Russia 
W ith some justice, other client countries have complained that they face tougher loan 
conditions than does Russia Other regions, however, still absorb and w ill continue to 
absorb the bulk o f the World Bank's resources, lending, and concessional support.
The former Eastern Bloc's transition to a market economy is surely one of the World 
Bank's most difficult challenges and rivals even the post-World War II rebuilding of 
Western Europe. While the Bank's mandate restricts it in many ways, it does offer the 
countries o f the former Eastern Bloc a rich vein o f economic, financial, and technical 
skills.
A Hard Look at World Bank Performance in the Former Eastern Bloc
The World Bank has enormous potential, as well as considerable limitations, for contrib- 
uting to reforms and growth in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. On the 
positive side, the World Bank can lend to vital sectors that strictly commercial finance 
would not support, and it can lend to support macroeconomic stabilization. World Bank 
lending can support market-friendly infrastructure projects and the creation of the regula- 
tory environments required for the private sector and foreign direct investment and help 
create the economic infrastructure that is needed. Its tools o f intervention to support the 
private sector, promote exports, and generate direct investment, arguably the keys to sus- 
tamable transition, are limited and largely indirect.
Although by far the bulk of its investment projects have lengthy gestations, the World 
Bank has had the capacity to respond quickly to emergency needs in Eastern Europe and 
the former Soviet Union. While poverty alleviation is its major mandate, the World Bank 
is not designed to run, as some nongovernmental organization do very well, relief-based 
projects that touch the hard-core poor directly.
Seeking how it may best contribute to the economic betterment o f the former Eastern 
Bloc, the World Bank, along with virtually all organizations working in this area, is ex- 
ploring unknown terrain. This paper has sought to inform others engaged in this effort of 
how the World Bank Group works, something o f its contributions to the region thus Car, 
and something o f its limitations. The World Bank's willingness to learn from rigorous 
appraisals o f its past projects, and from open exchange with others, especially borrowers, 
can only strengthen the World Bank's usefulness to the region and the world.
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Appendix 1: Czechoslovakia Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL)
The 1991 Czechoslovakia SAL focused on the stabilization and incentive policies 
that represented the first steps toward a market economy. The follow ing specific 
actions were conditions for tranche release in the Loan Agreement:
• Macroeconomic Framework. Satisfactory execution o f stabilization policies, re- 
duction o f subsidies, and introduction o f a new tax system.
• Price and Trade Liberalization. Regulated prices reduced from over 85% of 
turnover to about 6% in 1991. Price controls on all but a few items eliminated in
1992. New import tariffs, approved by GATT, became effective on January 1, 1992. 
The temporary import surcharge was phased out.
• Large Privatization. Preparation o f half o f all medium and large scale state- 
owned enterprises for privatization using a variety o f methods. (Small privatization 
through auctions was virtually complete.)
• Financial Sector Reform. Adoption o f legislation which provides a regulatory 
framework for the licensing and operations o f banks and for supervision by the 
Central Bank; and adoption o f prudential regulations. Privatization o f several state- 
owned banks under the coupon scheme.
• Energy. Preparation o f a least-cost energy study for the power sector; an in- 
crease o f electricity prices payable by households by at least 70 percent in nominal 
terms; and environmental impact assessment procedures.
• Labor Markets. Government controls on gross wage formation were lim ited to 
minimum wage requirements for private enterprises and to minimum wage re- 
quirements and total wage b ill ceilings for state-owned enterprises.
• Targeting o f Social Benefits Payments. Establishment o f social insurance funds 
and a program o f social assistance. Introduction o f selected measures to improve 
efficiency in the health and education sectors.
The SAL was split between the two successor states, the Czech Republic and Slo- 
vakia, in January 1993, and each country fu lly  complied with the remaining condi- 
tionality.
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Appendix 2: Enterprise and Financial Sector Adjustment Loan (EFSAL) in 
Poland
In 1993, Poland embarked on a far-reaching restructuring o f its banking and enter- 
prise sectors through its enterprise and bank restructuring program (EBRP), sup- 
ported by a $450 m illion EFSAL adjustment loan from the World Bank. The 
program assumed that banking and enterprise problems must be jo in tly  resolved, 
and that banks, not the government, some centralized debt collection agency, or 
"hospital for sick enterprises" were thought to be the best, and indeed the only 
"agent o f change" for a certain subset o f troubled, indebted enterprises. Banks 
know their clients best, and can distinguish better than can a government agency or 
outsider, between those borrowing enterprises that are loss-makers under any see- 
nario and should be pushed into bankruptcy or liquidation; and those that under
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some cases can be restored to profitability i f  properly downsized/restructured and 
their debt overhang reduced. And, with the right incentives, they can put this 
knowledge to more effective use than other players. What incentives are needed for 
this to work? There are five elements.
• First, banks must face a hard budget constraint. Practically speaking, this 
means that they must be privatized, or that they must believe that no further 
resources are forthcoming to support them from the fisc. (The latter is the case in 
Poland, where bank privatization is part o f the loan conditionality, but the agent of 
change role is already being played by поп-privatized banks, governed on a tight 
leash by a very determined M inistry o f Finance).
» Second, the accounting and bank regulatory and supervisory framework must 
be right, w ith market valuation o f loans in bank portfolios and required provision- 
ing o f non-performing loans. In Poland, a comprehensive program to strengthen 
bank supervision was supported by the EFSAL.
• Third, there must be a recapitalization o f banks which w ill give the banks a 
sufficient capital cushion to appropriately write o ff loans to problem/non-viable 
debtors follow ing restructuring or liquidation.
• Fourth, and absolutely critical is a privatization program and governance 
framework for enterprises that ensures prudent management and a hard budget 
constraint. The Poland EFSAL supports the mass privatization program, and set 
specific targets for more traditional privatization tracks.
• F ifth, bankruptcy procedures must function smoothly; given the expected 
workload and inexperience o f courts, the Polish EFSAL supports temporary out-of- 
court conciliation procedure led by banks that would facilitate creditor-led work- 
outs. Banks were given a deadline - a one year window - to conclude conciliation 
proceedings, with creditor banks accounting for 50% of loans also permitted to 
,cram down' a solution on other m inority creditors. For enterprises where agreement 
on conciliation or bankruptcy was not reached in the one year window, a gov- 
ernment-managed intervention fund, with a lim ited budgetary envelope, was set up, 
but - as a punitive entry ticket - banks would have to write o ff essentially all loans 
o f enterprises handled by this fiind.
W ith these incentives, a profit minded bank w ill do its utmost to recover value 
from its non-performing loans, either by pushing the borrower into bankruptcy/ 
liquidation, or by restructuring the borrowers debt (jointly with other creditors 
through the conciliation process) such that the enterprise once again becomes a 
profit-generating client for the bank.
What have been the results in Poland? Thus far, two banks have been privatized, 
with another privatization in process. The mass privatization program is on track, 
as well privatization through other routes. By the end o f the one year window, 
banks had dealt with 80% of their bad loans in value terms, and were expected to 
complete the job in a matter o f weeks. Bank-led conciliations were used to work-out 
60% o f bad loans in value terms; the balance was dealt with through triggering 
bankruptcy, or auctioning o ff the assets.
What are the risks, and where might one not chose this creditor-led approach? 
One case might be where banks are not yet tru ly banks - as in Albania or Moldova,
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where banking and credit skills are still too rudimentary for the role. Another case 
might be where bank privatization is not on the agenda, and the government is not 
credible in its policies to govern public sector banks such that they could effectively 
play the enforcement role.
And, clearly, banks could not fu lfil this role for all enterprises: the largest SOEs, 
especially those that were politically powerful, in strategic or critical sectors (coal, 
steel, chemicals) and public infrastructure enterprises (railways, etc.) would likely 
have such influence that they could hold the banks hostage, rather than the other 
way around, colluding with the banks to obtain more credit and subsidies from the 
government, rather than restructure and/or downsize. And, fina lly, there may be 
enterprises making large losses that are not in fact large debtors to the banking sys- 
tems: here the intersection o f the "enterprise problem" and the "banking problem" is 
a null set.
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The Role of International Financial Institutions




Strangely enough, to discuss the support given by the international financial insti- 
tutions (IFIs) to the transformation o f formerly centrally planned economies, i.e., 
the transition process, implies examining a broad range o f aspects among which 
the financial aspect is not the most important. The reason is that the IFIs have fill-  
filled  three main functions in addition to their institutional financing task. They 
have catalyzed financial support from other sources: they have embodied the most 
pervasive form o f economic conditionality that can be applied to a sovereign state, 
albeit subject to multilateral surveillance; and they have supplied critical expertise 
to help neophyte countries in the fie ld o f market economics to analyze economic 
policy issues, to design market-oriented policies, and to implement these policies in 
an effective manner. By combining these four functions, the IFIs collectively have 
come to play the most important role among the external supporters o f economic 
reforms in CEECs and NIS,2 far outpacing any other in terms o f effectiveness.
This outcome is not the result o f fortuitous circumstances but rather o f a strategy 
that evolved from the convergence o f interests o f the major donor countries, even in 
the absence o f a determined effort by these countries to coordinate themselves to 
this effect. None o f the donor countries has at its disposal large amounts o f public 
resources to grant to the CEECs and NIS because o f the need to redress their own 
fiscal deficits and to use also the so-called peace dividend to this end. At the same 
time, they wanted to help and to be sure that the resources provided would not be 
wasted in perpetuating the inefficiencies o f the old economic system but rather 
would help build a new, more productive system. They also lacked an appropriate 
national infrastructure to pursue these goals, because the main national institutions 
at their disposal for this purpose, i.e., export credit agencies and development assis- 
tance institutions, are not geared to this particular task. Since the IFIs are unique in 
having both the infrastructure and the resources for this task, they have become, 
since 1990, the main instrument used by the major donor countries to support 
economic reform in the CEECs and NIS. The aim o f this paper is to assess these 
functions, lim iting  its focus to the main IFIs, namely the International Monetary 
Fund (IM F), the World Bank (IBRD), the European Investment Bank (EIB), and 
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). This is not to 
deny that other IFIs, such as the Bank for International Settlements, the Interna-
1 The views expressed in the essay are the sole responsibility of the author and do not 
necessarily reflect those of any institution with which the author is associated.
2 CEECs stands for Central and Eastern European countries and NIS for new independent 
states of the former Soviet Union.
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tional Development Agency, and the Asian Development Bank, have been active in 
this area, but their contributions have not been as important as those o f the former 
Institutions. It is, instead, necessary to add the European Union although it is not a 
financial institution, because its financial support in the framework o f the Group o f 
24 donor countries' (G24) assistance has been very significant and in many respects 
sim ilar and complementary to that o f the IFIs.
In principle, these IFIs had different institutional mandates and specializations. 
The IM F, for instance, was called to focus on macroeconomic and balance o f pay- 
ments issues, which are its traditional domain, while in view o f their institutional 
roles or experience, the others were expected to concentrate their assistance on 
structural reforms, investment projects, and development o f the private sector. Nev- 
ertheless, in practice no clear-cut division o f responsibilities and areas of 
competence has emerged; their activities at times have overlapped, albeit not neces- 
sarily leading to wasteful duplication. In such a context, tigh t coordination among 
IFI programs would have been necessary in order to f i l l gaps, enhance assistance 
effectiveness, and avoid waste o f resources. Such a degree o f coordination, how- 
ever, has not yet been achieved, but progress in this direction has been made, 
particularly through collaboration in specific initiatives. There are many examples 
o f the W orld Bank and EBRD cofinancing the same project or o f the EU comple- 
menting IM F lending w ith its own loans or grants for the purpose o f fillin g  the 
balance o f payments gaps o f countries in transition.
Among the IFIs, the IMF has emerged as the leading institution that has assisted 
these reform ing countries in defining the framework strategy that must permeate 
the entire economy and set the general conditions for sectoral measures or projects 
for which the assistance o f other IFIs is called for. Such a leading role o f the IMF 
has resulted from the strong backing o f the Group o f 7 major industrial countries 
and from the enforcement o f cross conditionality, whereby financing by other IFIs 
has been made conditional upon agreement w ith the IMF on the overall economic 
strategy o f the country concerned. This aimed at ensuring coherence among differ- 
ent measures that address various parts o f the economy and whose success u lti- 
mately depends on the presence o f a sound macroeconomic environment.
U ntil 1993, the IMF also had a leading role among the IFIs in financing these 
economies. This reflects the fact that, in the in itia l stages o f economic transforma- 
tion, postcommunist countries mostly need general purpose funding to absorb the 
impact o f economic liberalization on their external accounts and to mitigate the 
deterioration o f liv in g  standards. The IM F is, by its mandate, the main institution 
responsible for supplying such financing even though the IBRD’s mandate has 
gradually extended to this area since the mid-1980’s. As these countries advance in 
the transformation o f their economy, their needs become greater because they are 
linked to the implementation o f structural projects that fa ll more w ith in the purview 
o f the other IFIs than o f the IMF. Hence, it m ight be expected that, in the coming 
years, the IM F w ill lose this lead financing role. This m ight also result from 
another factor, which depends on lim itations in IM F resources because they 
depend, firs t, on the allocation to the IMF o f government funds, and second, on the 
possibility o f m obilizing these resources, namely the liqu id ity  o f IMF resources. 
The other IFIs could expand their lending instead, subject to certain gearing ratios
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related to their capital, since they can tap private savings directly, without resorting 
to government funds, and s till benefit from the privilege o f being primary borrow- 
ers because o f the guarantee provided by major shareholders. The constraints on 
credit expansion for the other IFIs seem somewhat less stringent than those for the 
IMF. Accordingly, the current trend indicates a leading financial role being played 
in  the near future by the other IFIs, especially by the IBRD, which has the greatest 
financing potential as well as the largest operational infrastructure.
II. The Impact o f IFI Financing
Let us consider the financial impact that the IFIs under consideration have had thus 
far on the advancement o f economic transformation in the CEECs and NIS. The 
general impression one draws from the data on actual gross disbursements is that 
direct financial assistance in the firs t phase o f the transition, i.e., from 1990 to
1993, has been relatively modest. The combined annual flows from a ll IFIs have 
been in the range between $ 1.7 and $5.7 b illion , w ith a sharp increase in 1991 and 
a stable flow  o f around U.S. $5 b illion  in 1992 and 1993. Since five Central and 
Eastern European countries had collaborated w ith the IFIs earlier than the other 
reform ing countries, it is not possible to draw significant conclusions from the 
yearly financial flows. For instance, the financing received by each country on a 
yearly basis amounts to about 1 % o f the GDP o f the borrowing countries in Central 
and Eastern Europe, and much less than 1 % o f the GDP o f the NIS. Another way 
to assess the relative magnitude o f these annual flows is to compare them with the 
estimates o f the capital requirements that are necessary in order to sustain a GDP 
growth rate between 4 and 7% per annum. This is the range o f growth rates re- 
quired to narrow the current gap in per capita income between Eastern and Western 
Europe. The capital needs for the five major CEECs are estimated to be in the 
range between $75 and $226 b illion  annually.3
In absolute terms, among the economies in transition, Russia and Hungary are, in 
order o f importance, the largest recipients o f funds, w ith amounts o f around U.S. $3 
b illion  for the entire period 1990-1993 (see Table 1). In relative terms, i f  financial 
flows are compared with the economic weights o f the beneficiary countries, as 
measured by their GNPs, it instead appears that Hungary and the Czechoslovakian 
area are the largest beneficiaries while Russia is among the smallest recipients o f 
funds. Using the 1992 GDP figures as benchmarks, total borrowing from the IFIs 
for the 4-year period equals 9.4% o f Hungary's 1992 GNP and 8.3% o f Czechoslo- 
vakia 's 1992 GNP, while it amounts to just 0.8% for Russia. On the basis o f the 
same comparison, Romania seems to be a relatively large beneficiary, about 8% o f 
its 1992 GNP, and Poland a relatively small recipient, about 3%. Hence, it is not 
evident that the geographical distribution o f financial flows has necessarily 
reflected the relative intensity o f financial needs; that is to say that prio rity has 
been given to the countries w ith the lowest per capita income or the most severe de-
3 For a survey of estimates of investments needs see EBRD (1993) and Handler and
Stankovsky (1992).
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velopment problems. Apparently, the IFIs' financial assistance has de facto 
rewarded mostly those countries that embarked on the transformation o f their 
economies earlier than the others, that have progressed more rapidly, or that had 
not been burdened by the excessive weight o f accumulated external debt. Examples 
o f these three different cases are, respectively, Hungary, the former Czecho- 
Slovakia, and Romania.
Even taking into account these differences, the scale o f financial support has not 
yet reached the target level needed to achieve sustained economic growth. This 
overall impression is not substantially modified i f  one considers the IFIs' financial 
commitments rather than their disbursements. There is indeed a gap between the 
two sets o f figures, w ith the disbursements being between three-fifths and one-sixth 
o f commitments, depending on the institution and the year. The IM F has actually 
been the fastest disbursing institution, while other IFIs' disbursements have been 
constrained by the pace o f the implementation o f investment projects by the benefi- 
ciary countries. This is one explanation o f such a gap as well as o f the fact that the 
gap has widened over the years. There are, however, other good reasons that are 
related to the demand for loans.
In general, borrowing countries have encountered several problems in dealing 
w ith the IFIs. Some countries have had difficulties in defining or com m itting them- 
selves to a coherent macroeconomic policy framework that could be accepted by the 
IMF for financing. Others have not been able to present enough investment projects 
that are worth financing. Some, because o f political and social d ifficulties, have not 
been in a position to comply w ith the policy commitments that they had under- 
taken, thereby losing access to funding. Countries such as Bulgaria and Romania 
have failed to implement fu lly  their programs for economic stabilization because 
the financing, which was promised, but not pledged, by donor countries to com- 
plement IFIs' lending, did not materialize. Other countries could not secure in their 
budgets the funds necessary to cofinance public investment projects w ith the IFIs 
because o f the fiscal stringency advocated for macroeconomic stabilization. Short- 
age o f domestically generated private capital fo r investment has also hampered 
IFIs' complementary lending. In some countries, such as Russia, there has even 
been reluctance to borrow, either because it would have aggravated the accumulated 
debt burden or because there was uncertainty about which public institution should 
be held responsible for debt repayment.
There have also been countries, such as the Czech Republic, which have not bor- 
rowed because they did not actually have an urgent balance o f payments need.
Overall, demand factors have prevailed over supply factors in  determ ining the 
large difference between the financial potential o f some IFIs and their actual lend- 
ing. Supply factors are mainly related to the inevitable time delay that is required 
for the IFIs to analyze the demands o f these largely unknown economies, to define 
their lending strategy, and to create the internal infrastructure to manage these 
activities. By early 1992, a ll these institutions had completed fa irly  accurate recon- 
naissance work on these economies and had developed operational structures and 
strategies. I f  they have not succeeded in sharply increasing their lending after 
1992, this is due to the negative economic conditions s till prevailing in these coun- 
tries, w ith investment s till modest, a legal and institutional environment beset w ith
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a ll the uncertainties o f the transformation, and a shortage o f credit-worthy enter- 
prises or o f viable investment projects o f significant size.
To overcome these obstacles, it is necessary that the IFIs invest more than they 
have in the past in raising the capacity o f each country to absorb financial support 
and that they adapt their financing methods to the peculiar needs o f these countries. 
Efforts have been made by the IFIs in these two directions, but such efforts need to 
be intensified, not just to increase lending but in order to enhance its impact, espe- 
c ia lly  in the less-developed transition countries. In particular, the development- 
oriented IFIs should focus more on: (a) restructuring o f public enterprises; (b) help- 
ing  the fledgling private enterprise sector to develop sustainable capital structures; 
and (c) financing newly established export-import banks in these countries. To this 
end, the range o f IFIs' financing methods should be widened, for instance, by 
expanding the use o f instruments such as credit guarantee schemes and equity 
participation.
The sectoral breakdown o f financial flows shows that the direct support to these 
three areas has been relatively minor. The main share o f lending has been devoted 
to financing reforms in general, namely fillin g  the gaps that were caused in the 
balance o f payments and public budget by price and trade liberalization, the rise in 
social expenditure, and shortfalls in fiscal revenue.
In order o f importance, financing o f infrastructure represents the second major 
area, w ith a concentration o f loans for transport and telecommunications, as these 
sectors are critical elements fo r promoting trade and business initiative. The sector 
that is the largest single beneficiary o f funds from the IFIs is the energy sector, and 
this in recognition o f the substantial returns that can derive from investment in 
energy in terms o f a lower dependency on energy imports or a large potential for 
increasing convertible currency proceeds through energy exports.
Lending to manufacturing and to the private sector, particularly to small-scale 
enterprises, has attracted a relatively lim ited amount o f funds, owing perhaps to the 
particularly risky nature o f these loans. In these sectors there has been a useful 
diversification o f financing instruments, as the International Finance Corporation 
and EBRD have resorted, to some extent, to granting credit guarantees and making 
investment in equities. The EIB has also financed several small enterprises by 
granting so-called global loans to local financial institutions.
Apart from this diversification, the lending activities do not indicate any s ign ifi- 
cant specialization o f any IFIs in any particular economic sector. A ll development- 
oriented IFIs have been operating in roughly the same sectors, although some have 
focused more on lending to the emerging private sector and others have invested in 
less risky assets. Some sectors, in spite o f their importance, have received little  
funding. For instance, no significant financing has been provided as yet fo r the 
establishment o f a social safety system and an institutional framework for a new 
labor market, even though these are considered essential to ease opposition to in- 
dustrial restructuring and to help enterprises achieve productivity gains by reallo- 
eating excess labor. S im ilarly, few resources have been channeled to projects aimed 
at environmental protection.
On the whole, in the firs t phase o f the economic transition, the IFIs' financial 
support in itse lf has not been a determining factor fo r the advancement o f the
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reform and transformation o f these economies because o f the relatively lim ited 
transfer o f resources, particularly w ith respect to some sectors and some countries. 
It could not have been otherwise because the IFIs themselves had to undergo some 
transformation in order to address the problems o f economies largely unknown to 
them. Moreover, the financing demands presented by both the public and the pri- 
vate sectors o f these countries often did not appear in line w ith the objective o f 
promoting the expansion o f the most competitive or viable sectors. Instead, they 
frequently reflected the need to deal w ith industrial crises or lacked an adequate 
analysis o f the prospective returns on investment. A lbeit quantitatively lim ited, the 
IFIs' financing has not been marginal, particularly fo r reform ing countries that do 
not have alternative sources o f convertible currency financing. IFIs have actually 
filled , to some extent, the financing gap o f countries that experienced a decline in 
national saving, lost their most important export markets, and, due to a severe 
shortage o f convertible currencies, have not often been able to ensure the minimum 
levels o f imports necessary to maintain domestic production. I f  not in terms o f ac- 
tual direct financing, the IFIs' intervention has nevertheless been very important in 
three other respects that are collateral to the financial activity: (1) in catalyzing 
additional financing from other sources; (2) in inducing the reform ing countries to 
make proper use o f their resources through conditionality; and (3) in raising the 
level o f skills w ith the aim o f developing the institutional infrastructure o f a mar- 
ket-based system and im proving the management o f the new system.
The Catalytic Role
The IFIs have been very active in soliciting donor countries for additional financing 
and have succeeded in attracting substantial foreign aid and credit. For some coun- 
tries, such as Romania and Bulgaria, they even had to exert some pressure on donor 
countries to fu lf ill their financial promises, as these resources were indispensable to 
ensure the fu ll implementation o f the reform adjustment program supported by the 
IFIs themselves. For other countries, such as Russia, it was the opposite case; some 
donor countries had to spur the IFIs to modify their traditional approaches in order 
to address the particular socioeconomic difficulties o f these countries and to fa c ili- 
tate reaching an agreement on the reform and adjustment program that is the pre- 
condition for a rapid release o f the IFIs' funds.
The success achieved by the IFIs in attracting complementary, o ffic ia l financing 
has not been matched with respect to private fimds. The financial engagement o f 
the IFIs in a given country has not generally been regarded by private lenders or 
investors as a sufficient condition to make that country creditworthy in the interna- 
tional financial markets or to make it an attractive place for foreign direct invest- 
ment (FDI). Other factors have also contributed to this lack o f private funds, 
particularly w ith regard to the business environment, taxation, monetary converti- 
b ility , and politica l stability. Only Hungary and the Czech Republic have regained 
access to borrowing in international markets fo llow ing the implementation o f IF I- 
supported stabilization programs and the continuing m onitoring o f their economic 
performance by the same IFIs. The fact that Hungary, but not the Czech Republic
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or other reform ing economies, has received sizable FDI confirms that the catalytic 
role o f the IFIs has been mainly confined to officia l funding.
The latter includes several forms o f financing, such as grants, export credits and 
related guarantees, and offic ia l debt reduction. Private debt reduction has been 
more d ifficu lt to achieve than officia l debt reduction inspite o f the IFIs' pressure in 
this direction, as the cases o f Poland, Bulgaria, and Russia indicate. To some 
extent, foreign private creditors have tried to transfer their financial risk to the o ffi- 
cial sector by resisting reductions in the value o f their claims and by seeking 
o ffic ia l guarantees for their loans or other benefits from their governments. What- 
ever reduction has been achieved in private debt would have been virtua lly impos- 
sible had the IFIs not shown clear support for the economic policies pursued by 
these countries.
The attitude o f the IFIs vis-á-vis the reforming economies has also had a reverse 
catalytic function in two cases. First, the presence o f a so-called negative pledge 
clause in IBRD financing has somewhat discouraged potential foreign creditors or 
investors from comm itting their capital in these countries since their potential 
claims could not receive adequate guarantees because o f the competing guarantee 
given by the country to the IBRD. This impediment has been overcome recently 
because the IBRD renounced such a clause. Second, a negative assessment by the 
IFIs o f a country's economic performance or lack o f adequate compliance w ith the 
economic program agreed upon w ith the IFIs has had a significant disincentive 
effect on foreign offic ia l and private financing. Given the lim ited information 
available on the evolving conditions o f these countries and the IFIs' unparalleled 
capacity to scrutinize their economies, IFIs have been used by the international 
financial community as a sort o f beacon to shed ligh t on economic prospects. No 
country belonging to this area has been able to disregard the IFIs' assessment or 
policy conditions and at the same time to rely on alternative sources o f market 
financing. This leads to the question o f which criteria the IFIs applied to guide the 
economic policies o f these countries or to form  a judgment o f their appropriateness.
The IFIs ' Conditionality
Two types o f conditionality have been used: one related to the economic policy to 
be pursued at the macroeconomic, systemic, or sectoral level, and the other linked 
to the microeconomic projects to be financed. The former by its very nature has laid 
the path for the other, albeit in some countries sectoral policies have sometimes 
been the result o f individual microeconomic decisions more than o f a preordained 
strategy. The IM F and, to a lesser degree, the IBRD have been most influential in 
the definition by these countries o f their macroeconomic policies. In this area, no 
apparent inconsistency or contrast has risen between the IFIs as to the policy meas- 
ures that the country seeking assistance was requested to take. When dififerences in 
points o f view arose, they were sorted out through consultations and discussion, 
also involving major donor countries, before reaching the stage o f lin k ing  financial 
support to the implementation o f policy recommendations.
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The IM F approach in the early phases o f the transition process called for assign- 
ing p rio rity  over other economic objectives to the restoration o f macroeconomic 
balance which had been lacking at the time o f price and trade liberalization. Its 
conditionality was based on the traditional financial planning model which, in 
principle, is appropriate for any economic system since it aims at ensuring consis- 
tency in  the evolution o f macroeconomic aggregates fo r the purpose o f achieving 
low inflation, narrow public deficits, and a sustainable balance o f payments 
position. I f  this approach is, in theory, appropriate, its feasibility in these countries 
in which the instruments necessary for its implementation in a market-oriented 
context were lacking or untested was controversial.
The effectiveness o f the standard IM F conditionality rests on a number o f 
assumptions that did not actually match the reality o f these countries. First, it was 
assumed that by the use o f standard demand management tools, such as central 
bank credit, interest rates, expansion o f the banking system's assets, and lim iting  
fiscal deficits, it was possible to force the necessary adjustment o f structural imbal- 
ances. The enforcement o f financial discipline at the macroeconomic level was 
considered instrumental in  prompting the government to introduce radical reforms 
and bringing about, consequently, far-reaching and swift adjustments at the micro- 
economic level. Second, it was expected that market forces, once liberated from 
government repression and inserted in a balanced macroeconomic context, could 
set into motion a sustained growth process. Hence, the task o f the government was 
to withdraw itse lf from any involvement in the production system and banking 
industry and to dispose o f its enterprises. This could, however, give rise to a 
vacuum o f decision-making at the micro level leading to disruptions o f economic 
relationships and ultim ately to declines in output. Such a scaling down o f economic 
activity was deemed inevitable during the transition to a new economic system, but 
it was considered a transitory phenomenon that would be overcome by the expan- 
sion o f private output and investment fo llow ing the restoration o f macroeconomic 
stability. Third, it was advocated that the authorities rely mostly on standard 
macroeconomic tools and abandon a ll forms o f direct control on prices, wages, and 
income. M isgivings were expressed, for instance, about the appropriateness o f a 
tax-based income policy, which was eventually accepted, although it  was consid- 
ered to be less effective than a tighter management o f aggregate domestic demand 
and a source o f distortions.
This conditionality approach seems by and large to be the reflection o f an ideal- 
ized view o f the workings o f a market-based economy that is far removed from the 
socioeconomic conditions that prevailed in the postcommunist countries early in 
the transition. This ideal o f a market economy seems valuable as an ultimate goal 
that any economy should strive to approach, but it appears to be a poor guide fo r 
policy choices during the transition. Even for the most developed European coun- 
tries, several decades were needed after the Second W orld War to develop 
competitive market mechanisms, market-oriented policy instruments, and eco- 
nomie agents capable o f responding to market signals in terms o f seizing new 
opportunities or adjusting themselves to changing market conditions. During these 
decades, the development o f these countries relied, among other things, on
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government measures that were not fu lly  in line w ith the principle o f no interfer- 
enee w ith free-market competition, except, in cases o f market failures.
The IFIs conditionality fo r the countries in transition did not address the supply 
side o f the economy, the institutional framework, the effectiveness o f available poi- 
icy instruments, and the weaknesses o f emerging markets w ith the same timeliness, 
precision, comprehensiveness, and exactingness as in the case o f macroeconomic 
demand policies. In the systemic and structural areas, the commitments taken by 
reform ing countries vis-á-vis the IFIs were more generic, their linkages w ith other 
parts o f the economic strategy were not spelled out, and the d ifficulties o f impie- 
mentation \w re not properly accounted for. The development o f the necessary tools 
for macroeconomic management, particularly in the fiscal and banking areas, 
lagged behind, thereby signaling either an excess o f ambition in setting the pro- 
gram targets or an unsustainability o f their achievement. In brief, an imbalance 
emerged, especially in the firs t two years o f the transition, between macroeconomic 
conditionality and its systemic and structural counterparts.
The programs supported by the IFIs led to macroeconomic results that showed 
progress in  the desired direction but fe ll short o f the intended targets as well as o f 
the ultimate goal o f a noninflationary economic recovery (see Table 2). Further- 
more, the achievements did not appear sustainable over time unless greater efforts 
were deployed to accelerate systemic transformation and structural adjustment, 
thereby leading to output recovery. In most o f these countries, the fa ll in output was 
deeper and more prolonged than that ex ante expected by the IFIs and by the coun- 
try concerned in deciding the degree o f macroeconomic policy tightening. Such a 
downward deviation was not due mainly to external factors, although the economic 
recession in Western Europe, the war in Yugoslavia, and the collapse o f intra- 
CMEA trade contributed to this result. The main causes instead lay among domes- 
tic factors, particularly the combination o f financial policy tightening, the abrupt 
end o f central planning w ith the consequent lack o f orientation for the public enter- 
prises, the relatively slow change o f economic institutions, and the s till-low  contri- 
bution o f the expanding private sector to GDP formation. Inflation slowed down 
much less than expected and has not reached a single-digit annual rate in the 
current year even in  countries in which macroeconomic stabilization has progressed 
farther. The reduction o f the trade deficit was mainly the result o f an import 
compression that seems incompatible w ith the needs o f output recovery.
At the same time, public budgets turned increasingly negative under the pressure 
of mounting social expenditure due to the economic depression and incipient enter- 
prise restructuring, on the one hand, and the shrinking o f the tax base, on the other. 
Private production managed to expand rapidly although the contribution o f privati- 
zation o f public firm s to this expansion was lim ited. Even in 1994, in spite o f its 
rapid growth, the private sector does not account fo r the largest portion o f national 
output in most postcommunist countries.
The sharp fa ll in output coincided with several slippages in implementing the 
macroeconomic stabilization strategy recommended by the IFIs; after a ll, policies 
were not as tigh t as intended. This m ight contradict some claims that the 
stringency o f the IFIs' policy conditionality brought about or accentuated the pro- 
duction downturn. Nevertheless, there is little  doubt that fu ll compliance w ith the
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IFIs’ tigh t policy requirements would have led to a deeper output decline over the 
short term and higher social tensions that would have raised greater uncertainty 
about the possibility o f a strong output rebound over the medium term. Some flexi- 
b ility  was needed in managing policy conditionality in  the face o f deviations from 
expected policy performance, and the IFIs have shown such a flex ib ility . They have 
continued to cooperate w ith CEECs and NIS in adapting the policy strategy to the 
emerging difficulties, albeit at the cost o f some delays in  loan disbursements.
Structural adjustment and development o f market-oriented institutions did not 
progress at the same pace as macroeconomic stabilization and economic liberaliza- 
tion. This imbalance caused the recommended macroeconomic stabilization 
measures to produce a number o f perverse effects. For instance, steep rises in  the 
cost o f credit did not necessarily curtail credit expansion and improve its allocation. 
Rather, they tended to crowd out the credit demand o f fledgling private enterprises 
in favor o f public enterprises that, because o f government guarantees, are less 
responsive to changes in credit cost. In addition, monetary policy tightening did 
not prevent banks from having to support heavily indebted public enterprises to- 
ward which they were heavily exposed. Nor did it prevent the explosive growth of 
interenterprise credit in the form o f arrears in countries such as Romania and 
Russia.
Despite these shortcomings, in the in itia l phase o f the transition, such condition- 
a lity served well the purpose o f injecting a degree o f policy discipline in countries 
that had lost direct control over the economy. It also prompted these governments 
to innovate new methods o f economic management and to deepen their economic 
analysis fo r policy making. After the firs t two years o f experience, it became clear 
that the standard macroeconomic approach recommended by the IFIs, apart from 
not delivering entirely the expected results, was facing increasing social resistance, 
leading also to non-compliance w ith policy commitments. The policy approach had 
to become more pragmatic and less doctrinaire, had to recognize the specific d iffi- 
culties o f these economies undergoing radical transformation, and had to allow 
second- and even third-best solutions to unusual economic problems. The transition 
policy had to be seen more than in past as the planning o f a sequence o f macro- 
economic, systemic, and structural measures in a multi-phase process in which 
quantum leaps are very risky and solid progress before entering into the next phase 
matters more than the speed o f advancement.
In this context, it seems that a number o f unsolved problems have to be addressed 
as a matter o f priority. First, leaving aside the vexing issue o f whether or not to 
assign prio rity to macroeconomic stabilization, attention must focus on ways and 
means to in te rlink tigh t macroeconomic management w ith structural changes. Sec- 
ond, efforts need to be concentrated on completing the construction o f the institu- 
tions o f a market economy, its legal system, and the infrastructure for the markets 
to work properly. Third, any policy measure has also to pass a more stringent test 
o f political and social sustainability after the past four years o f sharp cut-backs in 
liv in g  standards and dw indling confidence in the ab ility o f the political leadership 
to bring about an economic recovery. Fourth, a solution must be found as to how 
the IFIs should deal w ith those countries which deviate from recommended poli- 
cies, without jeopardising the country's efforts in case they cut their support, and
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without losing evenhandedness in  case they accommodate policies which are not 
endorsed for countries in other regions o f the world.
In the past two years, IFIs macroeconomic conditionality has evolved under the 
pressure o f the above problems. Emphasis has shifted from macro-stabilization to 
the establishment o f conditions fo r the resumption o f economic growth against a 
backdrop o f continuing progress toward macroeconomic stability. The traditional 
approach has been enriched in order to incorporate better-defined linkages between 
demand management measures and structural adjustments. This has been achieved 
by setting benchmarks to monitor structural reforms or by requiring prior actions 
before supporting a program, even at the risk o f delaying financing and complicat- 
ing countries' policy difficulties. The IFIs' attention has increasingly been focused 
on two major reform areas: (a) social security programs and reform o f taxation; and 
(b) the development o f the enterprise sector by dealing w ith the problems o f priva- 
tization, bank rehabilitation, debt reduction, and corporate governance. New 
fle x ib ility  has been added to IMF financial intervention through the recent creation 
o f the Systemic Transformation Facility, which aims at helping these countries to 
phase in  radical reforms involving substantial social adjustments.
Such evolution o f conditionality cannot yet be considered as having reached the 
fina l stage, but it  must continue as long as the transition process unfolds and raises 
unprecedented policy challenges. There is s till room for shifting the focus o f eco- 
nomie strategy from the macroeconomic level to the structural and sectoral ones 
without generating macro imbalances. Once the construction o f the infrastructure 
o f a market system in these countries is completed, it must be decided whether to 
revert to the standard focus on macroeconomic conditionality or to move toward the 
comprehensive policy approach recommended to developing countries, such as in 
the context o f the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility.
Compared to program-based conditionality, the project-based conditionality 
appeared easier to define and monitor, its scope being much narrower. It turned 
out, however, to be equally d ifficu lt to comply w ith. This conditionality has been 
directed mostly toward promoting appropriate pricing policies for energy resources 
and public services, toward im proving the scrutiny o f prospective rates o f return on 
public investment, and toward ameliorating public procurement procedures. The ef- 
fectiveness o f project conditionality has, however, been lim ited by the slow pace o f 
project implementation by the beneficiary countries resulting from the reduction o f 
resources allocated to public investment, shortage o f privat capital, and administra- 
tive and legal hindrances.
Technical Assisterne
For countries sailing in the uncharted waters o f systemic transformation, IFIs' tech- 
nical assistance (TA) and tra in ing in the design and implementation o f policies and 
projects have been equally, i f  not more, important than their financing. For the IFIs 
this has not been just a necessary complement to financing but an objective to be 
pursued on its own for the purpose o f smoothing and accelerating the transforma- 
tion o f reform ing economies. A relatively large volume o f resources has been in ­
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vested in this area, as shown in Table 3, and it has covered a wide range o f sectors. 
Enterprise and industrial restructuring, energy, and transport and telecommunica- 
tions are the three areas that have attracted most technical assistance resources. In 
general, TA  has targeted government officials or public enterprises, while few proj- 
ects have been opened to the participation o f the private sector. Central and Eastern 
European countries have been the major beneficiaries, owing not to any preferential 
status, but because they have shown a better absorptive capacity. The European 
Union has been the largest donor, but in several sectors the assistance o f the IFIs 
has had an equally important impact.
In the firs t years o f the transition, TA has responded mainly to the IFIs' views of 
p rio rity  areas and the most appropriate modalities o f intervention. This reflected 
the fact that the countries in transition had lim ited knowledge o f the areas in which 
TA was most needed for their reforms to be successful and that they were not fund- 
ing TA. Subsequently, in view o f the need to obtain a deeper involvement and 
commitment o f the reform ing country in reform implementation, the IFIs' assis- 
tance has been made more sensitive to the specific requests o f the beneficiary 
countries, particularly in order to attune its operational modalities to each country's 
conditions. Its impact on reforms and sectoral problems has been most effective in 
those countries that were most determined to advance rapidly in the transformation 
o f their economy and were ready to apply innovative solutions. Good examples of 
effective assistance can be found in the privatization o f public firm s, restructuring 
o f the banking systems, and development o f central banking and national payments 
systems in the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary. In contrast, lim ited results 
have been achieved, fo r instance, in the same areas in countries in which the reform 
process is progressing slowly.
Although the IFIs' TA has been valuable in facilita ting  reforms, it is not exempt 
from some problems. First o f a ll, coordination among IFIs as well as w ith other 
donors, both bilateral and m ultilateral institutions, has been less than adequate at 
times. This has allowed some wasteful duplication o f efforts to emerge at times, or 
it has left some gaps. In some cases, assistance relying on outside consultants with 
lim ited experience w ith a country's conditions has been considered o f little  value by 
the recipient. The large demand for tra in ing o f officials has been satisfied only to a 
lim ited extent, leaving several countries w ith the d ifficu lt task o f having to manage 
a new economic system by officials trained to deal w ith the old system Inconsisten- 
cies in policy advice between different IFIs have also appeared in a few cases, 
specifically in dealing w ith exchange rate policies, price liberalization, and 
sequencing o f reforms.
Some solutions have been devised for these problems in the last two years. A 
clearinghouse o f information on a ll TA supplied by a ll donors and demanded by 
these countries has been created by the OECD for the purpose o f enabling the do- 
nors to coordinate their assistance activities. A number o f tra in ing institutes and 
facilities operating in the fields related to financial policy have been created by the 
IFIs and the OECD. A program o f assistance in public management reform and 
tra in ing for the public administration has been launched by the European Union 
and the OECD. A fa ir amount o f collaboration between IFIs on TA  projects has also 
emerged.
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Other improvements are s till needed, particularly in the modalities o f assistance. 
For instance, TA  should be concentrated on activities in the fie ld , focus on concrete, 
operational issues, and rely mostly on the direct collaboration w ith officials respon- 
sible for addressing issues rather than on lecturing. The opportunities fo r cross- 
fertiliza tion o f experiences among the reform ing countries themselves should be 
better exploited w ith the aim o f allow ing some reform ing countries to benefit from 
the experience o f those that are most advanced in the reforms. Special TA programs 
should be designed for countries that s till lag behind in economic transformation.
III. Conclusions
On the whole, the evidence gathered for this analysis suggests that, in  the firs t four 
years o f the economic transition, the IFIs have made an important contribution to 
helping the reform ing countries understand their economic problems, devise viable 
strategies, and fund policy implementation. Technical assistance and financial 
catalysis have been as important as, i f  not more than, IFIs’ direct financing. It is 
also evident that progress made in the economic transformation has not relied on 
and could not rely only on the IFIs’ support. Instead, it has had to rest on the inner 
forces o f these countries, in particular on the determination o f their people to reno- 
vate their economy, to adjust their economic behavior, and to take from their 
government a larger share o f responsibility fo r their own prosperity.
The economic transformation has been a learning process for both the reforming 
countries and the assisting IFIs. I f  their assistance has shown some delays, imper- 
fections in  approach, and lim itation in scope o f intervention, these have had a 
minor impact on the effectiveness o f their action. The constraining lim itations that 
IFIs’ operations have encountered on the demand side have had much more in flu - 
enee, due to the lim ited capacity o f these countries to make proper use o f the 
available assistance.
The outlook for the second half o f the 1990’s seems to indicate a trend toward the 
expansion o f the IFIs, financial disbursements and a sharpening o f their TA, 
particularly in the fie ld  o f training. Among the IFIs, the role o f development-ori- 
ented institutions, such as IBRD and EBRD, is bound to increase in parallel w ith 
the recovery o f output and investment in these countries. In contrast, the growth o f 
general policy financing is like ly to peter out in the coming years. In both cases, 
the relative importance o f IFIs' financing over total financing is expected to be 
outweighed by the growth o f nonofficial lending. The restoration o f creditworthi- 
ness among these countries should allow them to satisfy an increasing share o f 
their needs in the international capital markets. More diversification o f IFIs, 
financing and TA by country and type o f operation is also probable for the purpose 
of meeting the particular requirements o f lagging countries.
The need to support the transition has led to several changes in the IFIs mandates 
and their modus operandi. The IMF, for instance, can no longer be regarded as a 
mere monetary institution w ith the aim o f temporary funding o f balance o f pay- 
ments deficits while they are being corrected. It is, instead, heavily involved in 
fostering structural adjustment, and in this endeavor it has come close to perform-
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ing the role typical o f the other IFIs. The evolution in the IFIs1 modus operandi is 
not yet complete and must continue w ith a view to increasing the effectiveness o f 
their intervention and ultim ately to ensuring a rapid conclusion o f the transition 
process. In continuing in this evolution, the IFIs cannot be expected to fu lfill a ll the 
roles that donors and beneficiary countries now wish o f them. To attempt to do so 
involves several risks, namely to lose sight o f the IFIs' original mandates especially 
vis-á-vis the rest o f their member countries, to distort the use o f their resourses in 
favor o f a group o f countries, to stretch their financial v iab ility , and to apply un- 
even conditionality compared to that required o f other countries. Hence, even at the 
end o f such an evolution, the question remains as to whether other instruments 
apart from the IFIs have to be mobilized to help some reform ing countries catch up 
in the quest fo r a liberal and prosperous economy.
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TABLE 1
FINANCING OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS TO ECONOMIES IN
TRANSITION (1990-1993)
Cumulative commitments* Cumulative disbursements* 
_____________ (U.S. millions)_________________________ (U.S. millions)____________
EIB IMF IBRD EBRD EU ЕЮ IMF IBRD EBRD EU
p0063440
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C E E C s
A l b a n i a 8 7 3 1 1 1 . 0 4 5 . 0 2 4 2 , 5 1 8 . 0 2 2 . 0 4 . 3 1 6 7 . 2
B u l g a r i a 2 1 8 . 6 7 6 3 , 1 4 4 5 . 0 1 4 6 . 3 3 8 2 . 2 1 3 . 3 7 3 1 . 7 1 5 3 . 0 5 .1 1 2 7 . 3
C z e c h o s l o v a k i a 1 8 6 9 . 5 6 9 6 . 0 2 9 4 . 9 1 6 4 1 . 1 4 5 6 , 4 1 0 0 . 6
C z e c h  R e p . 2 4 7 . 7 2 4 7 . 2 8 0 . 0 2 1 5 . 2 7 0 . 3 9 6 . 2 8 . 0 8 2 . 9 7 . 5
S l o v a k  R e p . 1 5 3 , 9 8 9 , 9 1 3 5 . 0 9 7 . 1 4 6 . 8 5 , 9 8 8 . 5 1 6 . 6 4 . 1
E s t o n i a 5 . 6 7 1 , 8 3 0 . 0 7 4 . 0 2 7 , 0 5 7 . 5 2 3 . 0 2 8 . 7 4 . 4
H u n g a r y ' 4 5 1 . 4 2 6 4 6 . 9 3 8 7 3 . 7 7 0 7 . 7 5 0 3 . 7 1 3 4 . 7 1 4 2 8 . 7 1 1 7 5 . 7 2 3 3 . 4 1 5 1 . 3
L a t v i a 1 4 1 , 2 7 0 . 0 5 7 . 9 4 0 . 5 1 0 6 . 9 2 3 . 0 4 . 5 7 . 9
L i t h u a n i a 1 5 2 . 5 6 0 . 0 4 8 . 3 5 5 .1 1 2 0 . 9 4 5 . 0 3 , 2 8 .1
P o l a n d 6 2 8 . 3 2 6 3 6 . 5 4 2 7 2 . 0 5 7 0 . 3 9 9 5 . 2 1 6 4 . 9 8 5 0 . 6 1 0 6 7 . 1 1 0 2 . 0 2 4 3 . 3
R o m a n i a 1 6 0 . 9 1 4 0 9 . 9 9 5 0 . 0 4 3 0 . 9 5 4 5 . 9 1 5 . 8 1 2 7 4 . 7 4 1 1 . 0 9 4 . 5 2 2 3 . 8
Y u g o s l a v i a 3 2 4 7 . 5 3 7 6 . 8
C r o a t i a 4 . 0
S l o v e n i a 5 2 . 4 8 0 . 0 1 2 7 . 0 2 4 . 5 22 1 0 . 5
T o t a l 1 9 1 8 . 8 1 0 1 1 5 . 7 1 4 0 5 0 . 1 2 5 1 9 . 8 3 2 2 8 . 6 3 3 4 . 6 6 4 1 4 . 8 3 7 6 4 . 9 5 7 7 . 3 1 0 5 5 . 8
N I S
A r m e n i a 4 0 . 0 6 4 . 9 n a 1 . 0 3 . 4 n a
A z e r b a j a n n a n a
B e l a r u s 9 7 . 9 1 2 8 . 0 1 0 2 , 6 n a 9 6 . 3 1 0 . 0 5 . 7 n a
G e o i g i a n a n a
K a z a k h s t a n 8 6 . 4 2 1 8 . 0 1 2 7 . 8 n a 8 5 . 0 3 6 . 0 0 . 0 n a
K y r g y z  R e p . 8 2 . 9 6 0 . 0 n a 6 0 . 3 2 8 . 0 n a
M o l d o v a 1 5 3 . 9 8 6 , 0 n a 8 6 . 5 3 5 . 0 n a
R u s s ia 2 5 1 8 . 3 1 6 7 0 . 0 4 4 9 . 9 n a 2 4 6 9 . 7 4 7 3 . 0 1 2 9 , 7 n a
T a j i k i s t a n n a n a
U k r a i n e 2 7 . 0 1 0 . 6 n a 0 . 0 0 . 7 n a
U z b e k i s t a n 2 1 . 0 1 2 7 . 3 n a 0 . 0 1 0 . 8 n a
T o t a l 2 9 3 9 . 4 2 2 5 0 . 0 8 8 3 . 0 1 5 8 4 . 8 2 7 9 7 . 8 5 8 3 . 0 1 5 0 3 2 5 5 . 1
Sources: Author's calculations based on data from EBRD, ЕЮ, EU, EBRD, and IMF.
״ ЕЮ, cumulative commitments through 31 December 1993. IMF, cumulative commitmarts. 1990-1993. 
IBRD, un disbursed balance as of 30 June 1990 plus all commitments through 8 March 1994. EBRD, all 
"signed operations" through 28 February 1994. EU,19901993 ־ commitments of PHARE program (CEECs) 
and TACIS program (NIS). EU figures converted from ECU using annual average exchange rates. 
EIB/EBRD figures converted from aggregate amounts using average of S/ECU exchange rates. IMF figures 
converted from SDR using period average exchange rates. Cumulative commitments do not include any 
subsequent cancellations. AU amounts are quoted in nominal terms. Due to full disbursement immediately 
following Executive Board approval, amounts committed and disbursed are identical under the IMFs Sys- 
temic Tran^ormation Facility and Compensatory and Contingency Fianancing Facility (CCF). 
b Cumulative gross disbursement through 31 December 1993. IMF, 1990-1993. IBRD, disbursements from 
1 July 1990 through 8 March 1994. EBRD, all "disbursing operations" through 28 February 1994. EU, 
1990-1993 4payments" of PHARE program (CEESs) and TACIS program (NIS). EU figures convened from 
ECU using annual average exchange rates. EIB/EBRD figures converted from aggregate amounts using av- 
erage of S/ECU exchange rates. IMF figures converted from SDR using period average exchange rates. AU 
amounts are quoted in nominal terms.
c Cumulative commitments of IMF include SDR 50 million undisbursed from a standby arrangement agreed 
upon in 1988. Roland Schönfeld - 978-3-95479-733-2
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TABLE 2
MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE OF CEECs
Convertible current General government 





Intermediate targetsYear Program" Outcome Program" Outcome Program* Outcome Program* Outcome
B r o a d  m o n e y  t a i g e t s  " b r o a d l y "  m e (  i n  
1 9 9 2 :  s t a n d b y  s u s p e n d e d  i n  1 9 9 3
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p l e d g e d  t a x r e f o r m s  n o t  i m p l e m e n t e d
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- 6 . 5  S T F  h a s  l o w  c o n d i t i o n a l i t y ;  m o n e y  
t a i g e t s  s e e m  t o  h i v e  b e e n  m e t
S t a n d b y  i s  i n  p l a c e  a n d  s e c o n d  tranche 
o f  S T F  g r a n t e d
0.2
3 . 9  D e c e m b e r  1 9 9 2  t a r g e t  o f  b u d g e t
d e f i c i t  w i s  e x c e e d e d  a n d  s t a n d b y  w a s  
i n t e r r u p t e d
־7
- 5 . 5  G o v e r n m e n t  r e v i s e d  i t s  f o r e c a s t  o f
1 9 9 4  b u d g e t  d e f i c i t  i n  ) u n e  1 9 9 3
0.1
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- 1.2
- 0 . 9








0 . 5  - 0 . 5  
- 3 .1  - 6 . 0
-2
- 1 . 4
- 0.8
- 2 . 5
0 . 7
- 2 . 4
N / A
- 1.2
0 , 6 ־5
־0.1
2 6
4 9 0 b









































1 9 9 0
1 9 9 1
1 9 9 2
1 9 9 3
1 9 9 0
1 9 9 1
1 9 9 2
1 9 9 3
1 9 9 4
1 9 9 3
1 9 9 4
1 9 9 0
1 9 9 1
1 9 9 2
1 9 9 3
Date of 
program
F e b .  1 9 9 1  
A p r .  1 9 9 2
A p r .  1 9 9 4  1 9 9 4
J a n .  1 9 9 1
M a r .  1 9 9 3  
( s t a n d b y )
J u n e  1 9 9 3
J a a  1 9 9 1
D e c .  1 9 9 2
Country
- ,  —  -
B u l g a r i a
C z e c h o s o v a k i a
C z e c h  R e p .
S l o v a k  R e p .
H u n g a r y
Roland Schönfeld - 978-3-95479-733-2
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 09:44:06AM
via free access
-8 .01994
1 9 9 0 - 3 - 1 2 9 4 5 8 6 ־3 0 . 7 - 1 0 . 5 * E x c e e d e d  Uigets f o r  b u d g e t  a n d
r e s e r v e s
1 9 9 1 a 3 - 8 3 6 7 0 - 2 . 7 - 2 . 2 2 . ־5 - 5 . 9 * E n d  1 9 9 1  s u s p e n d e d :  f a i l e d  t o  m e e t
r e s e r v e s  a n d  b u d g e t  t a r g e t s .
1 9 9 2 d 0 1 .5 3 6 4 3 - 0 . 3 - 0 . 3 ־5 - 6 * N o  p r o g r a m
1 9 9 3 4 . 0 4 . 0 3 5 3 5 - 2 . 6 - 2 . 3 - 5 . 2 - 2 . 8 N e w  p r o g r a m :  A l l  t a r g e t s  m e t
1 9 9 4 4 . 5 2 3 - 2 . 5 - 3 . 8 1 9 9 4  a n d  1 9 9 5  p r o g r a m  f r a m e w o r k
s e t t l e d  b u t  n o t  y e t  t h e  c o n d i t i o n a l i t y
% G D P
1 9 9 5 5 . 0 1 6 - 2 . 0 - 3 . 3
1 9 9 0 - 7 . 4 - 1 . 7 1
1 9 9 1 - 5 . 0 - 1 4 1 6 3 1 6 6 - 2 . 4 - 1 . 4 - 2 . 4 - 0 . 8 C r i t e r i a  m e t
1 9 9 2 0 - 1 3 . 5 2 7 0 2 1 0 . 4 - 1 . 6 - 1 . 7 - 2 - 4 . 6 U n d e r s h o t  r e s e n  e  t a r g e t s
1 9 9 3 0 2 5 6 - 1 . 5 - 0 . 1 T a r g e t  o n  f i n a n c e  t o  t h e  b u d g e t  a n d
r e s e r v  e s  n o t  m e t :  p r o g r a m  s u s p e n d e d
1 9 9 4 0 1 5 6 - 0 . 8 - 2 . 5 1 9 9 4  c o m b i n e d  s t a n d b y  a n d  S T F
1 9 9 5 2 . 0 3 8 - 0 . 8 - 2 . 0
Dec. 1989Poland
M i d - 1 9 9 3
R o m a n ia
F e b .  1 9 9 1
A p r .  1 9 9 4
Source: Autlutfs compilation from IMF, OECD, and national sources.
* Program data or projections. 
b End period.
c At the time of signing the 1994 standby, it was clear that the inflation target was unattainable, because of a sudden depreciation of the currency. 
On the other hand, the target is actually expressed in nominal terms.
A The 1989 Polish program covered expectations only for 1990. Subsequent "program" figures represent government projections for each 
successive year.
c State budget figures are used for Poland, since the definition of general government has been changing. 
f Not including unpaid interest. 
g Systemic Transformation Facility.
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TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE OF MULTILATERAL FINANCAL ORGANIZATIONS
(in  Thousands o f U.S. $)
Sectors EBRD IBRD IMF EC Total:
Region: CEECs: status, planned
Agriculture and food 3627 na na 26,910 30,537
Communications 9945 154 na 3510 13,009
Economic cooperati(» 5616 220 na 3510 9346
Education and training na 100 na 10,530 10,630
Energy Aiuclear safety 8768 104 na 24,993 33,865
Enterprise and industry 21,671 126 na 143 21,940
Environment 6260 62 na 27,050 33,372
Financial sector 13,755 273 na 12,063 26,091
Govemmait/democrítizalirtiAnslitiilinn building 1521 200 na 23,985 25,706
Health/medical na 117 na na 117
Science and technology na na na 8190 8190
Social sector 433 132 na 44,460 45,025
Tourism 4680 na na na 4680
Trade and investment 9086 na na na 9086
Transport 1988 na na 597 2585
Total:
Region: CEECs: status, underway
87,349 1488 na 185,941 274,778
Agriculture and food 14,773 na na 58,625 73,398
Communications 19.823 na na 9360 29,183
Economic cooperation na 201 na 9149 9350
Education and training na na na 3276 3276
Energy Aiuclear safety 58 4800 na 70,153 75,011
Enterprise and industry 440 224 na 109,804 110,468
Environment na 216 na 14,704 14,920
Financial sector 4783 450 270 20,826 26,330
Gov emmeaVdamcralizatiæAisUtulicii building na 574 na 8775 9349
Housing 9621 na na na 9621
Science and technology na na na 1872 1872
Social sector na na na 21,177 21,177
Tourism na na na 5265 5265
Trade and investment 107 275 na 25,367 25,749
Transport na 1980 na 5148 7128
Total: 49,606 8720 270 363,501 422,096
* Source: OECD Register.
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TABLE 3-Continued
Sectors EBRD IBRD IMF EC Total:
Region: CEECs: status, completed
Agriculture and food 196 na na na 196
Communications 290 154 na na 444
Economic cooperation na 1349 na na 1349
Education and tra in in g na 100 na na 100
Energy Aiuclear safety 397 118 na 7962 8477
Enterprise and industry 497 642 na 78 1216
Environment 56 210 na 10,062 10,329
Financial sector 437 757 180 na 1374
GovemmaiL/democratizaticnAnstituticn building na 20,160 na na 20,160
Social sector na 383 na na 383
Tourism 201 na na na 201
Trade and investment 36 3200 na na 3236
Transport 59 150 na na 209
Total: 2169 27.222 180 18,101 47,674
Sectors EBRD IBRD IMF EC Total:
Region: NIS: status, planned
Agriculture and food 2958 na na 75,585 78,543
Communications 937 na na 5458 6395
Defease conversion 352 na na 5733 6058
Economic cooperation na 3225 na 1170 4395
Education and training na na na 27,437 27,437
Energy Aiuclear safety 11,048 7681 na 53,249 71,978
Entexprise and industry 13,950 591 na 32.918 47,460
Environment na 13,500 na na 13,500
Financial sector na 40,295 187 26,470 66,942
Govemmeit/danocratizalkxiAnslitutian building na 37.135 na 20,077 57,212
Health/medical na 620 na na 620
Science and technology na na na 468 468
Social sector na 1570 na 3943 5513
Trade and investment 831 4020 na 2340 7191
Transport 4228 2200 na 24,439 30,869
Total: 34,305 110,827 187 279,287 424,606
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Sectors EBRD IBRD IMF EC Total:
Region: NIS: status, underway 
Agriculture and food 1499 625 na 69,026 71,151
Communications 5790 na na 3411 9201
Defense conversi(® na na na 11,653 11,653
Economic cooperation 292 2079 na 23,672 26,042
Education and training na 558 na 28,196 28,754
Energyfoudear safety 1127 3240 na 87,636 92,002
Enterprise and industry 3968 1324 654 39,558 45,504
Environment 257 na na 4070 4327













Social sector na na na 6032 6032
Trade and investment 147 na na 4211 4358
Transport 350 na na 29,950 30,300
Total: 16,711 13,806 1694 369,395 401,605
Region: NIS: status, completed 
Agriculture and food na 2600 na 4107 6707
Economic cooperation na 7955 na na 7955
Education and training na na na 336 336
Energy Aiuclear safety 20 1034 na 498 1552
Enterprise and industry 548 3114 na na 3662
Financial sector 399 1209 na 2332 3940
Gnv<™ma1t/defnocrri7Mkv1Ar1<lit1Mion building na 991 na na 991
Science and technology na na na 176 176
Social sector na 1417 na 336 1753
Trade and investment na 475 na na 475
Transport 3966 na na 7234 10,300
Total: 4032 18,795 na 15,019 37,847
129 na na na 129
92 na na na 92
1755 6000 na 1324 99079
1976 6000 na 1324 9300
4217 na na na 4217
1069 na na na 1069
371 na na na 371
5657 na na na 5657
na 39 na na 39
na 39 na na 39
Region: NIS and CEECs: status, planned:
Agriculture and food 
Energy Aiuclear safety 
Environmait 
Total:
Region: NIS and CEECs: status, underway:




Regpon: NIS and CEECs: status, completed:
Energyfouclear safety 
Total:
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M a r ie  L a  v ig n e  
The EBRD in Eastern Europe
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In  October 1989 the French President François M itterrand proposed to set up the 
firs t post-cold war international financial institution, the EBRD (European Bank 
fo r Reconstruction and Development, reminding o f the officia l name o f the W orld 
Bank, the IBRD). The EBRD, sometimes called in France 'the chic Bank o f stricken 
Europe', began to operate in A pril 1991. In 1994 it had 57 shareholder states 
(donors and recipients), and two international members, the EC and the European 
Investment Bank. Its statutory aims were to promote democratic institutions and 
open market economies in Central and Eastern Europe, including the former 
USSR, through lending and investing, w ith 60 percent funding at least being di- 
rected to private sector enterprises or to state-owned enterprises engaged in 
privatizing.
The notorious firs t president o f the EBRD, the French academic and presidential 
adviser Jacques A tta li, was designated to this position by the shareholders in May
1990, when the treaty to establish the Bank was signed in Paris. From A pril 1991 
when the Bank began to operate in London to A ttali's resignation in June 1993 
fo llow ing a barrage o f criticism  over the management o f the Bank, the controver- 
sial style o f the President attracted much more attention than the activities o f the 
Bank. The firs t months o f Attali's successor, formerly head o f the IMF and later o f 
the French central bank Jacques de Larosière, who took over in September 1993, 
were devoted to internal restructuring. Overall, in three years o f operation the 
EBRD has not yet given a clear image o f itself. The book by which its firs t presi- 
dent comments on his experience (A tta li 1994) gives interesting insights but hardly 
helps to provide such in te llig ib ility .
Section 1 w ill investigate the concept o f the institution. Why to establish such a 
bank? What were the in itia l aims? Were the procedure and means consistent w ith 
the aims? It w ill be argued that from the very beginning the Bank’s concept was 
unclear, and that this fuzziness impaired the actual operation o f the bank, up to 
making it largely irrelevant to the needs o f the countries in transition to the market. 
Section 2 looks at the current reform o f the bank that is being undertaken under a 
new management. Is it possible to reactivate the role o f the EBRD without substan- 
tia lly  changing the project?
1. The Concept o f the EBRD
The idea o f a new institution was firs t floated by the French President François 
M itterrand in a speech to the European Parliament in Strasbourg, in October 1989 
(Sobell, 1990). In his book, A ttali claims that he actually wrote the speech, on the 
basis o f an idea born in his mind in August 1989. As he later explained, the idea 
was to set up the firs t post-cold-war pan-European institution, "in  order to make
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totally irreversible the end o f the split o f the European continent in tw o".1 This 
institution was a part o f a "grand design" to promote a continental Union which 
would ofifer the new democracies prospects fo r integration w ith in a larger Europe 
without com m itting the EC members to a quick enlargement. Such an institution 
had to be a bank because the main problem o f the East was finance. But that bank 
should not be likened to the existing international financial institutions (IFIs) such 
as the IM F, or to the m ultilateral development banks (MDBs): "This is not an IFI. 
This is not an MDB. This is an institution o f a th ird  type, o f a new type...".2
The ambiguity about the Bank's concept did not help fina liz ing  its charter, which 
was however ready a few months later. The founding treaty was signed on 30 May
1990, and the Bank o ffic ia lly  began its operation less than one year later, in A pril
1991.
Why a new institution?
Was the EBRD really necessary? Why not use existing agencies to achieve the goal 
o f helping the transition? The question was very early asked. As a French banker 
put it, the new agency looked as useful to Eastern Europe as braces to a shellfish 
(Laulan, 1991, p. 119). When M itterrand launched the idea, most o f his Western 
counterparts expressed strong reservations, suggesting that a new ״bureaucracy' was 
redundant and that institutions such as the EIB (European Investment Bank) or the 
W orld Bank could well tackle financial assistance to the transition.3 It could well 
be argued, however, that the EIB was devised to provide lending for investment 
prim arily for projects located in the EC, and the W orld Bank to assist the Third 
World.
Such objections are in order i f  the new institution is seen firs t and foremost as a 
means for providing assistance. The in itia l vision certainly included that aim but 
was much larger and political. The Bank was to become the firs t p illa r o f a future 
pan-European confederation, a project cherished by President M itterrand, fo r which 
he never won support from his Western or Eastern counterparts, short o f a half- 
hearted agreement o f Vaclav Havel.4 In this sense, the EBRD could be seen as an 
"a lib i" fo r postponing membership in an enlarged European Community.5
In the years fo llow ing the establishment o f the new institution, it became obvious 
that the EBRD project was totally unrelated to the developments occurring in East- 
ern integration into Europe. The integration debate focused on the association (so- 
called 'Europe') agreements that were signed w ith the Central and Eastern Euro-
1 Interview with Jacques Attali, conducted by Peter Norman, "Visionary with a global 
goal", Financial Times, 15 April 1991.
2 Ibid.
3 Leigh Bruce, "Aid Bank for East Europe Faces Stiff Challenge", International Herald 
Tribune, 27 December 1990. See also Attali (1994), chapter 2 ("Death of an empire, birth 
of an institution").
4 Vaclav Havel agreed to chair with François Mitterand the sittings of the European 
Confederation in Prague, 12-14 June 1991.
3 Paul Fabra, "La EBRD, cet alibi", Le Monde, 23 April 1991.Roland Schönfeld - 978-3-95479-733-2
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pean countries (in  December 1991 w ith Hungary, Poland, and the CSFR, and in the 
beginning o f 1993 w ith Bulgaria and Romania). Both the pan-European confedera- 
tion project o f M itterrand and the ,European stability area' later developed by the 
French Prime m inister Balladur6 remained fleshless visions.
Should one look for a specific feature o f the EBRD as an agency, this may be 
found in the principle o f political conditionality, embodied in Art. 1 and 8 o f its 
charter. Art. 1 provides that the purpose o f the Bank is to assist the reconstruction 
in  central and eastern European countries 'committed to and applying the principles 
o f m ulti-party democracy, pluralism and market economics'. Art. 8 states that i f  a 
member o f the Bank conducts a policy that is incompatible w ith Art. 1, it may be 
deprived from the access to the Bank's funding. Such provisions are quite excep- 
tional. The IBRD charter explicitly excluded any political intervention o f the Bank 
or any consideration o f political factors (Art. IV  o f the Agreement). The charter o f 
the IM F was less explicit but was understood in the same way (Yamane, 1994). In 
fact, it  may be argued that there is indeed a political philosophy underlying the 
IM F/W orld Bank adjustment programs. Conversely, the political conditionality o f 
the EBRD seems largely declarative. To exert such a conditionality presupposes 
firs t a clear perception o f the political aim and o f its lin k  w ith economic develop- 
ments; second, it implies that the Bank has a strong leverage it could bring to bear 
on the recipient countries. Both conditions are lacking. There is no agreement 
among the members o f the Bank on what the breach o f the commitment to m ulti- 
party democracy and pluralism would exactly mean.7 The resources o f the Bank are 
too small to allow  for a strong leverage.
Thus the political concept o f the Bank seems quite fuzzy. The in itia l vision o f a 
pan-European institution has not been endorsed in the significance it had for its 
'founding fathers’ M itterrand and A ttali. The political conditionality embodied in 
the charter is the fa in t reminiscence o f the same idea "to hook irreversibly the East 
to the West",’ which is yet to be applied. For instance, what would have happened i f  
the Bank had extended loans to Yugoslavia - a founding member? Would it have 
called in the loan after the conflict erupted in the Balkans? On what grounds and 
with which consequences?
Why a bank?
The answer is apparently straightforward: the east needs money, which a bank 
makes available. But money may be granted on concessionary terms, or on purely 
commercial terms. In the firs t case one has the MDB format, i.e. an institution fi-
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6 Presented at the European Summit in Copenhagen, 21 June 1993.
 Philippe Aghion (1992), Chief Deputy Economist at the EBRD, qualified the political ל
conditionality as "rather subtle": "The EBRD would not interrupt the flow of money to 
private investors if the democratic situation in the respective country changed for the 
worse. However, sooner or later the investor would decide not to further invest in that 
country due to political risks and hence the EBRD would also withdraw by then".
1 Interview with Jacques Attali, quoted in note 2.
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nanced by contributions o f its richest members and supporting projects that have an 
impact on the development o f the recipient country. In the second case one deals 
w ith the merchant bank type, which has to be profitable so as to be credible and 
which selects borrowers according to the pro fitab ility o f the projects submitted. In 
A ttali's vision, the EBRD was to be a ll that at once. It was supposed to help restruc- 
ture eastern Europe as an IFI would do, to concentrate on trip le A  status projects as 
an outstanding commercial bank, and yet to be something else - hence the aversion 
toward the current designation o f its members as "shareholders".
In his speech to the European Parliament in  October 1989, M itterrand had men- 
tioned a "Bank for Europe" without elaboration, however likening the future 
institution to the EIB. Later A tta li translated it into a "Bank o f Europe", a wording 
rejected by Chancellor Kohl who wanted to keep it for the future European central 
bank to be set up in the build ing o f the EMU, and proposed "Bank for Eastern 
Europe". According to A tta li, the name o f the EBRD was ultim ately suggested by 
the Danish m inister o f Foreign Affairs. Indeed the parallel w ith the IBRD was ob- 
vious, and hence suggested that the EBRD would be a MDB. In fact, the proposal 
was made so as to keep the Bank's affairs in the jurisd iction o f that m inister, who 
was already dealing w ith matters related to the W orld Bank; otherwise, they would 
have fallen into the jurisdiction o f the m inistry o f Finance, i f  the new institution 
was devised as a merchant bank (A tta li, 1994, p. 47).
Was the EBRD to be a standard development Bank then? Not quite. What is 
embodied in the charter is that the Bank merges the features o f merchant and 
development banking. Hence the Bank had two operations vice-presidencies. The 
merchant banking division was to provide lending and equity investment to private 
corporations, and to support privatization by lending to state-owned enterprises im- 
plementing a programme to achieve private ownership and control. The develop- 
ment banking division focused on four main areas: defining country strategies for 
Bank operations; helping to build the financial and physical infrastructure sectors, 
w ith the provision that no more than 40 percent o f the Bank's funding would be 
devoted to public infrastructure projects; supporting activities o f co-financing, 
tra in ing and procurement; and conducting local office activities. Both divisions 
were supposed to interact, in particular in activities connected w ith privatization - 
in  fact they often overlapped, which later led the second President o f the EBRD to 
merging them. In addition, the Bank could also provide advice and technical assis- 
tance, using special funds committed by a few shareholders.
This combination o f lending, project financing, equity investment, credit guaran- 
teeing, co-financing w ith other private or public banks, and a few concessionary 
activities, was by no means clear to the professionals o f banking and finance by the 
time the Bank launched its operations in A pril 1991. The Bank was not credible, 
not just because its President was not a banker himself. The role o f "catalyst 
between the capital and know-how o f the West and the businesses o f the East", as 
identified by President M itterrand at the signature o f the founding treaty,9 looked 
appealing but slightly unrealistic due to the high risk o f lending to the East. The
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goal o f developing a private sector o f small and medium-size companies, though 
quite respectable, entails the risk o f many bad loans. Lending to privatizing large 
state-owned companies is risky in another way, as it may involve the institution in 
lengthy restructuring actions. Thus it seemed that the Bank was doomed to ineffi- 
ciency and could be very soon choked by bad loans, taking into account its lim ited 
resources, which amounted to an in itia l working capital o f 10 b illion  ECUs, o f 
which 30 percent were to be paid out by 1995.10
Why a European agency?
The answer to this th ird  question seems obvious - the project was to help central 
and eastern Europe to achieve their transition to the market - until one realizes that 
the EBRD is not quite a European agency. True, most o f its members are European 
countries. But there are also non-European members, including developing coun- 
tries whose experience m ight be o f help to eastern Europe, such as Mexico, 
Morocco, Egypt, Israel, and Korea. A ll non-European developed countries are also 
members, so that membership includes the G-24 in fu ll. The most controversial 
inclusion has been that o f the USSR, which was fina lly admitted under strong lim i- 
tarions to its borrowing during the firs t three years. Following the collapse o f the 
USSR, the Board o f Directors lifted these lim itations in January 1992. But lending 
to the former USSR and particularly to Russia remained low in comparison w ith 
the central and eastern European countries, and was concentrated on a few projects 
mainly in the energy sector. From the very beginning the United States and Japan 
had cautioned against lending to the USSR, which huge needs in the area o f infra- 
structure could easily absorb an excessive share o f the Bank's lim ited resources.
The rationale o f the Bank membership is thus clear on the side o f what is called 
in the Bank's parlance the "countries o f operations". Though the countries belong- 
ing to the former USSR are members, the focus is on central and eastern European 
countries: quite logically, as the Bank is supposed to promote the nascent private 
sector, a process clearly more advanced in these countries. The Baltic countries 
have benefitted from a treatment closer to that o f Eastern Europe.
Could one say that there is a bias in favor o f the countries which are sooner or 
later to be integrated into the European Union, i.e. the signatories o f association 
agreements, or o f agreements like ly to evolve toward the association format as is 
the case for the Baltic countries? The members o f the Union together w ith the two 
member institutions (the EC, and the EIB, a very unusual case o f an IFI being a 
member o f another IF I) hold the majority o f the shares (51 percent). But this does 
not turn the Bank into a clearly focused pan-European institution, on the model 
Mr. A ttali and Mr. M itterrand certainly dreamt of. The Western European mem- 
bers never displayed a coherent front. The United States strongly influenced the 
drafting o f the charter through the G-7. The G-7 itse lf detains a majority o f the 
votes, which are distributed according to the shares. Overall the G-7 countries have 
a 55.9 percent stake, w ith the US holding the single biggest stake (10 percent) (see
10 Interview with Ray C. Smith, "Un risque d'inefficacité", Le Monde, 16 April 1991.Roland Schönfeld - 978-3-95479-733-2
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 09:44:06AM
via free access
figure 1). However the US do not have the power to block essential decisions as in 
the IM F and W orld Bank.11
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Why the EBRD at all?
In A pril 1993, a few days before the annual meeting o f the institution, the British 
newspaper Financial Times launched a harsh attack on the EBRD, claim ing that 
the Bank had so far done little  for eastern Europe and lavishly spent on itself.12 
Three months later, after promising to restructure the EBRD and to curb its 
expenses, M r. A tta li had nevertheless to step down. In his self-justifying book 
Europe(s), he both claims that the Bank has successfully fu lfille d  its in itia l goals 
and that it did not implement the in itia l "vision" (A tta li, 1994, p. 123).
In fact the concept was never clarified. To have a new agency was justified i f  the 
Bank had really been a "catalyst for change" and helped to implement a "vision"; 
w ithout that, there is nothing in the scope o f its activities that existing institutions, 
such as the W orld Bank and its affiliates, the EIB, the European Commission or 
the Western states and banks could not have done, and actually did. Mr. A ttali 
identifies the potential political role o f the bank: "to prepare Eastern countries to 
cooperation among neighbors, to take ecological needs into account, to press fo r the 
opening o f trade barrie rs,. .. fo r progress in the fie ld  o f democracy" (A tta li, 1994, p. 
119). On all these accounts the grand design failed. The East sees pressure for *co- 
operation among neighbors' as an excuse for postponing membership in the Euro- 
pean Union. It s till considers environmental protection as a luxury for developed 
countries, the latter being afraid o f the costs incurred i f  the EBRD had really to 
tackle that.13 In the view o f the European Commission, it is not really the task o f 
the EBRD to campaign for a quicker liftin g  o f trade barriers than what is negoti- 
ated between Central and Eastern Europe and the Commission.14 As we have seen, 
the crucial concept o f political conditionality has never been clearly defined, what- 
ever the useful role o f the political department o f the bank in m onitoring elections, 
tra in ing the press, watching the observance o f the human rights.
Just because the EBRD deals w ith activities performed by various financial insti- 
tutions and because o f its dual structure, it is not quite perceived as a bank. Though 
claim ing that it wanted to be assessed as a highly rated, profitable bank, the EBRD 
made it clear, on the occasion o f its firs t offering on the international capital
11 In the IMF or the World Bank the qualified majority for very important votes is 85 
percent of the shares. The US detains 17.82 of the votes and thus has a blocking minority. 
In the EBRD, the important decisions have to be taken by a majority of two-thirds, and 
the US has a much smaller share in the votes than is the case in the IMF.
12 Robert Piston, "The Bank that likes to say yes to itself', Financial Times, 13 April 1993.
13 Françoise Lazare, "La BERD n'est pas prête à lancer ses premiers programmes", Le 
Monde, 19 April 1991, quoting a US comment on the point that "the budget of the Bank 
could easily be entirely absorbed by the cleaning of the Baltic sea".
14 Leigh Bruce, "East's Banker Vows to Fight Protectionism", International Herald Tribune,
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markets, that it was "profit-guided" rather than "profit-m axim izing".13 The banking 
world is always cautious as regards non-conventional institutions o f "a th ird  type". 
W hile not a standard merchant bank, the EBRD has been less active than the 
W orld Bank in the fie ld  o f infrastructure reconstruction and development - a con- 
sequence both o f its lim ited resources and o f its commitment to prio rity financing 
for the private sector.
Finally, the Bank is not so much European as "non-Third W orld". It is the asso- 
dation o f the G-24 w ith the post-communist ex-Soviet block, w ith a few "samples" 
from the middle-income Third World. Thus, looked upon w ith mistrust in most o f 
the developed member countries, never really endorsed in the East where it is seen 
as a dwarf W orld Bank w ith even more red tape, it is considered in the Third 
W orld as a device to divert to the East funds which could be better employed in the 
South. Is the picture too black and unfair?
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2. The New EBRD and the Transition
The new concept o f the EBRD emerging after a few months o f a new presidency 
has been somewhat clarified. Mr. de Larosière reversed the in itia l design. By 
suppressing the political department he abrogated the "global vision" that had led 
to the establishment o f a new agency. By merging the two operational vice-presi- 
dencies - the merchant banking and the development banking ones -, and by 
restructuring the bank along a geographical division among "northern" and 
"southern" countries o f operations, he made the EBRD closer to a standard devel- 
opment bank. By bringing the staff closer to the East and specifically to the central 
European countries, he established the institution as an agency focused on the spe- 
cific needs o f Eastern Europe on ground level.16
But then, the Bank is no longer a unique agency, however unusual it may appear. 
It is just a development bank w ith commercial constraints. What can it achieve in 
the fields o f lending and assistance to transformation?
Carefiil Lending
Due to the low amount o f paid-in capital (3 b illion  ECUs out o f 10, made available 
in instalments by the end o f 1995), the Bank has to resort to borrowing on capital 
markets or from other financial institutions. It set its firs t bond issue, fo r 500 m il- 
lion ECUs, in September 1991.17 W ith an expected yield o f 8.91 percent, the Bank
15 Tracy Corrigan, "Raising Cash to Invest in the East", Financial Times, 26 September 
1991.
16 Robert Piston, "EBRD bord approves reforms", Financial Times, 9 November 1993; 
David Marsh, "EBRD raises local profile", ibid., 7 February 1994; id., "Excess gives way 
to restraint", ibid., 4 March 1994.
17 "EBRD Sets First Bond, 500 million Ecu Issue", International Herald Tribune, 27 
September 1991.
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had obviously to charge a higher interest rate to its clients, and it is said to charge 
more than the E IB .1*
This alone may explain why lending has been slow. The necessity o f selecting 
good projects in the nascent private sector, a very time-consuming task as central 
and eastern European private borrowers have no credit history, led to a slow start 
and a great country concentration o f the projects. By the end o f 1992, out o f 1 bn 
ECU commitments signed (in  loans and equity) only 126 m illion  had been dis- 
bursed; by the end o f 1993 the commitments had increased to 2.8 bn ECU and the 
disbursements to 556 m illion , displaying a slightly more favorable ratio o f the 
disbursements to the commitments (see figure 2 for the country and sectoral d istri- 
bution o f the commitments). The 60/40 split between loans to the private sector and 
loans to the public sector had been basically observed, w ith an actual 57/43 split. 
Poland, Hungary, the Czech and Slovak Republics have accounted for the greater 
share o f the projects, not surprisingly as these countries have started privatization 
earlier and achieved better results in macro-economic stabilization.
Though it had firs t seemed that the Bank m ight lend more under its new man- 
agement, developments in 1994 show that the 1994 commitments w ill hardly 
exceed the 1.8 b illion  ECUs total for 1993. The priorities o f the bank have been 
stated: firs t it w ill build operations in the borrower countries themselves, and the 
decentralization o f the bank's activities w ill allow to identify profitable projects in 
the private sector; second, it w ill invest more in small- and medium-sized enter- 
prises. The firs t p rio rity is mainly a matter o f credibility in eastern and central 
Europe. Besides, A tta li him self wanted to redeploy part o f his staff in the countries 
o f operations, and never succeeded due to the reluctance o f the staff. The second 
prio rity was also already stated in the past, as a focus on developing "an entrepre- 
neurial sp irit at grass roots level by helping the establishment o f small enter- 
prises".19 Specifically, in 1991 it was envisioned to support the development of 
SMEs by promoting a new network o f merchant banks which would in turn be able 
to finance the enterprises. It seems that the new management also wants to 
strengthen the local banks and investment funds to this effect.
The surprising conclusion that emerges is that apart from conveying a more 
focused image and shedding the pomp and circumstances o f A ttali's era, the new 
management is not proposing really new ways. The EBRD w ill obviously spend less 
on itself, but not much more on eastern Europe.
11 Financial Times, 4 March 1994. The ЕЮ charges 0.15 percent, whereas the EBRD 
charges 0.50 percent - true, as pointed out to me by the Director of Financial Studies at 
the ЕЮ, Alfred Steinherr, the ЕЮ has lower operating costs and no risk premium. Also, 
its loans have longer maturities.
19 Peter Norman, "EBRD draws up list of its priorities in east Europe", Financial Times, 7 
May 1994.
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Reflecting on what m ight be done (or not) one has to take into account both the 
needs o f the transition and the profitab ility constraint o f the EBRD, remembering 
that the Bank operates at the micro-economic level. The follow ing points can be 
made:
(i) Profitable deals to be financed in the private sector o f the countries in transi- 
tion are scarce, be it in form o f loans or o f equity. The best deals are understandably 
made by private foreign investors, and the involvement o f the Bank in such deals is 
more a help to the western investor than to the eastern partner (as had been said, 
for instance, o f the share taken in 1992 by the EBRD in the CSA Czech airline, a 
deal in which A ir France was involved as well). Helping privatizing big state- 
owned enterprises is very risky when they are not firs t restructured, an approach 
highly questionable in central and eastern Europe where industrial policy is not in 
favor. Focusing on small and medium sized enterprises looks appealing but cannot 
easily be done from London, or even from the countries in operation themselves 
with a lim ited staff. Besides it may involve the institution in unpleasant cooperation 
w ith local mafias. The indirect approach o f the SMEs through the support o f local 
banks and funds is potentially more efficient but no less risky. The EIB itse lf has 
undertaken such an approach, lending to local banks for on-lending to SMEs in the 
manufacturing, tourism and service sectors in Czechoslovakia (m ainly in the Czech 
Republic).20
( ii)  Global lending for development is much more secure, as here we are in 
charted waters. But then the EBRD looks as a competitor o f the standard develop- 
ment or regional banks. The EIB has already done better in eastern Europe, and its 
resources for infrastructure lending have been strengthened in September 1993.21 
The W orld Bank is the biggest project lender to the countries in transition, and has 
clearly taken the lead in the case o f Russia in the fie ld  o f commitments for the 
revamping o f the o il sector. However the W orld Bank is constrained by the condi- 
tionality o f the IM F, and the disbursements o f its loans to Russia were suspended 
when Russia failed to reach agreement w ith the IMF in 1993. The EBRD is not tied 
by this kind o f constraint; the political conditionality and the profitability con- 
straint may however be very restrictive here. In addition the EBRD cannot devote 
more than 40 percent o f its resources to development lending. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that the largest share o f its funding went to the telecommunications sec- 
tor, potentially the most profitable in the fie ld o f infrastructure.
Thus the options open to the Bank are either lim ited or already taken over by 
other, more standard institutions. It is very d ifficu lt to be a successful development 
bank without large resources and strong backing. It is no less d ifficu lt to act as a 
private bank when being a cumbersome m ultilateral agency. The second president
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A stronger involvement in transition?
20 Economic Bulletin fo r  Europe, Vol. 45 (1993), p. 62.
The Council of Ministers of the EC proposed to allow the EIB to lend an additional 3 bn 
ECU over three years to Eastern Europe and the Baltic States. Economic Bulletin fo r  
Europe, Vol. 45 (1993), p. 92.
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o f the bank tries to tackle both tasks while the firs t one tried to transcend them into 
a vision o f his own.
Conclusion
Can the EBRD usefully contribute to the emergence o f a market environment in 
Eastern Europe? The answer to this question opens a broader debate. Western assis- 
tance at large helped in this respect, and the EBRD played its modest part. But it 
had the most d ifficu lt part in the play, i.e. to provide microeconomic assistance 
while making it profitable for its shareholders. In addition, the countries where it 
has been most active ־ Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic - w ill soon no 
longer need its help, while the others may not yet have a private sector ready to 
absorb what may be offered.
Could the EBRD have improved the integration o f the east in the western 
(European) economy? It was certainly naive to expect such a development. Integra- 
tion through trade is a matter o f jurisd iction o f the European Union, and the 
suggestions o f the EBRD Presidency toward a greater market access for eastern 
Europe have always been considered as irrelevant. Integration through infrastruc- 
ture financing requires huge resources that are beyond the EBRD’s capacities. At 
best, the EBRD may work in parallel w ith the EIB and the W orld Bank, in particu- 
lar through co-financing, and play the same role o f catalyst to attract private funds.
The EBRD thus emerges either as helpless or redundant. It has helped a few 
specialists and policy-makers o f the east to become more fam ilia r o f the ways mar- 
ket institutions operate in the West. It has demonstrated negatively, as the Marshall 
plan did positively some forty years earlier, that assistance to reconstruction and 
development requires bu ilt-in  self-interest o f the donor(s) to be successful. It may 
s till prove useful on a modest and supplementary scale.
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Figure 1: Membership o f the EBRD
(in percentage of shares)
Source: EBRD, Organization of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
Notes:
The "EC G-7" are France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom.
"Other EC" are: Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, and Spain.
"Other G-24" are Australia, Austria, Finland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, New Zealand, 
Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland.
"Developing countries" are Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Korea, Malta, Mexico, Morocco, and 
Turkey.
"Countries of operation" comprise the Central and Eastern European countries (Hungary, 
Poland, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania), Slovenia 
and Macedonia, the Baltic countries, the countries of the former USSR.
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Figure 2: Country and sectoral distribution o f EBRD loans 
(in percentage of the total commitments)
A: Regional distribution: B: Country distribution. East Europe; C: Country distribution, 
former USSR. D: Sectoral distribution
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K ar sten  v o n  K l e is t 1
Recent Developments in Commercial Bank and Bond Financing of 
Countries in Eastern Europe
1. In troduction
The purpose o f this article is to provide additional information to those interested in 
u tiliz ing  the data collected and published by the Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS) on the bank and securities financing o f countries in  "Eastern Europe". The 
survey covers a ll countries in transition, that is, the countries o f central and eastern 
Europe, but also the former Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia (see Table 1). The 
focus o f the paper is on the period from 1988 to 1993, because major changes in  the 
structure o f the reporting banks' positions vis-à-vis these countries took place dur- 
ing that period. Any substantial subsequent changes are however mentioned in  the 
text.
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2. BIS reporting banks' positions vis-à-vis countries in  Eastern Europe
The BIS aggregates and publishes data on international banking activity collected 
in two reporting systems, which are stratified by the residence principle o f balance 
o f payments methodology on the one hand and by the country o f risk  exposure 
principle on the other. The quarterly, residence-based reporting system has the 
broadest coverage, w ith national banking authorities in 18 industrialized countries 
and 6 other financial centres supplying data that in most cases cover nearly 100% 
o f the cross-border positions o f their banking sectors. The data are published by the 
BIS about five months after the end o f the reporting period and thus tend to be a 
timely public data source on bank financing for many countries w ith less developed 
statistical reporting systems.
Over the ten years 1983 to 1993, the financial position o f BIS reporting banks 
vis-à-vis the countries in Eastern Europe developed in two phases. During the firs t 
period up to 1988, the claim s o f BIS reporting banks on this group o f countries rose 
rapidly, as the local authorities tried to sustain fa ltering economic growth. Thereaf- 
ter, output started to decline in most o f the region, reflecting numerous factors such 
as the move to world prices for inter-regional trade and the resulting decline in 
regional trade, the breakdown o f the old command system and cautious fiscal po li- 
cies. This output decline was accompanied by a reduction in financial claims 
outstanding (net o f exchange rate movements) which was the result o f reduced new 
credit and some write-offs. This reduction in claims would have been even more
1 Monetary and Economic Department of the Bank for International Settlements. The views 
expressed are those of the author and not necessarily the views of the BIS. I am grateful 
to Rainer Widera for comments. Responsibility for any remaining errors is my own.Roland Schönfeld - 978-3-95479-733-2
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 09:44:06AM
via free access
Karsten von Kleist112
pronounced i f  a build-up o f arrears towards the reporting banks had not led to a 
substantial increase in claims vis-à-vis selected countries.
The development o f the outstanding stock o f claims needs to be interpreted w ith 
care. F irstly, w ith nearly four-fifths o f the banking debt o f these countries now de- 
nominated in  currencies other than the dollar, exchange rate fluctuations may have 
large effects on the data which are expressed in US dollars. For instance, 55% o f 
the observed rise in the stock o f banking debt o f the region over the 5 years up to 
end-1988 was attributable to the decline o f the US dollar against the currencies in 
which the claims were mainly denominated (see also Graph 1).
Secondly, in  the wake o f German monetary union on 1st July 1990 and the trans- 
formation in central and eastern Europe, reclassifications and increased coverage 
by Germany and other countries added $ 19.2 b illion  to outstanding claims, al- 
though actual exchange rate adjusted lending fe ll by $ 3.3 b illion  over the period 
between end-1988 and end-1992.
Table 1: BIS reporting banks' positions vis-à-vis Eastern European countries,
1983 - 1993, US $ billion
Claims LUbUlties Net positions*
C »u trie• Dcc. Dee. Dcc. Dcc Dcc. Dcc. Dcc. Dcc. Dcc. Dcc. Dcc. Dcc.
19C 19« 1992 1993 1983 19« 1992 1993 1993 19« 1992 1993
Amounts outstanding
Bulgaria 1.8 6.9 7.4 6.5 1.2 1.8 1.4 1.2 0.6 5.1 6.0 5.2
F. Czechoslov. 2.7 4.5 4.9 4.7 0.9 1.7 3.8 4.4 1.8 2.8 1.1 0.4
Hungary 7.1 11.5 8.6 7.3 1.3 1.4 2.8 2.3 5.8 10.1 5.8 5.0
Poland 11.3 10.6 13.1 11.7 1.2 3.6 7.5 7.0 10.1 6.9 5.6 4.7
Romania 3.9 0.7 1.5 1.7 0.5 0.8 0.7 0.9 3.4 -0.1 0.7 0.8
F. Yugoslavia 10.0 9.0 4.7 3.9 2.1 3.8 5.3 6.1 7.9 5.2 ־0.6 -2.2
F. Soviet Union 16.2 36.9 59.0 54.2 10.9 15.3 14.2 16.5 5.3 21.5 44.8 37.6
T0U1 53.0 80.0 99.2 90.0 18.1 28.4 35.8 38.4 34.9 51.6 63.4 $1.6
1914 - 19» ־ 19S4- 1999 ־ 1994 - 1999־
1999 1992 1993 19tf 1992 1993 1999 1992 1993
Exchange rate adjusted changes
Bulgaria 4.0 -0.9 -0.7 0.3 -0.3 ־0.1 3.7 ־0.6 -0.6
F. Czechoslov. 1.0 -0.9 0.0 0.5 2.1 1.1 0.5 ־3.0 ־1.0
Hungary 2.0 -4.4 -1.1 -0.6 1.5 -0.5 2.6 -5.8 -0.6
Poland -3.6 -0.5 -0.6 2.0 3.9 -0.2 ־5.6 -4.4 ־0.4
Romania ־3.8 0.0 0.2 0.2 ־0.1 0.2 -4.0 0.1 0.0
F. Yugoslavia -2.3 -5.0 -0.7 1.2 1.0 1.1 ־3.5 -6.1 ־1.8
F. Soviet Union 14.8 8.4 -1.9 3.3 -1.2 2.2 11.5 9.6 -4.0
Total 12.1 -3 3 ־4.7 7.0 6.9 3.8 5.1 -10.2 -8.4
* Minus sign = net liabilities in case of amounts outstanding, decrease in net assets or in 
crease in net liabilities in case of changes.
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The lia b ilitie s  o f BIS reporting banks to these countries, which had amounted to 
no more than $ 18 b illion  at the end o f 1983, had doubled by 1992, w ith the rate o f 
increase during 1993 (11%) double that o f the previous four years (5.5% on an an- 
nual basis). These developments reflected the funding o f increased trading links 
w ith the Western economies and perhaps some capital flig h t, especially in  the case 
o f former Yugoslavia, where the reporting banks' claims have been declining since 
1987. The overall decline in the claims evident in Table 1 was delayed in the case 
o f the former Soviet Union until 1993 due to the accumulation o f arrears.
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Table 2: BIS reporting banks' positions vis-à-vis Eastern European
countries, 1993-1995, US $ million
C laias Liabilities Net positions*
Countries Dec» b • D•*. Jmm D tt
1m 1999 199S 1995 1993 1995
1 Amounts 0umsB<fcnfl |
Bulgāru 6461 3175 1225 1671 5236 1504
Czech Republic 2674 5394 2258 2910 416 2484
Slovak Republic 362 730 686 2054 -324 -1324
F. Czechoslovakia 1712 1822 4358 1193 -2646 629
Hungary 7314 8590 2322 2137 4992 6453
Poland 11694 7270 6994 12050 4700 -4780
Romania 1697 2241 901 1526 796 715
Belarus 241 702 128 271 113 431
Ruana 47184 52102 9426 10301 37758 41801
Ukraine 611 945 728 1078 -117 -133
Uzbekistan 35 290 377 1049 -342 -759
Other fonner Soviet Union 6088 4823 5868 3827 220 996
F. Yugoslavia 
Total
3921 4144 6092 9116 -2171 -4972
89994 41363 49401 48631 42X27
1994• Jm  1995 1994- Jom 1995 1994 - J n •  1995111ÎIi
Bulgaria -3837 277 -4114
Czech Republic 2203 253 1950
Slovak Republic 292 1 1162 -870
F. Czechoslovakia -67 -316 249
Hungary ־90 -410 320
Poland -5591 4234 -9825
Romania 334 550 -216
Belarus 399 130 269
Russia -3432 230 1 -3662
Ukraine 181 306 -;25
Uzbekistan 253 663 -410
Other former Soviet Union -1869 -2208 339
F. Yugoslavia -301 1965 -2266
Total -11525 6836 -18361
• Minus sign = net liabilities in case of amounts outstanding, decrease in 
net assets or increase in net liabilities in case of changes.
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The BIS provides separate data for the economies in transition in Central and 
Eastern Europe as well as for other countries o f the former Soviet Union from De- 
cember 1993 onwards (a selection o f which are shown in Table 2). W hile claims on 
Poland, Bulgaria and Russia were cut substantially in this last period, due to write- 
downs o f existing claims, new lending to the Czech Republic and the build-up o f a 
net creditor position by Poland (in  line w ith its accumulation o f foreign exchange 
reserves) and to a lesser extent the Slovak Republic are indicative o f the further 
strengthening o f economic growth in selected countries.
3. Currency com position o f BIS reporting banks' positions
At the end o f 1988, only a th ird  o f BIS reporting banks' total outstanding claims on 
the countries in transition represented traditional loans in domestic currency, while 
two-thirds reflected Eurocurrency lending, i.e. lending in a currency that is not the 
domestic currency o f the country in which the lending bank resides. Such foreign 
currency credits remained at their established level in absolute terms in the five- 
year period thereafter, although the composition o f both debtor and creditor coun- 
tries changed. A ll growth therefore was due to the marked expansion in  domestic 
currency credits (partly resulting from the increased coverage o f the statistics 
reported by Germany and Italy mentioned above), which im plied a rise in their 
proportion o f the total to almost 50% at end-September 1993. W hile domestic cur- 
rency credits are often trade-related and may benefit from offic ia l guarantees, Euro- 
currency credits are more often purely financial in nature and tend to be funded in 
the interbank market. The increased risk seen in lending to the area during these 
five years undoubtedly contributed to restraint in Euro-currency lending.
Graph 1: Currency composition of BIS reporting banks' claims
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As is evident from Graph 1, the currency shares as a consequence shifted quite 
markedly from 1988 to 1993. Over the most recent period up to June 1995, the 
currency distribution then remained largely unchanged. W hile the US D ollar ac- 
counted for 37% o f the total in itia lly , it has now shrunk to 22%; the main coun- 
terpart was an increased share o f the Deutsche M ark, which rose from 27 to 37% 
(38% in June 1995). The shares o f the Swiss franc and the Japanese yen have 
declined. By contrast, the proportion o f lending in  Austrian Schilling remained 
stable and rose to 6% in June 1995. The share o f a ll other currencies (including 
claims in transferable rubles) was up from 15 to 28%.
Although one m ight surmise that the change in the currency composition was 
purely a reflection o f the sources o f lending, there is some indication that trade and 
currency diversification considerations o f the borrowers also played a role, since a 
sim ilar shift can be observed in these countries' deposits w ith the reporting banks. 
Thus, while the share o f the US dollar has declined only slightly from 51% at the 
end o f 1988 to 47% at end-1993, the share o f the Deutsche M ark has shown an in- 
crease from 20 to 32% (33% in June 1995), w ith the share o f other currencies 
declining to a few percentage points each.
4. Share o f various banking groups in  positions vis-à-vis Eastern European 
countries
The quarterly  BIS statistics record positions on the basis o f the location  o f the 
banking offices irrespective o f their nationality. They therefore also convey infor- 
mation on the role o f the various banking centres in supplying funds to countries in 
Eastern Europe and on managing their assets held w ith banks. In terms o f percent- 
age shares, at the end o f 1988, banks in each country were supplying broadly the 
same proportion o f funds as were deposited w ith them.
Five years later, the distribution o f lending to Eastern Europe had clearly 
changed. Banking offices located in the United Kingdom, which had accounted for 
$ 21 b illion  or 26% o f a ll reporting banks' claims on the region had reduced their 
claims to $ 10 b illion  or 11% (10% in June 1995) o f the total. Banking offices in 
France reduced their share from 14% to 7%. In consequence, the increased expo- 
sure o f banks in Germany from $ 9 b illion  to $ 41 b illion  im plied an increase o f 
their share from 12% to 45% (51% in June 1995).
On the other hand, banks in the United Kingdom remained the most successful 
in attracting funds from the region, increasing their share from 22% in  1988 to 
26% in 1993 (25% in June 1995). Banks in Germany moved to second position and 
increased their share from 7% to 16% (14% in June 1995). F inally, banks in the 
United States moved from a m inor 4% in 1988 to 8% in 1993 and 13% in June 
1995.
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G raph 2: Share o f various banking centres in claims 
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5. The sectora l and m aturity d is tribu tion  o f BIS reporting banks' positions
Next to the quarterly statistics, the BIS also has been mandated to collect, since 
1983, a sem i-annual set o f banking data on banks' assets (lending) vis-à-vis devel- 
oping countries. Although this data is reported only by the industrial reporting 
countries, the data is more comprehensive than the quarterly report fo r those coun- 
tries who do participate, because it  is reported on a consolidated basis.
G raph 3: Banks' claims on Eastern Europe, 1977 1995 ־, US S b illio n
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As can be seen from graph 3, the coverage o f both series for countries in  Eastern 
Europe is very sim ilar. Because the semi-annual data is more burdensome to col- 
lect, the publication tends to lag about 2 months behind the publication o f the 
quarterly data, but it makes up for this by providing details on the m aturity  and the 
sector o f lending.
Since data in the BIS semi-annual statistical reporting system is reported to the 
BIS largely on a consolidated basis, it  also conveys an accurate picture o f the 
n a tiona lity  o f banks w ith claims on the area and thus o f the assumption o f credit 
risk by nationality o f ownership (Graph 4).
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The five years between 1988 and 1993 showed strong shifts in the composition o f 
creditors, w ith German and Italian banks increasing their exposure (partly due to 
increased coverage, as explained above). In December 1994, the three major credi- 
tors to the countries o f the region were German (49%), Italian (9%) and Austrian 
(8%) banks, while banks from other countries had curtailed their lending. A  com- 
parison o f Graph 4 w ith Graph 2 reveals that in  1993 a large part o f the lending to 
central and eastern European countries from banks in the United Kingdom was 
actually accounted for by foreign banks operating in the U.K.
The sectoral distribution o f lending as at end-June 1995 is shown in graph 5 in 
percentage shares. W hile in 1988 there had been no direct claims on the non-bank 
private sector apart from small amounts registered for the former Yugoslavia (not 
shown), the private sector is now beginning to be represented in lending, although 
most lending to that sector is s till channelled via local banks which then on-lend to 
local entities. In the Czech Republic and in Poland the private sector currently
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takes up 40% o f lending directly, indicative o f dynamic private sector development 
in  these two countries.
The maturity distribution o f claims on the region has remained largely un- 
changed over the years, w ith the proportion o f short-term claims (i.e. those w ith a 
remaining m aturity o f less than one year) fluctuating between 30 and 40% o f total 
borrowing. This was due to the large weight o f the former Soviet Union in total 
lending to the region. In cases where arrears o f interest and principal accumulated, 
the proportion o f short-term lending could reach spectacular heights, such as 67% 
in  the case o f Bulgaria before its restructuring at the end o f 1994, when its com- 
mereiai bank debt was halved and the proportion o f short-term claims fe ll to 24%.
Graph 5: The sectoral distribution of claims vis-à-vis eastern European 
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6. In te rna tiona l bonds issued by entities in  Eastern Europe
The BIS also publishes quarterly data on net issues and amounts outstanding o f in - 
temational bonds and Euro-notes, which is d ifficu lt to obtain elsewhere. This is 
based on data from the Bank o f England, the International Securities Market As- 
sociation (ISM A) and Euroclear. The BIS data is published one month after the end 
o f the period reported on.
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Hungary and the Czech Republic, the two countries which were issuing interna- 
tional bonds already in 1988 have managed to maintain this additional source o f 
credit. Hungary preferred to use the international bond market fo r a ll o f its 
substantial borrowing in 1993, while it further reduced loans from banks (Table 1 
and 2).
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Table 3: Net international bond issues by entities in Eastern Europe,
US S billion
Countries 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Jun.95
Hungary 0.8 0.9 0.9 1.1 0.8 3.7 2.4 0.6
Czech Republic 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.3 0.0 0.6 0.3 0.1
Total 0.9 0.9 1.4 1.4 0.8 4.3 2.7 0.7
7. C onclusion
The BIS data is not intended as a measure o f countries' external debt and should not 
be understood as such. However, it does provide tim ely, comprehensive and reliable 
data on two important build ing blocks o f external debt: commercial bank and secu- 
rities lending. In these sectors, it provides analysts w ith data fo r countries where 
domestic data sources may not be able yet to supply the data to the extent to which 
it is available from the BIS2. The international banking statistics indicate that 
cross-border capital transactions o f private nonbanks often are considerably larger 
than the amounts reported in  national balance o f payments statements. I f  due con- 
sidération is made for the inclusion o f securities holdings in the published banking 
data, the banking data can improve the quality o f balance o f payments statistics for 
many countries3. W hile this paper has provided a short overview o f the types o f BIS 
data available and their relationship to one another, more detailed inform ation can 
be found in recent statistical publications o f the BIS4
2 The BIS statistics are published every quarter in "International Banking and Financial 
market Developments".
i  "Report on the Measurement of International Capital Flows", International Monetary 
Fund, Washington, September 1992.
4 "Guide to the BIS Statistics on International Banking", Bank for International 
Settlements, Basle, April 1995.
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The Applicability of Standard Reform Packages 
to Eastern Europe
1. In troduction
W ith the collapse o f communism in East-Central Europe in 1989 and in the former 
Soviet Union in  1991 the 'Washington twins' found themselves in an unprecedented 
situation. A  large group o f countries whose economic system differed sharply from 
capitalist market system (even a distorted one - see below) found itse lf in need o f a 
stabilization cum liberalization, both necessary given the disequilibrated and distor- 
tion-ridden state o f these economies and their centrally-managed nature. Simulta- 
neous need for a measure o f financial support brought IM F and IBRD into the 
picture.
To this challenging task these institutions, in spite o f their intellectual potential, 
were not particularly well prepared. Not a few reports on those Soviet-type econo- 
mies (STEs) that joined these institutions before 1989 revealed deep misun- 
derstanding o f the characteristic features o f the economic system in question. 
Articles and papers on STEs by analysts from IMF/IBRD written in the 1980s rein- 
force this author's assessment.
Lack o f any deeper knowledge o f STEs reinforced the instinctively preferred 
standard reform package. Standardization has been based on the otherwise reason- 
able principle that economic rules o f the game are universally applicable. After a ll, 
as Mancur Olson once remarked at a K ie l Week conference, 'water always flows 
downstream, rather than upstream, regardless o f political or economic system'.
However, outcomes are not necessarily identical or even sim ilar under differing 
institutional conditions and inherited behavioural traits. This is exactly what in 
many respects protagonists o f standard stabilization and liberalization packages 
faced in post-STEs in question. Thus, without in any way questioning the need for a 
stabilization and liberalization programme for an economy shifting from socialist, 
centrally-managed to capitalist, market-driven economy, its particular components 
need not have matched one for one those applied elsewhere. And even i f  they did, 
effects o f their application need not have been the same - w ith implications not only 
for economic policy but also for political feasibility o f the transition process.
It is a contention o f the present w riter that numerous problems o f application o f 
the standard reform package came from their being invented and modified w ith 
market economies in mind. There is, however, a difference between a market econ- 
omy, even a heavily distorted one such as in many less developed countries (LDCs), 
and an economy without markets. Thus, although post-STEs at the start o f transi- 
tion were closer to distorted LDCs, they were distorted to a much larger extent or 
not always in an identical manner. Therefrom stemmed numerous surprises, often 
unpleasant ones, that affected policy making and transition process itself.
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The fo llow ing parts o f the paper deal w ith various components o f a standard 
package largely, albeit not exclusively, in the ligh t o f the then available knowledge 
on Soviet-type economies. Not exclusively, because some components o f the pack- 
age have already been criticised when applied to LDCs in need o f opening up 
toward the world economy.
2. O utput and Prices in  E arly  Transition
This and next section o f the paper largely fo llow  W iniecki [1993a]. As stressed 
there, expected changes in  output as a result o f stabilization programmes were to be 
small, in  accordance w ith theoretical considerations o f protagonists o f the 'hetero- 
dox' stabilization approach. Some empirical investigations correlated this assess- 
ment by stressing that, in actual fact, output m ight even slightly increase (although 
for theoretically rather dubious reasons [see Kiguel and Liviatan, 1992, on output 
growth based on programme's low credibility]). However, a more thorough investi- 
gátion into the nature o f the STE regime and the impact o f its legacy upon transi- 
tion suggests a radically different outcome.
In the opinion o f the present w riter [expressed already on many occasions, see 
W iniecki, 1990b, 1990c, 1991a, 199le, 1992c] one should expect a very large de- 
crease in  output at the early stage o f the transition process. These expectations are 
based on both the knowledge o f distorted macro- and microeconomics and that o f 
distorted output structure.
To begin w ith the former, one would at firs t approximation expect a fa ll in output 
registered only by offcial statistics. A paper presented at a symposium attended by 
those who often dealt w ith the Soviet-type (centrally-managed) economy detailed 
considerations o f the phenomenon in question are perhaps unnecessary. Therefore I 
signal only the types o f output existing only on paper that must have disappeared 
already in the early transition.
The firs t and simplest were w rite-ins (the russian term is p rip isk i). There was a 
very long tradition in STEs o f reporting higher output than the one actually 
produced. The second were hidden manipulations o f output structure registered as 
output growth but actually increasing prices only [there is an extensive Sovietologi- 
cal literature on the subject]. One should expect these ways o f doctoring reports on 
output to disappear w ith the shift from an economic system where firm s are paid by 
what they te ll to the one where they are paid by what they sell.
However, even more important as a determinant o f an expected steep fa ll in 
aggregate output is output that did exist in reality but would not have existed in a 
less wasteful economic system. It is output resulting from microeconomic realities 
o f the STE regime known as economics o f shortage [for the best exposition o f 
shortage phenomenon, see Kornai, 1979, 1980; see also e.g. Birman, 1983].
The STE regime was known for decades to have been plagued by persistent short- 
ages. Therefore economic agents adjusted to that systemic reality in  ways that were 
microeconomically rational, even i f  macroeconomically wasteful. Especially state 
enterprises, w ith their soft budget constraint, i.e. non-binding financial outcomes 
[see Kornai, 1980 and 1986], consistently demanded from their superiors and/or
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purchased wherever possible larger quantities o f inputs (as well as capital goods) 
than would have been necessary elsewhere.
The outcome o f such behaviour o f state enterprises (SOEs) in STEs were input in - 
ventories that were very much higher than those o f enterprises in capitalist market 
economies. According to Shmelev and Popov [1989] inventories-to־GDP ratio was 
in  mid-1980s in the USSR 2.5 times higher than in the United States. Various esti- 
mates put inventories in STEs w ith in 60-80% o f GDP range. Some such estimates 
on selected East European STEs are presented in Table 1. They are largely esti- 
mates owing to the fact that data on GDP (in  contrast to official net material prod- 
uct, NMP) have not always been available (other statistics often also needed 
recalculation).
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TABLE 1









a Without animal stock in agriculture
Sources: Estimates based on national statistical yearbooks; for USSR corrected estimates 
from Shmelev and Popov, 1989.
Now, w ith the fundamental realignment o f supply/demand relationship expected 
under the impact o f stabilization programme and product price liberalization, sup- 
pliers would be forced to search for customers rather than vice versa (as in the STE 
past). Customers would expect better supply discipline (tim ely delivery, higher 
and/or less variable quality, etc.) and, consequently would not see the need for 
maintaining such high level o f inventories. Their decision would be all the more 
incentivised to behave in that manner as the shift to market-based regime would 
simultaneously tighten SOEs' soft budget constraint, making high inventories a 
real financial burden.
Given the enormous size o f excessive inventories, even partial downward adjust- 
ment o f inventories-to-GDP ratio at the early stage o f transition should result in a 
substantial cut in orders for new inputs. Old inventories would be drawn down and 
one-off reduction in industrial output would occur.
It should be noted, however, that not only SOEs but also households carried lar- 
qer inventories under the STE regime (even i f  their budget constraint was definitely 
stronger). Thus, households, adjusting to shortages, made, e.g., larger food
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purchases then required by their current needs because they did not know when 
they would be able to buy the next batch. A  lot o f that food was subsequently 
spoiled [on adjustment in this respect see E.D. W iniecki &  J. W iniecki, 1990). W ith 
the disappearance o f shortages after price liberalization, excessive precautionary 
purchases should be expected to disappear as well. The adjustment o f households 
would quickly translate into lower purchases and lower orders by the retail trade 
sector also contributing to the fa ll in industrial output.
But output demanded for higher than elsewhere inventories is not the only one 
expected to disappear during the transition. STEs were also known to specialists in 
the area for their excessive level o f investment. For one per cent o f economic 
growth they throughout their existence neeeded about two percent o f growth in in- 
vestment, a ratio unprecedented in economic history (for selected contemporary 
comparisons, see Table 2).
A substantial part o f these excessive investments stemmed from the same high 
degree o f uncertainty under the STE regime that made SOEs to persistently run 
excessive inventories. In consequence, state enterprises became conglomerates o f 
sort, establishing various technologically unrelated divisions (constrution, machin- 
ery maintenance, instruments, transport, etc.) because it was safer - even i f  much 
costlier - to ensure that various renovations, repairs and other activities unrelated to 
given SOE's production profile are implemented in-house.
TABLE 2
GROSS FIXED CAPITAL INVESTMENT ТО-GDP: GROWTH RATES’ RATIOS 
OVER 30 YEARS PERIOD (1950-1979) IN  EAST EUROPEAN STES AND
SELECTED MARKET ECONOMIES
124 Jan Winiecki
STEs Ratio M arket Economies Ratio
Bulgaria 2.04 Canada 0.95
Czechoslovakia 1.66 Finland 1.01
East Germany 2.26 Greece 1.15
Hungary 2.43 Italy 0.97
Poland 2.35 Netherlands 1.11
Romania 1.95 Sweden 1.13
Soviet Union 1.62 German FRG 1.17
Average (unweighted) 2.04 Average (unweighted) 1.07
Source: Pryor [1985]
One should expect that increasing re liab ility  o f supplies after the beginning o f tran- 
sition, imposed by market discipline, results in decline in demand for, say, metal 
working machinery (for repair workshops o f non-machinery producing enter- 
prises), for construction equipment (for construction divisions o f non-construction 
firm s), for lorries, vans, and pick-ups (for a ll producers that used to fetch up unde- 
livered inputs from unreliable suppliers), or for buses (bringing employees from
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distant towns and villages under the pervasive conditions o f excess demand for la- 
bour). The reversal o f the despecialization process thus generates a fa ll in demand 
for and, in turn, output o f capital goods. The reduction o f demand for capital goods 
w ill be o f a permanent nature.
For the above-mentioned reasons, industrial output would be expected to experi- 
enee a very substantial fa ll. The foregoing overview o f determinants o f this fa ll in 
output o f intermediate products, as well as fina l (investment and consumer) prod- 
ucts is based on the widely accessible knowledge found in the literature on the STE 
regime.
The foregoing expectations o f a substantial fa ll in output and, in consequence, o f 
the shrinkage o f the industrial sector, could be formulated on yet another basis. The 
present w riter, together w ith his wife, wrote a series o f articles [J.W iniecki, 1986c, 
1987 and 1988b; E.D.W iniecki and J.W iniecki, 1987; E.D.W iniecki, 1987 and 
1991] on underspecialization o f STEs and resultant distortions o f their GDP, output 
and employment structures. The authors in question stressed the oversized indus- 
tria l sector that was 1/4 to 1/3 larger than in capitalist market economies at 
comparable levels o f development (see Table 3).
TABLE 3
ACTUAL AND EXPECTED SHARES OF INDUSTRY IN  SOVIET TYPE
ECONOMIES IN GDP AND EMPLOYMENT IN  %
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Share in GDP * Share in Employment
Actual Expected Actual Expected
Bulgaria 63 38 38 31
Czechoslovakia 71 39 48 35
East Germany (DDR) 69 40 50 37
Hungary 59 39 52 32
Poland 64 41 39 33
Romania 50 40 34 29
USSR 62 40 54b 31
Average (unweighted) 63 40 44 33
* Actual shares of industry in GDP are distorted upward due to non-market relative prices in 
STEs.
b Data in STEs were generally unreliable. In this particular case glasnost revealed that about 
4 million employees in military industry were not counted in national statistics (fact not 
known at the time of making calculations). Thus, the actual share of industry in USSR has 
been higher.
Source: J.Winiecki [1988].
The oversized industry was not in any way an indicator o f strength but rather the 
reverse. State enterprises strived for extremely costly self sufficiency at the enter- 
prise level (see above). Simultaneously officia l development strategy was based on
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also costly im port substitution at the STE level. One o f the consequences ot these 
two mutually reinforcing factors was an inflated share o f industry and, w ith in  it, of 
so-called, modem, 'progressive' industries going hand-in-hand w ith low  quality, 
obsolete products manufactured at a high cost by these pseudo-modern inflated 
industries.
Both changed incentives at the micro level at the start o f stabilization cum liber- 
alization and simultaneous opening up o f the economy at the macro level suggest 
that oversized industry w ill be forced to shrink. The most affected w ill obviously be 
heavy industries whose shares by far exceeded the same industries in non-STE 
countries at sim ilar development levels. In other words one would expect industrial 
structures in post-STEs in transition to begin to resemble more the same structures 
in Spain, Greece or Ireland rather than those o f Germany, the United States or 
Japan as they did in the past.
In post-STEs in  transition one would expect some other developments that m ight 
permanently reduce industrial output. Thus, since real transition to the market is 
inconceivable without preceding political transition to the democracy [see 
W iniecki, 1990a and 1992b], one would also expect the permanent reduction in 
m ilita ry expenditures. These, in turn, would entail reduced orders fo r m ilitary 
equipment and, again, reduced industrial output. It should also be noted that re- 
duced investment demand and reduced level o f m ilitary expenditures would be 
expected to affect any given post-STE in transition also indirectly through foreign 
trade effects o f sim ilar changes in other post-STEs.
The neglect o f knowledge o f the STE regime and its legacy's impact upon transi- 
tion is also present in the case o f expectations concerning the behaviour o f prices. 
Here, the problem stems from wrongly applied generalizations based on experience 
o f liberalizing LDCs. Again, price distortions in STEs, apart from being larger, 
were also partly different in structure.
Let us start w ith the stylized facts o f price behaviour w ithin the framework o f sta- 
bilization cum liberalization in LDCs. Before the beginning o f the process relative 
prices in a given LDC show a characteristic pattern: prices o f non-tradeables tend 
to be high vis-a-vis those o f tradeables. Price controls usually affect some non- 
tradeables, such as e.g. price o f eletricity (a subsidy to domestic industry, especially 
heavy industry), but most non-tradeables are priced at the market-clearing level. 
And this level is based on the lack o f foreign competition and their low  price 
elasticity.
The same cannot be said about the tradeable sector. Existing pattern o f ta r iff and 
non-tariff barriers (both export controls and import restrictions) makes some 
exportables, especially traditional ones (agricultural products and minerals) too 
cheap. Often the same applies to manufactures as a range o f subsidies reduces their 
costs to producers and result in lower domestic prices than those obtainable abroad 
under more realistic exchange rates. In any case, even w ith extensive (although 
usually erratic) protection o f import-competing industries, the tradeable sector is 
not in such a comfortable position as the поп-tradeable one. Therefore it tends to be 
too small.
One o f the aims o f internal and external liberalization is to increase the former 
sector by generating a shift o f resources from the non tradeable to the tradeable
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sector (although no less important is the internal restructuring o f the tradeable sec- 
tor in favour o f exportables and away from strongly protected import-competing 
industries). This aim is usually achieved by simultaneous freeing o f domestic prices 
o f most goods and devaluing domestic currency. The latter measure is combined 
w ith the elim ination o f export and import controls and reduction, as well as 
uniform ization, o f import tariffs. Such measures are rarely undertaken in favour- 
able conditions. Usually they take place under pressure o f strong internal and 
external disequilibria, high inflation and growing balance-of-payment deficit. 
Therefore price liberalization in itia lly  adds to the existing inflationary pressures, 
while devaluation tends to be large.
The price adjustment in LDCs is rather fast as domestic prices o f exportables rise 
to the (relatively well known) world market levels, while prices o f importables and 
import-competing goods now also reflect world market prices plus whatever level 
o f protection (more uniform than in the past) has been accorded to domestic 
producers o f the latter. In consequence, the period o f rapid price increase is rela- 
tively short because world market prices for agricultural produce and manufactures 
are relatively quickly established. The foregoing changes usually generate also a 
desired shift o f resources to the tradeable sector owing to the change in relative 
prices in  favour o f tradeables.
However, the price adjustment process outlined above is not, in the opinion o f the 
present w riter, replicable in fu ll in post-STEs in transition. To begin w ith, price 
structures in LDCs and STEs differ drastically. In contrast w ith relative prices in 
LDCs, prices o f поп-tradeables in STEs were drastically lower than those o f trade- 
ables, as could easily be seen from all international comparisons o f production and 
consumption such as those conducted by Summers and Heston [1988] and from 
various quantitative Sovietological studies [for a useful overview, see Marer, 1985].
The reverse relative price pattern would suggest somewhat different and more 
complicated behaviour o f prices after the start o f transition. Since prices o f most o f 
tradeables were also below the world market level (although the pattern here was 
much more complicated), the in itia l freeing o f prices would result, as elsewhere, in 
their rapid price increase to world market levels. However, the price adjustment 
process would last longer at least for two reasons.
First, suppliers o f various private and public services would encounter more d iffi- 
culties in establishing a ,world market price' for, say, rent for an apartment in a 
publicly owned apartment house (usually hideous and unbelieveably low quality 
[see E.D.W iniecki and J.W iniecki, 1990]) or even what is a 'world market price' of, 
e.g., a v is it to a barber or other personal services (to say nothing about much more 
complex bussines services that were then few and far between). Therefore, the proc- 
ess o f find ing equilibrium  prices for services would naturally last longer.
Second reason is that in STEs prices o f services were often ridiculously low and 
new governments would be reluctant to increase them by a factor o f ten or twenty at 
one stroke o f a pen. Thus, in order to moderate the shock, prices o f many services 
would be expected to remain controlled and the market-clearing levels would most 
probably be reached in stages. This is, nota bene, what has been happening every- 
where w ith respect to prices o f electricity, heating, rent, public transport, etc. W ith 
governments' intentions in this respect well known already at the start, one could
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safely predict that these periodic price increases would fuel in flation in  terms o f 
years rather than months.
The different relative prices o f tradeables and non-tradeables do not exhaust the 
lis t o f basic differences between LDCs and STEs that have serious implications for 
price adjustment after the start o f transition. Another radical difference is that in 
STEs the tradeable sector was everywhere too large, not too small (as in LDCs). 
Apart from the oversized industry, agriculture was in most countries too large as 
well. The tradeable sector was too large vis-a-vis the поп-tradeable sector, espe- 
cia lly services.
Again, one should expect that persistent and growing discrepancy between supply 
and (rapidly growing) demand for services in STEs w ill influence price develop- 
ments after liberalization. Quite obviously pricing policies o f service firm s would be 
more agressive under rapidly growing demand than under stagnant one. Therefore, 
services' contribution to price increases would be both higher and more lasting. 
Altogether, prices should be expected to behave differently. After the in itia l burst o f 
inflation, largely due to the price adjustment o f tradeables, they should be expected 
on the whole to grow for a longer period and at a higher rate than under sim ilar 
stabilization cum liberalization in LDCs.
3. M acroeconom ic P o licy Im plications
O f the two arms o f macroeconomic policy it is monetary policy that, in the opinion 
o f the present w riter, should undergo more modifications when knowledge o f the 
Soviet economic system has been taken into account. To give justice to protagonists 
o f 'heterodox' stabilization and IM F analysts, some knowledge o f the STE regime 
was indeed applied in the programmes devised for East European post-STEs. Ar- 
chitects o f the 'heterodox' stabilization programmes absorbed the most general 
lesson that state enterprises in STEs display 'soft' budget constraint and therefore 
credit to SOEs should be controlled through central bank's control over the quantity 
o f credit [see, e.g., Fischer and Gelb, 1991]. This, however, was not enough to 
reduce an adverse impact o f large SOEs' behaviour under monetary restraint on the 
economy as a whole.
But before this author restates his considerations on this point, he sees firs t o f all 
the need for drawing readers' attention to an even more general ־ and fateful - ques- 
tion. Namely, i f  economic policy-makers should expect a very large output fa ll at 
the outset (as explained in the earlier part o f Section 2), w ith its obvious deflation- 
ary implications, what influence should it have on monetary policy, more precisely 
on the extent and length o f monetary restraint?
There are good reasons to recommend monetary restraint at the start o f transition 
from STE to a capitalist market system. Hyperinflation, as in Poland and former 
Yugoslavia, was an obvious reason. The existence o f a monetary overhang (forced 
savings o f the population) was usually added as another reason for monetary re- 
straint. Some authors added a more generel reason for monetary restraint: the need 
to send a strong signal to the enterprise sector that the era o f persistent excess
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demand and sellers' market is over [for the present writer, see W iniecki, 1990b and 
1991d], i.e. build ing up the credibility o f the transition programme.
Expected steep fa ll in output implies, i.a., a fa ll in aggregate profits (that was de- 
layed fo r other reasons) and in aggregate wages. The former lim its own resources 
fo r investment, the latter - fo r consumption. Thus, by itse lf it strongly restrains de- 
mand. A  question ought to be raised to what extent monetary policy should add to 
the expected restraint by raising the cost o f money (increasing interest rate) and 
lim itin g  its availability also by other means (credit lim its fo r commercial banks). 
There are no facile answers to that question; nor are there any rules o f thumb than 
could be invoked for the very unusual occasion o f a shift from one economic system 
to another. But what bothers this author is the fact that, owing to the ignored sys- 
tem-specific consequences o f transition for output behaviour, the question was 
sim ply absent from IM F staff considerations, as well as from those o f post-STE 
economic policy-makers.
It is at this point that the present w riter returns to the issue only im plied at the 
beginning o f this section, that is the need for supplementing traditional instruments 
o f monetary policy w ith various prop-ups reflecting different ownership structure o f 
the enterprise sector in post-STEs in transition. The architects o f the 'heterodox' 
stabilization programmes drew only one conclusion, namely that SOEs' ,have 
autonomy without responsibility' [Fischer and Gelb, 1991] and therefore concluded 
that their access to credit should be controlled through central bank's credit lim its.
This is, however, only a part o f the story that should be taken into account. It has 
been known from numerous empirical studies done in  various STEs since the 1960s 
that efficiency o f state enterprises was negatively correlated w ith their size. The 
larger the enterprise was and the more showered w ith privileges (easier access to 
subsidies, credits, foreign exchange), the less efficient it really was. The conse- 
quences o f the above should not be underestimated.
Post-STEs entered the transition w ith what this author calls ,nobody's' banks and 
'nobody's' enterprises. The former did not care for the price o f money, while the 
latter did not look at creditworthiness o f their clients and riskiness o f submitted 
projects. This situation, in combination w ith the earlier stressed bad performance o f 
wasteful giants, called for more sophisticated approach than traditional prop-up in 
the form  o f credit lim its by the central bank.
Under the circumstances the very real threat was that wasteful giants, thanks to 
simple inertia in bank-client relationship, would continue to receive the lion share 
o f loans w ith in the credit lim its imposed by the central bank. In this they would be 
supported by the old nomenklatura linkages (between state banks' and SOEs' man- 
agers). The outcome o f the above would be that under the in itia l monetary restraint 
largest - and worst - enterprises w ill receive as much as they used to get in real 
terms, which under monetary restraint means a larger share o f total credit. A t the 
same time relatively better perform ing smaller state enterprises would get substan- 
tia lly  less. An atypical form o f crowding out would occur that must have an adverse 
impact upon the situation o f better performers (quite a few o f which could be 
pushed to the brink o f bankruptcy) and, in consequence, upon the aggregate per- 
formance o f the economy [on these issues, see W iniecki, 199Id  and 1992a],
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To prevent the foregoing from happening, another type o f a prop-up for monetary 
policy was needed [and proposed by this w riter in a report for the Presidential Ad- 
visory Committee, W iniecki, 1991 b]. There should be a credit lim it that freezes the 
share o f large enterprises, according to some accepted definition, to what it was in, 
say, the last two-three years before the start o f the transition. In fact, it would be 
even better to reduce that share below the old one - and keep reducing it over time - 
to make room for credit expansion for the growing private sector (a po litica lly d if- 
ficu lt step).
Another consideration affecting monetary policy decisions is that o f the nature o f 
expected greater persistence o f inflation after its in itia l outburst due to price libera- 
lization at the start o f transition. We know already from the preceding section that 
these price increases come to a large degree from the service sector, where price 
elasticity o f demand is low or, in some cases such as, e.g., electricity or heating 
costs, non-existent in the short to medium run. This being the case, monetary re- 
straint applied to squeeze the persistent inflation w ill affect price setting in the 
service sector to a lim ited extent only. On the other hand, it w ill adversely affect 
output in the goods producing sector by making money dearer.
The present writer approaches his last comment on the impact o f the legacy of 
STE regime on monetary policy with some hesitation. In contrast w ith well estab- 
lished empirical base for his earlier comments, it is only rough calculations that 
underpin this one. As stressed in Section 2, SOEs displayed very much higher 
inventories-to־output ratios. However, when all working capital is taken into 
account, not only inventories, this ratio (roughly calculated) tends to be s ign ifi- 
cantly lower than in Western enterprises. It follows that SOEs must have very 
much lower money holdings and other relatively liqu id  financial assets (in  fact they 
did not have any financial assets at a ll!)
I f  this is indeed the case, then it implies stronger enterprises' sensitivity to 
changes in monetary policy than in the case o f Western firms. I f  is, in the opinion 
o f the present writer, yet another argument in favour o f cautious, measured changes 
in monetary policy, and against large swings in policy stance that may overly 
influence SOEs' behaviour in both directions: expansion and contraction. I used the 
term 'yet another1 argument because everything that has been written so far in this 
section about the expected impact o f various STE legacies on monetary policy 
outcomes suggests the same. Measured restraint at the start, coupled w ith rather 
stable money supply after the in itia l burst o f in flafion, avoidance o f large swings in 
interest rate (as, e.g., in Poland in summer 1990/summer 1991 period) would seem 
to serve post-STEs in transition better than any alternative.
There are definitely fewer conclusions that could be drawn w ith respect to the im - 
pact o f STE legacy on fiscal policy. One such source o f impact has already been 
im plied in the analysis o f sources o f output fa ll at the start o f transition. Large in- 
ventories o f inputs not only influence demand for new inputs but also influence 
profitab ility since they were acquired at low, controlled prices and are used in 
outputs sold at high, liberalized prices. W indfall profits thus obtained should be 
expected to boost tax revenues and support efforts at balancing the budget. Baiane- 
ing the budget right from the start should become easier as a result. Furthermore, 
since it would be easier to do so at the early stage, a modified approach could be
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taken to cutting the subsidies. They would not need to be cut right from the start to 
such a great extent because taxes on SOEs' profits would support budgetary reve- 
nues at that stage but deeper cuts could be left for a later period, a second year o f 
transition, when SOEs’ w indfall profits would not boost budgetary revenues any 
more.
S till on the revenue side a general warning should suffice. SOEs had for decades 
practised various ways o f avoidance o f central controls. This applied also to their 
ab־ility  to increase employees private and enterprise-wide 'public' consumption at 
the expense o f profits. One could predict with a high degree o f probability that they 
would carry over these skills to the new economic regime. Therefore, enterprise 
profits should not be seen in the longer run as a reliable source o f budgetary 
revenues.
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4. Economics and P o litic a l Economy o f Wage Controls
A linchpin o f a standard, 'heterogenous' stabilization programme recommended by 
IMF has been for some time various methods o f wage controls. This has been one o f 
the so-called 'nominal anchors' o f the said programme. Its presence there has been 
maintained in  spite o f the neoclassical criticism  that a system cannot have but one 
fixed nominal value; otherwise the system cannot well reach stable equilibrium  
[see, e.g., Claassen, 1991, and Meltzer, 1992]. Even more interestingly, it has been 
maintained in spite o f an assessment o f its low level o f effciency even by some o f its 
intellectual fathers [see Dornbusch, Sturzenegger, W olf, 1990].
What matters here, however, is its applicabilty to a particular group o f countries. 
Countries, let it be noted, w ith a share o f the state enterprise sector (including 
quasi-cooperative sector) approaching in the lim it 100%. It is this factor that, al- 
though self-evident, has not been taken properly into account in this particular 
context.
In the West, where the public enterprise sector reaches at most 10-15% o f the 
aggregate output, or in LDCs, where it is larger but s till contributes a smaller part 
of the aggregate output, efficiency o f wage controls has been regarded as low but 
still, as we have seen, recommeded. In the opinion o f the present writer, there has 
been even less reason to expect positive effects in economies, where state ownership 
approaches 100%.
In private enterprise wage lim it may reinforce manager or owner manager 
resolve to resist workforce wage demands. Thus, it strengthens the w ill to lim it cost 
increase that is already there. In a post-STE state enterprise there is little , i f  any- 
thing, to strengthen in the firs t place. For decades under the STE regime managers 
learned to play on the same side in the team - w ith the workers and against the 
state (see Kom ai, 1980]. This attitude has changed little  under the transition be- 
cause the position o f managers has not been very clear and their structure o f 
incentives has not been compatible w ith that o f an owner, that is the state.
Therefore the easiest way for managers has been to play the generous but helpless 
uncle and say that they, o f course, would accept wage increase but it is the govern- 
ment that says 'no'. In consequence, in  post-STEs in transition the microeconomic
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conflict over wages has been politicized. The government becomes a party to every 
conflict in the state enterprise sector, and a much larger one at that. A politicization 
takes place over a much wider spectrum than elsewhere. There is o f course a differ- 
enee across countries, w ith more intense conflicts in countries w ith stronger tradi- 
tion o f workers' m ilitancy (comparison o f Poland and the Czech Republic is very 
pertinent here). But the strik ing difference between post-STEs in transition and 
economies w ith the dominant or at least larger private sector is the intensity of 
politica l conflict over wages.
Economic disadvantages o f wage controls are well known, and stressed already in 
the context o f post-STEs in transition [see the draft o f a firs t transition programme 
in Eastern Europe, Beksiak et al., 1989, Beksiak and W iniecki, 1990; W iniecki, 
1990a, Walters, 1991]. They slow down the microeconomic restructuring o f firms. 
This serious loss should be weighed against the short-run (or even purely potential) 
gains in faster slowing down the price rise after in itia l price liberalization.
There is, however, an even more important loss in  political Economy terms [see, 
for example, W iniecki, 1993b], Balcerowicz [1993] points to the existence o f what 
he calls a period o f ,extraordinary politics' fo llow ing major historical discontinuities 
(this is an interpretation o f an earlier Olson's [1982] view on discontinuities as a 
source o f an improved performance). During such periods the level o f readiness o f 
society to accept far reaching economic changes, often painful ones, increases 
sharply. Over time 'reform fatigue' [Bruno, 1992] sets in and that readiness declines.
Seen in those political economy terms, wage controls commit a major sin. First, 
the particularly high intensity o f conflict over state controlled wages reduces po liti- 
cal capital. Worse s till, political capital o f a transition-oriented government tends 
to dissipate at a faster rate than under wage liberalization alternative.
Second, wage controls shift po litica lly d ifficu lt and painful measures such as 
bankruptcies to a later period o f ordinary politics, where there is much more 
'reform fatigue' and much less willingness to accept such measures. Therefore, tra- 
ditional approach advocated by free marketeers is defnitely preferable in the case o f 
post-STEs in transition.
In the counterfactual scenario (since wage controls were accepted everywhere) 
state enterprises are allowed to price themselves out o f the market as a result o f 
wage increases granted to employees, a dreaded outcome for a ll do-gooders believ- 
ing in the absolute necessity o f a nanny o f some sort. Free marketeers assumed that 
one or two dozens or even a few more, large SOEs might really get bankrupt. 
Compared to a much larger number that have to be closed anyway due to their fun- 
damental unviability, it is not anything particularly out o f proportions. But the 
spate o f early bankruptcies would have a salutary effect on the whole transition 
process. The kind o f credibility gained by the transition programme in this manner 
could not be matched by any other.
At that early stage, in the era o f 'extraordinary politics' and readiness to accept 
painful measures at its peak, bankruptcies would have most probably been accepted 
by both the body po litic and the general public. No strikes or demonstrations, i f  
any, would engender a wholesale rescue operation. In the end other SOEs would 
learn a lesson whose implications were abundantly clear for a ll to see. M icro- 
economic adjustment would be speeded up. As the situation developed in reality,
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bankruptcies o f large SOEs were avoided (as intended in the early stage and later 
became a rare th ing (Hungary) or even next to non-existent one (elsewhere). In the 
end probably many more enterprises could be saved i f  the shock o f a spate o f bank- 
ruptcies galvanized many SOEs into action.
Compared to the foregoing major problem o f standard package applied to post- 
STEs, other problems o f employment and wages arising out o f the neglected know!- 
edge o f the legacy o f STE regime seem to be almost triv ia l in comparison. 
Sequence and nature o f redundancies, as well as higher probability o f acceptance o f 
real wage reduction belong to these problems and they are considered in greater 
detail in W iniecki [1993a].
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5. O utward O rientation, Exchange Rate Regime and P olicy
An area where the legacy o f the past has also been strongly underappreciated, is 
external trade, as well as exchange rate regime choice and policy making. A sur- 
prising element here has been somewhat different, though. Lack o f understanding 
o f the impact o f STE regime on transition has been a fixed element o f the picture, 
so to say. Here, however, the choice o f foreign exchange regime and subsequent 
policies pursued by countries in transition (under the influence o f 'Washington 
twins') neglected experience not only o f post-STEs in transition but also earlier ex- 
perience o f liberalizing LDCs.
There is an important lin k  between the shift toward outward orientation o f an 
economy, no matter whether underdeveloped (LDC) or maldeveloped (STE), and 
the choice o f an exchange rate regime and policy. An indispensable part o f greater 
reliance on markets must be an outward orientation i.e. greater reliance on the 
world markets. This can only be achieved through a shift o f resources (capital and 
labour) from non-tradeables to tradeables (in  post-STEs only exportables, see 
below) and resultant higher exports/GDP ratio. But steady export expansion needs a 
relatively stable real exchange rate. And here the problems with the choice o f a 
fixed (pegged) exchange rate regime, recommended by the IM F, begin.
Theoretical underpinnings o f the problem in question are not well presented in 
textbooks on international economics but the crux o f the matter is that benefits o f 
opening up a previously inward-oriented economy are reaped in two phases. Phase 
one is rather short and associated w ith liberalization o f both foreign trade and for- 
eign exchange. Domestic producers realise that shifting some output from domestic 
to foreign markets brings higher profits. The result o f phase one may be a rapid 
increase in exports from the existing production capacities. This is by and large 
what has happened also to post-STEs in transition soon after external liberalization. 
However, once liberalization reveals comparative advantages some goods become 
more profitable to produce and export on a more lasting basis. In consequence a 
shift o f resources begins to take place toward these more profitable activities. The 
capacity o f export-oriented sectors grows larger over time. Outward orientation be- 
comes an ever better established reality. This is phase two o f the strategy o f outward 
orientation, where lasting export expansion is achieved.
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Let it be noted that a pattern o f resource shifting in post-STEs is particularly 
complicated since under the STE regime the share o f tradeables has been continu- 
ously too large rather than too small as in other countries undergoing stabilization 
cum liberalization [see W iniecki, 1988a], Therefore the shift o f resources takes 
place w ith in the tradeable sector away from goods not saleable on the world mar- 
kets and toward those that can be sold there.
But apart from additional complications, fixed (pegged) exchange rate regime 
comes into conflict w ith phase two o f the opening up o f post-STEs in transition. 
The use o f pegging as an indispensable nominal 'anchor1 o f stabilization cum liber- 
alization and an associated tendency o f policy to use exchange rate as an anti-infla- 
tionary weapon [see W iniecki, 1992c] are inconsistent w ith m aintaining relatively 
stable real exchange rate over time.
Sticking for too long to a given 'peg' results in progressive overvaluation and 
slows down the shift o f resources to export-oriented sectors. The shift in question is 
predicated on the existence o f a lasting higher profitab ility o f producing and 
exporting some goods rather than producing other goods and selling them on the 
domestic market. W ith higher profitab ility being progressively eroded by over- 
valuation, shift o f resources slows down or, in  the lim it, disappears (as exports be- 
come more than temporarily unprofitable). Export capacity ceases to grow. At the 
same time imports progressively cheaper put more than usual pressure on domestic 
producers. Other developments and policy errors apart, this is what m ight have 
happened in East Central Europe in the 1991-1993 period after the in itia l good 
export performance.
O f special interest, as stressed at the beginning o f the section, is the fact that 
criticism  o f fixed (pegged) exchange rate regime as a part o f the standard 'package' 
has been noted already before in the case o f LDCs [see, i.a., Edwards, 1992, on 
Latin American experience].
Another interesting point related to the legacy o f STE past concerns this time a 
feature o f the standard package that reveals strik ing difference between post-STEs 
in transition and liberalizing LDCs, namely the need for a stabilization fund. Let us 
briefly recall stylized pattern o f foreign trade behaviour after the start o f stabiliza- 
tion cum liberalization.
Countries try ing  to shift from inward to outward orientation were usually faced 
w ith a dilemma. External liberalization brought about in its wake faster increase in 
imports than in exports, since exporters needed time to find  their niches on the 
world market, while importers were only prevented from im porting what they 
wanted by foreign exchange and trade controls. I f  foreign exchange reserves were 
small or growth o f imports particularly fast, the whole programme became jeopard- 
ized. Policy-makers were in some cases forced to abandon currency convertibility 
and freer trade. Therefrom emerged the idea o f a stabilization fund offered to a 
country undergoing such outward-oriented transition [see Krueger, 1980]. This 
idea was applied also to post-STEs.
However, a better knowledge o f the STE regime would te ll the architects o f the 
'heterodox' programme that whatever im port increase would take place after the 
opening-up (such as the inflow  o f consumer goods that were long denied to STE 
households) would be countered by a substantial drop in traditional STE imports.
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Net effect o f a ll these changes would be an import fa ll o f both temporary and per- 
manent nature.
Thus, the simultaneous regime change to the one where money begins to matter 
and a shift to restrictive macroeconomic policy force SOE managers to reassess 
both the rationale fo r extremely high input inventories and for preference o f 
imported inputs over domestically produced ones. A  reassessment should produce a 
sharp fa ll in  im port orders because an economically efficient choice for SOE 
managers is to draw on existing inventory o f imported inputs rather than to keep 
them at an extremely costly high levels o f the past. (This reasoning is, quite obvi- 
ously, a part o f larger reasessment discussed earlier in  Section 2).
However, quite apart from one-off drop in import orders to reduce inventories o f 
imported inputs down to (cost wise) manageable levels, one should also expect a 
permanent reduction o f imports (at a given structure o f output). The latter would 
come from different sources. First comes the disappearance o f excess demand for 
investment and a reduced level o f m ilitary expenditures. The author w ill not dwell 
upon these issues as they have already been analysed in Section 2. The only th ing 
worth doing here is to note their impact upon imports. STEs were well known for 
their heavy use o f imported parts and components in both consumer and producer 
goods. Imported high quality inputs were used to produce low  quality outputs sale- 
able only on domestic and other COMECON markets [see, i.e., W iniecki, 1984, 
1985 and 1988a]. This applied also to capital goods and to goods for the m ilitary. 
W ith the demand for both reduced, demand for imported inputs to them would be 
permanently reduced.
Second, internal price liberalization coupled w ith in itia l devaluation o f the gen- 
erally overvalued exchange rate reveals a part o f exports, based on costly inputs, 
that is unprofitable. In consequence, their exports and often their production w ill be 
discontinued. This applies as much to energy-intensive goods, once the heavy 
underpricing o f energy inputs ceases, as to import-intensive goods. A ll this should 
result in a fa ll o f the extremely high share o f inputs in aggregate imports (a feature 
characteristic o f STEs as seen from Table 4).
TABLE 4
IMPORT STRUCTURE OF SELECTED STES PERCENTAGE SHARES IN
AGGREGATE IMPORTS





Czechoslovakia 1973 67.1 13.8 12.6
1987 68.4 12.6 15.4
Hungary 1983 67.5 16,5 16.1
1989 61.6 18.1 20.4
Poland 1985 68.5 10.0 10.2
1989 61,1 12.6 12.9
Sources: For Czechoslvakia and Hungary national statistical yearbooks; for Poland: Polski 
Handel Zagraniczny w 1991 r. Raport Roczny. (Polish Foreign Trade in 1991. Annual Re- 
port). Prepared by Foreign Trade Institute, Warsaw, 1992.
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This share usually fluctuated over time (approximately between 60 and 80%) 
depending on the position o f a given STE in its investment cycle. W ith the expan- 
sionary phase o f investment cycle the share o f imported investment goods would 
rise and that o f inputs would fa ll toward the lower lim it o f the range.
Thus, w ith imports strongly reduced at the start o f transition, and w ith a part o f 
that reduction made permanent, the pattern o f trade after liberalization should be 
expected to d iffer from the one in liberalizing LDCs. Any surge in long desired 
imports would be more than compensated by a steep fa ll in imports typical for the 
STE regime. Consequently, there would be no need for any stabilization fund. The 
resources frozen for the purpose could w ith greater effect be used elsewhere in the 
transition process.
At the same time it should be kept in mind that some o f the determinants o f im- 
ports from the STE past w ill be influencing not only imports but also exports. 
Forgotten was the simultaneity o f the transition process. As more than one country 
began shifting from Soviet-type to market-type economic system, simultanous sta- 
bilization programmes, coupled w ith internal and external liberalizations, created 
parallel output declines that affected imports from other ex-COMECON countries 
for the same reasons they affected domestic output.
Thus, imports of, say, Poland from Hungary or Hungary from Czechoslovakia 
were affected by the decumulation o f input inventories, reduction o f persistent 
excess investment demand and reduction in m ilitary expenditures. Quantity o f 
goods imported by any country undergoing transition from other ex-COMECON 
countries w ill in each case be significantly reduced. It should be understood that 
transition changes the pattern o f demand and only ex-COMECON countries not yet 
undergoing transition could be counted upon to import in accordance w ith the old 
STE pattern (as the former USSR did in 1990).
6. Inventories: The M ost Conspicuously M issing Component o f Analysis
This Section is again based on W iniecki [1993a], Thus, it is stressed there that 
throughout the analysis pursued inventories o f state enterprises under the STE re- 
gime figure prominently as a factor to be taken into account in most respect. 
However, this factor has been conspicuously missing from considerations. The 
omission has been a ll the more surprising since inventories' component plays a very 
important role in any analysis o f business cycles in capitalist market economies. 
Nowhere is it as important as in predicions o f changes in output.
Why then the omission? May be a survey among theorists and policy-makers 
would help to answer this interesting question. W ithout it the present w riter offers 
two hypotheses. The firs t is that they (righ tly ) perceived that transition is some- 
th ing different from an ordinary business cycle. The second, that in no way 
excludes parallel presence o f the firs t type o f reasoning, is that they (wrongly) ne- 
glected the influence o f legacy o f the STE past upon the transition process.
And yet the level and structure o f inventories inherited from STE past should be 
expected to influence transition in many direct and indirect ways - as already tran- 
spired from our earlier considerations. It directly affects the level o f output and
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imports. It indirectly affects the level o f employment. It makes some macro- 
economic policy options, popular among those who reject rapid transition, com- 
pletely irrelevant (so-called Keynesian reflation that becomes useless when there is 
no demand that can be restored without the return to Soviet-type economy w ith its 
attendant excessive input inventories, excessive investment and m ilitarization).
It also affects indirectly macroeconomic policy outcomes w ithin the framework o f 
stabilization cum liberalization. The expected utilization o f inputs that had been 
bought at low, controlled prices in outputs sold at high, liberalized prices implied 
the emergence o f w indfall profits. These w indfall profits should be expected to have 
twofold impact. First, they should be seen as an opportunity fo r management not to 
adjust or postpone adjustment and as such they should be taken into account in 
government strategy (political economy impact). And, second, they would be 
expected to give temporary re lie f fo r the budget on the revenue side, as taxes on 
enterprise profits played such an important role in aggregate revenues o f the 
budget. As they would allow  to plan budget expenditures, e.g. change in subsidies, 
according to a different time schedule (see above, Section 4).
Altogether, inventories should be expected to play an extremely important role in 
considerations concerning transition. It is amazing that they did not. The stylized 
facts from the STE regime, i.e. high inventories o f state enterprises were well 
known to everybody who had contact w ith these economies even at a fa irly  superfi- 
cial level. The abnormally high ratios o f inventories to output are well known (for 
some estimates, see Table 1 above). According to various sources the different 
structure o f inventories, that is a much larger share o f inputs in STE enterprises, 
makes these anomalies even larger. This structure is shown in Table 5.
TABLE 5
INPUT INVENTORIES TO OUTPUT INVENTORIES’ RATIOS FOR SELECTED 
STES AND MARKET ECONOMIES IN  MANUFACTURING
(AVERAGE FOR 1981-1985 PERIOD)
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STEs Ratio M arket Economies Ratio
Bulgaria 5.07 Austria 1.06
Czechoslovakia 3.07 German F.R.G. 0.71
Hungary 6.10 Japan 1.09
Poland 4.49 Portugal 1.66
USSR 3.16 United States 1.02
Average (Unweighted) 4.38 Average (Unweighted) 1.11
Source: Komai, 1992
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7. S ta b iliza tio n  cum L ib e ra liz a tio n  P rogram m es: A Restatem ent
A review o f Sections 2-6 reveals that the standard package offered by the 
IM F/W orld Bank clearly neglected most o f the legacy o f these countries past eco- 
nomie system. This omission meant that policies and particular policy measures 
taken w ith in the framework o f stabilization cum liberalization were sometimes 
expected to deliver outcomes that a better knowledge o f the STE regime would 
regard as unattainable (such as expected low output losses after the start o f transi- 
tion). It also meant that a variety o f policy measures were in  need o f modification 
as a result o f taking into account this system-specific knowledge [see 
W iniecki, 1993b],
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Iv a n  T . B e r e n d
The Self-regulating Market Model of Central and Eastern 
European Transformation and the Role of the International 
Financial Institutions
After a short period o f confusion and ambiguity and, in several cases, coquetting 
w ith a "th ird  road" approach o f mixed economy and collective workers ownership, 
Central and Eastern Europe turned to a Western-type laissez faire road. The rapid 
marketization, liberalization o f prices and import, a dramatic transformation o f the 
ownership structure, in some cases w ith restitutions and "voucher-privatization," 
withdrawal o f state activity and subsidies, opening the countries for a free competi- 
tion were initiated according to the blueprint o f a self-regulating free market econ- 
omy. It is "an economic system controlled, regulated, and directed by markets 
alone," defined the model Karl Polanyi, and added: "No measures or policy must be 
countenanced that would influence the action o f these markets... Only such policies 
and measures are in order which help to ensure the self-regulation o f the market by 
creating conditions which made the market the only organizing power in the 
economic sphere."1
This model had a relatively short history from the end o f the 18th century in 
B rita in, followed by the core countries in Europe and later the United States. The 
model, however, was highly challenged in the 1920s and even more in the 1930s to 
the 1950s. Self-regulated market was, however, successfully restored after W orld 
War II by the United States and some o f the core countries o f Western Europe but 
was effectively applied only in a handful most advanced countries o f the world.
The rapid market transformation was accompanied by a dramatic decline o f 
industrial and agricultural output and Gross Domestic Product in a ll o f the coun- 
tries o f the region between 20% to 50%. Unemployment jumped to 10-14%, stan- 
dards o f liv ing  declined and poverty h it large masses o f the population. Although 
the economic turm oil was much more dramatic and harsh than predicted, and 
caused severe political backlash and the emergence o f political dangers, several 
economists, politica l thinkers and most o f the governments o f the region are still 
convinced o f the va lid ity and applicability o f the model o f self-regulating market.
R olf Dahrendorfs phrase, that "things get worse before they get better" and the 
people o f Central and Eastern Europe have to march through the "Vale o f Tears" to 
arrive market prosperity was often quoted. It means that there is an unavoidable 
negative side effect o f market transformation, but it w ill pay a high profit after a 
while.
János Kornai, one o f the best experts o f the state socialist economy, shared this 
view when stated in December 1992:
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There were some factors, connected w ith international fluctuations, which con- 
tributed to the decline, but their role had a secondary importance. The primary 
explanation is the follow ing: the severe decrease o f production is a painful side 
effect o f the healthy process o f changing the system. Whereas several elements 
o f the mechanism o f economic decline seem on the surface to be sim ilar to other 
cyclical phenomena and structural transformations o f various types o f econo- 
mies, this is something rather different...its cause is the transition from social- 
ism to capital ism...To end the decline one should not go backward, but forward, 
preserving the results o f the transformation already achieved and accomplishing 
even faster the tasks s till remaining.
The "transformational recession," as Kornai called the economic decline in 
Central and Eastern Europe, has a multi-causal explanation. He speaks about six 
main factors o f it: "Shift from a sellers' to a buyers' market; Contraction o f invest- 
ment; Shift in the composition, o f output; Shift in the composition o f foreign trade; 
Disruption o f coordination; Enforcement o f financial discipline."3 In this interpre- 
tation even the "disruption o f coordination" and "enforcement o f financial 
discipline" are strong reasons for decline since once the command economy was 
abolished, a market could not automatically start to function because a coordination 
void developed. That was the main reason o f the dramatic decline and economic 
chaos in Bulgaria and Albania, where the elim ination o f the old regime was not 
immediately followed by consistent reforms.
In Michael Mandelbaum's interpretation, the only question is time and patience. 
The editor o f the important Makina Markets stated:
The chances for...[an] ultimate success w ill depend...on how longand how con- 
sistently the policies can be sustai ned... Free markets w ill work..The harsh eco- 
nomie medicine w ill ultim ately have the desired effect. So i f  the people o f 
form erly communist Europe can endure the hardship that the policies o f stabili- 
zation, liberalization, ana institution build ing in flic t, they w ill emerge at the 
other end.;.of the valley o f tears, into the sunlight o f Western freedom and 
prosperity.
Transformation was undoubtedly accompanied by accidental events, such as the 
collapse o f the Comecon market and a severe Western recession, and, indeed, itse lf 
has several negative side effects which all contributed to an unavoidable decline. 
Deeper analyzes, however, had not satisfied w ith the above argumentation and 
searched for further factors o f decline. Several maintained that besides 
"transformational decline" and unfavorable international circumstances, the most 
important factors o f economic disaster were severe policy mistakes.
Some analysts found the roots o f mistakes in attempting to transform state social- 
ist economies overnight. The firs t critics o f shock treatment emerged in Poland.
2 János Komai, M agyar H írla p , December 24, 1992.
3 Interview with János Komai, "Anti-Depression Cure for Ailing Postcommunist 
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Vol. 4, N0.1, February 1993. p. 2.
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Tadeusz Kowalik the former Solidarity adviser argued that sharp decline was most 
o f a ll a consequence o f mistaken shock therapy: "To a certain degree this is a con- 
sequence o f the collapse o f trade w ith the USSR, but undoubtedly the main reason 
was an orthodox, and very rig id , austerity policy."5 "It is clearly evident," added 
Andrzej Koźm iński, "that continuation o f the shock treatment policies enhances 
further cost driven inflation...and further reducing demand."6
The accusation o f shock therapy, often heard in 1991 and early 1992, was, how- 
ever, discontinued afterwards. It happened partly because severe economic decline 
characterized not only the countries which applied shock treatment but those o f 
gradualist and even overcautious approach alike. Furthermore, the decline o f 
income and output in Poland stopped in the summer o f 1992, and growth followed. 
In  1993, Poland w ith a 5% growth rate was not only the only single country in 
Central and Eastern Europe which began to rise but was ranked firs t in growth in 
Europe and shock therapy was celebrated as the most efficient method and a real 
success.
A new doubt emerged in 1993, partly because an unstoppable decline continued 
in  most o f the region's countries, and, especially in the fa ll and winter o f the year, 
as a consequence o f the Polish election o f September and the Russian political eri- 
sis, the revolt o f the old parliament and the armed "solution" o f the crisis, then, 
most o f a ll, after the December election and the clear danger o f mass dissatisfaction 
o f the population w ith every fourth voters voted for the extreme right-w ing, fascist- 
type Zhirinovsky's party.
The experts who denounced "fast transition" and maintained that capitalism was 
never "introduced" by a "B ig Bang" gained ground. As Shafiqul Islam, the co-edi- 
tor o f the already quoted M aking M arkets suggested, a more "evolutionary model - 
a growth oriented, sector-sensitive, and...gradualist approach - [is needed which] 
has a much better chance at controlling inflation, promoting recovery, and putting 
the transitional economies on a sustainable path toward capitalism than the 'crea- 
tionist model' being tried currently.7
Paul Marer sought to challenge the over a ll va lid ity o f celebrated shock treatment 
and reestablish the genuine concept o f shock therapy as a cure o f "large macro- 
economic disequilibrium ," which is required only in certain situations and certain 
countries, while in others "had no need for shock therapy."8
Michigan economist Thomas Weisskopf argued that "shock therapy is extremely 
unpopular... [and Russian government] would search far and wide for an alternative 
strategy o f transition that would not impose such huge immediate costs on so many
5 Tadeusz Kowalik, Creating Economic Foundation fo r  Democracy. (Manuscript, Los 
Angeles), 1992. p. 6.
6 Andrzej K. Koźmiński, ,Transition from Planned to Market Economy: Hungary and 
Poland Compared." Studies in  Comparative Communism. Vol.XXV. N0.4. December 
1992. p. 325.
7 Shafiqul Islam, "Conclusion: Problems of Planning a Market Economy." In: Sh. Islam - 
M. Mandelbaum (Eds), On. c it. p. 211.
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people."9 The Columbia University economist Padma Desai stated: "The IMF has to 
relax its insistence on rapid, sweeping market reforms...Russia must introduce, step 
by step, a package o f feasible measures...The shock o f sharp cutbacks...hasn't 
worked - and won't."10
American policy makers in a broad scope from Senator Bob Dole, Senate minor- 
ity  leader, to Vice President A l Gore openly criticized Western misunderstanding 
and pressure to carry on strict austerity measures and use shock treatment to force 
rapid transformation in Eastern Europe. Strobe Talbot, the designated second man 
in command in the Department o f State urged "less shock and more therapy." 
Western media began to question too rapid transformation because o f its social 
costs and political consequences.
There is, however, another school o f thought which describe policy mistakes in a 
rather different way. They do not stop at the problem o f tim ing and rapidity of 
transformation and go beyond accusing shock therapy. They see much more gen- 
eral and widespread policy mistakes in a ll o f the countries o f the region.
Richard Portes argued that there was a
serious macro-economic policy error in both Poland and Czechoslovakia: in itia l 
excessive devaluation o f the currency... A  move to convertibility must be accom- 
panied by a sensible exchange rate policy: do not devaluate excessively; peg 
in itia lly : then go to a crawling peg. Some o f the output loss...is due...to viola- 
tion o f one or more o f those principles. The opening to trade with the West - 
w ith convertibility, low tariffs, and few quantitative restrictions - was too 
abrupt...many important industrial branches became vulnerable.
The drastic deterioration o f general economic conditions, Domenico Nuti 
observed, "is not [a] necessary concomitant o f transition, nor a consequence o f 
shock therapy..., but the unnecessary consequence o f policy fa ilures."12 Nuti lists 
several policy failures, such as the dearth o f liquidation and bankruptcy procedures, 
which had long encouraged firm s to accumulate debt. He also criticized the lack o f 
a "clear and coherent privatization program." But the primary focus o f his criticism  
is regarding "the failure in government management o f the state sector."
Indeed, in most o f the countries, the state sector was handled as i f  it was an 
instantaneously disappearing group o f companies. State-owned b ig industry was 
written off, and served only as a source o f state income. In most o f the countries, 
state companies were and are overtaxed, unable to invest in themselves. They u til- 
ized their last reserves and began to concentrate on exporting to the West, but, 
renounced by their respective governments and unable to adjust to the rapidly 
changing situation, they were for the most part doomed to obligation. This 
"betrayed," a iling  state sector, however, s till represents the bulk o f the economy,
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manufacturing 50 to 70% o f domestic production, but there is little  interest to revi- 
talize a part o f them.
The lis t o f policy mistakes is quite long. Sándor Kopátsy added a few more items to 
it:
It is fashionable to explain the decline o f the economy as a necessary sacrifice o f 
transformation. In reality it is not true. During the past five years, financial re- 
quirements for Hungarian firm s were so mistaken that they could destroy the 
big industrial sector o f each country o f the world.
Kopátsy mentioned, among others, the abolition o f subsidies without any kind o f 
compensation, the mistaken taxation o f inflationary profits, the lack, then the mis- 
taken bankruptcy law, a too high interest rate which channels industrial profits to 
the state-owned banks, and the exchange rate policy which overvalued the currency 
and made imports more expensive and exports less profitable.
These mistakes undoubtedly contributed in an unexpectedly deep and long eco- 
nomie decline in the transition economies. Some o f the mistakes were certainly 
unavoidable because o f the lack o f experience how to direct a process which was 
unprecedented in history.
In a closer analysis, however, most o f the above listed policy mistakes were not 
only the consequences o f an understandable lack o f experience. Several mistakes 
were connected w ith an unquestioned, religious neo-liberal economic philosophy 
predominating in the region. A  group o f scholars maintains thus the central reason 
o f the severe policy mistakes and economic turm oil in Central and Eastern Europe 
is an ideological approach to the practical problems o f transformation. They 
denounce the policy makers o f the region as 'new believers' who are convinced that 
there is only one single "design," an imagined ideal laissez faire capitalism without 
state ownership and intervention, and rejected all other options.
Unlike in 1988-89, when the West European mixed economies, the "Scan- 
dinavian model" and Austrian "Sozialpartnerschaft" were rather popular in Central 
and Eastern Europe, the new governments soon enthusiastically copied 
"Thatcherism" and "Reaganomics." The highly redistributive Scandinavian model 
is considered too etatist and socialist. In the place o f "Sozialpartnerschaft," the re- 
gimes seek to crush the trade unions, which they view as being either "Red" or 
anachronistic to the changing times, and they frown upon union organizing as po- 
tentially undermining the democratic order. The ha lf century triumph o f West 
European mixed economies in France, Italy and Austria, w ith a 20 to 50% state 
owned economy, was counterbalanced by a pronounced trend towards privatization 
in the eighties. The successful road o f the East Asian countries, which in several 
cases combined dictatorship w ith market-oriented modernization, and in a ll cases 
utilized strong state interventionism, was not even considered, or immediately 
denounced in Central and Eastern Europe.
This ideological approach was also the source o f other serious mistakes. Since the 
neo-liberal paradigm is based on the assumption o f an ideal equilibrium  and a
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perfect market and market mechanism, the followers imagined the possibility o f 
"introducing" this type o f market which would automatically solve everything.
Alec Nove, in a study on the gaps and illusions o f transition, critica lly  cited 
Marek Dambrowski and Václav Klaus as ones resisting "interventionist pressures" 
and "the demand for a kind o f government investment policy." As Nove points out, 
any kind o f source allocation for restructuring, any "state influence on the branch 
structure o f the economy...[and] prio rity in government policy" over the market 
mechanism is rig id ly  opposed.14
David Stark strongly criticized the ideological approach o f Central and Eastern 
European transition and rejected "design capitalism." He even suggested not to use 
the word "transition" regarding the region's transformation since it im p lic it means 
an exact blueprint to fo llo w  a transition to Western type o f capitalism. Stark ar- 
gues that "transformation schemes that rely on a single coordinating mechanism 
[i.e. market] do not so much emulate capitalism, as echo the implementation o f 
state socialism." He added: "A  policy o f all-encompassing marketization across a ll 
sectors would therefore pose a new obstacle to international competitiveness. M ar- 
kets are but one o f a many coexisting coordinating mechanisms [such as 'networks,' 
'alliances,' 'in ter-firm  agreements' etc.] in modern capitalism ."15
Why became an ideological laissez faire policy triumphant though at firs t most o f 
the post-communist parties and leaders looked for a kind o f "Third Road" com- 
promise? In Michael Mandelbaum's explanation because o f the example o f the 
West: "the West supports the creation o f Westem-style politics and econom- 
ics... simply by the example that it sets. Many o f the people who lived under 
communism wish to remake their countries in the image o f the West...Western 
prosperity can be seen on television...by everyone from Berlin to V ladivostok."16
Alec Nove went further when he passionately remarked: "Extremist neo-conser- 
vative think-tanks send missionaries to expound the gospel: ro ll back the state, do 
not copy Western Europe...laissez faire is seen as the answer."17 Jeffrey Sachs, 
Anders Aslund and many other Western advisors, indeed, "expounded the gospel" 
o f laissez faire.
The attractive Western blueprint and the promising advises to copy it in itiated 
and mobilized the new elite to adopt the model, even i f  it is d ifficu lt and painful. 
They thought that it is a rational price, an "entrance fee" fo r jo in ing  Europe. "I 
understood the d ifficulties that we faced because o f the Balcerowicz Plan," stated 
Bronislaw Geremek one o f the most influential Solidarity leaders, "but at the same 
time I knew that this was the only way that could secure the chances for Poland o f 
getting place in the European economic order. In other words: w ithout...a very 
painful renunciation...we had no chances to overcome the distance separating us 
from the threshold allow ing us to start the process o f integration. I was also aware
14 Alec Nove, Economics o f  T ransition - Some Gaps and Illusions, (manuscript, Berkeley),
1992. pp. 5,10.
15 David Stark, "Can Designer Capitalism Work in Central and Eastern Europe?"
Transition. The Newsletter about Reform ing Economies. The World Bank. Vol. 3, N0.5.
May 1992. p. 4.
16 Michael Mandelbaum, O p.cit. p. 13.
17 Alec Nove, O p.cit. pp. 4-5.
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that we must move very quickly...because Europe had frankly no intention to wait 
for us."18 As Andrzej Olechowski a close aid to Walesa and member o f several Pol- 
ish cabinets added: "even unilateral opening o f the economy to the world is advan- 
tageous...Liberalization may be harmful... Nevertheless, the overall prosperity w ill
1119increase.
Geremek, Olechowski and many others were convinced that a bold policy to 
introduce Western laissez faire system w ill conclude in a great leap to Europe.
The role o f the international financial institutions such as the International 
Monetary Fund and W orld Bank, however, played a central role in  effectively 
helping the realization o f these concepts. Most o f the countries o f the region were 
arrested by an indebtedness trap and needed foreign assistance for their macro-eco- 
nomic stabilization. A ll were highly dependent on Western trade, markets and, 
above a ll, the acceptance o f the European Community. In other words, they had no 
other choice but fo llow  the "advice" o f the so-called G-7 governments, the IM F and 
W orld Bank, which were often accompanied w ith strict conditions o f credits and 
trade concessions.
As M ira  Muc, head o f the Slovenian privatization office stated in the early sum- 
mer o f 1993: "We gave our word to the W orld Bank for privatizing 400 firm s in 12 
months...without that there are no credits.20 The U.S.Government Accounting 
Office's publication on the assistance to Eastern Europe reported on 1989 that the 
Commission o f the European Communities was given the authority to manage and 
control assistance to Eastern Europe from EC members. As a prerequisite to receive 
assistance from EC members, recipients were required "to make market rapid 
movement toward free market economies...and furthermore, 60 per cent o f its 
lending is earmarked for private sector projects, directing capital away from the 
hands o f the state. Conditionalities favors the radical over gradualist model o f 
transition."21
The international financial institutions represented a rig id  stand regarding social 
policy and welfare programs. They always subordinated the social issues to 
"economic rationality," and pushed the governments to this direction. This author 
had this personal experience during a day-long meeting in the W orld Bank in the 
spring o f 1989, together w ith a group o f American experts. Governments o f the 
countries o f the region were forced to keep the budgetary deficit under 5% o f GDP 
and cut social expenditure in a drastic way. In the fa ll o f 1992, the newly appointed 
prime m inister o f Poland, Hanna Suchocka had to face crucial decisions since the 
IMF suspended credit to the country because its budgetary deficit surpassed the pre­
The Self-regulating Market Model 147
1,Bronislaw Geremek, "Rok 1989." Warsaw, 1992. p. 365. Cited by T. Kowalik, The 'B ig  
Bang' as P o litic a l and H is to rica l Phenomenon. A Case Study on Poland. (Manuscript. 
Milan), 1994. p. 10.
19 "Integracji dzień powszedni." Zycie Gospodarcze, N0.44, November 5, 1993. Cited by: T. 
Kowalik, O p.cit. 1994. p. 15.
20 Napi Gazdaság, June 5, 1993.
21 "Eastern Europe: Donor Assistance and Reform Efforts," Washington,D.C.: US 
Government Printing Office, 1990. Quoted by: Beverly Crawford, M arket States and 
Democracy: The Transform ation o f Communist Regimes in  Eastern Europe and the 
fo rm er Soviet Union, (manuscript), Berkeley, 1993. Roland Schönfeld - 978-3-95479-733-2
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 09:44:06AM
via free access
00063440
scribed lim it. Decreasing the deficit from 7.5% to 5.5% o f the GDP, in accordance 
w ith the conditions o f the IM F, pushed governmental policy toward harsh social 
conflicts in the summer and early fa ll o f 1992, which undermined the government.
In the fa ll o f 1993, when the Rumanian government sought to receive a major 
IM F assistance for helping its transformation, the Western media righ tly  reported: 
" if  an agreement w ith the IMF is reached, Rumanians are bound to feel even more 
pain fo r the sake o f long-term economic health." This attitude and policy o f the 
international financial institutions led to a lack o f social sensitiveness o f govern- 
ments which directed transformation. In a period o f sky-rocketing unemployment, 
the M inister o f Labor in Solidarity's new government, Jacek Kuron, the former 
in itia to r o f the "Workers' Self Defence" in the late seventies, now followed a non- 
interventionist policy. Retraining and job creation was left to local initiatives. The 
period o f e lig ib ility  for unemployment benefit was reduced. "Society...cannot be 
permitted to go bankrupt," stated deputy m inister Piotr Mierzewski, "because o f 
health expenditures."23 Tens o f thousands o f pre-schools were, indeed, closed in the 
Polish countryside, and drug consumption in Hungary also declined by 22% and 
33% in  1991 and 1992 respectively. Only very recently some slight signs o f 
changes appeared. A new understanding, a readiness to change appeared after the 
frightening Russian elections o f December 12, 1993. "O fficials o f the International 
Monetary Fund said today," reported the New York Times a few days after the 
election, "that they were considering loosening their conditions for...Russia...The 
IM F, the W orld Bank and the wealthy industrial nations are straining to find  ways 
to expand social programs for Russia's poor."24
"The West is imposing strict and damaging conditions on the new democracies," 
noted Misha Glenny, "in  order to influence their socio-economic development...The 
Western economic strategy...has clearly been designed to coerce them into the swift 
construction o f a market or capitalist economy along lines preferred by the West."25
"The actual economic programs o f the governments", stated Federigo Argentieri, 
an Italian expert o f the Central and Eastern European transformation, "are more 
dictated by the International Monetary Fund than anybody else, leaving not too 
much place for maneuvering, except for nationalist and populist demagoguery."26
Moreover, the newly established parties and freely elected governments began to 
compete w ith each other in demonstrating their determination to fo llow  the Ameri- 
can-led Western world. The applause in the West that immediately followed was 
encouraging. The shock therapy definitely became the greatest propaganda success 
achieved by the former state socialist countries. The West awarded Poland w ith a 
unique and unparalleled gesture: it forgave 50% o f Poland's offic ia l debt in A pril
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1991, while the American administration took the spectacular step o f reducing 
Poland's American debt by 70%.
In competing for foreign aid and for easy access to the European Community, 
which was seen as a realistic possibility after the historic year o f 1989, the Central 
and Eastern European governments became free-traders and anti-state- 
interventionists to a degree surpassing the countries that were classic adherents o f 
that policy. The new elite thus became the world's most ardent advocates o f free 
trade ideology, and they followed it w ith neophyte bigotry and orthodoxy. Anyone 
who questioned this policy fe ll under suspicion and was arbitrarily accused o f har- 
boring nostalgia fo r the collapsed regime and o f attempting to preserve certain 
elements o f it, or being attracted by 'd irig ist'-dictatorial and 'statist' models.27
Laissez faire market economy without state interference, protectionism and 
public ownership became a religious commitment in the 1980s. The conservative's 
attitude (in  the American case) was excellently characterized by Guy Molyneux: 
"Where today’s conservatives leave te rra  firm a  is their unquestioning faith in mar- 
kets...Expanding markets and cutting taxes is the answer to every - not just some, 
but every - social problem ...If problems remain, that is only because we s till haven't 
gone far enough - the response o f a ll true ideologues."28
Moreover, this unquestioning fa ith did not remain the monopoly o f certain con- 
servative groups but became a sort o f Zeitgeist by the 1980s. It was not the case in 
the 1930s and most o f the European countries and all o f the successful Asian 
modernizing economies followed a state interventionist policy and several had a 
mixed ownership in the unparalleled growth period after W orld War II. When the 
new structural crisis emerged after 1973, previously triumphant Keynesism was 
defeated by a jub ilan t Chicago school version o f free market ideology. 'Reaganom- 
ics' successfully promoted laissez faire ideology and free market policies, and 
offered the spectacular American upswing by the early-mid eighties as an example 
to be emulated. Reaganomics was presented as a simple and quick solution to the 
world's complex economic ills. S im ilarly, 'Thatcherism' offered a 'vaccination' 
against the "Sozialpartnerschaft" and social-democracy, and initiated instant priva- 
tization in Britain. The relatively successful adjustment o f the Western core to the 
new technological and structural requirements o f the eighties thus led to a 
triumphant vindication o f free market ideology.
Indeed, the entire world was on a spectacular march towards a laissez faire 
system. From Great B ritain and France to Latin America, countries which had
This author expressed his view on the role of government in modernization in the 
Hungarian weekly Figyelő. András Brody, a reknown economist denounced it in the 
following way: "I have never believed in government-led modernization. The government 
should leave things happened. In contrast of this view, the concept of Ivan T. Berend's 
article met with the views and statements of Péter Boross and Viktor Orbán [prime 
minister of Hungary and the head of the Young democrats respectively who are 
seemingly not sympathetic to Brody who also sought to strengthen the role of the state. I 
think none of them are happy with each others company." {Figyelő. Gazdasági Hetilap 
December 22, 1993. p. 18-19.)
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turned towards strong state interventionism, bu ilt a huge public sector and insti- 
tuted planning during the postwar period, now dramatically revised their policy 
and introduced privatization. Marketization became a leading trend through 
deregulation and elim ination o f obstacles to free trade set up during the postwar 
decades.
The application o f the self-regulating free market model in the transform ing Cen- 
trai and Eastern European countries was certainly a historical mistake. A  pragmatic 
approach to the tasks o f economic transformation in the region righ tly  realize the 
need o f "tariffs at a significant level" along w ith a 'transitional wage subsidy," and 
"a ll this," stated Richard Portes, "argues for an active policy, fo r the kind o f indus- 
tria l restructuring that cannot be left to the market."29
Rather close to this argumentation, Shafiqul Islam urged "temporary protective 
walls o f tariffs, as well as direct budgetary subsidies." The philosophy o f "the 
survival o f the fittest should be perused firs t at the national level, and the survivors 
should then be gradually exposed to foreign competition." Islam denounced Polish 
non-tariff policy ("incredibly...average ta riff rate in Poland [9%] was only slightly 
higher than in the United states [5%], and while Washington maintained quantita- 
tive restrictions on almost forty food and agricultural items...quotas and other non- 
ta riff barriers are v irtua lly  non-existent in Poland"), and called for "a strong state 
w ith a coherent plan, [since this] is precisely what [the] command economy needs 
to free itse lf from the strangling g rip  o f the state...The creationist model o f laissez 
faire capitalism is an appealing but abstract ideology."30
State intervention, industrial, structural and investment policies are especially 
needed to make significant advance in restructuring the economy. The central goal 
o f marketization and privatization is the creation o f the prerequisites o f an efficient, 
reactive economy. In the firs t years o f transition, however, because o f a religious 
"de-stateization," economic restructuring and the attempt to generate an adequate 
response to the challenge o f the world economy 'temporarily' was pushed aside.
As Alec Nove pointed out, any kind o f source allocation for restructuring, any 
"state influence on the branch structure o f the economy," o r any "prio rity in gov- 
emment policy" over the market mechanism is rig id ly  opposed. "No industrial 
policy, no energy policy, no investment strategy. A ll w ill come about by itse lf i f  
and when macro-economic stabilization is achieved."31
The Schumpeterian term o f "creative destruction" was certainly never used more 
often than in these three-four years in Central and Eastern Europe. By 1992-93, 
however, there was a destruction so unexpectedly strik ing that the creative charac- 
ter o f the transition is s till delayed.
"The fa ll in output," •stated two W orld Bank experts, "does not seem to have been 
accompanied by the radical economic restructuring that many expected as part o f
150 Ivan T. Berend
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the reform process."32 Richard Portes added: "Industrial restructuring... has made 
little  progress. Privatization w ill not cure that."33
The core issue o f the structural crisis, the need for a structural-technological 
adjustment, is thus yet to be addressed.
The firs t m inor small steps toward the needed structural changes are linked, 
almost w ithout exception, to a few isolated large-scale investment projects o f sev- 
eral Western conglomerates, mostly car makers such as Volkswagen, General 
Motors, General Electric, Audi, Unilever and Suzuki. There is a definite drive to 
create a modern car industry in Central and Eastern Europe.
Others, such as Ameritech International and German Bundespost w ill contribute 
to create a modern communication infrastructure which is a major basis o f restruc- 
turing as well. But very few multi-nationals have shown genuine interest in the 
area, and those who have mostly did so at the beginning o f the transition.
Some other Western giants prefer to build profitable Pizza Hut and Kentucky 
Fried Chicken chains and went to monopolize the cigarette market. Needless to say, 
however, Pepsico and P hilip  M orris cannot possibly generate a major structural 
change.
Moderate domestic sources and small foreign enterprises made already a major 
difference in im proving services which were highly neglected in the postwar dec- 
ades. They had, however, little  real impact on the development o f competitive 
export branches, partly because o f a lack o f financial strength, partly because o f 
their preference in investing in trade and services.
There are further frightening signs regarding the lack o f structural adjustment. 
The severe industrial decline namely unevenly h it the various branches o f industry. 
Paradoxically, the characteristic branches o f lower development level, those which 
produce relatively prim itive products containing a high degree o f energy and raw 
materials such as iron, steel, textile, are more competitive on the world market than 
the more sophisticated processing branches. Cheap export helped thus to keep pro- 
duction on a relatively higher level in the former branches than in the latter. Engi- 
neering, electronic, transportation and communication technology, pharmaceutical 
branches, those which are responsible for technological development and modern 
adjustment, suffered the most. According to the analysis o f the M in istry o f Industry 
and Commerce there was a negative structural change, an opposite trend than that 
of the advanced industrial nations' in the Hungarian industry. W hile the energy 
sector's weight (including m ining) increased from 25% to 36%, the output o f engi- 
neering declined nearly by two thirds in four years and its percentage share 
dropped from 30% to 22% between 1988 and 1992.
This trend was exactly the opposite than that o f the advanced countries and repre- 
sented a highly negative structural change in the entire Central and Eastern Euro- 
pean region.
Although three-four years are too short a period to foresee the various adjustment 
processes o f the twelve countries o f the region, historical parallels are warning.
s  Ib id . pp.2-3.
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What is emerging in Central and Eastern Europe now is rather sim ilar to the 
region's response to two previous challenges o f sim ilar structural crises.
In the 1870s80־s and in the 1930s major structural crises were generated by the 
change o f the old technological regime. A whole set o f changes required a dramatic 
adjustment by shutting obsolete branches and establish rapidly developing new 
ones. Central and Eastern Europe could not successfully accommodate and 
responded by attempting to save and protect the obsolete branches o f its economy. 
Grain production remained dominant and grain continued to be the leading export 
item o f Russia, Romania and Hungary. The latter succeeded to build high protec- 
tive ta riff around the Austro-Hungarian empire and compensated the lost Western 
markets by the huge imperial one.
During the Great Depression, almost the entire region "escaped" from economic 
adjustment and preserved the obsolete structure o f the economy by accepting 
H itler's offer and take refuge in the German "Grossraumwirtschaft," a protected, 
isolated regional agreement system (based on bilateral trade agreement w ith Ger- 
many). The countries o f the region, after signing the agreements in 1934-35, 
escaped the depression, recovered the serious decline and reached, moreover, even 
surpassed the pre-depression level o f GDP and output. They could not adjust, how- 
ever, to the technological-structural transformation o f the, as it is often called, 
'fourth industrial revolution.' They remained agricultural countries and the gap 
between them and the advanced world continued to broaden.
The essence o f the transformation o f the 1990s is to create the prerequisites o f the 
economic adjustment and accommodate to a dramatic technological-structural 
modernization. A marketization and privatization program definitely belongs to the 
most important prerequisites o f catching up. Marketization and privatization itself, 
however, does not mean structural and technological adjustment and does not lead 
automatically to it. One may not forget that peripheral pre-W orld War I and II 
Central and Eastern European market-private economies were unable to give an 
adequate response to that time world market challenges.
In other words, the heart o f the matter is not just to stop further decline and gen- 
erate a new growth process. It is actually already in the horizon. Poland success- 
fu lly  halted decline in m id-1992 and became the fastest growing country o f 
depression-ridden Europe in 1993 w ith its nearly 5% growth. Albania also stopped 
to decrease output and income and accomplished positive growth results. The 
Czech Republic, Slovenia and Hungary may fo llow  in 1994 or 1995.
It was and w ill be crucially important to cope w ith the deterioration and achieve 
growth. One should not forget, however, two important lim itations o f a possible 
recovery. First o f a ll, the countries o f Central and Eastern Europe h it the bottom by 
their dramatic and unprecedented decline. A kind o f reconstruction-type o f growth 
rate, as in reconstruction periods in general, and in the case o f the region after both 
world wars, is always rather high. Reconstruction, however, m ight happen on the 
old technological and structural basis, as, again, occurred in both post-world war 
reconstruction periods in this century.
Rising output and GDP is thus good sign but not yet the real success o f transfor- 
mation. It may not be successful without a breakthrough in economic adjustment to 
the world economy.
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A ll these m ight lead to the conclusion that Central and Eastern Europe ought 
have to apply a more adequate model o f transformation. The self-regulating free 
market system, based on market automatism is a basic prerequisite but itse lf unable 
to promote structural adaptation in a non, or at least incomplete market environ- 
ment. The regulated (often mixed) market economy would offer a more suitable 
setup for the basic goals. In this pattern a centralized administration influences the 
flow  o f money as well as supply and demand; and labor and land, meaning the 
society and its surroundings are often not subordinated merely to the laws o f mar- 
ket. In this model the economic system is controlled, regulated and directed by both 
the state and the market. State regulations both assist as well as replace the market 
mechanism (which is highly incomplete). W ith its investment and structural policy, 
w ith a combination o f free market, and selectively market protective policy, the 
countries o f the region could more successfully apply the methods o f the post- 
W orld War West European and Asian modernization policies.
In February 1992, Frank Hahn delivered a Keynes Lecture at the British Acad- 
emy in London. His concluding remarks were as follows:
I hope I may have convinced you that the problems raised by incomplete mar- 
kets are real ...Keynes... has been declared out o f date and wrong by the very 
simple device o f ignoring and assuming away all o f the difficulties which he 
thought to be important. But they w ill not go away. When, as now appears to be 
the case, they are again recognized, economists w ill again become more c ir- 
cumspect in their judgement o f market eco n o m ies...T h e  General Theory...w ill 
again be seen as pointing to the right questions.
The "invisible hand" cannot arrange everything, and cannot solve the central 
questions o f the "economies o f missing markets" or "incomplete market." Most o f 
the policy mistakes and economic difficulties o f Central and Eastern Europe are 
connected w ith the mistakenly chosen model o f transformation. To replace a non- 
market w ith a market economy was an unavoidable prerequisite for adjusting to the 
technological-structural transformation o f the world. Privatization o f an almost 
entirely state-owned economy was inseparable from marketization. But a transfor- 
mation to a regulated-mixed-market economy would have been more ,organic' and 
smooth than one to an imagined free and self-regulating laissez faire system.
History rarely tolerates U-turns and new regimes always have to carry the heavy 
legacy o f the rejected past which, against the w ill and dreams o f the new govern- 
ments and systems, often pushes them towards genuinely rejected tracks. Addi- 
tionally, the peripheries have never had a successful free market economy. It could 
not work in a backward economic environment and in non-market societies, and in 
fact has never worked outside the advanced core countries.
A deep analysis o f the lessons o f the transformation years, a realistic acceptance 
of facts instead o f believes and hopes, a complex policy reorientation o f the inter- 
national financial institutions and the Central and Eastern European governments 
is needed.
34 Frank Hahn, "Incomplete Market Economies." Proceedings o f the B ritish  Academy, 80. 
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St a n is l a w  Go m u ł k a 1
1. B road P o licy Objectives and M a jo r E rrors
The main economic actors whose policy objectives I consider in this paper are the 
local reformers, the IM F and the W orld Bank. The local reformers include above 
a ll finance ministers and presidents o f Central Banks who are the key policy de- 
signers and the formal negotiating partners for the two Bretton Woods Institutions 
(BW Is). The governments (in  Russia including the President) and parliaments are, 
h o o ve r, the key institutional partners and policy makers. The immediate analyti- 
cal problem is the wide variation o f views amongst reformers at any time and the 
considerable changes o f their views over time. Some changes o f objectives have 
also occurred on the part o f the IM F and the W orld Bank. Nevertheless, at a very 
broad level, there were important policy objectives which have been common and 
stable, and there have also been distinct differences in objectives between the IM F 
and the W orld Bank, and between these two institutions and the local reformers. 
Since I wish to comment on reform programs in terms o f success and failure, and 
such an evaluation depends critica lly  on the objectives o f the program designers, 
the nature o f these objectives is important.
/. /. Differences in  po licy  objectives
At the level o f broad and long-term objectives the approaches o f local reformers 
and the Bretton Woods Institutions have been remarkably sim ilar. The firs t Polish 
Letter o f Intent states that "the sustained growth o f output and liv ing  standards and 
the strengthening o f our external position over the medium term...are the ultimate 
goals o f our efforts" (LO I, covering letter, December 22, 1991, p. 1). The proposed 
strategy to achieve these goals had the fam ilia r three components: extensive and 
rapid liberalization o f prices and trade, macroeconomic discipline, and market-ori- 
ented structural reforms, particularly privatization. Safety nets and external assis- 
tance were additional, supportive features. Most reformers would also agree w ith 
the IM F that " it has taken us far too long to shake o ff two dangerous misconcep- 
tions o f the 1970s: firs t, that monetary stability and growth are at odds w ith one 
another; and second, that external financing - borrowing - is the best path to
157
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growth" (Camdessus, July 11,1990). To meet popular criticisms, the Director o f 
the IM F also explains that "we are striving to improve the design o f our pro- 
grammes to ensure a better blend o f adjustment, growth and equity,...we encourage 
governments to avoid raising taxes on the basic staples...and to protect critical 
social expenditures" (op.cit. p.4).
However, the traditional, central concern o f the IM F has been macroeconomic 
stability in the short and medium terms. Its main role is that o f a global regulator o f 
economic policy, acting on behalf o f member states to assist in maintaining a 
proper international economic order. Its services are called upon when that order is 
endangered, and the Fund programmes are designed specifically to remove the 
danger and restore order. Hence the core policy concerns o f such programs are the 
restoration and sustainability related to external and internal macroeconomic 
equilibria. The policy objectives and the performance criteria are related to these 
concerns. The recipients o f the IMF funds are therefore typically Central Banks, 
not governments or enterprises, and their primary purpose is to strengthen the 
external position during the adjustment period.
W hile the IMF is concerned mainly w ith creating the right macroeconomic con- 
ditions for growth, the W orld Bank is a development agency concerned with the 
promotion and financing o f economic growth itself. To fu lfil this role the W orld 
Bank aims to create the righ t economy-wide microeconomic conditions for growth, 
largely by promoting price and trade liberalization, removal o f subsidies and exces- 
sive import tariffs, market competition and privatization.
The coordination o f policies for transition economies between the two sister 
organizations became, however, somewhat o f a problem. For institutional and other 
structural reforms are the core o f the transformation, and they are neither macro 
nor microeconomic. In principle, these reforms were supposed to be the province o f 
the W orld Bank. But the immediate problems in Poland, 1989-90, and in Russia, 
1992-94, were those o f stabilization. This in itia l primacy o f macroeconomic issues 
gave the IMF the leading role in form ulating conditions for a ll Western assistance, 
including that o f the W orld Bank. The policy interest o f the IMF has consequently 
over time expanded to cover also a ll economy-wide market-oriented structural re- 
forms. Except on the occasion o f negotiating so-called Structural Adjustment Loans 
(in  Poland, Spring 1990), the role o f the W orld Bank has been reduced to discuss- 
ing sectoral adjustments and specific investment projects.
The Polish authorities have all along taken the view that the two institutions' 
long-term objectives coincide w ith the ultimate interests o f Polish reforms so much 
so that the success o f reforms could and would become for them an important poi- 
icy objective in itself. By far the dominant concern o f the Polish reformers was 
therefore to enlist the international authority o f the BWIs in supporting the case for 
a deep reduction o f Poland's large foreign debt. The eventual reduction by about 
US$20 b illion  has been by far the dominant form o f external assistance. The inter- 
mediary role o f the BWIs, especially o f the IM F, in obtaining the reduction has 
been clearly helpful to both the creditors and Poland. The second objective was that 
o f the central reform group, based largely in the Finance M inistry and the Central 
Bank. It was to enlist the BWIs in supporting its policies w ith in the government, 
the parliament and the country in general. For this purpose it was useful o f the
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group to stress, even exaggerate, the external influence o f the BW Is among gov- 
emments, banks and private investors. The th ird Polish objective was to secure new 
credits, which have been particularly significant in the case o f the W orld Bank 
(Tables 1 and 2). F inally, the missions o f the BWIs represented a large th ink tank 
o f highly professional analysts and advisers who have been providing Polish 
reformers w ith systematic analysis and helping them to formulate specific policies.
1.2. P o lic y  A rgum ents and  C ontroversies
Policy controversies in Poland between the BWIs and reformers concerned impor- 
tant issues, such as energy pricing, the role o f expectations in form ulating 
exchange policy in 1990, the methods o f financial restructuring o f banks and 
enterprises in 1993/94, the form o f wage policy, the choice o f nominal anchor(s) in
1993, the speed o f state-led privatization, the ideal level o f subsidies and the level 
o f ta riff protection. However, the disagreements were relatively m inor and were in 
most part resolved by the BWIs accepting the Polish view. O f overriding impor- 
tance has been the agreement that dramatic actions are required to liberalize prices 
and foreign trade, impose a restrictive macroeconomic policy to discipline enter- 
prises and stabilize liberalized prices, and to establish a process for fast privatiza- 
tion. The common ground eventually also included the acceptance that a large fa ll 
o f output is inevitable and that the fa ll is largely the effect o f a rapid pace o f 
systemic transformation rather than the cost o f stabilization.
Perhaps the most controversial issue has been the possibly excessive weight 
accorded by the IMF to inflation during transition. One view is that low inflation is 
neither necessary nor sufficient to effect systemic transformation. The IMF's view 
on that matter has been changing somewhat, but the in itia l position appears to have 
been that low inflation, while not sufficient, is certainly necessary to effect systemic 
transformation successfully. Consequently, despite large progress w ith the main 
systemic reformers in Russia, the IM F has been most reluctant to support the re- 
forms financially. The IMF is an institutional guardian o f low inflation, and its 
credibility worldwide depends on how that role is discharged. It may have therefore 
developed a bias in attributing to high inflation excessive resource costs and in 
refusing to accept that, in conditions o f extraordinary output falls, there may also 
be sizeable welfare benefits, arising from income redistribution from rich to poor 
among both households and enterprises, through the inflation tax. There may there- 
fore be a case, in transition economies, for a gradual disinflation path, such as that 
adopted by Poland.
1.3. M a jo r E rro rs  in  Assum ptions and  P o lic ies
Part III o f the paper discusses actual programmes and their outcomes. However, it 
w ill be usefiil to collect and list in this introductory section the major errors in 
assumptions and policies. It w ill be evident that these errors are related mainly to 
che inadequate understanding o f the transformation process by the programme de-
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signers at the start o f the process. Despite large errors, the Polish stand-by pro- 
gramme for 1990 was successful in its own terms. But the errors contributed to the 
failure o f the Fund-supported programmes for Poland in 1991/92 and for Russia in 
1992/93. The last Polish programme, for 1993, was however almost error-free and 
exceptionally successful.
Poland
Error 1. Assumptions concerning GDP growth:
- 3.5% in 1990 against actual -11.4%
+ 3.5% in 1991 against actual -7.4%
The so called actual numbers above are, in fact, the officia l estimates o f measured 
changes in GDP. The really actual GDP falls were apparently significantly lower 
than o ffic ia lly  stated (Zienkowski, 1992). Nevertheless the errors were probably 
large, especially for 1991, when the impact o f the collapse o f the CMEA and the 
dollarization o f trade w ith the former CMEA area were grossly underestimated. In 
the programme for 1990, little  attention was given to the other two phenomena 
which deepen the fa ll o f output: de-stocking o f inventories and high savings pro- 
pensity o f households. W hile these assumptions on GDP growth were made by the 
Polish Finance M inistry, they were accepted by the IMF.
Error 2. The assumptions concerning 'corrective' inflation (Consumer Price 
Index), fo llow ing price corrections and price liberalization (compared to average 
December 1989):
45% against actual 79.6% in January 1990
75% in Q l, 1990 against actual 133%.
The IM F team produced calculations, dated December 5, 1989, w׳hich formed the 
basis fo r the choice o f the dis-inflation path in the course o f 1990 and the choice o f 
the exchange rate in Polish stabilization program for 1990. The calculations were 
based on the fo llow ing assumptions: the 41 price effect o f excess liqu id ity was 20% 
and the excess to be absorbed by coal and other energy price increases (12% in 
January, 5.4% in February and 1.7% in March). The coal price increase would be 
500% and gas increase 200% in January (these were approximately the actual 
increases); the January wage increase was to be equal to inflation minus the impact 
o f exchange rate adjustment, wage levels fixed in February-April, and indexed on 
inflation o f the same month w ith 70% coefficient from May (this assumption was 
approximately correct, except for January when wage increase was much lower); 
the new׳ exchange rate would be 9706 zloty to the dollar, the result o f adding up the 
!December 'unification level' (5888) zloty, export incentives (430), the effect o f 
January inflation o f (2505) and a 10% safety margin (882) (the actual rate chosen 
was 9500). The wage increase was assumed to be 26.5% in January, but its contri- 
bution to inflation would be only 4.3% (and 2.1 % in February and 0.7% in 
March). The cumulative price impact o f devaluation was thought to be 24% (14.4% 
in January, 6.3% in February and 2% in March). At the request o f the Polish
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authorities, I discussed these calculations w ith M r. Russo, the Director o f the IMF's 
European Department and the leader o f the team. M y notes show that I proposed 
corrections (three times higher impact o f wage increases and two times higher im - 
pact o f energy price increases, no impact o f the stock excess demand but an impact 
o f the flow  excess demand o f 10% in January), which implied the fo llow ing in fla- 
tion rates: 70% in January, 30% in  February and 10% in March. The actual rates 
were: 79% in January, 24% in February and 4.7% in  March. M y projection for Q l,
1990 was therefore close to the actual outcome (143% against actual 133%), espe- 
cia lly since the actual wage increases were lower than assumed in these discussions. 
On the other hand, our price projections did not take into account the impact o f 
sharp increases o f interest rates and depreciation rates. The lower IM F inflation 
rates were seen by the Polish side as unrealistic, but were adopted nevertheless as 
an bu ilt-in  safety margin o f the program.2
Error 3.The misinterpretation o f the reasons for large taxable 'statistical' profits 
in 1989 and 1990, the consequent large underestimation o f holding gains during 
that period, and a large over-estimation o f taxable profits in 1991.
These matters are discussed best in Schaffer (1993). The presence o f holding 
gains was known in principle, but the absence o f good data on inventories pre- 
vented the Polish/IMF program designers from coming up w ith a credible estimate 
o f any gains and their impact on profits and budget revenue. In the absence o f the 
estimate, a popular hypothesis, later abandoned, was that very high pro fit margins 
(and sharper than assumed output fa lls) reflected the monopolized market structure.
Error 4. The explosion o f social transfers in 1991 and later.
It was overlooked that a background-looking indexation rule, link ing  current 
changes in transfers to past changes in wages, would result in a sharp increase in 
the ratio o f benefits to wages with the progress o f stabilization.
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On December 7, 1989, the IMF team produced "Alternative 2" projection, in which the 
impact o f price liberalization, including energy price rises, was increased from 20% to 
40% in Q l, 1990. The impact o f wage rises was also increased somewhat. In this 
scenario, prices would rise 53% in January, 21% in February and 6.6% in March, giving 
a total increase, in Q l, o f 97%, and an exchange rate o f 10,385 zl. to the USS. That 
alternative was eventually dropped as *too pessimistic*. The Polish program was later 
often criticised fo r adopting an excessive devaluation o f the zloty. The Polish authorities 
assumed in itia lly  that the new exchange rate would be 10,500 zl. and that it would be 
progressively increased to 14,500 zl. by the end o f 1990. The advice o f the IM F team to 
keep the rate o f 9,500 reduced the size o f over-devaluation. In a personal note to Leszek 
Balcerowicz, dated December 4, 1989, M ichael Bruno, at that tim e Governor o f the Bank 
o f Israel on a v is it to Poland, suggested that there may be no need to devalue, or make 
only a small correction at the launching o f the stabilization program. The suggestion 
would im ply a rate o f about 6,500-7,000 zloty per US dollar. The note influenced the 
correction o f the Polish original intention. Bruno's suggested rate would be probably 
correct, although the actual choice was in my view justified  by the urgent need to 
increase international reserves and to provide a safety margin for the program.Roland Schönfeld - 978-3-95479-733-2
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Errors 3 and 4 were large enough to set the stage for the fiscal crisis in 1991-92 
and the collapse o f the EFF progam in late 1991.
Error 5. The targets fo r state-driven privatization were in itia lly  excessively 
optim istic.
However, an explosive growth o f the original private sector has neutralized the 
impact o f that particular error on the assumed growth o f the private sector.
E rror 6. The Extended Fund Facility (EFF) programme for 1991-92 assumed a 
hugely optim istic growth rate o f 15% per year for the level o f investment activity.
In 1990 the perception was that the recovery in output would be led by invest- 
ments and net exports. It was overlooked that, fo llow ing large fa lls o f output and 
real incomes, the recovery is like ly to be consumption-led. The Polish government 
programs for each year o f the period continued to call fo r a redistribution o f expen- 
diture from private consumption to investment and net exports, only to find  out that 
the actual developments had each year moved in the opposite direction.
Russia
Most errors in that country were o f implementation rather than o f design. The Rus- 
sian IM F team from late 1991 included several experienced members o f the earlier 
Polish IM F teams. But the IMF impact on policy implementation in Russia was 
clearly less substantial than in Poland.
Error 1. An in itia l error o f the Gaidar Plan was a vast underestimation o f correc- 
tive inflation in January, 1992: assumed 100% against actual 245%. The assump- 
tion was based on the advice o f the IMF team, which itse lf was influenced by an 
analysis due to M ario B leijer (December 2, 1991). The analysis appeared careful, 
w ith many caveats, but it concluded that "the in itia l rise in the price level needed to 
restore stock balance to the money market should not exceed 70-75 per cent" (p.5 ). 
An internal estimate by the Russian Economics M inistry, based on unit cost analy- 
sis, was o f an increase by about 200%. This appeared vastly excessive and was 
rejected in a written directive to the Budget Group o f the Finance M inistry by 
Gaidar himself. The error was not fatal by any means, but it was large enough to 
undermine significantly the credibility o f the firs t Gaidar budget fo r Q l, 1992.
Error 2. In itia l support o f the IMF for a common currency and a monetary union 
spanning most o f the FSU was a policy mistake that betrayed technocratic bias and 
politica l naivety or insensivity. The proposal could not be accepted by Russia w ith- 
out its Central Bank controlling fu lly  the credit expansion by the non-Russian 
members o f the rouble zone, and such a control would be at variance w ith inde- 
pendence aspirations o f most o f those members (J. Odling-Smee, 1992).
Error 3. As mentioned earlier, probably excessive emphasis by the IM F was 
placed in itia lly  on inflation and insufficient weight was given to the substantial
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progress o f the transformation-related structural reforms and the major improve- 
ment in the external position o f the country.
The IMF's 1993 Systemic Transformation Facility o f US$4 b illio n  was a financial 
innovation intended essentially to redress the imbalance.3
2. The conceptualization o f Policies and the Performance C rite ria
The standard IM F program has five interconnected components: fiscal, monetary, 
external balance, incomes (wages) and structural/institutional. It sets principal poi- 
icy aims and formulates policies in a il these five components to achieve these aims. 
Given in itia l conditions and some behavioural and other assumptions, it also for- 
mulates performance criteria for the purpose o f m onitoring the programs' impie- 
mentation.
2.1. The U nderlying Theory to Achieve Consistency
Using standard notation, a demand-driven macroeconomic model may be written in 
the form o f the fo llow ing ten equations:
Y = C(Yd,M /p) + І(П ,г) + G + X(pq) - PqCKPqY) (1)
where pq = ep*/p, the ratio o f foreign to domestic prices, г is the interest rate, П is 
profits, Yd is disposable income, X is exports and Q is imports;
Yd = Yd (Y ,T,r) (2)
T = T (Y , П, tax rates) - transfers (3)
П  = p Y -w L (Y ) (4)
Md = V (r) pY (5)
Ms = eR + Í (p G -T)dt + K (r) (6)
where T is net government revenue, R are net international reserves and К  is bank 
credit to the non-fmancial sector o f the economy
M d ־־ M s (7)
3 In support o f the G-7 proposal for an exceptional programme o f assistance to Russia, the 
W orld Bank has an Accelerated Program o f lending also amounting to US$ 4 b illion . The 
Bank's Rehabilitation Loan o f US$ 0.6 b illion , approved in 1992, belongs to the same 
category. Roland Schönfeld - 978-3-95479-733-2
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X  - p q Q  + NCF = AR (8 )
p = p(w,e,r) (9)
w  = w (p-l,p°,u,...), or MPL= w, or w =  w (10)
where NCF is the net capital flow, p ' is the expected price level, и is the unem- 
ployment rate, and MPL is the marginal product o f labour.
The ten endogenous variables in this model are: Y, Yd׳, П, T, M<j׳, M*׳, p, w, r 
and either e, under the floating exchange-rate regimes, or R i f  the exchange rate is 
exogenously fixed.
In the terms o f our four macro components o f the programme, the relevant vari- 
ables are these.
fiscal: the budget deficit, BD = p G-T 
monetary: r 
external: e and R 
incomes: w
The quantity o f money is endogenously determined:
M = eR + Í BDdt + K (r).
In order to stabilize quickly, the wage rate w is sometimes fixed. In this case, 
under the fixed exchange regime, w and e are exogenously given, and all the other 
variables o f the model are functions o f the two variables. In particular, w and e 
determine the price level, as well as the interest rate, the budget deficit, NIR (not 
international reserves), the demand for credit К  and money M. The standard IMF 
approach is therefore to regard e and w as key nominal anchors o f a stabilization 
programme, as was the case in Poland in 1990.
The budget deficit is, however, also subject to the choice o f government spending, 
G. In transition economies, and especially in periods o f high inflation, both taxes 
and government spending undergo large changes and they, rather than the 
exchange rate or the level o f international reserves, are under direct government 
influence. In such circumstances, BD and w are the nominal anchors. In this case 
the policy instruments remaining under the formal control o f the Central Bank, 
such as the money supply, the exchange rate and the interest rate, are effectively 
decided by the government. When the interest rate is set too low to bring the mar- 
ket fo r credit into equilibrium , which is often the case in transition economies, the 
credit to enterprises is subject to administrative lim its imposed by the Central 
Bank. In this case, credit to enterprises and (direct or indirect) Central Bank 
financing o f the budget deficit are the main nominal anchors. This has been the 
case in Russia, throughout the transition so far, and also the case in Poland in 
1992-93.
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2.2. Hazards in  the Choice o f M acroeconom ic and O ther Assumptions
The starting point for a programme designer is usually the price path, specified in 
terms o f the monthly inflation rate, in the course o f the period covered by the Fund- 
supported program. Achieving the targeted price path could be a principal short- 
term policy aim o f the programme. I f  it is a stabilization program, it would typi- 
cally have the price path showing a strong disinflation. Already at this stage the 
problem is to estimate correctly the unavoidable, cost-push impact on prices o f in- 
tended policy actions. This impact is largest at the start o f transition and, as I 
discussed earlier, it is also the time when the choice o f the disinflation path repre- 
sents the greatest hazard.
The second step is to use the Fisher equation to determine the quarterly changes 
in the quantity o f money that are consistent w ith the targeted price path (equations 
5 and 6 above). At this stage assumptions have to be made about the level o f GDP 
and the velocity o f money circulation. Again, in the period o f systemic transforma- 
tion, the risks are that the adopted assumptions would be seriously wrong, as in 
Poland in 1991.
The th ird  step is to divide the available money increase between credit to the gov- 
ernment, credit to the economy (the non-financial sector) and a change o f the NIR. 
The money increase thus represents a budget constraint. In order to decide about 
that division, it is essential to know the size o f the budget deficit which would have 
been under existing legislation, the like ly net in flow  o f foreign capital, and the size 
o f the so-called directed credit to economic units. During systemic transformation, 
major revenue and expenditure reforms take place, level o f activity changes rapidly 
and fiscal discipline is d ifficu lt to maintain. Assumptions underlying the govern- 
ment budget are consequently often wrong by wide margins.
The fourth step is the consideration o f detailed policy measures which appear 
needed to bridge the gaps between the targets implied by the division made at the 
third stage and the like ly outcomes in the absence o f new measures. By the nature 
o f things, these measures are concentrated on public finances.
To achieve consistancy, the analytical framework cannot be linear, a sequence o f 
steps outlined above, but must be one o f a general equilibrium  type. In particular, 
the original inflation path may be altered in view o f the policy measures taken at 
stage four, and this may lead to the next round o f programme design.
2.3. The Inherent Tension Between Q uantitative C rite ria  and Q uantitative  
Analysis.
The choice o f performance criteria by the BWIs reflects the strongly macro- 
economic and short-term orientation o f the IMF and the microeconomic and 
medium-term orientation o f the W orld Bank. The IM F criteria are typically few, 
quantitative and quarterly. The interesting feature o f these programmes is that the 
inflation rate is a policy objective rather than a binding target. This is in recogni- 
tion o f the fact that policy-makers do not control inflation directly and their indi- 
rect control is imprecise (IM F, 1988, p. 16). The key criteria are as follows:
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(a) The upper lim it fo r the cumulative change in net credit o f the banking system 
to the General Government;
(b) The upper lim it for the cumulative deficit o f the General Government;
(c) The upper lim it fo r the cumulative change in the net domestic assets o f the 
banking system; and
(d) The lower lim it for the cumulative change in NIR in convertible currencies o f 
the banking system. There may also be a lim it for changes in average wages or 
wage funds in the socialized sector, and a lim it on contracting or guaranteeing o f 
new external debt.
These criteria are not different in conception from those o f the "standard" IMF 
programme, they are in fact the same. This underscores my earlier point that 
despite occasional claims to the contrary, the inflation rate and the external posi- 
tion, and not systemic transformation as such, remain the central focus o f IMF 
programmes for Eastern Europe. The only concession for transition concerns the 
'quality' o f programmes - reflected in the tightness o f criteria. O f the three types o f 
programmes; the Extended Fund Facility, the Stand-by Agreement and the Sys- 
temic Transformation Facility, the firs t is the most demanding and the last the least 
demanding. Fund programmes for economies in transition are usually o f the last 
two categories. The credibility o f the IMF requires that it treats the agreed quantita- 
tive targets seriously. W hile waivers may be granted, the programmes are usually 
suspended i f  lim its are breached by wide margins.
3. Programmes and Outcomes
This section discusses briefly four IMF-supported programmes w ith a view to iden- 
tify in g  their distinct features and purposes.
3.1. The Polish Stand-by Programme fo r  1990: A C onditiona l Success?
This extremely important programme both for Poland and the IMF had a number o f 
unusual features. They were directly linked to the launching o f a radical reform in 
crisis circumstances and the absence o f any sim ilar experiences by policy designers. 
The main paradoxical feature o f the programme was that many o f its important 
assumptions and policy aims were missed by wide margins, yet a ll o f its six per- 
formance criteria were comfortably met during most o f 1990, allow ing Poland to 
draw three tranches o f the total support granted out o f the four available. Compared 
to the in itia l assumptions, the output fa ll was much larger, yet the fiscal outturn 
was much better (3.1% GDP surplus instead o f 0.6%  GDP deficit); the exchange 
rate had held throughout the period, yet prices increased by 250% rather than the 
assumed 94%; and despite the large appreciation o f the zloty, the trade surplus was 
much higher than assumed. A ll these developments have good ex-post explana- 
tions, but were wholly surprising for the programme designers, both Polish and the 
IMF's. The two major concerns o f the designers were the rules for indexing the 
wage norm in the firs t six months o f the programme (particulary in the first
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month), and whether a public and binding commitment could be made to defend 
the exchange rate at a fixed level for a period o f time, e.g. three, six or lu ll twelve 
months. For the IM F a satisfactory agreement about these matters was crucial for 
the success o f the entire programme. Discussions o f these issues were therefore both 
intense and time-consuming. In the event the much tighter than planned fiscal and 
monetary policies, and a deeper than expected fa ll o f output, rendered the two 
issues irrelevant.
In retrospect, given the novelty o f systemic circumstances and the in itia l crisis 
conditions, the programme served its role remarkably well. The bu ilt-in  safeguards 
and errors o f the programme have resulted in a stop-go sequence o f policies which 
proved more pronounced than desirable, but this feature was secondary compared to 
large achievements (IM F 1991, Gomułka 1991, 1992, 1993a, Berg and Blanchard 
1992).
3.2. The Polish EFF Programme fo r  1991-93: A F a ilu re  Which Served a 
Purpose?
This three year programme was meant to be a successful fo llow  up o f the firs t 
standby. However, errors 3 and 4 discussed in Part 1, section 3, led to its suspen- 
sion a few months after approval on A pril 18, 1991.4
In early 1991 the flaws o f the programme were already apparent, but there was 
no time to re-negotiate it. For, on March 18, 1991, the Paris Club offered Poland an 
immediate 30% debt reduction, conditional only on her having a Fund-supported 
economic programme. The condition was met on A pril 18, 1991 and the reduction 
was granted on A pril 19, 1991. The EFF therefore served its purpose.
3.3. The Polish Stand-by fo r  1993: A M odel o f Success?
The errors 3 and 4 mentioned above produced a threat to the progress o f stabiliza- 
tion in the form o f a large budget deficit. Despite corrective measures, the deficit o f 
the general government reached 6% o f GDP in 1991 and 7% in 1992 (Table 4). 
The deficits were financed nearly wholly by monetary expansion and, by 1992, 
became the main source o f inflation. In the meantime, the Paris Club accepted that 
Poland would qualify for a further 20% reduction o f the officia l debt i f  it ran a sue- 
cessful Fund-supported programme in 1993. Reaching an implementable agree- 
ment w ith the Fund became therefore essential. This was made easier by the more 
flexible position displayed by the IM F in 1992. Influenced probably by the course o f 
events in Hungary and elsewhere in Eastern and Central Europe, the IM F has 
increased its tolerance level for the budget deficit. Moreover, to ease the deficit 
problem, the organization offered to support the Polish case for an import sur- 
charge. However, a package o f strong fiscal measures, amounting to about 5% o f
4 Poland breached the criteria already fo r June 1991. The negotiations o f new criteria for 
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GDP, was proposed by the Polish authorities, not the IMF. The package reflected 
the outcome o f an internal policy debate w ithin the government and the country 
about the potential net costs and risks associated w ith a large budget deficit. To 
increase the change o f success, the programme for 1993 was based on conservative 
fiscal assumptions. Its implementation was also helped by economic recovery which 
was stronger than assumed. In the event a ll performance criteria were met com- 
fortably, and in a manner which should help the progress o f recovery and stabiliza- 
tion in the post-programme years.
3.4. The Russian Experience: A Macroeconom ic Fa ilu re  but a Transform a- 
tion  Success?
There has been much confusion about what kind o f strategy Russia has followed 
and much discussion about policies which the country should follow , less shock and 
more therapy or more shock and more therapy. Was the strategy excessively grad- 
ual? W ith respect to macroeconomic policies, why have they been so inflationary? 
Were they irrational?
From the perspective o f the student o f systemic transformation, there is much 
evidence in favour o f the view that Russia in its own chaotic manner has followed a 
very radical reform, a form o f managed shock therapy. The three main components 
o f that strategy have apparently been implemented: fast liberalization o f most 
prices, including the exchange rate, has permitted the replacement o f central plan- 
ning by market co-ordination; considerable foreign trade liberalization has led to 
large shifts in the geographical and product composition o f trade; and large prog- 
ress in privatization and other structural changes have taken place. A deep fa ll in 
industrial output is an indirect evidence o f the large volume o f painful reforms 
having been implemented. Moreover, the floating exchange rate policy led to an 
extremely deep real devaluation, and this in turn has produced a fa irly  dramatic 
improvement in the external position o f the country.
Russia’s reforms have been extremely gradual and controversial only w ith respect 
to inflation. The country's inflation crisis has been due almost entirely to the mone- 
tization o f large budget deficits and even larger subsidised credits to enterprises. In 
this respect, the sharp differences in public spending between Poland and Russia 
are worth noting: much higher spending in Russia on defence, (6% versus 2%), 
and producer and import subsidies (10% versus 1.5%), but much lower spending on 
social transfers, particularly pensions (8% versus 20%).י
The distinct feature o f the Gaidar stabilization plan was that neither the wage rate 
nor the exchange rate was proposed to serve as a nominal anchor. This feature 
caused concern o f the IM F already by the end o f 1991. However, a strict monetary 
policy probably could have controlled wage increases. Real wages fe ll sharply in
1992, as required by the stabilization objectives. The problem was the failure o f the 
government to eliminate the need for the domestic bank financing o f the budget
16 8  Stan isiaw Gom ulka
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hopefully indicate the orders o f magnitude involved.
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subsidised credit to enterprises by the authorities.
The firs t Fund-supported programme for Russia, o f June 1992, was o f a Standby 
type. It expired on January 4, 1993. During that period the inflation rate increased 
from about 10% a month in the second quarter o f 1992 to about 25% a month. In 
terms o f this particular indicator o f performance, the programme was therefore a 
complete failure. The second programme was o f the STF type. It started in June 
1993 and is s till continuing. Again, the chief aim o f the programme in 1993 - 
reducing the monthly rate o f inflation to single d ig it levels by the end o f 1993 - was 
missed. However, in early 1994 Russia is showing an unexpected determination to 
bring the rate o f in flation down.
)0063440
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4. Foreign Assistance in  a Broader Perspective
In his address to the Group o f Thirty at its Spring 1993 planning meeting in 
Vienna, Mr. Klaus, the present Prime M inister o f the Czech Republic, summarized 
his experiences as a major reformer in the form o f Ten Commandments for what he 
calls profound, fundamental, structural reforms. One o f the Commandments asserts 
that the role o f foreign aid in these reforms is marginal. This also happens to be my 
view w ith respect to most transition countries o f the region. The reason is self-evi- 
dent. Using purchasing power parities, per capita GDP in the FSU and Central 
Europe was, just before the reforms, some US$ 5000 and, therefore, the total GDP 
of all the transition countries was about 2000 b illion  US dollars. The average fa ll o f 
measured GDP during the contraction phase o f transition has been about 40%, or 
$500 b illion  in flow  terms. The investment needed to restructure the region's capital 
stock sufficiently so that, at least, the pre-reform level o f GDP is regained must be 
several times the lost output; that is, o f the same order o f magnitude as the in itia l 
annual GDP, or some $2000 b illion. The combined resources o f international fi-  
nancial institutions are clearly too small by comparison to make a sizeable contri- 
bution to such an investment effort. The resources can in any case be provided only 
on a commercial basis, rather than as development aid, and therefore subject to 
strict conditions which transition economies cannot easily meet.
The argument above appears to fly  very much against the general perception o f 
the potentially large role which foreign assistance can and should play. That per- 
ception may in part be based on a fa irly  large actual role o f the international finan- 
cial institutions, particularly the IM F, in providing the expertise and policy 
guidance for economic stabilization and institutional development, and on confu- 
sion concerning the motivations guiding the cooperation between local reformers 
ard international institutions. An extreme view would be that the West has been 
attempting to impose specific reforms and policies which reflect its own vaiues and 
interests rather than the needs o f the reform ing countries. A large Western assis- 
tance has been provided or offered to transition countries as an incentive, indeed a 
form o f compensation, for the countries to adopt the capitalist system and specific 
pclicies. One o f the reasons for the reluctance o f Western governments to offer
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sizeable foreign assistance to transition countries may have been the concern not to 
lend support to such a view.
Another, and perhaps more popular view, has been based on a drastic downgrad- 
ing o f the size o f transition economies and a corresponding exaggeration o f the 
potential economic impact o f foreign assistance. Extreme devaluations o f local 
currencies have for some periods reduced wages to some 20 US dollars a month, 
and the region's GDP to about $200 b illion . By this account, Russia's GDP in 1992 
was a mere $100 b illion , or less than 1% o f the West's GDP and about the size o f 
West German annual assistance to the former GDR. It would therefore appear pos- 
sible to stabilize the Russian economy by providing relatively small external aid to 
the government budget and the enterprise sector. Such a stabilization plan would o f 
course be based on the illusion that the exchange rate would remain vastly 
depressed after stabilization has taken place.
5. Concluding Remarks
The impact o f foreign assistance can be substantial, even vita l, only on a few occa- 
sions, especially when it is in the form o f grants and debt reductions. However, 
large grants, i f  not linked to performance, reduce the financial discipline o f local 
economic agents, and may have an impact on transition economies sim ilar to that 
o f a soft budget constraint on state enterprises. The post-communist economies are 
also simply too large and their transition to capitalism too costly for the foreign 
assistance to have a more than marginal impact. Most o f these economies are al- 
ready heavily indebted, and this gives them little  room for contracting new debt. A 
far more important foreign impact may come from the in flow  o f Western private 
investment and know-how. However, internal reform efforts rather than external 
financial assistance seem to be needed for this in flow  to take place.
International financial organizations, especially the BWIs, have been helpful for 
Russia and Poland in providing local reformer w ith modern analysis and expert 
policy advice. They were also most helpful in pressing Western creditors for a size- 
able debt reduction o f Polish debt and a fast removal o f trade barriers to West 
European markets. However, the sequence o f reforms and the speed o f transition in 
the countries have been decided largely by the in itia l circumstances, the new long 
term goals o f the countries and the various internal political and institutional fac- 
tors during transition. The difference between Poland and Russia has been mainly 
in the conduct o f macroeconomic policy, and not in the core o f transformation 
reforms. Some errors have been made, both in analysis and in policy, but in the eri- 
sis circumstances the main body o f reforms, especially in Poland, has probably 
been about right.
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TABLE 1
Poland: Credit lines of the World Bank and their utilisation until 31, Jan. 1994
Name Receiving
in s titu t-
ions
A p p ro va l
Date
Sum  in 
m l. US $
U tilisa tion , in  
1 9 9 0  1991
m l US $ 
1992 1 9 9 3
■----- ־ ־ 111
C um u la tive  u ttli 
sa tion  1990 - 
31 O il 994
in  m l. in  percen ts
ו Ind Export Develop. NbP 6 II. 90 260 10 1 17.7 12 0 24 4 60 2 23
2 AgncuU. Expoit Develop. NBP 611 90 100 14.9 9 1 32 4 15.0 71 4 71
3. Environmental Management G 24.V.90 18 0.5 0.4 6.5 3.0 10 6 58
4 Transport General E 1 V 90 4 75 1.0 0 6 1.4 3 0 63
5. Transport Railway• E I V . 90 145 16.0 18 6 20.6 57.3 39
6 Energy Resource Develop. G 6.V I.90 250 32.2 46 6 8 1 161.0 64
7 SAL G 31. VII. 90 300 28.4 270.9 0  7 300 0 100
в Telecomuiuc étions G 23.1V.90 120 24.3 23.2 1.8 49 2 41
9 Employmanl Promotion G 23.VI.91 100 2.0 3 1 0.1 5.2 5
10 Financial Inst. Oevelop. G 11.VI.91 200 76.1 7.2 82.3 41
11. Privatisation Raslrucl. G 11.Vt.91 280 0.1 74.8 8.2 82.9 30
12. Agncultrual Develop. G 11 V I.91 100 1.00 4.7 5.7 6
13. Haat Supply Restruet. E 26.VI.91 285 47.5 25.3 73.2 14
14. Haallh G 7.V.92 130
15 Privala Enterprise Deve. E 7. Vi. 92 60
1 в Housing G 25 VI.92 200 4.6 4.6 3
17 Roads G 9.111.93 150
18 EFSAL G 4.V.93 450 27.7 100.0 33
19 ASAL G 4.V.93 300 4.7 4 9 3
20. Forestry G 29.VII.93 146
Total 3598.75 1071.3
Notation: NBP * Central Bank (National Bank of Poland). G ■ Government, E *  economic units.
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Poland; Credit Lines from the Institut tons other than the World Bank, until 31. Pec, 1991
Credit taker Credit Equity Capital Utilisation %
EBRD4 Private sector 264.0 75.5 ?
IFCA Private sector 158.1 32.6 ?
EIB* Economy 303.0 - 45
EBRD* Government 166.5 - 1
IMF״ NBP
(i) Standby 20.II.90 14.111.91 ־
(ii) EFF IV.91 - V.93
(iii) Standby 111.93 - IV.94 
G-24 Government
Source: Poland's Ministry of Finance. "Information concerning the utilisation of foreign credits", 
mimeo. 23 February 1994.
Note: Л ml US Dollars, f ml. ECU, * ml. SDR.
545 (about $710) 60
1,828.6 (about $2500) 16
476 (about $600) 80
1000 (Stabilisation Fund) 100
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T A B L E  3
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Poland: Selected E c o n o m ic  Indicators, 1 9 8 8 - 9 4  
(Percentage c h a n g e  unless o th e rw ise  indicated)




Gross domestic product (SNA basis) 4.1 0.2 -11.6 -7.6 1.5 4.0 4.5
consumption (SNA basisi 2.6 6.1 ־11.7 3.3 5.0 4.1 2.4
gross fixed investment 6.1 -2.1 • 10.6 *4.5 2.8 9.8 8.5
Consumer pnces (penod average) 60.2 251.1 S8S.8 70.3 43.0 35.3 •
Consumer pnces (12 month increase) 
Average monthly wages (penod average!
72.9 639.7 249.3 60.4 44.4 37.6 23.1
nominal 81.9 291.8 398.0 70.6 39.2 33.6
Fiscal indicators (in percent of GOP)
State budget revenue 35.6 30.8 33.3 25.7 27.0 29.6 30.1
State budget expenditure^ 37.0 36.9 32.7 32.7 33.9 32.9 30.1
State budget balance*' -1.4 ־6.1 0.7 -7.0 -6.9 -5.4 *4.2
General government balance*' 
lonetery indicators (end of penod)
-7.4 3.1 -6.5 -6.7 -2.9 -3.9
Net domestic assets'* 127.3 192.3 38.4 142.0 35.6 21.7 21.1
Money and quast-money
xternai indicators in convertible 
currencies (in terms of US dollars)
133.0 236.0 121.9 47.4 57.5 36.0 27.7
Exports4 k 17.6 4.5 43.4 17.5 9.7 *2.9 0.8
Imports* * 
Trade balance
ו 16.3 17.9 46.9 6.1 17.7 2.0
in billions of US dollars 0.9 0.2 2.2 0.1 0.5 -2.3 -2.1
in percent of GOP* 
Current aceount
1.4 0.4 3.6 0.1 0.6 -2.7 ־2.4
in billions of US dollars •0.6 -1.8 0.7 -2.2 *0.3 -2.3 -2.7
in percent of GOP*
External debt (end of penod)’
־0.8 -2.7 1.1 *2.9 -0.3 -2.7 ־3.2
m billions of US dollars 
Ratio to exports of goods and nonfactor 
services in convertible currencies 
External debt services ratio*
39.1 40.2 48.9 48.3 47.6 48.4 46.2
Due 85.0 61.6 56.3 71.5 20.0 21.5 17.5
Paid
Commercial exchange rate depreciation(-)
20.0 16.0 6.9 6.6 9.9 11.2 *
Against US dollar (penod average) *.38.4 ־70.2 -84.8 -10.2 ־22.4 -24.9 «
Sources: 1MF (March 11.1994). where the sources •re : Central Statistical Office. Roctnifc Statvstvornv <־*■*» provided 
by the authonties, and staff estimates.
1. In the five main areas of the socialised sector through 1990; thereafter in the six main areas of the economy.
2. On a commitment basis, except external interest which is on a cash basis.
3. In relation to broad money at end of the previous year.
4. Balance of payment basis.
5. IndKiding transactions with former CMEA area for 1991 and 1992.
6. Gross domestic product in zlotry terms is converted into US dollar« at the commençai exchange rate.
7. Including arreers in the Fund.
8. In percent of exports of goods an nonfactor services in convertible currencies, including the Fund.
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Table 4





41.4 430 41.Ç 42.8
35.5 37.2 33.6 37.0
9.7 14.0 6.1 4.4
3.4 3.0 2.4 6.3
8.8 6.3 7.4 9.0
9.1 9.0 11.7 13.1
- 0.6 2.1 2.3
1.8 1.5 3.3 1.5
2.8 2.7 0.6 0.3
4.4 5.1 3.9 3.1
1.7 2.2 1.5 0.6
- ■ 0.2 0.4
1.6 0.6 4.0 2.7
4Ç-9 39-9. 47.5 49 ■в
38.9 33.2 39.5 44.8
6.8 5.8 7.4 9.1
2.5 3.6 6.0 7.7
- 0.4 2.3 3.7
11.7 11.0 17.0 20.6
8.2 8.1 12.2 15.0
- 0.1 0.9 1.3
3.5 2.7 3.9 4.3
12.9 7.3 4.6 3.1
4.6 3.4 1.6 1.1
0.4 3.9 3.0 2.0
5.1 5.2 2.1 0.7
3.3 2.8 2.2 2.5
6.5 3.9 5.9 2.5
-JA i l AA -JA
2.0 ־0.3 1.7 -0.4
■АЛ 2A -AA JA
L á ÚA ÛA 2A
5.6 -2.7 5.1 7.1
5.2 -2.8 5.0 6.6
-0.4 • 0.1 0.5
-0.3 -0.7 -0.1 -0.2





Turnover tax and excises 
Social security contributions 
Custom duties
Tax on excess wage increase 
Other taxes 
Nontax revenue 





Wages and salaries 
Other goods and services 
Interest payments4 



















Sources: IMF January 12, 1994, Table 14, here the sources are: National authorities and Fund staff estimates.
1 Comprising the state budget, extracudgetary operations, and the local government operations.
2 Extrabudgetary operations that are excluded from the state budget, and, for 1991-92, includes local 
authorities operation (since 1991), state budget excludes local authorities).
3 On a commitment basis, except for external interest payments which are on a cash basis.Roland Schönfeld - 978-3-95479-733-2




Z d e n e k  D r á b e k
IMF and IBRD Policies in the Former Czechoslovakia
D0063440
I. In troduction
When the revolution came to the former Federal Czechoslovakia, its relations w ith 
the international financial institutions changed from one extreme to the other. 
From virtua lly  zero contacts before 1989, Czechoslovakia was inundated w ith In- 
ternational Monetary Fund and W orld Bank missions. The firs t contacts between 
the IM F and IBRD with the former Czechoslovakia were, indeed, very rich and 
promising. It m ight have been the attractive location, the history o f the country, or 
its relative sophistication as a client that brought the staff o f international financial 
institutions to the country w ith such great frequency. The plans o f these institutions 
had v irtua lly  no bounds: technical assistance programs, new projects, policy sup- 
port, and even a resident mission and possibly even a regional resident mission. 
S im ilar hopes were build ing up in the newly created European Bank o f Reconstruc- 
tion and !Development and in the International Finance Corporation, the private 
sector arm o f the W orld Bank.
However, the actual role o f these institutions has fallen far short o f these early 
expectations. The activity o f IBRD has been lim ited to three projects, o f which only 
two are actually ongoing. The only substantial drawing on funds from these institu- 
tions has so far been under the Structural Adjustment Facility (SAL) in the amount 
o f USD (U.S. dollars) 450 m illion. The other Bank project was the Power and Envi- 
ronmental Improvement Project (Energy I) in the amount o f USD 246 m illion  to 
improve power plant efficiency, to reduce air pollution in Northern Bohemia, and 
to modernize the transmission system. The relations w ith the IMF have been more 
active: two standby arrangements w ith the federal government and one standby 
w ith the Czech government. The firs t standby o f December 18, 1990 included a 14- 
month arrangement in the amount o f SDR 619.6 m illion  including SDR 147.5 m il- 
lion w ith a contingency element for o il purchases, and the so-called Compensatory 
and Contingency Financing Facility (CCFF) in the amount o f SDR 483.8 m illion  to 
help finance the rising costs o f oil imports. The second standby o f March 2, 1992 
amounted to SDR 236 m illion. The th ird  standby arrangement o f March 1, 1993, 
this time w ith the Czech government only, was for SDR 177 m illion. The IM F has 
also established a resident mission in Prague.
Other financial institutions have also played a role, albeit a lim ited one. Arguably 
the most active has been the European Investment Bank, which has expanded its 
activities into the market o f Czechoslovakia under the provision made in the 
Europe Agreements. Their role has been restricted to a small number o f projects in 
the area o f infrastructure. The other financial institution w ith activities in Czecho- 
Slovakia was the EBRD, which has negotiated several highly visible transactions 
that included infrastructural projects in the public sector as well as investments in
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the private sector. Nevertheless, the number, as well as the nature, o f these projects 
was below the expectations o f most observers.
Even the role o f the Fund has been much smaller than orig inally expected. The 
government has not fu lly  utilized resources available under the th ird  standby. How- 
ever, in  contrast to the usual suspensions o f IMF programs elsewhere in the world, 
the suspension o f the Czech standby was at the request o f the Czech government. 
The government found the financial position o f the country to be so favourable that 
it decided against drawing on the remaining two tranches o f the standby and for 
prepaying its debt.
TTie activities o f the international financial institutions can be discussed in two 
different ways. The role o f these institutions may be important in terms o f their 
contribution to resource mobilization and in terms o f their impact on policies. 
There is absolutely no doubt that the contribution to resource mobilization in the 
Czech and Slovak Republics has been vital. This contribution was especially impor- 
tant in 1990-1991, the firs t years o f transformation when the country needed a fast 
response from the international community, and these institutions did respond very 
quickly indeed. Therefore, I shall focus my discussion mainly on those activities o f 
these institutions that have had important policy content.
The activities w ith important policy content have been concentrated, so far, pri- 
m arily on assistance for macroeconomic stabilization and a broad economic reform. 
They involved the above-mentioned standby arrangements o f the IM F and the SAL 
o f the W orld Bank. Other activities w ith a policy content have been directed 
towards sectoral policies in the energy sector. This activity has involved a jo in t 
effort o f the W orld Bank and the EBRD; also under the discussion is a project in 
telecommunications.
The purpose o f this paper is to review the policy-based lending o f the IMF and 
the IBRD in the former Czechoslovakia. The focus w ill be on the stabilization poli- 
cies because other policy-based lending does not exist w ith the single exception o f 
the energy sector. This means that excluded w ill be also an evaluation o f specific 
projects o f the EBRD and IFC, both o f which have been relatively active in the pri- 
vate sector. I also shall not discuss the technical assistance efforts o f these interna- 
tional financial institutions nor those o f other agencies, which have been quite 
extensive. Discussion o f all these issues would be very much beyond the scope o f 
this paper.
The questions to be addressed in this paper include: (1) Have stabilization poli- 
cies been successful in the former Czechoslovakia? (2) I f  so, why, and what were 
the reasons and what role has been played by the IM F and the W orld Bank? My 
argument can be summarized as follows. The stabilization program has been rela- 
tively successful as evidenced mainly by the success in reducing the rate o f in fla- 
tion, m aintaining low unemployment, and requiring small recourse to external 
borrowing. Moreover, on a ll these fronts the country has done better than other 
economies in transition. The explanations for this are complex. The factors were 
partly exogenous, such as smaller in itia l inflationary gap and social peace with 
modest wage claims, no strikes, and political support. But the good results were 
also due to good policies, including strict monetary policy, fiscal restraint, large 
devaluation o f the exchange rate, and strong external support, foreign exchange
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and trade liberalization, in the formulation o f which the IBRD and IM F played an 
active role.
Nevertheless, problems remain and these include fa lling  GDP and an inflation 
rate well above that o f the country's competitors. Even though there are signs o f the 
end o f recession, unresolved issues remain: wage growth is too fast in terms o f pro- 
ductivity as well as in comparison to inflation, and this is a policy issue. Other 
policy issues include the exchange rate, interest rate policy, and the shortage o f 
long-term resources. It can also be argued that industrial productivity has been fa l- 
lin g  due to a slow rate o f adjustment o f firm s, which raises a host o f policy issues, 
e.g., lack o f financial discipline, weak corporate governance, highly leveraged 
firm s, and a fragile banking sector.
The paper consists o f four sections: Section 2 describes the stabilization policies, 
that is, their objectives, policy instruments, tim ing and sequencing, the perform- 
ance criteria, and the role o f structural policies. Section 3 focuses on the perform- 
ance in 1991-1993 and demonstrates how well policy has been implemented in 
spite o f exogenous influence such as the split o f the country, the collapse o f external 
markets in the East, and the recession in the West. Section 4 suggests that the 
country is not yet over the h ill and identifies areas o f concern including policy 
issues.
2. The S tab iliza tion Program
The fundamental objective o f the stabilization program has been to contain in fla - 
tionary pressures generated by the policy o f liberalization. These policies, together 
w ith wide-ranging institutional reforms to be discussed below, have been an inte- 
gral part o f the economic transformation from central planning toward a market 
economy. These objectives have been fu lly  shared by objectives o f the standby 
arrangements w ith the IMF as well as by the IBRD under the SAL umbrella. The 
objectives o f the SAL program loan were slightly broader in that the loan empha- 
sized assistance in reducing the unacceptably high economic and social costs which 
would otherwise be associated w ith the firs t phase o f the economic transformation.
The important feature o f these programs was a broad agreement between the 
Fund, the Bank, and the Government regarding the direction o f the economic 
reform as well as the specific objectives and instruments o f the stabilization pro- 
gram. The principal objective o f the stabilization program was to ensure the inter- 
nal and external stability o f the currency, which was translated into the targets for 
consumer price inflation, 30% in 1991, to 12% in 1992, and to 15% in 1993, and 
the stability o f the exchange rate. The main instruments o f the program were (1) 
strict fiscal targets, (2) tigh t monetary targets, (3) unification o f the exchange rate 
and devaluation, and (4) wage control. These measures were directed toward 
restricting the growth o f domestic demand, encouraging the growth o f exports, and 
reallocating resources from nontradeables to tradeables. In addition, the govern- 
ment agreed w ith the international institutions on price and trade liberalization, 
competition and deregulation, steps toward financial sector reform, energy policy, 
labor market, and social policy.
Roland Schönfeld - 978-3-95479-733-2
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 09:44:06AM
via free access
00063440
Another interesting feature o f these programs, especially that o f the IBRD, was 
the inclusion o f structural policy measures in the reform packages. This may not be 
an interesting phenomenon to Western readers, especially those who are fam iliar 
w ith the IBRD structural adjustment facilities, but it is a point that cannot be em- 
phasized enough for Czech readers. Some Czech experts are s till calling for the 
introduction o f structural policy reforms as i f  the government has refused to do so. 
Others, this time from the present as well as from the previous governments, argue 
w ith passion that no structural policies w ill be adopted by the government since 
these interventions would only distort the operations o f the markets. Clearly, all 
these disputes stem from a serious misunderstanding about the real meaning o f 
structural policies. The present government officials typically understand structural 
policy to mean investment decisions by the government, in the spirit o f the central 
planners o f the past. But these are fundamental misunderstandings. Fortunately, the 
implications o f these misunderstandings are not too serious. What matters is that 
the present government in fact has been w illing  to adopt a great number o f struc- 
turai policy measures without perhaps even realizing it, and it has been playing 
down their importance for political reasons.
The structural policy measures agreed with the government included under the 
SAL fac ility  (1) tax policy measures; (2) price liberalization; (3) liberalization o f 
foreign trade, including elim ination o f foreign trade monopolies, abolition o f QRs, 
ta riff restructuring, selective tariffreduction, and reduction o f export licensing; (4) 
privatization; (5) enhancement o f competition policies including adoption o f the 
Competition Law and the creation o f an anti-trust office; (6) banking sector reform 
focusing on the establishment o f a two-tier banking system, opening o f the banking 
sector to foreign banks, submission to the Parliament o f the Banking Law, 
strengthening o f bank supervision, introduction o f a new payment and settlement 
system, and preparation o f strategic financial audits; (7) energy efficiency measures 
emphasizing an increase in energy prices toward the market level, selection o f the 
least-cost investment program for the electricity sector and submission to the Par- 
liament o f the Public U tilities Law, and (8) extensive measures establishing the 
social safety net. In sum, the SAL fac ility  has provided for an extremely large poi- 
icy-based program that probably far exceeds the standard SALs that the Bank has 
concluded elsewhere. The vast extent o f these measures was possible, o f course, 
prim arily because the measures had been either already adopted by the government 
before the agreement w ith the Bank or they were in the process o f being impie- 
mented. The extent o f the policy-action program notwithstanding, some policies 
were clearly critical while others were less significant. More important, certain 
policy measures crucial to a successful transformation were missing.
There were also two significant differences between the programs agreed w ith the 
Fund as compared to the program agreed with the Bank. The firs t difference was, o f 
course, the question o f emphasis on tranche release conditions. W hile the Fund 
approach is traditionally more geared to fiscal, monetary, and international reserve 
conditions, the Bank's SAL program emphasized additionally other policy, typi- 
cally structural, measures. The SAL project was "front-loaded," which means that 
the firs t tranche o f the loan was released on the day o f effectiveness, but the two 
remaining tranches were tied to conditionality. These conditions were:
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Second Tranche: (1) Additional liberalization o f domestic prices and export quo- 
tas, (2) preparation o f the privatization program and submission to Parliament o f 
new banking legislation, (3) least-cost investment program in energy and increase 
in electricity prices, (4) wage control lim ited to minimum wages and to total enter- 
prise wage bills, and (5) targeting and delivery o f social benefits.
Third Tranche: (1) Continuation w ith the privatization program, (2) introduction 
o f governing principles for the reform o f the banking system, (3) submission to 
Parliament o f a Public U tilities Law, (4) enactment o f legislation on social insur- 
ance fund, measures to improve efficiency o f higher education, and research and 
development and health sectors.
The IMF conditionality included targets on net domestic assets o f the banking 
system or, alternatively, net credit o f the banking system to the Government, the 
cumulative change in net international reserves in convertible currencies o f the 
banking system and on the net disbursements o f external debt. These are, o f course, 
standard Fund conditions.
The implementation o f the programs, both the Fund's and the Bank's, has been 
smooth. Even though some disagreements have existed, mainly between the gov- 
ernment and the Bank, the differences were small and easily resolved. The inflation 
targets have been broadly achieved even though the 1991 target turned out to be 
substantially more optim istic than the actual figure fo r the year. One area in which 
the implementation process has been slightly derailed was the reform o f state en- 
terprises for which the Bank anticipated much faster action by the government in 
preparing and submitting the new Bankruptcy Law. The law was not adopted until 
much later, which slowed down the introduction o f better discipline in public and 
newly privatized companies. Moreover, apart from this policy reform, the SAL pro- 
gram had very little  to add to public enterprise reform except fo r a superficial 
requirement for the government to introduce a hard budget constraint in the state- 
owned companies. M inor difficulties have also arisen in the case of, fo r example, 
social policy measures, but these were more a question o f tim ing and sequencing 
rather than o f substance. In the end, none o f these program loans has been subject 
to any disruptions, such as the need for renegotiation o f contract terms, let alone 
disagreements that m ight lead to suspended disbursements. On the contrary, the 
IMF stabilization program has been proceeding so well that the government de- 
cided not to make the last drawings and began to repay its debt earlier than 
contractually agreed, as noted above.
A ll this is relevant for one important reason: it is very d ifficu lt to distinguish be- 
tween the actual program and recommendations o f the IMF and program o f the 
government. Typically, o f course, all IMF programs are in fact programs o f the 
government concerned, but not all governments are as keen on taking the necessary 
medicine o f restrictive measures as has been the Czechoslovak government. In fact, 
the government stabilization measures have been so radical at times that they have 
kept even the Fund staff blushing: viz., for example, the size o f fiscal surplus, 
below-target growth o f credit.
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3. The Success o f S tab iliza tion Policies
The stabilization program in the former Czechoslovakia and in the present Czech 
Republic has been considered by many observers a major success. The program has 
been even heralded by some as one o f the most successful Fund programs in its his- 
tory, and it is often presented as an example o f what such programs can achieve. 
One indication o f this success is the fact that the Fund's resources have not been 
fu lly  utilized by the Czechoslovak and Czech governments respectively. The main 
evidence o f success is, however, the actual performance o f the economy.
The best indicator o f good economic performance has been the remarkable sue- 
cess o f the government in containing inflationary pressures once prices were liber- 
alized in  1991 and 1992. After the in itia l pricejump o f 25.8% in January 1991, the 
rate o f monthly inflation slowed dramatically. The overall annual inflation rate for
1991 was 56.7% (Tables 1 and 2). I f  we omit the extraordinary increases in prices 
that were attributable to administrative measures, the monthly rate o f inflation was 
in the range o f only 0.0-2.0% that year. The annual inflation rates in 1992 and 
1993 were lowered even more as the government continued w ith its determined 
effort to reduce the inflation rate. By the end o f 1993 and the beginning o f 1994, 
the monthly inflation rate was down to the range o f 0.2-0.6%.
Success was also demonstrated in other areas. Throughout the duration o f the 
stabilization programs, unemployment, a major concern o f reformers, has never got 
out o f control. Again, the numbers have been remarkably positive. Unemployment 
firs t appeared in 1990 but began to grow only in 1991. However, throughout the 
whole period, the unemployment rate has remained substantially below the rate not 
only in other transform ing countries but also in the West.
Real incomes o f the population have also held up reasonably well. After the in i- 
tia l fa ll in 1991 o f an estimated 25.5% real incomes started to grow again in 1992 
and 1993. By the end o f 1993, it is estimated that real incomes o f the population 
were about 17.9% below the level o f 1989. Thus, i f  we add to the successes o f low 
inflation and unemployment also the fact that real incomes o f the population have 
been rising since the in itia l decline in 1991, we can see that the costs o f transfor- 
mation have remained reasonably low in the Czech Republic. This also explains 
why the social scene has been spared any major disruptions.
There are other indicators o f success. Consumer markets have been greatly 
improved so that the consumer market equilibrium  has been widened and strength- 
ened. Corruption has not been, o f course, fu lly  avoided but it is far less o f an issue 
than it appears to be in other transition economies. The most impressive indicator 
has been the growth o f international reserves reflecting a rapid increase in confi- 
dence among international investors (Table 1). This was partly due to financial 
assistance arranged by, or through, international financial institutions and to the 
growth o f foreign investment and to foreign borrowing.
The only major macroeconomic indicator adversely affected under the stabiliza- 
tion program has been the growth o f GDP, arguably the most important o f all 
macroeconomic indicators. As Table 1 shows, it is estimated that GDP fe ll in the 
firs t year o f the reform in 1990 by 1.2% and the decline continued in all subsequent 
years. The only consolation has been that the rate o f decrease has been itse lf
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decreasing so that by the end o f 1993 the rate o f growth o f GDP stabilized at 
around 0%.
Even these GDP figures have been interpreted by the Government fa irly  posi- 
tively. The Government has consistently argued that the GDP figures have been 
biased downward for two reasons. The firs t is that the GDP statistics cover the 
activities o f small businesses poorly due to tax avoidance and also because the 
statistical authorities have not yet been able to monitor the activities o f this brand 
new sector. The second reason concerns the problem o f product-quality and prod- 
uct-mix. There is no doubt that the reform has brought along a major shift in the 
mix o f products that have appeared in the markets due to the expansion o f imports, 
jo in t ventures w ith foreign companies, and greater responsiveness o f domestic 
companies to market pressures. S im ilarly, the quality o f products has improved as 
consumer sovereignty, as well as the pressures o f competition, has increased. Due 
to these factors the government has repeatedly argued that the officia l GDP figures 
understate the true rate o f growth.
What is even more remarkable is that these successes have been achieved despite 
three major external shocks, which under any circumstances produce serious dis- 
ruptions to trade, capital flows, and domestic production. The firs t o f these shocks 
was the collapse o f the CMEA market, which used to be particularly important for 
the former Czechoslovakia. In its heyday in the m id-1980’s, the share o f a ll CMEA 
countries in Czechoslovak trade was almost 80%, which is considerably more than 
in the other European CMEA eountries. By the early 1990’s, the share dropped to 
less than 20%. Total losses o f output due to the collapse o f CMEA were estimated 
in the range o f 30-50% in 1991-1992 (Rodrik,1993). The country has successfully 
adjusted its trade pattern by increasing its trade w ith the West, especially w ith the 
European Union. The second external shock was the deep recession in the West in 
1990-1993, which put severe barriers on the growth o f Czech exports to these coun- 
tries. The th ird  and arguably the most serious external shock by far was the collapse 
o f the former federation o f the Czech and Slovak Republics, which has led to the 
creation o f two independent states w ith their own governments and economic insti- 
tutions, as well as their own currencies. The impact on trade has been dramatic: the 
real value o f Czech exports to the Slovak Republic declined by about 22% in 1993.
a. The "Luck" Factor
The relatively successful performance can be explained by a number o f exogenous 
factors. The firs t reason was the starting position o f the Czechoslovak government 
which was considerably better than the starting position o f other governments in 
Central and Eastern Europe including the countries o f the former Soviet Union (see 
Drábek et al., 1994). The level o f general macroeconomic disequilibrium  in 1989 
and 1990, the period o f the critical political and economic changes, was much 
lower than in these other countries. Moreover, the absolute level o f the disequilib- 
rium was so low that the total amount o f resources, domestic and external, required 
to support the transformation could be mobilized relatively easily. Thus, Czecho- 
Slovakia in 1990-1991 quickly gained access to more than USD 1.5 b illio n  through
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the IM F and IBRD facilities, which were further supplemented by additional bor- 
rowing o f the Czechoslovak National Bank in the commercial market. The highly 
successful effort to mobilize resources externally, together w ith the low level of 
disequilibrium , made it possible to apply fa irly  modest restrictive measures domes- 
tica lly .1 This was reflected in the fa irly  small general price increase generated by a 
sudden liberalization o f domestic prices. Other starting conditions were also highly 
favorable: a balanced government budget, low domestic indebtedness o f the gov- 
emment, small external debt, and a consumer market that was relatively well 
supplied w ith consumer goods and that did not have widespread queues and short- 
ages or parallel markets.
Other non-policy-related factors have been also conducive to good performance. 
They include a favorable improvement in terms o f trade (see Table 1). Social atti- 
tudes and placid behavior o f the population have been highly conducive to the 
implementation o f the reform. The attractiveness o f the country in general, and of 
Prague in particular, stimulated enormous growth o f tourism. The total number 
visitors to the Czech Republic in 1993 was estimated at between 70-80 m illion 
tourist days. The total receipts from tourism in 1993 exceeded USD 1.5 b illion , con- 
tributing to the financing o f trade deficits in the early period o f the reform. Another 
important factor was the proxim ity o f the country to the German and Austrian mar- 
kets, providing a great opportunity for Czech traders and producers after the 
collapse o f CMEA. This proxim ity has been also extremely important in providing 
job opportunities fo r people in border areas that were particularly exposed to the 
domestic recession.
Savings behavior o f economic agents has been another positive variable. Savings 
behavior has been subject to several adverse influences and uncertainties, such as 
the separation o f the country and the elim ination o f old currency and introduction 
o f new money, to name just two, albeit very important, events. Real interest rates, 
especially short-term deposit rates, have remained negative throughout the whole 
period. Moreover, taxation o f savings has been high by international standards. 
Nevertheless, household savings have been growing quite impressively despite all 
these factors. The savings behavior o f the Government sector was sim ilar. For 
example, the outturn o f the central budget showed in 1993 a large surplus against 
the anticipated balanced budget. Local governments, in particular, were very cau- 
tious, and they accumulated substantial surpluses (see Table 4). A ll these agents 
had one th ing in common: a strong financial conservatism.
b. Success o f Policies
The economic performance has been also positively affected by the conduct o f gov- 
ernment policies. The effect came in four areas. The firs t was the flexible real wage 
policy. As Table 1 above shows, the growth o f wages was very moderate in 1990
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and 1991 in the aftermath o f price liberalization. The growth o f nominal wages was 
3.5 and 16.7%, respectively, well below the rate o f inflation, which led to an esti- 
mated fa ll o f real wages o f 31.2%. This was possible mainly due to the government 
policy o f controlling wages. This policy lasted until 1992, when the controls were 
lifted and replaced by a Tripartite Agreement between the government, the unions, 
and the employers. The Agreement provided for growth o f wages tied to the rate o f 
in flation plus up to 5%, which effectively allowed more-than-inflation indexing. 
The unions took fu ll advantage o f these provisions o f the Agreement, and, indeed, 
the growth o f wages exceeded the growth o f inflation by almost 5% in 1993. The 
government was, therefore, forced to return to wage controls in the second ha lf o f 
1993.
In addition to wage policy, other elements o f price policy have been instrumental 
to success. Product prices were liberalized almost completely and in one step, and 
this had the fo llow ing positive effects. Enterprise liqu id ity  increased, and this 
helped especially those enterprises that lost budgetary support. Price liberalization 
also changed domestic relative prices, and these are now close to world market 
relative prices, a sine qua non for a small trading nation like  the Czech Republic. 
The liberalization o f prices has also been the key factor in stim ulating the private 
sector and the in flow  o f foreign investment. Last but not least, price liberalization 
has reduced the scope for government allocation o f resources and the dangers o f 
corruption.
Another aspect o f policy that helped create a successful transformation was the 
privatization policy o f the government. This policy was ultim ately the one aspect o f 
the government reform package that most differentiated the Czech Republic from 
other countries and that made the biggest contribution to the success o f the eco- 
nomie program. The process included two methods o f privatization: small and large 
privatization. Small privatization led immediately to the change in effective owner- 
ship as properties were auctioned o ff to their new owners. Small privatization 
introduced, therefore, better conditions for financial discipline in newly privatized 
firms as new owners were under greater pressure to repay loans used to acquire the 
property and to survive as new businesses. Large privatization also made a d iffer- 
enee. This was the case in spite o f the widely voiced criticism  that the voucher 
method was an inefficient and inequitable way o f transferring property from the 
state to private owners.2
Privatization policy made several important contributions: strengthening corpo- 
rate governance and the balance o f payments, encouraging the in flow  o f foreign 
investments, expanding the service sector and small and mediumsized enterprises 
(SMEs), and facilita ting government budgetary policies. Large privatization was 
important for corporate governance on two accounts. First, a vast number o f state 
assets were sold directly to domestic or foreign investors who have fundamentally 
changed the management o f their companies. Second, large-scale privatization led 
to the commercialization o f the banking sector. Large-scale privatization has been 
also successful in strengthening the balance o f payments because it has affected a 
large number o f enterprises (Table 3). The key was, again, foreign investments. The
2 See. for example, Kouba (1993) and (1994).
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mass privatization approach enabled the government to privatize about 1500 enter- 
prises in  1 year and in the firs t wave o f privatization alone. It attracted more than 
USD 2.0 b illion  o f direct foreign investment in the 3 years, 1991 -1993. Privatization 
policies have also opened up room for a dramatic expansion o f the service sector 
and for the growth o f SMEs (see Table 1). Last but not least, the policies have con- 
siderably reduced the financial burden o f government support to enterprises (Table 
1), while they dramatically increased the revenues o f the state.
Even though large-scale privatization was an important element o f the agree- 
ments w ith the international lending institutions, the voucher method in itia lly  was 
not supported by the W orld Bank. Fortunately, this never became an issue because 
whatever disagreements existed on this topic could not affect the actual agreements 
about the stabilization program. As noted above, the method was not seen as an ef- 
ficient way o f introducing corporate governance, and the advantages were, there- 
fore, seen as mainly political rather than economic. Nevertheless, both the Bank 
and the government have seen privatization as being v ita lly  important in ensuring 
that the impact o f monetary policy measures filtered down to credit providers and 
credit recipients. The position o f the Bank toward the voucher method o f privatiza- 
tion has changed quite dramatically over time, which shows a considerable degree 
o f flex ib ility . Today, the method is fu lly  supported by the Bank not only in the 
Czech Republic but also elsewhere in the transition economies.
The th ird  important area where reform supported success was foreign exchange 
liberalization. The in itia l step included a complete liberalization o f a ll foreign 
exchange transactions on the current account, excepting the transactions o f physi- 
cal persons who were domestic residents and all transactions involving inward for- 
eign investments. The main attraction o f this step was its positive impact on the 
in flow  o f foreign investments, which was favorably influenced by the right o f unre- 
stricted transfer o f profits, dividends, and capital abroad. Foreign exchange liber- 
alization has also enabled a complete liberalization o f imports, which in turn has 
provided more competition for domestic firm s and helped to break domestic 
monopolies. Liberalization has also kept a brake on the growth o f domestic prices 
and was instrumental in im proving consumer market equilibrium.
The fourth important reason was the conduct o f fiscal, monetary, and exchange 
rate policies, which effectively eliminated dangers o f hyperinflation w ithin 3 
months o f 1992 (Table 2). The positive role o f fiscal policy lay mainly in stimulat- 
ing companies' liqu id ity and savings and reducing their demand for bank credit. 
The starting fiscal position was relatively favorable, as noted above, but the 
government faced two major challenges. Privatization, together w ith the liberaliza- 
tion o f commodity, factor, and financial markets, were expected to increase the 
pressures on the government to increase support for a iling  companies and rising 
unemployment. The other challenge was self imposed. The government set itse lf 
two objectives, to m inim ize the claims o f the state on domestic savings and to 
reduce the role o f the state in the economy. Both objectives have been met, as can 
be seen from Table 4, which shows the highly disciplined behavior o f the govern- 
ment sector, which consisted o f the federal government and two national govern- 
ments until the separation o f the two countries in 1993, as well as o f local 
governments. The consolidated public sector position was in surplus in 1989-1990
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and incurred a small deficit in 1991-1992. Fiscal stringency increased further in
1993.
Fiscal performance was achieved both by restraining government expenditures 
and by reducing the tax burden (see Table 5). The expenditure restraint was concen- 
trated on two major steps, a significant cut in budgetary subsidies to enterprises, 
which were, therefore, forced to increase their selffinancing capabilities, and by a 
large cut in real capital expenditures. For example, the real capital spending o f the 
government in 1993 is estimated to have been reduced by 70.8% in  comparison 
w ith the level o f 1990. At the same time, the reduction o f the tax burden has been 
prim arily channeled to the enterprise sector, helping the companies at the time 
when production subsidies were lowered. Moreover, the government attempted to 
help companies by reducing indirect taxation in order to stimulate domestic 
demand.
This, too, was a sensible policy even though, for other reasons, the supply re- 
sponse to this policy remained lim ited, and the policy resulted in higher financial 
profits for companies. This thrust o f fiscal policy continued in 1993. Since the 
fiscal numbers are not easily comparable between 1992 and 1993 due to the split in 
the federation, the 1993 budget is not reported here.
The success o f monetary policy lay in the ability o f the Central Bank to meet its 
monetary targets. The success was, o f course, not foolproof, as 1 shall discuss fur- 
ther below, but there is no doubt that the Czech National Bank has been able to 
contain the growth o f money supply at relatively low rates for three reasons. First, 
the demand for credit by the government has been extremely low, as noted above. 
Net credit to government declined in 1992 and 1993 after a small increase in 1991. 
Second, other components o f bank credit also have been growing well w ith in the 
target zone. The most rapidly expanding component o f credit demand has been 
credit to enterprises, but even this component has been growing at reasonable rates 
(see Table 6). Third, the monetary authorities have been able to restrain the growth 
o f money even in the face o f a rising net in flow  o f capital that was related partly to 
speculative movement o f money from Slovakia and partly to the in flow  o f direct 
and portfolio investment, which, in 1993 alone, reached a level o f USD 1.6 b illion .
Control o f the growth o f money stock has been achieved by the authorities 
through a combination o f direct and indirect instruments. During the firs t 2 years, 
the authorities relied prim arily on indirect instruments by setting interest rate and 
credit ceilings both on the overall level o f credit and by setting individual credit 
ceilings for major banks. This policy was practiced for about 2 years, and interest 
rate ceilings were abolished in April 1992 and credit ceilings in October 1992. 
Since then, authorities have relied almost exclusively on indirect instruments such 
as minimum reserve requirements, discount and Lombard rates, rediscounting 
facilities, the auctioning o f refinancing credits and, from July 1992, sales o f Cen- 
trai Bank bills.
The fina l point is the conduct o f exchange rate policy and the success in 
maintaining a stable exchange rate since 1991. There is no doubt that the stability 
o f the exchange rate must be considered a success in ligh t o f the government’s 
overall objective to control inflation. A stable exchange rate has been instrumental 
in helping to keep inflation down by avoiding an upward pressure on domestic
Roland Schönfeld - 978-3-95479-733-2
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 09:44:06AM
via free access
00063440
prices from rising import prices, which would have occurred had the currency been 
devalued as was done in other Central European countries. The foundation o f this 
policy consisted o f the three successive devaluations that took place in 1990-1991 
and that resulted in the depreciation o f the currency to the level o f the unofficial 
rate for the koruna in Vienna. This resulted in a devaluation large enough to stabi- 
lize the balance o f payments by encouraging exports and providing for adequate 
protection from imports. It is estimated that the devaluations overshot the rate of 
the purchasing power parity by a factor o f three, and this gave the government con- 
siderable leeway to allow  real appreciation and time to protect domestic firm s from 
foreign competition.3 In addition, by fix in g  the nominal rather than the real rate of 
exchange, the government was able to eliminate one potential source o f inflation, as 
noted above. Clearly, a ll these steps were negotiated w ith the international institu- 
tions, although these have recommended rather different policies in Hungary and 
Poland where the government followed more closely the movement o f real 
exchange rate.
188 Zdenék Drábek
4. The S tab ilization Policies and Economic Growth
However successful government policies to stabilize the economy have been, there 
are concerns about the future. Some o f these have to do w ith policies that have been 
applied thus far and others may be due to policies that have not been applied at all. 
The reasons for concern are twofold. As noted above, GDP has been declining for 
the past 4 years, at least in statistical terms, and for at least 2 years longer than pro- 
jected by the W orld Bank and by the Fund in the early phases o f the programs. 
Clearly, GDP growth has been affected by exogenous shocks, as noted above, but 
there are also reasons to believe that the existing recession is also partia lly policy- 
induced. The other reason for concern is inflation. Even though inflation control in 
the Czech Republic has been undoubtedly more successful than in other transition 
economies, this success is not sufficient to ensure that any future recovery can be 
sustained. This is because the inflation performance relative to other transition 
economies matters only marginally in view o f the small volume o f mutual trade 
that exists among these countries. In contrast, relative inflation performance mat- 
ters much more when it comes to the comparison w ith OECD countries, and, in this 
comparison, Czech performance is considerably worse.
Appreciation o f the Real Effective Exchange
Given the faster inflation rate relative to the inflation in the OECD countries, the 
real effective exchange rate (REER) vis-a-vis the dollar and the Deutsche Mark, 
two currencies that make up the basket used in setting the koruna's exchange rate, 
has been appreciated rapidly. The in itia l competitive advantage o f Czech tradeables 
obtained by the original devaluations has been, therefore, gradually eroding under
3 See, for example. Pick (1994).
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the existing policy o f a fixed nominal exchange rate. The current exchange rate 
probably s till provides sufficient advantages for domestic companies to compete 
w ith foreigners, but, unless there is a dramatic reversal in the decline o f domestic 
productivity or the domestic inflation rate is pushed down to the rate prevailing on 
the country's main markets, the policy o f fix ing  the nominal exchange rate could 
turn out to be a serious constraint.4 This is prim arily because the loss o f competi- 
tiveness could seriously affect restructuring plans o f domestic companies, which are 
becoming not only more uncertain but also more costly. In sum, what may appear 
to be an equilibrium  exchange rate in the short run may not be sustainable in the 
long run.
Furthermore, there is also no doubt that a fixed nominal exchange rate also com- 
plicates the conduct o f monetary policy. In the course o f the last 7 months o f 1993, 
the Czech Republic received more than USD 1 b illion  o f portfolio investments. 
This, together w ith about USD 550 m illion direct foreign investment, foreign bor- 
rowing by local companies o f almost USD 1 b illion , and receipts from tourism o f 
more than USD 1.5 b illion  increased considerably the liqu id ity  o f the domestic 
banking system. This, in turn, has put considerable pressure on the monetary 
authorities to mop up excess liqu id ity. Whether this is the right time to do so 
remains unclear because banks’ lending continues to be extremely cautious and to 
expand at a relatively slow pace. Moreover, the intervention would have to bring 
about an increase in interest rates, which would only fiirther delay the expansion o f 
credit needed to jum p-start the economic recovery. On the other hand, even though 
there are costs to the existing exchange rate policy, there is no clear alternative. 
The only other policy option would have been a revaluation o f the currency to slow 
down the in flow  o f foreign capital, but this would have been even more costly in 
terms o f the impact on competitiveness o f producers as noted above.
Critics o f the exchange rate policy viewed the magnitude o f the original dévalua- 
tion as excessive because it was forced by the speed and magnitude o f trade and 
price liberalization. Liberalization caused serious damage to domestic industry 
because it brought about a fast penetration o f the domestic market by imports. This, 
in turn, forced the government to apply restrictive demand management policies in 
order to maintain the balance o f payments in equilibrium .5 However, without get- 
ting into a theoretical dispute w ith this argument, which clearly ignores and com- 
pletely misunderstands the role o f exchange rate policy, it is quite evident that the 
argument has so far not been supported by empirical evidence. It is d ifficu lt to 
argue about excessive costs o f liberalization in a situation in which real wages have 
been growing since 1991 and the rate o f unemployment is one o f the lowest in 
Europe. Exports increased in 1993 by more than 20%, which also indicates that 
export incentives have been very powerful so far and that the supply response has 
been quite impressive. So far, no major complaints have been registered about in ju- 
ries from import penetration. It is needless to point out, however, that the magni- 
tude o f the devaluation has prevented the authorities from making an effective
1 These policies are beginning to be understood also in the Czech Republic. See, for exam- 
pie, Jonas (1993).
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anchor o f the exchange rate, as they had hoped. The domestic price level has not 
been anchored by the foreign price level, as is evident from the faster domestic in- 
flation in comparison to that in Western Europe.
Tightness o f M onetary Policies
As noted above, the monetary authorities have been often criticized by those who 
argue that the monetary stance has been too tigh t (e.g., Klacek, 1994, Vienna Insti- 
tute, 1993). Before we turn to this criticism  in some detail, it is necessary to put 
monetary policy into a broader context o f overall macroeconomic management. 
This raises, firs t o f a ll, the question o f whether the inflation rate should not have 
been lower than what has been actually achieved. Here the answer is very clear: 
in flation continues to be a real danger. Current inflation erodes the real value o f 
savings: most short-term deposit rates after tax are below the rate o f inflation and 
this discourages savings.6 The current rate o f inflation is also much faster than that 
in competing countries, which impedes the adjustment process, as noted above. Un- 
t il in fla tion is reduced to the rates at least comparable w ith the rest o f Europe it 
must remain the number one priority o f the government.
The tightness o f monetary policy can be assessed in the context o f the effects of 
other economic policies. Here the main issue has been the wage policy o f the gov- 
emment. The policy, it could be argued, has allowed too rapid a growth o f wages. 
Wages have been allowed to grow without any reference to the growth o f productiv- 
ity , which, it appears, was perilously declining throughout the period. The only 
exception was 1991 when real wages declined even more than the fa ll o f productiv- 
ity , but this outcome has not been repeated since.7 Clearly, under such circum- 
stances, a ll wage increases have been purely inflationary, and they have been 
monetized by central bank policy.‘ The disturbing story is that the current wage 
regulations may even allow the growth o f wages to be faster than in 1993 as indi- 
cated by a high o ffic ia l in the M inistry o f Labor.9
Fiscal policy, too, has had a major impact on the movement o f monetary aggre- 
gates. The latter have been greatly affected by budgetary policies o f different parts 
o f the government, i.e., by the federal and the two national governments prior to 
1993 and by local governments throughout the period. As we have seen, the con­
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6 See Vojtišek (1994).
7 We have no analysis o f true factor productivity. Available studies m ix together structural 
changes w ith true factor productivity. There is also a disagreement whether output per 
worker has been falling, or rather rising as recently proposed by the Central Bank. Never- 
theless, most observers would probably agree that output per worker has been falling 
since 1990. See, fo r example. Flek and Buchtíková (1993). See also the discussion o f pro- 
ductivity •and wages in Janácková (1993, pp.27-33) and Kouba (1993).
‘  The only other alternative is, o f course, external financing. There is evidence to suggest 
that external funding has been indeed instrumental in financing the trade imbalance in the 
course o f the firs t three quarters o f 1993.
9 See "Letos mohou m zdyrust o desetiny procenta rychle ji než v lonském roce": 
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solidated budgetary position during the federation was in surplus in 1989-1990 and 
in small deficit in 1991-1992. Fiscal stringency became even more pronounced in 
1993 after the breakup o f the federation. The total consolidated surplus was 12.2 
b illio n  crowns at the end o f June 1993. This, together w ith 6.9 b illion  crowns set 
aside from government debt service and 6.3 b illion  crowns o f collected but tempo- 
ra rily  retained tax revenues, accounted for about 4% o f total outstanding credit o f 
the banking sector at the tim e.10
Because the government keeps most o f its accounts w ith the central bank, it is 
clear that the consolidated budgetary policies o f the government had a contraction- 
ary impact on money supply. Some o f this impact was not predictable in  view o f the 
unexpected surpluses o f local governments which were unable to disburse all their 
funds assigned to investment projects. Moreover the fiscal surpluses together w ith 
the rising importance o f foreign resources have increased the role o f autonomous 
factors that determine the moment o f money stock in the economy and reduced cor- 
respondingly the role o f credit. This further complicates the conduct o f monetary 
policy particularly in view o f the policy o f a fixed exchange rate.
The critics o f the government's monetary policy have pointed to the very high 
nominal interest rates that have reduced the provision o f credit to new and estab- 
lished companies and encouraged extremely risky investments. Some have even 
pointed out that the growth o f money supply has been too slow, which has lim ited 
the access o f companies to bank resources." The criticism  can be, therefore, split 
into two parts, interest rate policy and liqu id ity  management by the central bank. 
The level o f interest rates has been affected by four important factors, the expected 
rate o f inflation, the lim ited scope for monetary authorities to lower interest rates, 
the shortage o f long- term resources, and the banks' efforts to clean up their balance 
sheets. The expected rate o f inflation has kept up the nominal interest rates on 
deposits, and this has adversely affected the costs o f funds to banks. Effective com- 
petition among banks, both on the deposit and credit side, has remained lim ited 
despite a large number o f new licenses issued by the central bank since 1990. This, 
in turn, has given large banks an opportunity to have better access to deposits than 
do smaller or newer banks. At the same time, the smaller banks have been aggres- 
sively lu ring  depositors w ith higher deposit interest rates. The impact o f the central 
bank on interest rates has been lim ited by the shortage o f monetary instruments. 
This reflects partly lim ited effectiveness o f the central bank's own interest rates and 
partly the shortage o f government paper.12 This was the main reason why the cen- 
trai bank had to rely on credit rationing in the firs t phase o f the reform until 1992. 
The range o f instruments has expanded impressively over the past 2 years, e.g.,
10For more details, see Kotulan (1993, pp.37-39).
11The distinction between the impact o f policies on interest rates and the growth o f money 
stock may seem redundant. Nevertheless, the impact may be sometimes different due to 
other interventions such as regulations or due to the role o f competition.
12Given the policy o f a balanced budget, the government reduced its recourse to debt 
financing. The securities market has been, therefore, extremely thin, which has forced the 
central bank to issue its own bills. In March 1994 the market traded w ith 24 b illions Kc 
o f Treasury b ills, 16 b illion  Kc o f b ills  o f the Fund for National Property but w ith 58 b il- 
lion Kc o f central bank bills. See Kučera (1994). Roland Schönfeld - 978-3-95479-733-2
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rediscounting and the issuing o f b ills, but the benefits are beginning to be visible 
only now.
The shortages o f long-term resources can be partially attributed to policy and 
institutional issues. The authorities have been verv slow in designing the legislation 
and instruments to attract long-term resources from pension funds, insurance com- 
panies, other institutions, and the general public. For example, mortgage legisla- 
tion, an ideal instrument to attract long-term savings, was firs t discussed only at 
the end o f 1994 and the law has not yet been passed.13 Finally, the level o f interest 
rates has been fundamentally affected by the government policy to privatize banks 
without providing aid for all the existing nonperforming loans that the banks had 
on their books at the time o f privatization. This policy was designed to avoid the 
"moral hazard" o f banks but it has also forced the banks to make large provisions 
for bad or doubtful loans. The latter had to be financed by adding large margins to 
deposit interest rates; the 1993 average was more than 7%. These margins have 
remained persistently high and could not be reduced without major costs to the 
banking sector. It may be interesting to note that these issues were already well 
understood in the early years o f the reform, and both the W orld Bank and other in- 
dependent experts have favored a more radical method o f cleaning the banks' 
balance sheets.14 The criticism  o f the liqu id ity policy o f the central bank also seems 
misplaced. There is no serious evidence to support the view that there was an over- 
a ll shortage o f credit to the nongovernment sector.15 The arguments have thus far 
been based on anecdotal evidence about difficulties o f small businesses in obtaining 
credit. The criticism  also centers on the failure o f the central bank to keep monetary 
growth w ithin the stated monetary targets.16 However, this criticism  fails to take 
into account the fact that the original monetary targets were based on more opti- 
mistie assumptions about the growth o f output, and the failure to achieve the mone- 
tary targets reflects nothing more than a response o f the central bank to slower 
growth. Moreover, we can deduce some trend from the partial evidence that, on the 
whole, confirms the conclusion that the Czech economy has not suffered from a 
credit crunch. In particular, the velocity o f circulation remained on average more or 
less constant over the period under observation even though temporary fluctuations 
on a quarter-to-quarter basis have been observed. These fluctuations could be par- 
tia lly  explained by temporary withdrawal o f savings that took place on at least two 
occasions. The firs t occasion occurred in 1990-1991 when a small monetary over- 
hang was absorbed by higher money expenditures on consumption. The second 
occasion occurred in 1993 when the monetary movements were affected by a small 
withdrawal o f deposits in early 1993 at the time o f separation o f the two republics.
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13In spite o f their impressive start, the capital markets in the Czech Republic cannot be ex- 
pected to be an effective alternative for some tim e to come. See Drábek (1994).
14See, for example, Long (1991) and Begg and Portes (1992). Needless to say, however, 
that the Bank itse lf has not been entirely convinced about this solution. For a contrasting 
view see, for example, van Wijnberger (1992).
15The only serious attempt to analyze the liqu id ity  position o f the banking sector is, to my 
knowledge, that o f Siklós and Abel (1993); who do not find any evidence o f credit crunch.
16 See H m čif (1993) and Kotulan (1993). Roland Schönfeld - 978-3-95479-733-2
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 09:44:06AM
via free access
p0063440
Another indicator o f a possible credit crunch, interenterprise debt, has shown 
movements that could be explained by other factors. It is true that the total inter- 
enterprise debt increased significantly between 1990 and 1993, and this has been 
interpreted by some writers as the product o f tight monetary policy.17 The total 
amount o f interenterprise debt amounted to 157.6 b illion  Kc, about USD 5.3 m il- 
lion, at the end o f December 1992; the corresponding Czech and Slovak figures 
were 94.4 b illio n  Kc and 63.2 b illion  Kc respectively, which represented as much 
as 27.6% o f total outstanding bank credit.1‘ However, the interesting aspect o f this 
debt was that it changed over time, including a significant reduction in the course 
o f 1992 before the total amount increased again. This would suggest a different 
interpretation o f the emergence o f interenterprise debt, that is, the debt has been at 
least as much due to the financial indiscipline o f enterprises as it has been due to 
the shortages o f credit. By far the most powerful argument against the criticism  of 
monetary policies has been the growth o f domestic aggregate demand. As can be 
seen in Table 1 above, private consumption has been growing in real terms since 
1991, or at an average annual rate o f 5.1%. The growth has been fueled by the 
rapid growth o f wages, which has been partly channeled to a growth o f household 
savings, by 26% in 1992 and by 22.6% in 1992 and 1993, respectively, as well as 
to the growth o f consumption.19 The growth was rapid enough to offset the in itia l 
fa ll in capital spending in 1991 (see also Table 1). Total domestic aggregate de- 
mand was rising relatively fast in 1990 and 1992, and this growth was met by 
rapidly expanding imports and partly by rising prices. As noted above, the domestic 
supply response remained more than sluggish.
L im ita tio n s  o f S tru c tu ra l P o lic ies
I f  any serious criticism  can be raised against the government policy, then it w ill 
concern prim arily structural policies that might have been more conducive to 
growth o f output. There has been a major controversy in the country about how 
much demand management the government should, or indeed could, have done.20 
Given the growth o f domestic demand and the existing low level o f unemployent, 
the risk o f faster inflation stemming from demand expansion must have been very 
high. Moreover, given the structural rigidities in the financial sector, it is extremely 
unlikely that monetary policy could have been used more effectively to stimulate 
aggregate demand, as noted above. On the other hand, more effective structural 
policies could have provided a significant impetus to growth o f output. Even 
though the government has adopted a number o f important structural policy meas-
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17See H m cif (1993).
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1993. Unfortunately, these data are no longer collected and published.
19See Mesicni Bulletin ČNB, No. 3, 1994.
20See, for example, Klacek (1994) but also OECD (1994) and Vienna Institute (1993) to 
name just a few o f the protagonists who have been pushing for a more active demand 
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ures, as noted above, the structural policy interventions have not been sufficient. 
The role o f the international financial institutions has not been, in this respect, 
forceful enough to convince the government that the adoption o f some o f these 
policies would be crucial to restoring economic growth. Among these policies, one 
should include mainly those that affect the corporate governance, the financial sec- 
tor, and the infrastructural policies.
The issue o f corporate governance was expected by the pioneers o f the voucher 
scheme to be fu lly  resolved w ith the implementation o f privatzation policies, but 
this expectation was not met. The voucher method has been very successful in de- 
etatizing state property, but it has not yet brought about a major improvement in 
corporate governance. This is reflected, for example, in a huge intra-enterprise debt 
that was created after the imposition o f tight monetary targets and that represents 
partly the reaction o f nonfinancial enterprises to the lack o f bank credit but mainly 
the absence o f financial discipline as mentioned above. The reasons for the lack of 
effective ownership are several. Legal lim itations on equity ownership imposed on 
investment funds restrict the control o f companies by their owners, the investment 
funds. Banks are subject to conflicting interests as owners o f major, investment 
funds and as creditors o f enterprises owned by those funds. Moreover, banks have 
been unw illing to be more aggressive in collecting the outstanding loans by putting 
companies into bankruptcy in order to avoid taking possession o f properties that 
have been securitized by their clients or to avoid debt-for-equity swaps.21
Financial sector policies have been vigorous over the past 4 years but they, too, 
have not been entirely satisfactory. Bank competition has been greatly increased 
through the central bank licensing procedures, and most banks were recapitalized 
fo llow ing the stricter capital adequacy requirements o f the monetary authorities. An 
expansion o f banking products and services was made possible by amendments to 
the banking law and the foreign exchange law and by the adoption o f the law on 
securities, investment funds, and the stock exchange. Banks were assisted in re- 
structuring their balance sheets by the government's move to refinance a part o f 
their nonperforming loans, to name just a few main elements o f the policy reform. 
However, major problems s till remain. One problem has been the banks' credit poi- 
icy which has been constrained by intertwined relationships among borrowers, the 
investment funds, and the banks themselves, as noted above. This has been made 
possible by the decision o f the monetary authorities to establish a universal banking 
system, a decision that may turn out to be a major weakness in the future.22 Fur- 
thermore, the banks' credit policy has been biased toward short- and medium-term 
credits since banks have very lim ited access to long-term resources. This reflects 
partly the lack o f legislation to develop institutions in areas that could attract long- 
term resources. Another problem has been central bank supervision policy, which 
has been hampered by lack o f experienced staff. The role o f international financial
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commercialized state enterprises. "
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institutions has been rather lim ited in these areas.23 The central bank has been re- 
ceiving assistance on supervision policy from bilateral sources, but IMF assistance 
would have been more effective in  this case, particularly as an integral part o f 
standby arrangements.
Furthermore, the balance sheets o f several major banks have continued to be bur- 
dened by a large proportion o f doubtful or nonperforming loans. This distorted the 
banks' interest rate policy as we have seen above. The central bank estimated the 
total amount o f so-called classified assets, поп-repaid loans w ith at least 30 days 
arrears m aturity, or poorly secured loans that have not been repaid after 90 days, at 
133.1 b illion  Kc at the end o f December 1992, or about USD 4.2 b illion . The meas- 
ures adopted by the government to address the issue o f nonperforming loans, e.g., 
debt-for-equity swaps, encouragement o f fo rfe iting agencies, and the sale o f these 
loans to the Consolidation Bank, have not been effective. These issues have been 
regularly disussed w ith the W orld Bank, which took a rather different stand. The 
lack o f action in resolving the problem of nonperforming loans was not surprising 
to some observers, one o f whom remarked: "It appears th a t... the W orld Bank was 
right when it recommended to undertake the cleaning o f the balances as early as 
possible while property was mostly in the hands o f the state. W ith the diversified 
ownership o f debt-ridden companies and the banks holding the non-performing 
loans, the administration o f this process becomes more d ifficu lt and the use o f pub- 
lie money more questionable" (Kerouš, 1994).
The method o f cleaning the banks' balance sheets, too, can be considered highly 
controversial. As noted above, assistance has been provided in  the form o f transfers 
o f a part o f nonperforming loans to the Consolidation Bank. This operation has 
been financed partly by the government, but by far the most important source o f 
financing has been the proceeds from privatization. This approach has been already 
taken in three different operations involving the banks. In other words, the gov- 
ernment has taken a very small responsibility for the banks' liabilities. W hile the 
policy has been probably most desirable on political grounds it has most like ly not 
been the most efficient use o f proceeds from privatization. The policy has simply 
transferred the debt from one creditor to another, and this has tended to ossify the 
existing structure o f resource use, including a ll its inefficiencies. P ari passu, the 
privatization proceeds could not be used for investments w ith higher returns.
The last policy that I wish to discuss is the government policy toward infrastruc- 
ture. This policy has suffered from one major drawback: the lack o f an overall 
strategy in v irtua lly a ll segments o f infrastructure. It w ill not be perhaps an exag- 
geration to say that in some areas the absence o f strategy reflected the inab ility to 
define the role o f the state in the provision o f infrastructural services such as in 
telecommunications, health, ra il, road, and city transport. The translation o f strate- 
gic goals into specific policies has taken an extremely long time in situations when 
the basic principles o f strategy had been agreed upon. The slow speed w ith which 
these policies and specific projects are prepared and implemented remains a serious 
problem in a ll areas. The role o f the W orld Bank and the EBRD, two prime donors 
who could have been extremely helpful in these areas, has been very small due to
23For details see Kerouš (1994). Roland Schönfeld - 978-3-95479-733-2
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In this paper I have looked at the activities o f the international financial institu- 
tions, mainly the W orld Bank and the IM F, in the Czech Republic. The main idea 
was to describe and evaluate the role o f these institutions in the process o f trans- 
formation to a market economy. I have not considered all their activities but rather 
focused on their role in the stabilization process. This role had two aspects, the 
transfer o f resources and the influence o f these institutions on policy-m aking in the 
country. The positive role is quite evident, clear, and extremely important when it 
comes to the assistance o f these institutions in terms o f resource transfer. This role 
cannot be sufficiently emphasized. The role is less self-evident when it comes to the 
policy-m aking aspect, and it has been the policy aspect that has been covered in 
this paper.
In  sum, the role o f these institutions has been relatively small in the Czech 
Republic. This was partly due to the fact that the institutions had only a lim ited 
range and number o f instruments that could be used for this purpose. The instru- 
ments included three standby arrangements w ith the Fund, a Structural Adjustment 
Loan fac ility , and an energy loan from the W orld Bank. Moreover, there was virtu- 
a lly a complete meeting o f minds when it came to the design o f the stabilization 
programs, w ith many elements o f the program being introduced even before the 
signing o f the actual agreements. Under such circumstances, it is obviously d iffcult 
to discuss the specific role o f these institutions.
The standard question about the IMF and the W orld Bank programs is whether 
the programs are not too restrictive and, consequently, too costly for the recipient 
countries. The question has probably been asked ever since the introduction o f 
stabilization programs all over the world. The question is naturally also asked today 
in  the transition economies. The answer provided by the critics o f the programs is 
typically also the same, irrespective o f whether they happen to be in Latin America, 
Africa, Asia or, currently, in Central and Eastern Europe. The general criticism  of 
these stabilization programs is that they move into liberalization programs too fast 
in terms o f the institutions that are necessary to support such programs. As a result, 
the governments are obliged to adopt highly restrictive policies to contain infla- 
tionary targets and to maintain balance o f payments equilibrium. The absence o f 
the righ t institutions is today vehemently argued by critics in the Czech Republic or 
Poland as much as it is criticized in, say, Africa.
The question o f speed is not a straightforward matter o f pure economics. It may 
involve a choice between current costs and future benefits, which is typically a mat- 
ter o f politics. The Czech story is, however, a rather different one. It is d ifficu lt to 
be critica l o f the stabilization program on the grounds that the program has been 
too costly in view o f the growing real incomes o f households since 1991 and the 
level o f unemployment that is currently m inim al and far lower than in Western 
countries, let alone lower than that in other countries in transition. Under these
Roland Schönfeld - 978-3-95479-733-2
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 09:44:06AM
via free access
p0063440
circumstances, the continued preoccupation o f Czech authorities w ith in fla tion is 
understandable.
The government has succeeded partly because o f good policies and partly because 
it was lucky. The cost o f stabilization has been very m ild so far, and this has been 
crucial in ensuring social support. To the credit o f the government, it is necessary 
to stress that the Czechoslovak and, later, the Czech governments also were in- 
strumentai in m obilizing social support. There is very little  evidence that govern- 
ment policies were excessively restrictive in terms o f domestic demand as demon- 
strated, fo r example, by growth o f wages and private consumption. The starting 
position has been much easier than in other transition economies, and the govern- 
ment has been also very successful in m obilizing external support. Other exogenous 
factors, in particular the spectacular growth o f tourism and favorable changes in 
terms o f trade, have also made major contributions.
Moreover, we have witnessed no collapse o f output such as we have seen in other 
countries in sim ilar situations. This was partly due to the growth o f tourism noted 
above but also due to the positive contribution o f government policies. Four com- 
ponents o f government policies should be particularly singled out. The mass priva- 
tization program has exceeded most expectations. Small privatization enabled a 
rapid expansion o f the service sector and the growth o f SMEs. It has led to some 
improvement in corporate governance, and it has enabled much easier adjustment 
in the government sector by reducing the budgetary support to enterprises. Moreo- 
ver, privatization has been responsible fo r a significant in flow  o f indirect and 
portfolio foreign investment. Foreign exchange and price liberalizations have been 
crucial in attracting foreign investors, improving liqu id ity  o f enterprises, and 
stimulating domestic competition. The major contribution o f monetary policy has 
been its focus on inflation and its ability to attract savings into the banking sector. 
Finally, exchange rate policy has achieved three vita l objectives: it provided strong 
incentives to exports, it avoided ta riff and quantitative protection, and it m itigated 
inflationary pressures from imports.
Nevertheless, the supply response has not been fu lly  satisfactory. It has been 
adversely affected by major exogenous disturbances as well as by government po li- 
cies. Major problems may be building up that could seriously affect future perform- 
ance. Wages have been growing much faster than the growth o f productivity. 
Domestic inflation has been much faster than foreign inflation, but this discrepancy 
has not been reflected in the corresponding adjustment o f the nominal exchange 
rate, which has been kept unchanged. Output has been fa llin g  while employment 
has adjusted at a much slower pace. The lack o f coordination between monetary and 
other policies has put an inordinate burden on the monetary authorities to control 
inflation and to stimulate economic growth. Since inflation has not been fu lly  sub- 
dued, the central bank has been in the position o f having to target both growth and 
inflation w ith only one instrument, interest rate policy. Clearly, the bank needed 
more help from government policies to moderate the growth o f wages, and, as the 
study has discussed at some length, more effective structural policies o f the gov- 
emment would have been particularly helpful in stim ulating a better supply 
response.
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Zdenëk Drábek2 0 0
Table  1: Czech Republ 
(annual percentage change)
I 1990 4491 1992 1993 f
JGDP (const, prices) -1.2 -14.2 -6.6 ־0.3
!Private consumption (const prices) 6.7 ־23.9 8.6 1.5
!Fixed investment (const, prices) -2.1 ־17.7 6.3 ־7.9
[Exports (current prices) 
Imports (current prices)
0.2 43.8 6.1 20.0
!Industrial output -3.3 -22.3 -13.8 ־5.3
!Nominal wages 3.5 16.7 22.0 25.0
peal wages -5.7 -25.5 9.8 3.5
[Consumer prices 9.7 56.7 11.1 20.8
[Terms of trade 
Services output
• • 2.4 4.1
Ind. output of enterprises (up to 25 employees) -3.3 ־24.4 -13.7 I ־7.4
Total employment ־0.8 -9.2 -2.5 -2.3 •> J
Industrial employment -3.2 ־11.6 -11.8 В ־6.3
Production subsidies 3.6 ־22.5 ־9.5 -5.3 ļ
Memorandum Items: ן
Unemployment rate (%) 0.8 4.1 2.6 3.4 f
[Gross reserves (bn USD) - - 3.6 6.2 f
}Official reserves CNB (bn USD) - « 0.8 3.8 Й
QeneraLnote;
GDP, consumption and investment data are measured in constant (1984) prices while industrial 
output is expressed in constant (1989) prices. Consumer prices are represented by the consumer 
price index. Real wages have been reported by the authorities and they are not consistent with 
the figures on nominal wages and consumer prices in this table.
Satiras;
Indikátory ménového hospodáfskéhovyvoje Ceské repubfiky 1994, N0.2, Prague, Czech National Bank, 
Z. Drábek, K. Janáček and Z. Túma (1994) and Czech National Bank
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Table 2: Czech Republic: Official Price Indices. 1991. monthly.changes
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Öct Nov Dec
CPIa> 25.8 7.0 4.7 2.0 1.9 1.8 -0.1 0.0 0.3 -0.1 1.6 1.2
of which:
- foodstuffs 31.4 1.0 -2.2 ־1.6 -0.5 ־0.1 0.4 -0.1 0.8 -0.1 3.5 2.9
- durables 23.0 13.9 11.4 3.9 3.5 0.5 -0.6 -0.1 00 -0.5 03 0.5
catering ־ 43.7 1.8 -1.0 -0.1 -0.3 0.9 0.5 -0.3 0.2 -0.5 0.0 1.1
- services 8.6 3.6 1.5 4.8 4.2 12.8 0.6 0.4 0.5 2.5 3.6 0.6
PP|b)
- industry 24.0 19.3 0.1 2.9 1.7 -0.8 0.5 0.4 -0.4 0.0 0.9 0.6
- construction
work ־ 33.1 8 .3 c> 1.7 c> 0.8 c> 2.2 c> 0.3 c> 1.3 -0.3 -0.2 0.6 0.2 0.0
- material 42.6 10.4 1.8 1.1 3.3 0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 0.1 0.3 0.0
agriculture ־ - 2.7 1.3 -0.6 ־1.8 2.9 -0.7 0.4 -3.8 11.5 11.7 11.2
Notes:
a) Consumer price index 
b> Producer price index 
c> Estimate
Source:
Drábek, Janáček and Тита [1994], Table III.
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Table 3: Czech Republic: Key Dimensions





Total Number of Companies Privatized: 1491 1491
Czech Republic 943 988
Slovak Republic 487 503
Federation 61 0
Kčs bn USD bn
Book Value of Properly: 299.4 10.3
Czech Republic 206.4 7.1
Slovak Republic 90.1 3.1
Federation 2.9 0.1
Number of Shares Offered for Sale: 299,393,282 with a face value of
Czech Republic 212,490,000 Kčs 1,000, or USD 34.5
Slovak Republic 86,900,000
million
Number of Participating Investors: 8.54 (or 54% of the total population, some 01
Czech Republic 5.95 whom invested through more than 400






PlanEcon, Washington, DC: 31 Dec. 1992, p.3
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Table 4: Czech RepjjbüCL Federal. National and Local Government Budgets. 1989-1993
(CSK bn)
־ ־ I M ......................1990־ m r 1992 1993
Total Expenditures 













































Balance of budgets of local governments 











GDP (Czechoslovakia) in current prices 
Share in GDP
- of balances of all budgets
- of balances of national budgets






















Dlouhodobÿ vÿvoj finančnich ukazatelù ĆSFR; Praha, Federal Ministry of Finance 1990, 1991 
Závéreőné úőty к státnimu rozpočtu; Praha, Federal Ministry of Finance 1990, 1991, 1992 a 1993
Note;
Data are shown in the Czechoslovak crowns for 1989-1992 and in the Czech and Slovak crowns 
respectively for 1993. The 1993 figures refer to the Czech Republic.
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Table 5: Czech Republic: 
(Billions of current crowns)
1
!1 ! 1990 i 1991 I 1992 19931
!!State budget and local authorities expenditure 
1 (consolidated) 
i Current expenditure 
;І Capital expenditure and net lending





















;State budget and local authonties revenue i  1 I I
j (consolidated) 501.9 547.8 I 562.3 432.29
Personal income tax 54.7 58.5 I 76.0 29.711
І  Profit tax 100.3 132.6 114.0 70.881
ļļ Payroll tax י 120.7 89.9 I 92.0 \1• • !
; Turnover tax 147.8 123.7 125.8 117.081
Home-ownereship tax 0.0 1■ •
Property tax 0.2 15.1 17.1 3.041
Social secunty contributions " - 0.0 108.97:
! International trade and transaction 25.8 11.5 17.5 15.171
il Non-tax revenue 61.3 103.8 118.6 62.721
1 Timing adjustment total revenue 
!Lalance (deficit -)
-8.9 12.7 1.3 • «
j
-57.3 5.6 ־26.8 12.21 j
\As percentage of GDP
j  State budget and local authorities expenditure
1 (consolidated) 68.91 54.2 55.7 46.83
1 State budget and local authonties revenue
(consolidated) 61.9 54.7! 53.2 45.51 I
Balance (deficit -) -7.1 0.6 -2.5 1.32
Memorandum item: j־’
1 GDP ׳ 811.3 ! 1000.7 1057.0 932.10
Sources:
Czech Ministry of Finance
for 1992: State Bank of Czechoslovakia. Annual Report 1992
Note;
GDP figures are not fully comparable to those in table 4. The 1990-1993 figures referto the federation.
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Table 6: Czech Republic: Monetary Survey 
(in bn of CZK. 28 CZK/USD)
*)
 1 - ׳ 111
12/91 *2/92 12/93




NET FOREIGN ASSETS 9.0 27.6 c> 75.6 c>
1
173.9І
FOREIGN ASSETS convertible 73.1 100.4 172.5 71.81
FOREIGN LIABILITIES convertible 64.1 72.8 96.9 33.1
NET FOREIGN ASSETS (CR/SR) 11.1 26.0 26.0 0.0
NET DOMESTIC ASSETS 467.4 544.0 600.4 10.41
DOMESTIC CREDITS 537.6 634.0 722.7 14.0!
- Net credit to Government b) 31.6 74.7 <0 60.3 •19.31
- Net credit to property funds 7.1 -24.5 -34.4 40.41
- Total credit 498.9 583.8 696.8 19.4!
• Credit to e.+h. in CZK 495.4 567.8 •> 672.0 18.4!
- Credit to enterprises 459.2 521.3 627.0 0 20.31
- Credit to households 36.2 46.5 45.0 -3.21
* Credit in foreign currency 3.5 16.0 24.8 55.01
І
LIABILITIES 
LIQUID LIABILITIES 487.5 597.6 702.0 17.6
MONEY 256.0 306.9 351.7 14.6
CURRENCY OUTSIDE BANKS 55.3 58.9 59.7 1.4
DEMAND DEPOSITS 200.7 248.0 292.0 17.7
- Households 65.7 71.0 85.0 19.7
- Enterprises 131.7 174.4 202.5 16.1
• Insurance companies 3.3 2.6 4.5 73.1
QUASI MONEY 231.5 290.7 350.3 20.5
DEMAND.TIME and SAVINGS DEP. 393.7 484.6 589.8 21.7
TIME AND SAVINGS DEPOSITS 193.0 236.6 297.8 25.9
Households ־ 145.1 168.9 198.3 17.4
- Enterprises 8.9 30.0 61.5 105.0
Insurance companies ־ 39.0 37.7 ( 38.0 0.8
FOREIGN CURRENCY DEPOSITS 38.51 54.1 1 52.2 ־3.01
- Households 24.1 ï 36.7 ; 42.י 16.3!
- Enterprises 14.4 17.4 93 -43.7
OTHER ITEMS NET 70.2 90.0 122.3 35.91
Notes:
*> Preliminary data
b) Excluding cleanng with SR. EC loan to Government etc. 
c> Including swap ODerations in gold
Including transfer debt to the Czech Government (CSOB. KTUK)
•> Excluding transfer debt to the Czech and SLovak Governments (KTUK) 
(Including deferred income *uncollected interest KOBP י
Soum;
Czech National Ѳапк
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Hungary and the IMF: The Experience of a Cordial Discord1
I. In tro d u c tio n
In setting the task and scope o f this paper I set out from the fo llow ing presump- 
tions. First, the circumstances in which, as well as the facts, about how Hungary 
has become one o f the most indebted countries in the world in terms o f per capita 
liab ilities are discussed in detail in widely available and up-to-date source material 
(Lőrinc-Istvánfíy, 1992; Oblath, 1993; and Riecke,1993). Second, there are a num- 
ber o f relevant theoretical reflections on the general issues pertaining to the vices 
and virtues o f applying stabilization policies to form erly planned economies at a 
time when they are on their way to the market (Balcerowicz, 1993; W iniecki, 1993; 
and Csaba, 1995, Chap. 5). I try to m inim ize overlap w ith any o f these. I also try  to 
contribute to what may be the summary o f the discussions conducted in  this sympo- 
sium, i.e., to the evaluation o f how the Washington twins, the IM F and the W orld 
Bank, fared in the troubled waters o f systemic change in Central and Eastern 
Europe. In order to do this, I shall focus exclusively on the Hungarian experience.
The key aspect o f the argument is a search for an answer to the follow ing ques- 
tion: Even though all Hungarian governments in power since our accession to the 
IMF and IBRD in 1982 have been explicitly cordial, even forthcoming toward the 
aspirations o f these institutions, why has the leverage o f these institutions over 
systemic change in Hungary remained as lim ited as that in any other country on 
the globe? In other words, why could the Fund and the Bank not bring about even 
more marketization in a country where nobody close to the commanding heights 
has ever challenged the conventional wisdom o f these institutions, and furthermore, 
where, even in academe, the Fund-busters constitute a miniscule marginal m inor- 
ity? What makes the question even more important is that Hungary has not had to 
face the problems typical of, say, Bolivia, Russia, or Poland, i.e., the conflict 
between stabilization and market liberalization has not come to the fore. In many 
ways, at least in systemic terms, Hungary seems to have been predestined for the 
role o f an exemplary pupil, but she has surely underperformed relative to such 
expectations. Fiscal reform, social security reform, and banking reform s till have a 
very long way to go. Though against the performance o f her fe llow  travelers Hun- 
garian performance may well be judged satisfactory, one cannot escape the tempta- 
tion to apply a different standard to Hungary.
A country that has had 20 plus years o f reform experience, that has legislated 
commercial banking, bankruptcy, VAT, and PIT reforms, that further launched
1 The author acknowledges, without implicating, useful suggestions by György Szapáry, 
First Vice-Governor o f the National Bank o f Hungary and former resident o f the IMF. 
Further comments by Imre Tarafás, former First Vice-Governor o f the National Bank o f 
Hungary and by Ben Slay on a previous version o f the manuscript helped to correct mis- 
takes and clarify points. Roland Schönfeld - 978-3-95479-733-2
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trade liberalization and reorientation before the collapse o f communism, certainly 
had a certain edge in terms o f institution building. This circumstance, coupled with 
the professedly cordial relationship w ith the Washington twins and the lack o f po- 
litica i and philosophical differences over economic issues, so typical in the under- 
developed world, could well have led one to expect Hungary to accelerate rather 
than decelerate the pace o f change once geopolitical constraints and ideological 
taboos suddenly evaporated in 1989-1990. W hile one can lis t the domestic factors 
explaining these developments, one may wonder why the Washington twins, and 
prim arily the Fund, could not make better use o f the leverage they certainly had 
over a country whose balance o f payments was in a very precarious position in 
1988-1991.
The Fund and the Bank are, o f course, no substitutes for a world government. 
However, ever since systemic transformation started and especially since the Rus- 
sian accession to membership in 1992, these organizations suddenly assumed roles 
far exceeding their original mandates and the aspirations o f the bulk o f their staff, 
who invested a considerable amount o f time, funds, and expertise into understand- 
ing the form erly communist systems. They produced important theoretical and 
policy findings (Bruno 1992; Tanzi, 1993) explaining why standard balance o f 
payments adjustment recipes and other conventional considerations m ight not be 
directly applicable to, or helpful in, mastering the task o f economic transformation. 
Thus the customary references either to the dogmatism o f the IMF or to the po liti- 
cal narrow-mindedness o f the local elites are inadequate to explain the Hungarian 
story.
208 László Csaba
II. The P retransform ation P eriod
Since Hungary was not a founding member o f the United Nations, it could not in- 
herit Bank and Fund membership from the pre-cold-war era. Understandably, ever 
since the firs t thaw in East-West relations started in 1953, culm inating in Hungar- 
ian membership in the United Nations in 1955, there was an undercurrent o f po liti- 
cal debate over jo in ing  the Washington twins as well. Several twists and turns 
delayed membership. The most logical step would have been to jo in  these organiza- 
tions at the time Hungary joined the UN. This was indeed discussed by the 
government, but the return to power o f the Stalinist Mátyás Rákosi in July 1955, 
the crowding out o f the reformist Imre Nagy from a ll political positions, and the 
return to the pre-1953 economic policies made this step untimely.2 Following the 
crushing o f the 1956 revolution, the Economic Commission convened by János 
Kádár, and composed mostly o f avowedly non-Marxists discussed the issue again, 
but this proved immaterial. First, the Hungarian case was s till open w ith the UN, 
and Russia would have distrusted the new Communist rulers' follow ing in the foot- 
steps o f Imre Nagy and his dangerously neutralist policies. Second, due to the 
internal political dynamics o f consolidating Communist rule, the propositions o f
2 Personal communication from József Bognár, th a i M inister o f Foreign Trade (1950- 
1956). Roland Schönfeld - 978-3-95479-733-2
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the Economic Commission were considered so far o ff the mark by the Central 
Committee that they decided not to put it on the agenda o f any decision making 
organ (Berend, 1983, p .l 15).
The rule o f János Kádár rested on a new compromise w ith the USSR. The Soviet 
leadership, at least form ally, gave up its claim  to having the recipe for the only cor- 
rect way o f build ing socialism, in exchange for unconditional Hungarian loyalty in 
foreign affairs. Though neither side completely followed this understanding, in the 
end, it did work. Later analyses o f Party archives (Horn, 1989) shed some new ligh t 
on this, proving that it was Kádár who rejected Khrushchev's troop withdrawal 
proposition in 1958, which was offered to Romania as well. This means that the 
compromise between the USSR and Hungary was not only an arrangement imposed 
on the country from outside, but also part and parcel o f the original self interpreta- 
tion o f the person who ruled Hungary for 32 years. Thus, any attempt to take some 
even triv ia l reform steps encountered fierce resistance for quite some time.
As in the 1949-1953 period, in the early 1960s maybe carried away by the sput- 
n ik-shock o f 1957, economic target setting was based on a fundamental misjudge- 
ment o f both Soviet and domestic economic potential as well as on the disregard for 
a ll nonquantitative aspects o f development. This attempt ended in a catastrophe. 
Instead o f catching up w ith Austria by 1970, in 1963 and 1964 serious financial 
problems surfaced in a country whose external liab ilities had been negligible. 
Output stagnated, which was worse than depression, against the background o f 
loudly preached promises o f accelerating growth.
Not surprisingly, in October 1964 a new reform committee was convened to dis- 
cuss how to get out o f this dead end. Due to the severity o f the crisis, the debate was 
not constrained by the ideological straightjackets o f the day (Szamuely, 1986). The 
debates went much the same way as in 1957, but the outcome was different. The 
most radical reform variant was approved, albeit w ith a gradual implementation 
scheme, and 1968 was chosen as the year in which to implement the firs t, more 
tim id version o f the reform, w ith 1971-1972 targeted for the introduction o f the 
more radical market socialist variant. This decision had a great impact over the 
next 25 years, since everybody knew that offcial approval was, or could be, more 
far-reaching in terms o f market reforms than offic ia l dogma ever would have 
allowed.
Since these developments were brought about by Soviet and CMEA inab ility  to 
deliver what had been promised, conflicts w ithin the CMEA intensified, and, w ith 
the Romanians vetoing integration, the decision to orient the Hungarian economy 
toward the West proved correct. Russian-German talks on what culminated in a 
Grundvertrag in 1970 and the Helsinki Summit provided the necessary leeway for 
Hungary to attempt to jo in  the IMF. Talks were successful, but the Hungarian lead- 
ership wanted to play it safe, and they asked for formal approval from the USSR. 
The answer was a fla t n'iet (Bakó, 1990, pp. 226-227). In the memory o f other par- 
ticipants in the discussions, the answer was not at a ll that clear. Kosygin stated: "It 
is your job, comrades. But. . . ", and then followed a litany o f complaints against 
the IMF as the extended arm o f American imperialism. So, while the Hungarian 
leaders got all they could ever hope for, the constraints described above made them
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unw illing  to make a decision. Following the invasion o f Czechoslovakia in August 
o f 1968, such a decision again became inappropriate.
The 1970s saw the replication o f the eastward-looking, import-substituting indus- 
tria lization endeavors o f 1949-1953 and 1958-1963, indicating how strong an ideo- 
logical bias can be against fa irly  clear-cut economic realities. The result was much 
the same. By 1978 it was obvious that neither growth acceleration nor greater re li- 
ance on the CMEA could bring about the increased consumer welfare that was part 
o f the im p lic it social contract struck after 1956. In October 1977, the leadership 
decided to turn west-ward again.
This decision did not reflect concerns over indebtedness, which came to the open 
only as late as December 1978. However, some unpleasant news was taken into 
account, including the facts that the o il crisis did not stop at Hungary's borders as 
had been hoped in 1974: the planned economy per se was not a sufficient buffer 
against external shocks; membership in CMEA was not a guarantee o f ample en- 
ergy imports; acceleration o f GDP growth was not a viable substitute for market 
reforms; and, i f  anything, Hungary had to rely on more, rather than less, Western 
financing. Im porting Western technology and Western management methods 
seemed to be the best way to preserve the underlying social construct.
The Kádár leadership turned its back on Moscow, but they again wanted to play 
it safe. Though discussions on Hungary's accession to the IM F were again fa irly 
advanced, the rulers again sought Soviet approval. To be more precise, they were 
try ing  to play the card o f what were later called im p lic it subsidies. They told the 
Soviets that Hungary would fo llow  Romania, which had joined the IMF in 1971 
w ithout prior discussion w ith the Soviets. Reference was also made to Polish mem- 
bership. But, so went the Hungarian bargaining strategy: Hungary was ready to 
refrain from this step i f  the USSR could find an extra couple m illion  tons o f crude 
o il to be paid for in soft currency. This strategy proved to be a w inning one. 
Brezhnev started his talk in the summer Crimea meeting by stating that, as it is an 
extension o f American imperialism, jo in ing  the IMF would be an infringement o f 
socialist brotherhood. A couple o f m illion tons o f o il could not be an issue among 
true allies.
The Hungarians took Brezhnev’s promise at face value, as such commitments had 
been honored on past occasions. The problem was that the world had changed. As 
was documented at the time (Csaba, 1980), there was absolutely no reason to be- 
lieve that the Soviets could honor their promise, even in the best o f circumstances. 
Thus it was both surprising and unsurprising that in October 1981 the Soviets 
declared that, reflecting upon their original proposal o f 1978, a ll increments in o il 
supplies had to be paid for in hard currency.
This was an extremely well-timed announcement. First, it angered Kádár who 
had just been acknowledged by the Soviets at the 1981 Party Congress o f the CPSU 
as having run a Hungary worthy o f emulation. He was deeply hurt because he had 
seen the withdrawn concession as his personal victory over his narrow-minded eco- 
nomie advisers. Second, it was a time when the shadow o f martial law in Poland or 
o f Soviet intervention seemed to have been avoided by General Jaruzelski's taking 
charge o f both Party and Government. Thus, neither the stick nor the carrot was in 
the hand o f the Russians. Only 60 minutes after the Central Committee approved
210 László Csaba
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Hungary's IM F accession by a narrow m ajority, János Fekete's plane was taking o ff 
for Washington.
This was a typically Hungarian last-minute rescue operation. May 1981 had been 
the last time the country could tap medium-term international funds. In that sum- 
mer, Romania had covered its insolvency by means o f dubious practices such as 
nonpayment o f their part o f swap operations. By September, Yugoslavia had to 
reschedule its foreign debt. Polish insolvency was an accomplished fact. Following 
the imposition o f martial law, a lending embargo on the Soviet Bloc was declared. 
This prompted the de facto  Soviet-run International Bank o f Economic Cooperation 
and some Arab investors to withdraw deposits o f 1.5 b illion  U.S. dollars from the 
National Bank o f Hungary to relend it to Poland and to bridge Soviet cash-flow 
problems. This would surely have knocked out the Hungarian economy and forced 
it into rescheduling, had not the BIS, on two occasions, Manufacturers Hannover 
Trust, and Margaret Thatcher extended their help. As the one-time Vice-Governor 
o f the National Bank, István Szálkái (1990, p. 195) noted, these exceptional forms 
o f assistance would hardly have been conceivable, had not the Hungarian applica- 
tion fo r IMF membership been well under way. Thanks to these operations, Hun- 
gary could maintain her solvency.
It is hard to overemphasize the Copernican revolution IM F membership and the 
associated rescue operations implied for Hungarian policy-making. They signaled 
an end to the Soviet-first approach that had shaped the firs t 25 years o f K ádárt 
rule. Ferenc Havasi, Secretary o f the CC in charge o f the economy noted in his 
speech to the Parliament:
Asyou know, at the beginning o f this year, Hungary has run into exceptional 
d ifficulties in her international financial relations. First, we were turning to our 
allies. Unfortunately, they were a ll preoccupied w ith their own headaches. They 
were not in a position to help us ..Then we were turning to our Western part- 
ners. As the Hungarian proverb says: it is in times o f d ifficu lty  when you find  
out who your real friend is. We were assisted, and I can report to the Parliament 
w ith pride: the financial crisis has been overcome. (Havasi, 1982)3
But how? In theory one could have envisioned a radicalization o f reforms, since 
the blueprint for a second economic reform (Bauer, 1984) was already elaborated in 
expert commissions. From the introduction o f a two-tier banking system to cur- 
rency convertibility, from tax reform to bankruptcy legislation, more or less a ll the 
measures fina lly  introduced in the time span o f a decade were already available. 
Note that it was not the urging o f the Fund that caused Hungary to radicalize 
reform deliberations. Rather, it was analyses o f the inherent weaknesses o f various 
aspects o f the Hungarian economy, conducted by Hungarian economists, that led to 
these findings. Many o f the reformers o f the day were o f the opinion that IM F 
would give us a hand in convincing the political leadership o f the desirability o f 
more radical reforms. In fact, the result was disappointing.
I have spent a relatively long time in explaining what a long-awaited fu lfillm ent 
it was for the Hungarian leadership to achieve fu ll membership in the IMF. It is
3 It is probably not a coincidence that the reference was printed in the narrowly circulated 
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important to see the professional consensus behind the radical market socialist 
measures, as well the fact that references to Russian concerns were made irrelevant 
by the step o f accession. Moreover, the financial crisis o f 1982 was so severe and 
immediate that it did make sense to expect that IM F proposals for systemic change 
would have the ears o f the decision makers, and, conversely, that the latter would 
feel more comfortable i f  they could make offers on their own, which were known to 
have the blessing o f the Fund.
In any event, due to the instability in and around Poland, the bulk o f large-scale 
reform measures was rejected.4 As a temporary solution, the worst and most prim i- 
tive version o f the command economy was restored. Headed by the Economic 
Commission o f the secretariat o f Deputy Premier József M arjai, a m ilitary-style 
day-to-day management gained the upper hand. Whatever were the formalized 
structures o f economic and political decision making, this informal chief o f staff 
reigned. Imports were adm inistratively restricted, operating committees were set up 
to license imports o f individual items, export orders and obligatory contracts were 
also employed. The Treasury and the Bank supplemented this system by individual, 
often retroactive, measures restricting demand. Supply bottlenecks and other grow- 
ing irregularities in intra-CM EA relations were used to justify  this practice, and not 
only because it was congruous w ith everything that had become the norm o f behav- 
io r in intra-CM EA relations by then, but also because, in macroeconomic terms, the 
outcome was reasonable. According to the retroactive calculations o f the National 
Bank o f Hungary, filte rin g  out the several elements o f misreporting in the contem- 
porary statistics, the fo llow ing conclusions were reached: i f  the actual government 
deficit was 7.1% o f GDP in 1980, it was 5.1% in 1981, 2.9% in 1982, 2.5% in 
1983, and 0.5% in 1984. As far as the actual corrected balance o f payments was 
concerned, in 1973-1978 net foreign debt grew by 5.3 b illion  dollars whereas in 
1979-1984 it grew by only 408 m illion , w ith 1983 and 1984 being very rare surplus 
years (Nyers et a l,  1993 Part II, p. 48 and Part III, p. 28).
At this point, the story starts to resemble those o f developing countries. Since 
administrative measures brought quick results, a political leadership, otherwise 
hesitant to support reforms reducing its discretionary power, finds an excuse for 
postponing overdue structural and institutional reforms by pointing to satisfactory 
macroeconomic performance. The Washington twins, were internally deeply split, 
but they could not step over the boundaries set by their respective statutes. I f  the 
quantitative performance criteria were, or at least appeared, satisfactory, the two 
banks could only extend friendly advice to their Hungarian client, but they could
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contracts in retail trade, foreshadowing what was later turned into small privatization, and 
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not insist upon specific reforms in the internal workings o f the Hungarian econ- 
omy.
The new d irig is te  mechanism, never form ally promulgated in Hungary, but cer- 
ta in ly applied seems to have worked. Macrocriteria were met. Reform deliberations 
continued, as committees never ceased producing documents, and from late 1982 
they resumed activities w ith many famous people involved. Guidelines for the next 
reforms were ready by m id-1983. Party and state organs discussed them, parts o f 
these ideas were aired in the press. A decision was taken in A pril 1984, when an 
extremely watered-down version o f the projects was approved by the Party. In sum, 
in the years 1982-1984 the leadership could buy time, and it was not vulnerable to 
outside pressure.
There were several concrete reasons why Hungary had such a measure o f policy 
autonomy. First, basic economic information was quite lim ited w ithin the country. 
The IM F could require a certain degree o f disclosure o f the Hungarian authorities, 
but not enough to attain a breakthrough. Thus the balance o f the National Bank or 
the balance o f payment figures were available in the English version o f the quar- 
terly report o f the Bank and were later also published in some major Western 
dailies, but this inform ation could not be quoted inside the country, even in profes- 
sional and narrow-circulation sources. Not only did legislators know little  about the 
actual situation, even governmental agencies, including the top leadership o f the 
Planning Board, were underinformed. This proved to be a rather fundamental defi- 
ciency, since the forecasts o f the five-year plan for 1986-1990 were elaborated 
without prior adequate knowledge o f the state and prospects o f external financing. 
As one o f the active participants openly acknowledged (Zdeborsky, 1990), it was a 
small team, hand-picked and controlled by then Vice-Governor János Fekete, that 
was running external finances in complete secrecy and without any external con- 
trol. I f  and when any major decisions needed to be taken, Kádár and Fekete 
arranged it between themselves without regard for proper procedures.
These arrangements built an extremely effective filte rin g  mechanism into Hun- 
gary's relations w ith the IMF. For one, all relations w ith the IM F were channelled 
through the National Bank. This was paradoxical in more than one respect. First, 
according to the formal decision making structures o f the day, it should have been 
the Commission on Planning, composed o f the chiefs o f the Planning Board, the 
M inister o f Finance, the National Bank's governor, and some key ministers who 
would have undertaken this task. I f  we temporarily ignore the parallel hierarchy o f 
the Party only this economic cabinet had all the prerogatives needed to take meas- 
ures pertaining to the entire macrostructure. Second, the National Bank o f Hungary 
was traditionally an agency w ith its own particular interests. As could be demon- 
strated at the time (Csaba, 1986), it held an ambiguous position toward marketizing 
reforms. On the level o f generalities it had always been a free marketer, but when it 
came to financial deregulation, it tended to act much more conservatively. Third, 
the secrecy around the Bank and around external financing created an atmosphere 
in which any citicim s, or indeed, public discussion o f any aspect o f the activity o f 
the Bank became impossible. I do not know o f a single case in which any leading 
personality o f the Bank has ever acknowledged having made a mistake while in 
office. Fourth, as reflected in contemporary analyses, while the standing and in flu -
Hungary and the IMF: The Experience o f  a Cordial Discord 213
Roland Schönfeld - 978-3-95479-733-2
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 09:44:06AM
via free access
00063440
enee o f the other actual center o f power, Marjai's Secretariat, was rapidly eroding, 
the power o f the Bank was increasing. Finally, since the external financing com- 
partment o f Fekete was hermetically separated from the rest o f the Bank, a very 
small group o f people held a disproportionately high degree o f power in their 
hands. They lacked any checks and balances or the control o f publicity. This 
allowed for highly individual considerations, not legitimated by outside authority or 
economic theory to play a crucial role.
These circumstances may explain how the questionable self interpretation o f this 
small group o f people could prevail over the deliberation o f the m ighty Washington 
agencies. It m ight also explain how the Fund and the Bank proved unable to fore- 
stall what retroactive analysis shows to be the gravest mistake o f the National 
Bank's policy in 4 decades: its support for the growth acceleration policies o f 1984- 
1985 (Csáki, 1994).
Those who have had the patience to fo llow  this history to this point w ill be less 
than surprised to read that the unchanged political and power structure in Hungary 
made its last attempt to turn eastward and to accelerate growth rather than to let the 
market in. What looks sim plistically triv ia l in historical perspective was anything 
but that after 15 years o f reform thinking. In fact, it was the Planning Board 
headed by former Finance M inister Lajos Faluvégi that had become the bastion o f 
resistance to these growth-accelerating propositions. The Board was joined, in an 
uncoordinated fashion, by the IM F, which refused to agree to a three-year standby 
arrangement since the Hungarians insisted on keeping prices low through ādminis- 
trative methods. Nevertheless, this was a very m ild protest, and in both 1984 and 
1985, annual stand by agreements were implemented, and only the launching o f a 
p ilo t project o f a three-year standby program was prevented.
Formally, there seems to have been no way to escape the policies advocated by 
the IMF and the domestic professionals, and a restrictive macroeconomic policy 
complemented by accelerated institutional reforms, which had been postponed for 
the fifth  year in 1985.3 However, due to the filte r mechanism explained above, 
questions were raised in a completely different fashion. Systemic th inking was 
pushed to the background, and the conventional, more narrow financial considera- 
tions, and the related formal and informal prestige considerations and success indi- 
cators, o f the National Bank came to the fore. As the retrospective reflections o f 
Szálkái (1990, p. 201) show the dilemma for the Bank was whether they should 
maintain that no external financing was available, which was untrue, or whether 
they should te ll the truth, knowing that it would be misused for setting false eco- 
nomie targets. The less philosophical Fekete (1989) put his views more bluntly. In 
his view, there was a leadership in the country, whose sole responsibility was to set 
economic targets. It was not his job to correct them, but rather to obtain all the
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omy, as Komai (1992, Chap. 20) demonstrates convincingly. Contemporary Hungarian 
reformers used the related concept o f self management in a rather unscrupulous fashion to 
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money he could to fu lfill these targets. Knowing the informal imbalances in deci- 
sion making and information that existed, this view is unacceptable. It is clear that 
no major actions could be taken at the time without Fekete's approval.
And he gave approval to an economic program that most o f the profession 
resisted from the very outset. As a leading officia l o f lasting tenure and experience 
noted bluntly, they were simply g iving in (Balassa, 1990, pp. 165-168). The IM F 
was unhappy, but private markets provided considerable freedom for the Hungarian 
government to maneuver. The Communist authorities could but the years o f 1985 
and 1986, when the radical reforms could be further delayed. One wonders whether 
this a ll could have happened, had not it been for the filte ring  mechanism and the 
overall secrecy surrounding major decisions. These two interlinked factors explain 
why the pressure o f the profession from inside and o f the IM F from outside could 
not jo in  forces to hinder this dangerous policy, which resulted in the doubling o f 
Hungary's external debt in 1984-1987.
By September 1987 conspicuous nonattainment o f the targets set by the five-year 
plan and the dramatic deterioration on the external front triggered the replacement 
o f one o f the longest-ever serving Hungarian Premiers, György Lázár, by Károly 
Grósz. The latter, coming from the quarter traditionally most hostile to reforms, 
surprised everybody by promulgating a three-year government program o f export 
orientation and marketization. Besides domestic professional pressure, the IM F was 
instrumental in molding this turn in the overall policy line. The IMF kept reiterat- 
ing the need for institutional reforms, particularly import liberalization. However, 
structural reforms were basically outside the immediate focus o f attention o f the 
IMF.
As compensation for the political breakthrough o f industrialists in the 13th Party 
Congress, reformers could push through the decision on the two-tier banking sys- 
tem, which began functioning on January 1, 1987. In doing this they capitalized on 
the poor bargaining power o f the Bank and the Treasury, which had become po liti- 
cally weak due to the victory o f the industrialists. The decision to liberalize imports 
had been contemplated since 1986, but it would hardly have been implemented had 
not the need to please the IMF played a role.
This seeming infringement on national sovereignity was particularly useful. As 
early as 1987-1989 Hungary had to, indeed, was fortunate to, implement several o f 
the institutional reforms other Central European nations only started years after 
their transformation. Actually, tax reform, import liberalization, application o f 
bankruptcy procedures, reliance on tight monetary policy, and the problems o f how 
to cope with at firs t only nominally independent, commercial banks are a ll issues 
where learning by doing cannot be avoided. Thus IMF insistence on an early start 
to reforms gave Hungary an important edge over the latecomers. Whatever the 
shortcomings o f any o f these arrangements might have been, and they were numer- 
ous indeed, three years o f experience is o f more use than a decade o f speculation, 
all the more so when m illions o f agents are involved in the learning process.
In 1989 the IMF again played a useful role. The administration, modestly calling 
itself a government o f experts, made possible a surplus 10 times greater than 
planned in Hungary’s trade with the ruble area alongside a parallel deficit o f 1.4 
b illion dollars w ith the West. The latter depleted the currency reserves o f the coun­
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try nearly totally. In the midst o f policy improvisation by the experts, the IMF sus- 
pended the standby agreement on May 15. Thus the IMF could ensure that, unlike 
in 1981-1983 the liberalization o f imports would not be reversed, although this 
could well have been the most triv ia l, and harmful, response o f the Hungarian 
authorities. Under the pressure o f a growing number o f analyses published domes- 
tica lly and abroad, and facing the prospect o f a competitive political system with 
the concomitant public scrutiny, M iklós Németh was forced to admit the regular 
misreporting o f the foreign debt, conducted by the previous governments. The 
Hungarian public was confronted w ith the actual severity o f the situation for the 
firs t time. The IM F required the country to repay 150 m illion SDR. Thus the outgo- 
ing administration bequeathed to its successor an economy in which many o f the 
institutions o f the market were already available, w ith most public companies cor- 
poratized, both entry and exit o f firm s secured, and the trade regime liberalized. 
Discontinuation o f the CMEA, as well as agreement on Russian troop withdrawal, 
was achieved. Meanwhile, at the time the new, democratically elected government 
took office, the foreign exchange reserves o f the country sank to 300 m illion dol- 
lars, covering only 10 days o f imports.
Against this background, one wonders why the IM F could not push the Hungar- 
ian government more strongly in the direction o f the market in 1987-1990. Re- 
forms were long overdue and had been well elaborated by government agencies and 
expert commissions. The answer may be found i f  we look into the recalculated gen- 
eral government deficit series already quoted above (Nyers et a l., 1993). It shows 
the follow ing deficit/GDP ratios: 1986, 3.8%; 1987, 2.8%; 1988, 0.7%; 1989, 
3.2%; and 1990, 0%. In other words, the IMF was back in the situation o f a banker 
who is in no position to impose anything on his client as long as the client's quanti- 
tative performance criteria are met.
III. The Pos ttransfo r m ation P eriod
The year 1990 was fu ll o f expectations. Systemic change took place peacefully. It 
seemed that both geopolitical and internal structural resistance withered away. Rep- 
resentation o f vested interests, so intim ately intertwined w ith the old regime, had 
suffered a heavy blow. Unions hardly survived, employers' organizations blossomed 
in large numbers, and political representation was decoupled from both ideological 
and regional interest articulation. The window o f opportunity for sweeping reforms 
seemed to have been opened. A il political forces agreed on the need for a market 
without adjective and to the need to turn toward the West. Various expert groups 
advising the new government underscored the singular nature o f the opportunity 
and called for radical changes, and fiscal reform figured high on the agenda. The 
IMF came to the rescue immediately after the new conservative government was 
formed by signing a standby agreement in May 1990. The IBRD signed a new 
Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL) and helped to organize a cofinancing project in 
September 1990. Finally, the new three-year standby agreement was signed in Feb- 
ruary 1991. Therefore, even in the most unstable year o f 1990, Hungary could rely 
on private foreign capital markets.
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However, formation o f economic strategy by the conservative government lasted 
much too long. Only four months after taking office did the government produce a 
document, the Program for National Renewal, but it was a collection o f good inten- 
tions, not an operational policy document. Meanwhile, government ministers quar- 
reled in public and acted single-handedly, fo llow ing at least four different 
economic policy platforms. The M inister o f Finance was somewhat puzzled to see 
that no agreement had been reached w ith the IM F, though he him self conceded in 
the same interview that the three-year policy platform o f the government was as yet 
in a prelim inary stage (Rabár, 1990). In fact, he was the one who acted the most 
unprofessionally and most single-handedly in his short period in office. Driven by 
his own professional conviction, he declared a 100 b illion  Ft subsidy cut in a single 
stroke, which would have led to a 65% hike in fuel prices in a single day. This 
triggered the firs t, and to this day the last, massive social protest, w ith taxi drivers 
blockading the major bridges o f Budapest fo r 3 days. In fact, Ferenc Rabár put an 
end to the revolt equally single-handedly. W ithout prior agreement o f the hospital- 
ized Premier, he made major concessions. This good news, however, can by no 
means overshadow two basic shortcomings: (a) he did not enjoy the support or for- 
mal endorsement o f the entire government fo r his subsidy cuts: and (b) this attempt 
was in open contradiction w ith the election promises o f the largest governing party, 
the MDF, which portrayed itse lf as an adherent o f small, gradual changes in the 
economy.
When both shock therapist Ferenc Rabár and his opponent, supply-sider György 
Matolcsy, resigned in November 1990, a three-year economic program (Figyelő, 
34, 49, and 50) could fina lly  be adopted. W ithout going into detail, suffice it to 
note that this was a slightly edited version o f the policy document o f 1989, whose 
major thrust was to pass the operating losses o f the system onto the population 
without touching any o f the fundamentally ill points. To list but a few o f the issues 
not addressed by this policy guideline: banking reform and handling o f inherited 
bad debt, fiscal reform, privatization, anti-inflationary policies, social safety net, 
financing the pet project o f the administration, the W orld Exposition o f 1990, etc. 
In sum, this was basically a single-year document, w ith vague, i f  any, propositions 
for longer periods o f time.
In the meantime, a new Finance M inister emerged on the scene. M ihály Kupa 
was known domestically and at the IM F for being the father o f PIT reform, who 
had the courage to explain this most unpopular way o f paying public dues in a tele- 
vised series week after week. He was an avowed adherent o f urgent fiscal reform. 
Furthermore, both the new Hungarian democracy and its firs t Premier seemed to be 
in pretty bad shape. Altogether the IMF has had good reasons to apply its famous 
educational exercises by unexpectedly signing a three-year standby agreement in 
February 1991.6 The collapse o f CMEA was a much-feared event both for public
6 During the 1970's and the 1980's, the Fund had often been criticized for its overemphasis 
on short-term current-account figures as performance criteria. In response, the Fund at- 
tempted to be more generous, thus (a) institutional criteria were included among perform- 
ance criteria: (b) 3-year agreements were signed; and (c) nonattainment o f conventional 
quantitative performance criteria was intentionally overlooked or waivered. A ll three 
elements aimed at providing strategic guidelines for governments. These attempts were
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finance and for the balance o f payments. A current account deficit o f 1.2 b illion 
dollars was approved as a target fo r that year, and, out o f the 1.1 b illion  standby 
fac ility , 500 m illion  could be drawn in 1991 alone; besides a special fac ility  bridg- 
ing the losses from  the CMEA collapse in the amount o f 348 m illion  SDR was 
agreed upon o f which 226 m illion  SDR could be drawn in 1991. The budget deficit 
was waivered from among the performance criteria (B rü ll, 1993, p. 127). Obviously, 
both the impact o f the G u lf War on global o il markets and the impacts o f the col- 
lapse o f CMEA were misjudged, to the benefit o f Hungary. In fact, the years 1990-
1991 ended w ith a combined current account surplus o f 394 m illion  dollars in those 
two years. The fiscal balance ended w ith an equilibrium in 1990 and a 5% deficit in 
1991.
It is important to emphasize that, as in a ll previous cases, it was the expectations 
rather than the actual performance that shaped IM F policies toward Hungary. Judg- 
ing by the documents listed above, Hungary was obviously unfit fo r support. 
Meanwhile, the IM F had two expectations, both o f which proved to be wrong. First, 
they believed in mechanistic approaches and dramatized the impact o f CMEA dis- 
integration on the Central European economies. In this case, the fle x ib ility  of 
adjustment in the microsphere was clearly underestimated. Second, the IMF overes- 
timated the reform commitment o f the Hungarian government. At that time, the 
Kupa Program (Stabilization... ,1991) seems to have made a step in the right direc- 
tion by declaring the legislative aspect, i.e., institutional change, as its major 
thrust, and putting the quantitative estimates into its supplement. But in many 
ways, this program too, lacked support w ith in the government and the coalition 
parties. In fact, none o f the major elements o f legislation were submitted to Parlia- 
ment by the governing factions, which enjoyed a comfortable majority. By the 
autumn o f 1991, Kupa lost the support o f the Prime M inister, who asked a M inister 
without Portfolio and Vice-Chairman o f the MDF, Tamás Szabó, to convene a 
W orking Group on Economic Policy. The ideas o f this group, from populist priva- 
tization schemes to an overall policy o f growth acceleration, were diam etrically op- 
posed to those o f Kupa, but they received officia l blessing. Szabó was not the only 
member o f the government who proposed a line inconsistent w ith the policy o f 
institutional reform and fiscal restraint. When the consultations w ith the IM F on 
the budget for 1993 ended with the Hungarian side proposing a 250 b illion  Ft defi- 
cit, double o f figure proposed by the IM F, the latter suspended the three-year 
standby agreement.
This seemed short-sighted and ill-mannered. After a ll, and despite its many 
weaknesses, the Hungarian government did legislate some very radical reform 
measures unmatched by those preaching shock therapy and reform radicalism. For 
one, bankruptcy legislation was severe, producing over 16.000 cases between April
1992 and December 1993. The law on accounting and the law on financial institu- 
tions have brought Hungarian practice up to those o f the European Union. This was 
the firs t serious legislation on banking in the region, and it uncovered much o f the 
financial strain inevitable under restructuring and recession. Private enterprise was
218 László Csaba
less than satisfactory, as those countries who resorted for IMF advice often lacked condi- 
tions for policy cred ib ility  and sustainability. Roland Schönfeld - 978-3-95479-733-2
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 09:44:06AM
via free access
219Hungary and the IMF: The Experience o f  a Cordial Discord
booming, but unemployment was increasing quickly to double-digit levels in 1992, 
showing that, fo r the Hungarian economy, cold winds were blowing. And then the 
IM F discontinued lending.
W ith the benefit o f hindsight, the IMF was quite right in  sending this signal, 
serving the same educational purpose as signing the agreement had. By m id -1992, 
it became clear that the government had lost control over fiscal processes and that 
the fiscal expansion was threatening to derail many o f the favorable processes that 
were then under way. There was surely an inadequate awareness o f problems. In an 
article written just about this time, the new Governor o f the Bank emphasized that 
the financing needs o f the state could be covered from domestic sources. His coun- 
terposing this w ith practices o f preceding decades (Bod, 1992, p. 8) suggested that 
it was a long-term trend that could be relied on for a long time. Already in  1993, 
and even more in 1994, domestic savings fe ll behind the financing needs o f general 
government spending, not the least because o f the Bank’s continued, and temporär- 
ily  successful, attempt to depress interest rates. In the middle o f July 1993, finan- 
cial organs s till disputed the repeated claims o f the M in istry o f international 
Economic Relations that there would be a collapse o f exports (Kádár, 1993). The 
collapse materialized, w ith only 8.9 m illion dollars exported in 1993 against 10.7 
in 1992, resulting in a deficit o f $3.6 b illion  on the trade and $3.4 b illion  in the 
current account.
Besides foreign trade, fiscal reform also became controversial. Despite many 
promises, v irtua lly nothing has been done to date. The Fiscal Act is a collection o f 
procedural norms only. The Committee on Rationalizing State Finances has been 
convened, but it has not even started working except for two introductory encoun- 
ters where members were fam iliarized with one another.7
Seeing the danger, realistic individuals in the Hungarian government attempted 
to forestall the deterioration o f situation. A small team headed by the M inister o f 
Industry elaborated propositions for sizable fiscal cuts. These were complemented 
by the dormant fiscal reform plans o f the M inister o f Finance. This was a daring 
project produced by secretive camarilla policies. In September 1992, the Hungarian 
delegation made very radical promises to the IM F, promising to cut back fiscal 
spending, without any backing from the government and or from among the coali- 
tion MPs. The figures approved by Parliament had no relation to the ones presented 
to the IMF. Kupa remained alone, alienated, misused, and he was retired in an act 
balancing the ousting o f the populist rightist w ing o f the MDF in February 
(Lengyel, 1993). His successor, Iván Szabó, has earned a name as a friend o f large 
industrial programs and the reputation o f a not being particularly monetarist in his 
previous job as M inister o f Industry. Szabó actually proved much less o f a disaster 
than feared by many because his amended version o f the Kupa Budget for 1993 was 
credible. He also ran a M inistry o f Finance able to submit to Parliament a budget 
draft that could be approved before the calendar year started. The volume and the 
structure o f spending, however, leave much less room for satisfaction, and the 
planned 12% general government deficit forecast for 1994 speaks for itself.
1 A new, this tim e operational. Committee on the Reform o f Public Finances started its 
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One wonders what led Hungarian government officials to believe for a ll o f 1993 
that they could satisfy the IM F by meeting some o f the basic formal requirements 
while avoiding most o f the substance o f fiscal and social security reforms. As late 
as m id-July, anonymous sources informed the most influential Hungarian economic 
weekly that, although the government had avoided funding cuts to the newly ere- 
ated social security directorates and thus could not agree w ith the IMF in June, on 
the basis o f the amended Budget, it s till viewed a new understanding as realistic 
(cf. Kádár, 1993).* Later, in autumn, the then Secretary o f State reiterated much the 
same story as had led to the downfall o f Kupa the previous year. Requirements and 
financing targets agreed w ith the IMF and the ones derived from legislation passed 
by the Hungarian Parliament on the initiatives o f the governing parties, such as the 
law on c iv il servants, on social security, on retirement age, on supports fo r medi- 
cine, and on bank consolidation, were again inconsistent (Nagy, 1993). S till, the 
hope for an agreement w ith the IMF was cherished.
W ith the approaching elections, a certain sobering took place. This led to the first 
open confrontation between the Hungarian authorities and the IMF. Explaining the 
economic policies and the Budget for 1994, the M inister o f Finance spelled out in 
no uncertain terms, and w ith reference to the election defeat o f Polish radical re- 
formers, that growth and social consensus were more important than fiscal cuts and 
anti-inflationary concerns (Szabó, 1994). He noted, w ith reference to the IM F, that 
after 40 years o f socialist dogmatism, Hungary does not need antisocialist, free 
marketeer dogmatism.
The Hungarian government refrained from launching new government programs 
and not increased government expenditures rapidly. It followed a generally prag- 
matist overall line. S till, it could not avoid a clash w ith the IMF due to the rise o f 
fiscal deficit. In part, the structural deficit inevitable in transforming economies 
(Bruno, 1992) have surfaced, but this explains less than ha lf o f the general govern- 
ment deficit that occurred. The other half is explained by delays in social security 
and fiscal reforms and the related explosion o f the domestic debt servicing burden 
on the Treasury, as well as by the costly bank recapitalization and industrial loan 
consolidation programs.
As far as social security is concerned, the need for reform had been known for 
sometime. When the Antall government took office, a leading figure in the central 
bank called it an issue that had been put o ff for about a decade (Riecke, 1991). As 
documented in detail in this reference as well as in Kopits (1993), by the late 1980s 
a fa irly  detailed and far-reaching reform project had been elaborated w ith the tech- 
nical assistance o f the Fund. This would have separated services into those provided 
to citizen as entitlements and those to be paid for. Privatization o f many public 
establishments figured high on the agenda. In reality, w ith the accession to power 
o f the new government, these ideas were rejected out o f hand. A confused idea.
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orig inating w ith the Free Democrats but later taken over and cultivated by the gov- 
erning Christian Democrats, prevailed. This rejected the concept o f focusing on 
financing health care services. Instead, it sought to endow social security director- 
ates w ith wealth and thus to enable them to conduct economic activity like a large 
bank or pension fund in the United States.
Knowing the level o f financial intermediation, as well as the demographic struc- 
ture o f the Hungarian population, aggravated by extremely generous retirement 
benefits, sickness and unemployment schemes, this idea had absolutely no relation 
to Hungarian realities. Furthermore, when the average yield o f public assets is be- 
tween 3-5% even in the best o f circumstances social security directorates could not 
earn enough from their assets to be able to finance already-existing schemes. Actu- 
a lly, these organs were endowed w ith less than 10 b illion  Ft o f assets instead o f the 
decreed 300 b illion . This proved to be fortunate because they were already making 
sizable losses on even this small amount o f capital, disproving the belief that it  is 
the state that is always the worst entrepreneur. Meanwhile, the M inistry o f Public 
Welfare (M PW ) sabotaged any meaningful reforms. In a survey, conducted by the 
independent Hungarian-International Blue Ribbon Commission, a number o f social 
security reforms were proposed (KSZB, 1993). Social policy should be targeted to 
the poorest rather than distributed as a general right. Except fo r basic services, 
health care should require some payment by the patient. Tuiton fees should be 
introduced in higher education combined w ith a British-style credit system. The 
system o f unemployment benefits should be reformed because two-sevenths o f the 
unemployed were receiving 85-100% o f their previous wage, and a further two- 
thirds over 70%. Consequently, the incentive to readjust to changes in the labor 
market were m inimal. Rents should be raised to levels at least covering mainte- 
nance. Special programs to deal w ith the problems o f special underprivileged 
groups, e.g., gypsies and drug addicts, need to be elaborated.
This was more or less a replication o f the 1988 propositions. Meanwhile, the 
MPW was proud o f allegedly defending the poor by sabotaging any change.
As far as fiscal reforms are concerned, as the current resident o f the IM F for 
Hungary, George Kopits (1993), explains, it is lack o f transparency, insufficient 
controls, and a duplication o f tasks that plague Hungarian public finances. First 
attempts to produce a consolidated general government balance were made only 
quite late (Borbély and Neményi, 1993), and even then without taking due account 
o f the need to apply international standards in accounting for individual items.
It is important to note, that these much overdue technical corrections do not take 
account o f some further faeton that aggravated the situation. A  large number o f 
new offices were created. New entitlements, such as early retirement schemes and 
restitution and compensations o f various sorts were created. The act on c iv il ser- 
vants envisaged salaries absolutely out o f line w ith the economic performance o f 
Hungary in 1990-1994. When GDP declines by 20% it is not feasible to raise wages 
across the board in the public sector. Last, but not at all least, territoria l decentrali- 
zation created 3200 new municipalities, w ith obvious financing needs for the longer 
run. As many o f the vested interests were defended and new entitlements created in 
the sphere o f social security, with the new legitimacy and revoutionary euphoria 
gone, it w ill be increasingly d ifficu lt to get even elementary cuts through. Owing to
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the type o f legitim ation earned by the firs t coalition government and to the type o f 
political self interpretation practiced in the firs t Hungarian Parliament, it is not 
only the traditional left who are against such cuts. Most o f the m iddle-of the-road 
and center-right parties also declared a crusade against such reforms, w ith the 
extreme righ t employing social demagoguery anyway. This means that most pre- 
cious years 1990-1994 have been wasted. It w ill be both more costly and politica lly 
more d ifficu lt to institute such cuts when the pressure to do so comes in 1995 at the 
latest.
The government o f Hungary has chosen forms o f reorganization o f banks and 
companies where politica l, employment, and strategic considerations play a much 
larger role than the resident o f the IBRD sees as understandable (Rogerson, 1994). 
This is not a fu lly  independent development but is intim ately related to the eco- 
nomie policy turn o f late 1991 discussed above. Pressed hard by the disciplinary 
force o f the IM F, by private financial markets, by social resistance, and by the 
dramatized fears o f the implications o f a collapsing CMEA, in 1990 and the first 
ha lf o f 1991, the conservative government o f Hungary managed to distance itself 
from the economic platforms o f its constituent parties and to apply a fa ir degree o f 
common sense. W ith the immediate danger gone, and w ith the radical populist 
voices in the governing parties, especially the MDF, gathering momentum in 
August 1991 and August 1992, this situation changed. Policy-making became more 
responsive to what it perceived as social needs, which were basically its own elee- 
tion rhetoric and the feedback from its handful o f fa ithful. Whatever our political 
tastes and priorities are, the fact remains that the educational operation o f the IMF 
3-year standby program failed. The commitment o f the Hungarian government to 
market principles was much less than had been assumed, and its vulnerability to 
various pressure groups much greater. Therefore, developments in Hungary, 
increasingly resemble a typical third-world scenario, w ith the Fund and Bank 
preaching macroeconomic common sense, and the national authorities making 
their customary references to their national peculiarity and the need to behave in a 
socially sensitive manner.
It is an important feature o f continuity that the government in general has 
refrained from publicly contesting the wisdom o f the Washington twins either in 
general or in particular cases. However, its way o f th inking was clearly reflected in 
its outburst against the National Bank when the Bank increased its prime rate in 
September 1993. A t this time, the Treasury was s till hoping to depress the real rate 
o f interest and avoid the burden o f debt servicing, without any technical or institu- 
tional or structural fiscal reform. In a week, the professional number one o f the 
Bank, First Vice-Governor Imre Tarafás, an internationally highly esteemed and 
strictly nonpartisan long-serving officia l, who could have been a model c iv il ser- 
vant in any democracy, was relieved o f his post by the Acting Prime M inister, Péter 
Boross, without explanation. Since Tarafás was only 47 and Boross was about to 
run against populist-rightist contenders for the Chairmanship o f the largest gov- 
emment party the connection seems fa irly  straightforward. Likewise, another 
professional known for his sk ill and opposition to d irig is te  industrial policies, Péter 
Balázs, was relieved o f his post as Secretary o f State for Industry just at the time his 
boss became the frontrunner o f the Christian Democrats, the staunchest adherents
222 László Csaba
Roland Schönfeld - 978-3-95479-733-2
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 09:44:06AM
via free access
o f statist policies. In sum, social sensitivities and dislike for IMF-type policies were 
emerging hand-in-hand.
But not only the, probably inevitable, po liticking o f the election campaign played 
a role. From late 1991, i.e., ever since Hungary's survival o f the economic crisis 
seemed assured, an overall softening o f economic policies could be observed. First, 
monetary policy became expansive from October 1991 to September 1993 when it 
returned to the neutral stance o f 1989-1990. In the summer o f 1992, fiscal deficits 
increased. In 1992 and 1993, costly and government-run reorganization programs 
were launched and several new transfer entitlements legislated. The tough bank- 
ruptcy legislation was relaxed in June 1993, leading to a threefold decrease in new 
cases initiated since then. And, as could only have expected, calls fo r protecting the 
domestic market and reversing trade liberalization started to gain the ears o f deci- 
sion makers. In 1994, for the firs t time since 1988, the degree o f foreign trade lib - 
eralization in Hungary has decreased, even though only by 2%.9
The bottom line is that a replication o f a ll that could be observed in 1985-1987 
occurred. W hile the government o f the day was responding to politico-ideological 
and power aspirations rather than to economic challenges, the central bank o f the 
country was d iligently hoarding hard currency reserves. This stockpiling paid o ff 
insofar as direct clashes w ith the Fund and the Bank were averted due to the satis- 
factory level o f reserves. Having raised over 4.5 b illion  dollars in fresh money, the 
National Bank was awarded the borrower o f the year title  by Euromoney magazine. 
Indeed, comments by the Bank's chief money manager, Frigyes Hárshegyi (1994), 
were directly supportive o f the above-mentioned claims o f Finance M inister Iván 
Szabó that Hungary could survive 1994 not only without resorting to the IM F facil- 
ity, but even under a worst-case scenario o f not a penny o f fresh money being 
injected into the country.10
Much as in 1985-1987, narrower banking considerations and success indicators 
were in conflict w ith broader economic policy and especially systemic priorities. 
Successes and the predominance o f the former considerations led to distortions o f 
the latter. At times o f real need, when grave mistakes were being made, the IM F 
could, and did, send its warning signals, make its position clear, and try and per- 
suade the authorities, but it did not impose anything upon an unw illing  partner. In 
many ways, it is a story that could take place in any corner o f the globe; s till it is 
also a unique story.
I f  there is a difference between the two periods, it is the domestic scene in Hun- 
gary The filte r mechanism o f the early period did not exist in 1991-1994. On the 
other hand, no central economic policy-making could emerge in Hungary. For- 
mally, the Hungarian party conducting talks w ith the Fund and the economic cabi- 
net were legitim ately representative and could take action. In reality, neither o f 
them were in a position to transform the understandings into actual policy meas- 
ures. The economic cabinet is a formal organ, not the least because Antall con­
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sistently resisted the creation o f a top government agency. Mr. Horn seems to be 
fo llow ing this path. When Antall passed away, the election campaign was already 
in  progress, w ith cabinet ministers playing their party roles. In the new center-left 
government, most departments are headed by people publicly portraying them- 
selves as protagonists o f particular vested interests or sectoral concerns, be that 
industry, farm ing, social policy, or defense. This makes the continuation o f the 
trends described above probable. By the time the Fund has regained its leverage 
over the Hungarian government, the latter w ill have shown early signs o f being 
worn down by being in office and being unable to deliver on its election promises, 
most particularly w ith regard to improvements in liv ing  standards. Thus, the situa- 
tion w ill probably be a replication o f 1989-1991, and domestic weaknesses w ill pre- 
vent the government from perform ing according to the expectations o f the Wash- 
ington twins. The latter w ill probably force some o f the measures needed to achieve 
a degree o f fiscal equilibrium , but they w ill surely fa ll short o f getting those wide- 
ranging measures that their philosophy suggests would make major improvements 
in the Hungarian economy. Thus, we are back to the much-too-familiar situation o f 
the majority o f Third-W orld members o f the Fund and the Bank.
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IV . C onclud ing  Rem arks
The objective o f this paper is much more modest than that o f a detailed overview. 
In reviewing Hungary's pre- and posttransformation experience a fa ir degree o f 
continuity is evident. This is remarkable per se, given the widely divergent phi- 
losophy and target setting o f the respective regimes. A more detailed examination 
shows the recurring conflicts between systemic and narrower banking considera- 
tions. Inherent lim its to the IMFs and the W orld Bank's power to impose policy are 
evident since they lacked the means to discourage Hungarian governments from 
adopting populist measures and socially motivated growth-promoting policies at 
those times when systemic and other, broader conditions for the sustainability o f 
growth were clearly nonexistent. The repetition o f the story indicates how little  the 
Fund and the Bank let themselves and their operations be influenced by the consid- 
erations o f transformation. This is a value-free descriptive statement.
Thus, reasons for the discord between the IM F and the Hungarian government o f 
the day are quite sim ilar to those in other countries. The Hungarian governments, 
too, tended to resort to the IMFs advice much too late, only when things had dete- 
riorated to the utmost. Moreover, the IMF's advice was taken only temporarily, as a 
digression and only as long as accepting it was inevitable. Whenever macro 
performance was acceptable and immediate pressures receded, institutional reforms 
tended to be avoided. For its pan, the IMF tended to close its eyes benignly as long 
as the current account seemed to be in reasonable shape. Reasons for the cordiality 
o f relations are several. First, nobody who came close to rule in Hungary seriously 
contemplated a debt rescheduling or moratorium, even at times when countries 
from Mexico to Bulgaria were resorting to such options. Those who publicly aired 
such ideas kept them to themselves whenever they came close to having a say in
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actual decision making. These include József Torgyán, Imre Pozsgay, and István 
Csurka.11
Second, Hungary has never had a government during its IM F membership that 
would have declared an all-out assault on the principles o f the market economy on 
which the Fund is built. This is quite unlike many member-states, probably Russia 
included. Third, the Fund has always treated Hungary w ith care and assistance. At 
times o f real d ifficu lty , such as in 1982 and 1990, a hand was given. Differences on 
both sides were played down. Fund positions on systemic change were hardly more 
radical than those o f Hungarian specialists. Fourth, Hungarian governments never 
blamed the Fund for their own policies or for the need to respond to exigencies. The 
Fund never sought to make policies in place o f the Hungarian authorities, whereas 
the latter never contested the philosophy, or the fina l wisdom o f Fund proposals, 
although they often declared these untimely or avoided their substance out o f fear 
o f social resistance.
One wonders whether or not the Fund and the Bank could have delivered more in 
terms o f market reforms. And indeed, when it firs t became possible to discuss the 
vices and virtues o f Hungary's Fund membership, this criticism  was immediately 
made (Csikós-Nagy, 1990, pp. 157-158), faulting the Fund's one-sided insistence on 
equilibrium  considerations and its neglect o f restructuring. Our reading o f the 
events does not support this claim, reiterated by several other authors ever since. 
We jo in  Szálkái (1991, pp. 178-180) in seeing the standby programs and radical 
measures to implement institutional reform as mutually supportive in each o f the 
cases. The only exception was 1982-1984, but then an unprecedented improvement 
in fiscal and external balances took place. Moreover, the requirement o f even- 
handedness would hardly have allowed the Fund to apply more pressure on Hun- 
gary, where radical reforms were already endorsed by governmental expert commit- 
tees, than on Ceauçescu's Romania, which was also a member. Like in other coun- 
tries, the Fund had rather bad experiences w ith medium-term standby agreements 
in Hungary.
W hile being constantly dissatisfied with what the government o f the day deliv- 
ered, and righ tly  so, the IMF never lost its sense o f reality. Resisting the constantly 
changing tides o f sympathy in the international press, the Washington profession- 
als never forgot the Hungarian lead in systemic reform. In many ways, Hungary 
was a tra in ing ground for them to study strains and difficulties that surface sooner 
or later in transform ing countries. To note but a few, bankruptcy legislation, the 
problem o f bad debts in banking reform, the insufficiency o f subsidy cuts alone to 
attain fiscal equilibrium , revenue losses due to privatization, and many other prob- 
lems making a sizable im print on IM F th inking could be studied in Hungary first. 
Thus, it is hardly by chance that it was the then-resident o f the IM F to Hungary 
who concluded about transformation that there is no cookbook to go by (Szapáry,
11 József Torgyán is Chairman o f the Smallholders' Party, a right-w ing populist Party taking 
about 8% o f the seats in the 1994-1998 Hungarian Parliament. Imre Pozsgay used to be a 
leading figure o f the reform ist wing o f the Communist Party. Having quit the Socialists in 
1991, he has sunk into oblivion. Csurka's Hungarian L ife and Justice Party earned 1% o f 
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1993). He, too, drew attention to the large number o f unexpected behavioral charac- 
teristics o f both firm s and households that made actual transformation quite unlike 
the early visions. Last but not least, he and Kopits (1993) underlined the large 
number o f factors making fiscal and social security reform a much longer process 
than most o f us would have thought a few years ago. When one-fifth o f GDP is lost, 
and liv in g  standards have not improved over a decade, it is hard to in itiate drastic 
cuts, provided sustainability is also a policy consideration.12 In the end, it is sincer- 
ity , criticism , and empathy that are the foundations o f any lastingly cordial rela- 
tionship.
Is there a general lesson from the IMF-Hungarian encounter? I would suggest 
only prelim inary findings. First, radicality o f the original reform projects did not 
prove to be a sound indicator o f success, since sustainability matters more once 
stabilization is mastered and institutional reforms come to the fore. Second, being a 
watchdog o f balance o f payments disequilibria, the Fund is ill-suited to enforce 
structural reforms. When Fund assistance is needed, immediate, often administra- 
tive, steps to improve the balance o f payments are necessary. When improvement 
occurs and reserves are built up, only enlightenment and persuasion remain and the 
Fund has no leverage over an unw illing government. Third, combining the above 
two, one is reminded o f a political triv ia lity , often forgotten by technical economists 
and system designers. In order to enable institutional reforms to last, preferably 
beyond a single election cycle, one needs to build up a constituency in favor o f 
these reforms prim arily w ithin the country concerned. Unless there is a degree o f 
consensus, the stability o f policies required by the nature o f the exercise cannot be 
secured. Poland and Russia already show warning signs. Membership in the Bank 
and the Fund can hardly substitute, only supplement, other, more important condi- 
tions for a sustainable and committed domestic reform policy.
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Hungary became a member o f the International Monetary Fund in 1982 as firs t 
among the Central European satellite countries o f the Soviet Block. The step had a 
great politica l importance since it was taken in a period when these economies s till 
operated in a rig id  centralized system o f economic management and under close 
politica l and economic control from Moscow. Hungary's jo in ing  the Fund was also 
a clear expression o f intentions and efforts having already existed in several Central 
and European countries since the middle o f 1970s to open up their economies to the 
West and, to launch economic management reform.
Hungary has become member at record speed, in six months, o f the IM F and, 
three months later o f the Worldbank. It could be attributed to three factors. First, it 
was most welcome, that during the previous two-three years a marked shift from 
the stimulation o f growth to the improvement o f the external balance has taken 
place in Hungary's economic policy. Second, the Fund management greatly appre- 
ciated that since 1968 when Hungary introduced a broad market oriented reform, 
elements o f market mechanism and a moderate scope for private initiatives have 
existed in the economy and provided basis fo r further development o f the economic 
reform. Last, but not least, Hungary had got the support o f the international finan- 
cial community and enjoyed its confidence, as a reliable borrower w ith low political 
risk at the international capital markets. During the twelve years o f cooperation 
with the IM F these very factors o f Hungary's policies have constituted a sound basis 
to close and fru itfu l relationship. Namely, undertaking o f adjustment when needed, 
promoting reform process and maintaining good relations w ith the financial com- 
munity, became fundamental in Hungary's economic policy. Hungary benefited 
from Fund support in different forms, like policy advice to design adjustment and 
reform programs, technical assistance and provision o f substantial financial 
resources.
The IMF's Role in the Hungarian Reform Process
Fund S upport and  R eform  Steps in  the P e rio d  o f 1982-1989
The international financial institutions have strongly urged market reforms even 
before the political changes in 1990, and have played a major role in making the 
economy more flexible and adaptable to external environment. A firs t and a second 
standby arrangement, concluded in 1982 and 1984, respectively, represented the 
first steps o f cooperation between Hungary and the IMF. Both arrangements sup- 
ported strong macroeconomic stabilization programs, to overcome the d ifficulties in 
the balance o f payments, Hungary experienced due to the serious deterioration in 
terms o f trade. Adjustment programs o f that period put a strong emphasis on steps 
to check domestic demand and included a tightening o f credit, a freeze o f govern- 
ment expenditure, higher interest rates and curbs on real wages and investments.
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Introduction o f heavy import restrictions was also needed to achieve a desirable im- 
provement in external payments. In lack o f market intruments, policies o f these 
programs were implemented w ith the help o f administrative controls through direct 
state intervention. The early reform steps, like a price liberalization in 1980, the 
liberal policy toward small private production in agriculture and the attempt to 
increase enterprise autonomy, left intact most o f the traditional institutional system 
o f economic management. The government s till did not foresee the enhanced role 
for such economic policy instruments as the exchange rate and interest rates. A l- 
though the Hungarian economic management system was not characterized by per- 
vasive direct administrative controls any more, the authorities remained able to 
control enterprise activity and enterprise financial results. Moreover, the economic 
development strategy has also remained fundamentally unchanged. Macro- 
economic policies were not sufficiently tigh t to avoid the subordination o f price and 
wage liberalization to political objectives and a renewal o f imbalances and growing 
indebtedness vis-á-vis the convertible currency area.
The IM F management made it clear in its policy recommendation for the 1984 
program that more fundamental measures needed to improve the responsiveness o f 
the economy to market stim uli and to improve the efficiency o f resource allocation. 
They proposed further price and wage liberalization, increased financial responsi- 
b ility  o f enterprises and the establishment o f an efficiently working financial inter- 
mediation system. However, most o f those steps proved to be too ambitious objec- 
tives for the Hungarian authorities and policymakers to achieve even in 
mediumterm. Reform efforts as a whole had been scaled down during 1985-86, 
reflecting the prim aly o f political objectives and the intention o f m aintaining the 
prevailing economic system.
Political consideration has resulted in a stop-go pattern for demand management 
policies, too, during most o f the 1980s, whereas the supply response o f the economy 
also remained inadequate due to the inconsistent and incomplete measures o f eco- 
nomie reform. The stagnating pattern o f reform process has changed only from
1987 on, when the government adopted a comprehensive medium term stabilization 
and a structural adjustment program to overcome the balance o f payments d ifficu l- 
ties experienced again in 1985-87. The program, which was supported by a new 
IM F standby agreement in 1988, gave a new impetus to structural reforms affecting 
important areas o f economic policies. Supported by IM F advice and technical assis- 
tance, a two-tier banking system has been established, personal income tax and 
value added tax system have been introduced in the frame o f a tax and budget 
reform, and further progress has been made w ith price and import liberalization.
Measures to substantially reduce subsidises to inefficient enterprises and prepara- 
tion o f a comprehensive reform o f the social security system were also on the 
medium-term agenda. As an important move toward institutional reform, a new 
Corporate Association Law was adopted in 1889 establishing uniform  conditions 
for business activities across the economy and fa c iliting  the Conversion o f state 
enterprises to jo in t stock companies. These reform steps were supported and en- 
couraged by extensive technical assistance o f the IMF. Staff analyses and recom- 
mendations were especially focused on the area o f banking reform, the development 
o f more effective monetary policy instruments and on the tax- reform.
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The adoption o f a new Association Law and other connected corporate acts in
1988 represented the firs t steps to reform the institutional system in the area o f m i- 
croeconomic decision making. This measure was strongly urged by the IMF and 
the implementation o f the key features o f the Corporate Association Law consti- 
tuted a perfomance criterion under the 1988 standby arrangement. The urgent need 
to make price system responsive to relative scarcities in order to ensure efficient 
resource allocation was also emphasized by the Fund. Accordingly, a criterion on 
pric ing system, too, was set to raise the share o f consumer prices not subject to 
controls.
These reform steps and their implementation, however, were inadequate to deal 
w ith the structural rig id ities reflected in the renewal o f macroeconomic imbalances. 
In particular, price liberalization was too gradual to promote the required adjust- 
ment o f the economy to world market conditions. Exchange rate policy and wage 
measures have reflected competing and inconsistent objectives. Only the firs t stage 
o f a desirable budgetary reform has been reached, and the creation o f the two-tier 
banking system represented only an in itia l move toward financial sector reform 
which did not change the operation o f the state controlled resource allocation.
The Fund staff clearly spelled out that the main reason for inconsistencies in the 
Hungarian reforms was the lack o f effective representation o f ownership interests in 
the enterprise sector which lim ited the financial responsibility o f corporate man- 
agement and undermined financial discipline. This situation also complicated the 
enforcement o f tigh t fiscal and monetary policies, which in turn lim ited the scope 
o f further liberalization o f the price and wage systems.
During this period, the scope and effectiveness o f economic reform, as well as the 
ab ility and willingness o f the Hungarian policy makers to fo llow  Fund advices on 
further essential reform steps were severely lim ited by the prevailing social-politi- 
cal system. The dominant role o f the party in all political and economic activities 
and the dominance o f state ownership allowed only halfway implementation o f 
economic reforms. A political reform was necessary to achieve a sound and consis- 
tent progress w ith market reform process and to start a successful transformation o f 
the economic system.
IM F  S upport to  Reform s Since 1990
By 1990 Hungary has already made substantial progress w ith economic reforms 
compared w ith most o f the countries in economic and political transition. Neverthe- 
less, the tasks ahead represented a major challenge for policy makers, not least 
because o f the need to establish many o f the economic and legal institutions o f 
market economy wich were s till missing
The firs t freely elected government o f Hungary that assumed office in May, 1990 
after the fundamental political changes, has formulated a comprehensive program 
o f economic reform aimed at moving to a market economy based on private owner- 
ship The government faced the enormous challenge to proceed without delay to 
restructure the economy and accelerate the build ing o f market institutions in many 
important areas, while dealing w ith the serious macroeconomic imbalances experi-
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enced during 1989 and 1990. The IM F management welcomed the government's 
medium-term "Economic Program o f National Renewal" and supported it by a 
three-year extended arrangement fo r Hungary. Fund experts provided extensive 
assistance in form ulating the policy content o f the program, taking account o f the 
need to address, in a comprehensive fashion, many well-known weaknesses o f the 
economy hampering productive potential and leading to periodic external imbal- 
ances. The lis t o f structural policies included:
- privatization and deregulation to promote an effective supply response and also 
to increase the responsiveness o f inflation to demand management policies,
- measures to reduce the share o f resources absorbed and distributed by the public 
sector,
- measures to promote market based reallocation o f resources toward efficient 
production and investment, including the completion o f price and import liberaliza- 
tion, improvement and development o f the financial system, the break-up o f mo- 
nopolies, the restructuring or closing down o f loss-making enterprises, and,
- measures to develop an adequate social safety net.
Performance criteria for the arrangement included a detailed time schedule for 
progress in various areas o f structural reform, including the adoption o f legislation 
and implementation o f the envisaged reforms for social security, banking and the 
budget. To monitor progress w ith structural reforms, quantitative and other bench- 
marks were also established for the period o f the arrangement. As immediate tasks, 
the program for 1991 included significant steps in a ll these areas and a strong 
macroeconomic stabilization program.
The Fund has been closely involved in the design o f both macroeconomic adjust- 
ment policies and structural measures. Pace and sequence o f different steps in the 
areas o f privatization, enterprise restructuring and legislation for the financial sec- 
tor have been extensively discussed during consultations between Fund staff and the 
Hungarian authorities. Fund and Worldbank staffs' collaboration have also been 
intensified during this period with close coordination o f conditionality o f the IMF 
program and the Bank's SAL loan. The Fund and Bank staff have jo in tly  assisted 
the authorities in preparing program documents for the medium-term macro- 
economic and structural adjustment.
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Technica l Assistance
As an important channel o f IMF support, technical assistance has also been pro- 
vided to promote institution building in the areas o f banking, monetary policy and 
the exchange system. In accordance w ith the objective to reduce the state's role in 
the economy, technical assistance focused on the fiscal system during 1990 and
1991. A  major technical assistance program, covering VAT, personal income tax,
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review o f corporate taxation, reorganization o f tax administration, the budget and 
treasury system has been completed by 1991. The comprehensive review o f the 
social security system started in 1989 by Fund experts, has been continued w ith the 
aim o f promoting creation o f a less expensive and more efficient social safety net. 
Technical assistance was provided to advise the authorities on the development o f a 
foreign interbank market, too. The IMF's role in the design and implementation o f 
the Hungarian transformation process has been strengthened by the direct assis- 
tance o f a senior resident representative o f the Fund who has been staying in 
Budapest since 1990.
F in a n c ia l Assistance
The v iab ility  o f the Hungarian stabilization efforts and the whole program, in gen- 
eral, heavily depended on sufficient external financial assistance. At the firs t ha lf o f
1991 Hungary was on the edge o f losing access to capital markets due to political 
uncertainties and financial difficulties which have threatened the economical and 
political transformation process that had been initiated. Hungary was one o f the 
countries benefiting from the concerted financial support fo r the transforming East- 
ern and Central European countries that was launched in July 1989 by the G-24 
and the international financial institutions. During 1991, in addition to Fund finan- 
cial support, as o f US $ 1 b illion  under the firs t year o f the EAF and a separate 
compensatory financing, further assistance, amounted to US S 1.3 b illion , were dis- 
bursed to Hungary from Worldbank and parallel financing, and from the G-24 and 
the EC, in the form o f exceptional balance o f payments support.
Tasks S till Ahead
During the years since 1990, Hungary has made a significant progress w ith struc- 
turai transformation in all main areas o f the economy. Privatization has progressed, 
the remaining consumer price controls have been eliminated, liberalization o f 
external transactions has continued, actions have been taken to reduce government 
spending, to reform taxes and, new laws on banking, accounting and bankruptcies 
have been introduced. W hile appreciating the successful implementation o f these 
structural measures, the Fund stressed the need for further progress in many areas. 
In particular, they consider the pace o f privatization too slow, especially for larger 
state enterprises. The Fund staff emphasizes the need for setting clear and consis- 
tent objectives at this d ifficu lt area o f privatization while recognizing that the 
determination o f the appropriate size o f government involvement in the reallocation 
of resources represents a main challenge o f the transition process. Further areas 
where Fund management urges more concerted and accelerated actions, are the 
consolidation o f the banking sector, and improvements in the bankruptcy process.
Fund advices on these areas and on many other important structural issues as 
well, was set forth in the program for a recent standby arrangement, approved for 
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consultations w ith the Fund staff were focused on the problems and aspects o f the 
government's bank consolidation program. Both IM F and Worldbank staff has col- 
laborated in the preparation o f an appropriate scheme for a comprehensive recapi- 
talization operation. The program aims at reinforcing Hungarian commercial banks 
and addresses the problems o f bad loans. Parallel projects w ith the Worldbank to 
strenghten bank supervision and restructure o f specific enterprises w ill also support 
the consolidation program.
A further improvement o f the fiscal system is also on the list o f fund structural 
policy advices. They are o f the opinion that despite stuructural improvements which 
represented the 1992 Act on Public Finances, significant weaknesses s till exist in 
the system, hindering effective financial management in central and local govern- 
ments. A  technical assistance mission o f the Fund has completed its findings on 
this issue and submitted recommendations to the government just a few weeks ago. 
It includes proposals to develop a comprehensive system for public debt manage- 
ment, a rationalization and streamlining o f the structure o f the government sector.
Hungary is also confronted - like  most o f the transforming countries - w ith the 
even more d ifficu lt and burdensome task o f implementing severe macroeconomic 
stabilization policies in the face o f substantial and prolonged output loss. Although 
the im plying contraction o f income, the widening fiscal deficit and the recently ex- 
perienced substantial external imbalance represent a major challenge to the funda- 
mental restructuring o f the productive sector, the government agrees w ith the Fund 
that the way out o f stagnation lies in w ith further intensification o f structural 
tansformation rather than slowing down the process.
The transition to a market economy has proved to be a much more costly and d iffi- 
cult task for the peoples in Eastern and Central European countries than it had been 
expected. This is the case for Hungary, too, and there had been periods when West- 
em assistance and policy advice had been criticised because it proved insufficient in 
the face o f the severe income loss Hungary suffered. Disappointment had been felt 
by the public and by many experts and politicians because o f the lim ited access to 
western markets and especially because o f the unfulfilled expectations on a much 
larger financial assistance from the advanced countries and the international finan- 
cial institutions. Nevertheless, during a ll these years there was no major disagree- 
ment between the IMF's and the Hungarian authorities' views regarding the policy 
issues o f the reform. IM F assistance and policy advice has played a catalystic role 
in the acceleration o f Hungarian market reforms and the government continues to 
rely on this assistance in implementing the numerous tasks s till remaining.
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! The IM Fs Role in the Hungarian Reform Process 235
HUNGARY'S FINANCIAL RELATIONS WITH IM F
(As o f December 31, 1993)
SDR M illio n Percent o f Quota
Quota 754.8 100.0
Fund Holdings o f Currency 1595.0 211.3
Outstanding Purchases and Loans 896.3 118.7
FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS






Standby December 8, 1982 January 8, 1983 475.00 475.00
Standby January 13, 1984 January 13, 1985 425.00 425.00
Standby May 16, 1988 June 30, 1989 265.35 215.35
Standby March 14, 1990 February 20, 1991 159.21 127.37
Extended February 20, 1991 February 19, 1994 1114.00 557.24
Standby September 15, 1993 December 14, 1994 340.00 56.70
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- :ц> ך-I ־ î 7=T■ — ^ ^ 4. י ־1-
A  a
1| י ,
Roland Schönfeld - 978-3-95479-733-2
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 09:44:06AM
via free access
J í l
Roland Schönfeld - 978-3-95479-733-2
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 09:44:06AM
via free access
Roland Schönfeld - 978-3-95479-733-2
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 09:44:06AM
via free access
Ma rv in  Ja ck son
I. In troduction
Although this impression is s till subject to verification (some of which may come 
from  this conference), Bulgaria does appear to have had especially d ifficu lt rela- 
tions w ith the international financial institutions. This is said on the basis o f much 
patient observation o f the Sofia scene, but s till as one outside o f the inner circles o f 
both the international financial institutions (IFIs) and the Bulgarian government 
officials and politicians who deal w ith these issues. I have learned one thing. A ll 
parties in these relations, no matter how much one might be counted as a beer 
drinking  friend, do not welcome curious outsiders about their bureaucratic business 
and do not like to a ir d irty laundry. Good c iv il servants, anywhere, avoid discuss- 
ing bureaucratic business w ith friends. In any case, I have learned some important 
things by try ing  to collect information myself. This lends more truth than listening 
to the often uninformed voices o f those who make politics about and against the 
international financial institutions and those who try to work with them to bring 
reforms sw iftly in the transition countries.
Before turning to a review o f the bits o f public evidence that I have been able to 
collect on Bulgarian-IFI relations since 1980, I would like to suggest some o f the 
reasons why some transition countries, like Bulgaria, might have more difficulties 
in the ir relations w ith the IFI than other countries.
Transition of Bulgaria
and the International Financial Institutions
II. Possible Sources o f Transition Country Problems w ith the IF I
There are at least three general problems that would be expected to contribute to 
d ifficu lt relations between a transition country and the IFIs.
1) The extent o f politica l instability in a transition country and, related to this, 
the amount o f time in office o f regimes that are unfriendly to transition.
2) The extent o f structural and institutional distortions at the time o f in itia ting 
transition, the extent o f exogenous shocks after transition, and the degree o f 
negative economic impact o f transition on the country.
3) The amount o f international debt at the in itia tion o f transition and the 
difficulties o f servicing and reducing the debt after transition is initiated.
I shall now turn to a review o f Bulgaria in these terms, which also allows me to 
provide a good introduction before I consider Bulgaria's record with the IFIs (at 
least that part that I have uncovered).
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III. B u lgaria 's Transition P o litics
The special features o f Bulgaria's political life  since the beginning o f transition 
have been a sequence, each lasting approximately one year, o f (1) a former com- 
munist government that won the firs t election and then resigned in the face o f 
popular protests, (2) an interim  "non-political" government o f technocrats, (3) an 
elected government o f the non-communist (non-socialist) opposition, and fina lly 
(4) another "non-political" govornment o f technocrats. During this whole period, 
the Bulgarian Socialists (former BCP) have remained the single strongest party but 
since the second elections unable to achieve a governing majority without the help 
o f a th ird  political group representing the Turkish m inority. This same m inority 
party formed a government w ith the non-communist opposition coalition (UDF) 
and played a critica l role in supporting, w ith the Socialists and some elements o f 
the UDF the present "non-political" government o f Berov.
Bulgaria’s long ru ling  communist leader, Tudor Zhikov, was removed from office 
by his own associates in November 1989. Early in 1990 the BCP changed its name 
to the BSP and successfully campaigned to win the election in June 1990 by 211 
seats o f 400. Andre Lukanov, head o f the BSP, became Bulgaria's firs t elected head 
o f government, while the presidency was won by an opposition leader, Zhelu Zhe- 
lev. The BSP did not win a two-thirds constitutional majority and in the face o f a 
political stalemate, growing economic confusion, and popular strikes and rallies 
against him, Lukanov resigned in November 1990. A technocratic caretaker gov- 
ernment was formed by D im itar Popov, a former judge, to see the country through 
the new constitution, adopted in  July 1991, and elections fo llow ing its adoption.
The firs t elections under the new constitution in October 1991 were won by a eoa- 
lition  o f non-socialist parties, the Union o f Democratic Forces (UDF), and a coali- 
tion party representing Bulgaria's Turkish m inority (the Movement fo r Rights and 
Freedoms). The new UDF Prime M inister, F ilip  D im itrov, remained in office until 
October 1992 and then resigned in the face o f a non-confidence vote.
On December 30, 1992, a new government was formed under Liuben Berov, the 
economic adviser o f President Zhelev. This government was seriously reshuffled in 
June 1993 and now has lasted beyond most expectations. A fter the IM F agreements 
(see below) and w ith a seeming crisis o f confidence in the Bulgaria Lev, Berov 
came under growing political pressure and the opposition o f the trade unions. On 
March 8 he was rushed to the hospital w ith a heart attack and then underwent 
quadruple by-pass surgery. His deputy announced on 23 March that Berov would 
be back at work on 28 March. Indeed, even on 25 March he appeared on TV  with 
attacks on the trade unions and the opponents to his economic reform program.
It has been said that the Berov government continues because neither the BSP 
nor the now disunited UDF want to assume responsibility for the d ifficu lt situation 
o f the country. It is remarkable that Berov survives without organized political 
backing and perhaps even more remarkable that he apparently has managed rather 
large concessions from Bulgaria’s private creditors and to get Parliament to accept 
tough measures to earn IM F support again.
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Political instability o f the Bulgarian sort makes it especially hard to carry out 
complex reform projects. I choose privatization as an illustrative case because it is 
also an important condition in the programs o f the IFIs.
In Bulgaria's case it is also important fo r the Berov government. Berov him self 
came into office "as a government o f privatization". Also, privatization has been 
and s till is one o f the key issues divid ing a ll political groups and factions, even 
w ith in  the non-socialist UDF where every politician seems to have become his own 
expert on the subject and on which program should be followed in Bulgaria.
Although a one-man privatization office was set up under the BSP, the firs t seri- 
ous steps were the Privatization Law adopted in A pril 1992. Among other features, 
it included possibilities fo r debt-equity swaps as a way o f privatization. Actually in 
spite o f much work organizing and then reorganizing privatization agencies under 
the D im itrov and Berov governments, no large scale privatization took place until 
m id-1993. This record provoked the Financial Times (5 May 1993) to describe 
Bulgaria as "the laggard in east European privatization".
Since 1988, preceding the fa ll o f the communists, real privatization has taken the 
form o f managerial and nomenclatural asset stripping. Usually this has been done 
by setting up related new private companies with friends or fam ily and then doing 
business through the new company and stripping funds by the pricing arrange- 
ments and financial flows. W hile this was going on, the politicians and the experts 
were quarrelling and struggling over the methods o f privatization.
Programs fina lly  took form, although w ith much debate over which enterprises to 
privatize, and 49 cases were initiated and 13 sale transactions conducted before the 
end o f 1993. Also, in August plans were announced to study and to undertake a 
form o f mass privatization, using vouchers. Details o f the plan are s till debated and 
may not be high on the lis t o f an otherwise hard pressed government.
IV. In itia l D istortions, Exogenous Shocks, and the Economic Im pact o f 
Transition in  B u lgaria
Bulgaria entered the transition already facing a foreign debt crisis (see below) as a 
result o f mismanagement o f the communists (and possibly even theft o f assets by 
leading communist officials). To the debt crisis was added further external shocks 
from the collapse o f the CMEA trading and payments system, and the G u lf War. 
Recently, Bulgarian officials have claimed that the country is owed a total o f USD 
3.0 b illion  by the former Soviet Union and Third W orld countries.
The terms o f trade losses alone from the collapse o f CMEA were estimated by 
Bulgarian authorities to be USD 2.5 b illion , or 12.8% o f 1989 GDP. Also, between 
1980 and 1990, it is estimated that Bulgaria granted USD 2.4 b illion  in Third 
World credits, including large loans to Libya and Iraq. Only in m id-1990 a deal 
had been made w ith the latter fo r annual o il imports o f USD 120 m illion  for 5 
years. As w ill be seen below, the firs t funds to Bulgaria from the W orld Bank went 
to finance o il imports in order to avoid a crisis from the losses o f both Soviet and 
Iraqi sources.
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The data in Table 1 may be compared to other transition countries. The fa ll in 
Bulgaria's GDP o f 30 per cent from the end o f 1989 to the end o f 1993 is much less 
than the experiences o f Romania (-38%), Albania (41%), Russia (41%) and the 
Baltic States. On the other hand, Bulgarian industry is badly h it by the loss o f con- 
nections and its declines are more like those in the other countries. Compared to 
Romania, Bulgaria has had the specific disadvantage o f not being able to run a 
large trade deficit for either consumer goods or industrial supplies.
These factors may account for Bulgaria having the highest unemployment rate in 
the region. It also has one o f the highest ratios o f deficit to GDP fo r 1993, espe- 
d a ily  i f  deferred foreign debt service is included in the deficit.
The economy until the end o f 1993 was also suffering from a relative revaluation 
o f the lev because its nominal depreciation against the dollar lagged behind the in- 
crease in domestic prices. According to PlanEcon's calculations o f ratios o f officia l 
exchange rates to estimated purchasing power exchange rates, the lev (at 2.42) in 
July 1993 had become stronger than the Czech, Romanian and Slovak currencies. 
That relationship rose sharply when the lev fe ll to 36.8/USD on 18 February 1994 
and further to 50/USD in March.
TABLE I
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M AIN  STATISTICAL INDICATORS
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Real GDP (%) -0.3 -9.1 -11.7 -7.7 -4.0
Industrial output -1.5 -17 ־22 -18 -10
Consumer prices (% ) 6.2 21.6 333.5 82.6 72.9
Unemployment (% ) 1.5 10 15 18
CC exports ($bn) 3.1 2.5 3.7 5.1 4.5
CC imports ($bn) 4.3 3.3 3.8 4.6 4.8
Current account ($bn) -1.3 -1.2 -0.9 -0.3 -1.0
Gross CC debt ($bn) 10.1 10.9 12.0 12.1 13.0
BIS bank assets ($bn) 1.2 0.6 1.0 1.4 1.2
BIS bank liab ilities 7.8 8.7 8.2 7.4 7.0
Exchange rate (Lv/$) 0.9 2.2 21.8 23.3 27.5
Sources: PlanEcon Report, 12 October 1993; Economist Intelligence U nit, C ountry Report, 
1st quarter 1994; EBRD, Economic Review: Annual Economic Outlook. September 1993; 
National Statistical Institute, S ta tistica l News, 3:1993 and Statisticheski spravochnik, 1993; 
Agency for Economic Coordination and Development, Business Survey Series, 1993 annual.
Foreign Investments
In m id -1991 a Foreign Investment Law was passed w ith relatively liberal provi- 
sions. It was revised in January 1992 to provide an even more liberal framework. In
1990, only USD 100,000 o f foreign investments were reported and in 1991 s till a
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modest USD 700,000-800,000. Bulgaria has remained the least attractive transition 
country.
Data on foreign investment are rather uncertain. One report said that from 1991 
to August 1993 only USD 216 m illion  had come in, including USD 120-150 m il- 
lion in shares, bonds, and deposits in Bulgarian banks (PlanEcon Business Report, 
3:24).
I f  the transition started w ith an external shock, it seems to be continuing w ith an- 
other one. According to a government commission, losses on account o f sanctions 
against Yugoslavia amounted to USD 3826 m illion by July 22, 1993, a monthly 
average o f USD 212.6 m illion. It was pointed out that this would be a large per- 
centage o f Bulgaria's foreign debt.
V. B u lg a ria 's  In te rn a tio n a l D ebt P roblem s
The Bulgarian government announced a moratorium on principal payments on 29 
March 1990. Subsequently the moratorium was extended to interest payments, as 
well.
Negotiations w ith the Paris Club led to an agreement in May 1991 for reschedul- 
ing the offic ia l debt over 10 years, w ith a six year grace. More good news has 
resulted from President Mitterand's vis it to Bulgaria in January, 1993, the result o f 
which new meetings w ith the Paris Club (officia l creditors) started in March. It is 
hoped that the USD 1.6 b illion  officia l debt can be reduced and rescheduled.
Negotiations started w ith a consultative committee o f the London Club in A pril
1992. Pending an agreement, Bulgaria's commercial creditors granted a succession 
o f three-month ro ll overs o f maturities o f principal and interest. The negotiations 
w ith the London Club proved very d ifficu lt. The UDF government under D im itrov 
had paid 20% o f the current interest as a gesture o f good w ill, but this was stopped 
by the Berov government in March 1993. In June the Prime M inister suspended the 
discussions, saying that an agreement was impossible when "we suggest a w rite-off 
o f 50% and the banks offer us 8%." He went on to suggest follow ing Poland’s strat- 
egy o f suspending discussions for a year (reported in the Bulgarian Economic Out- 
look, August 6-12, 1993). Parliament and the government then agreed to lim it 
commitments on restructuring to a fixed payment o f USD 700 m illion  and up to 
USD 200 m illion  in annual debt service until the year 2000.
In November 1993 an outline agreement was reached which indicated a 50% 
reduction in the USD 9.3 b illion  debt, covering principal o f about USD 7.0 b illion  
and interest o f about USD 2.0 b illion , w ith technical discussions to fo llow  and ne- 
gotiations to be concluded by June 1994.1 A  practical problem is that separate b ila t- 
eral agreements have to be signed w ith more than 300 commercial bank creditors.
1 It was also announced on 20 January 1994 that the Bulgarian government had accepted in 
principle some Russian offers for settlement o f the TR 670 m illion  and the "clearing dol- 
lar" 500 m illion  that Russia owes Bulgaria from TR trade in 1990 and "clearing dollar" 
trade in 1991. The offers envisage payment in commodities. Roland Schönfeld - 978-3-95479-733-2
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The agreement stipulated an in itia l downpayment o f not less than USD 865 m il- 
lion and annual payments o f less than USD 300 m illion  fo r the firs t seven years, 
altogether making payments o f USD 4.5 b illion  by the year 2030. Bulgaria is 
required to recommence interest payments and partial payments fo r three quarters 
o f 1993, starting 1 A pril 1994, to the amount o f 5% (instead o f 20% as was agreed 
back in  1992).
At least three means o f settlement have been discussed. One would involve Bui- 
garia buying USD 300 m illion "zero coupon" US Treasury bonds to serve as collat- 
eral for two types o f Bulgarian bonds: (a) discount bonds at 50% and (b) bonds w ith 
below market interest rates. A second approach mentioned is debt-for-equity swaps, 
involving the privatization program.
A th ird  approach is a debt by-back. In March the government offered 25% on the 
dollar and some creditors appeared to be ready to take it up. This may appear at- 
tractive to the USD 2 b illion  that had been purchased in the secondary markets by 
non-banking investors at discounts as low as 10-18% o f par.2
VI. Selected Review o f B u lg a ria 's  R ela tions w ith  the IF I  
VI.A. The IM F
Bulgaria joined the IM F/W orld Bank in September 1990. By February 1991 the 
firs t stand-by loan o f SDR 279 m illion was approved, which was subject to the 
fo llow ing conditions:
- interest rate increases and tightened credit conditions;
- wage controls;
- price liberalization, except for electricity, heating, and essential foods;
- a unified floating exchange rate based on an inter-bank foreign exchange 
market;
- demonopolization, introduction o f commercial practices, and privatization;
- abolishment o f import-export quotas and reduction o f subsidies to exports;
- commencement o f negotiations w ith officia l and private creditors concerning 
the debt moratorium.
In 1991 the IM F disbursed about USD 400 m illion (disbursements were lower 
than expected by SDR 32.6 or USD 45 m illion).
Following the adoption o f an austerity budget w ith a deficit target o f 4.3 per cent 
o f GDP, in A pril 1992 the IMF approved another stand-by credit for 12 months o f 
USD 212 m illion  (SDR 155 m illion) w ith the purpose o f supporting the balance o f 
payments deficit, the economic stabilization program, and structural reform. Funds 
were to be provided in 5 tranches. By the end o f January 1993 Bulgaria had re- 
ceived 4 tranches. Total credits from the IM F had reached USD 632 m illion  (SDR
2 On March 16 the secondary market was closed for dealings in debt when the Bulgarian
Foreign Trade Bank stopped registering such transactions. This was done in order to help
establish who the creditors are.
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459.9 m illion ), while Bulgaria had paid interest charges o f USD 51.1 m illion  (SDR 
37.2 m illion ). Payments o f principal were to begin in 1994 and last un til 2000.
At the end o f 1992 net budget crediting by banks exceeded the upper lim it o f the 
SBA, partly due to unpaid interest on internal debt. As a result, the fifth  tranche 
was not taken up and the second SBA expired on March 31,1993.
In addition to the funds, the IM F had provided significant technical assistance in 
setting up a modern banking system. The Bulgarian National Bank, in  particular, 
received help in nearly every area.
The IM F argued that Bulgaria had not achieved the projected progress in struc- 
turai adjustment and passing necessary financial legislation. It also refused to nego- 
tiate a new SBA before adoption o f the national budget act and minimum budget 
deficit targets. In July 1993 a new IM F negotiator arrived in Sofia without agree- 
ments being achieved. Then the Bulgarian group to the IM F meetings in September 
returned, saying that in spite o f large increases in the budget deficit, a new sympa- 
thy for losses connected to the Yugoslav embargo would lead to an agreement 
w ithin months.
A draft agreement was fina lly  announced by the IM F and Bulgarian government 
negotiators in December 1993. The conditions were recognized in a letter o f intent 
to the IM F as:
- a maximum deficit o f 6.2% o f GDP;
- an in fla tion target o f 30%,
- positive interest rates by the firs t month;
- new budget revenues from taxes and cut backs o f price subsidies 
(including higher energy prices);
- a restrictive incomes policy;
- a floating rate fo r the USD to be maintained without National Bank intervention 
in currency markets;
- encouragement o f secondary markets by the M inistry o f Finance;
- the bad debts o f state owned enterprises to be settled in late 1993 and early 
1994;
- overall bank lending to be reduced.
It was said that i f  these negotiations are a success, Bulgaria should expect some 
USD 1.0 b illion  new funds from official creditors in 1994. This would include a 
new standby credit o f USD 70 m illion and USD 300 m illion Systemic Transforma- 
tion Facility (STF) loan from the IMF, plus a new SAL from the W orld Bank.
It was not until 28 February 1994 that the Parliament, in an extra-ordinary 
session approved a budget w ith the necessary deficit lim it o f 6.7 per cent o f GDP. 
The budget includes USD 246 m illion interest payments to London and Paris Club 
creditors (6.8% o f total expenditures).
The IM F Sofia representative then said that this would pave the way for new 
funds o f USD 400 m illion by mid-year to make in itia l repayments to the London 
Club under the rescheduling agreement.
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VI. B. The W orld Bank and the IFC
After the IMF approved the firs t stand-by loan in February 1991, the W orld Bank 
opened in August 1991 a USD 250 m illion  credit line. USD 150 m illion  were used 
for the purchase o f crude and fuel o il. Then delays in structural reform and the 
requirements o f the Structural Adjustment loan caused the second tranche o f USD 
100 m illion  to be postponed. Among the specific problems were the lack o f privati- 
zation and land reform, and need to adopt international standards o f bank supervi- 
sion.3 A  new Financial and Enterprise Sectoral Adjustment Loan (FESAL) was 
offered in 1992, w ith the private investment and export finance (PIEF) project as a 
bridge in negotiations. In March 1992 a consulting company initiated a study of 
structural issues in the banking system.
The W orld Bank established an office in Sofia. By the summer o f 1993, World 
Bank commitments reached a total o f USD 445 m illion  for 5 projects covering (a) 
structural adjustment, (b) technical assistance, (c) energy (USD 93 m illion: an ear- 
lie r commitment o f USD 75 m illion  loan for the energy sector was to be disbursed 
March 1993), (d) telecommunications (USD 30 m illion), and (e) credit for private 
investment and exporting (USD 55 m illion).
The head o f the Sofia office "... the Bulgarian reform program has been slower 
than we expected and that has delayed the extension o f our fu ll support." (BEO, 13- 
19 August 1993).
The loan for telecom services was only approved December 4, 1993, when the 
firs t tranche o f USD 135,000 was released. Release o f funds for private investment 
and exporting was arranged earlier, in September 1993.
The conditions o f the latter loan provide a useful review o f the terms that the 
Bank demanded and the Bulgarian government was w illin g  to accept. The techni- 
cal conditions were:
- a loan o f USD 55 m illion  for 20 years including a 5 year grace period, o f which 
USD 52 m illion  would go to private entrepreneurs (through financial inter- 
mediaries) and USD 3 m illion to the participating financial intermediaries (PFI);
- the proceeds to be lent out to PFI at prevailing six-month market spreads;
- loans to be repaid in the currencies which were lent;
- private exporters to receive funds for a maximum o f 180 days and funds for 
investment financing for loans o f 10 years and 3 years grace period.
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3 According to an undated W orld Bank report, "The Bank's Activities in Eastern Europe &  
Central Asia", lending in 1990/91 was USD 17 m illion  and in 1991/92 amounted to USD 
250 m illion  (the SAL). As o f 15/3/93 some USD 1055 m illion  were in the pipeline, in- 
eluding agricultural development (USD 50 m illion ), debt and debt service reduction 
(USD 215 m illion ), education (100), energy I (USD 75 m illion ), financial and enterprise 
sector adjustment (USD 150 m illion ), health development (USD 50 m illion ), employ- 
ment promotion and social protection (USD 65 m illion), private investment and export 
finance (USD 70 m illion ), SAL П/private sector development (USD 150), telecommuni- 
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The macroeconomic conditions were that:
-  the Government should advance privatization in 1993;
- the Government should declare its decision on the State Fund for Reconstruc- 
tion and Development to the effect that funds would no longer be distributed at 
non-market prices through a centralized loan mechanism;
- the National Bank should approve a new bank control system which would be 
obligatory for a ll banks in order to receive funds from Structural Adjustment 
Loans;
- the Government should meet its commitment and implement a market-oriented 
mechanism for money lending in a ll sectors o f the economy;
- by September 30, 1993, the National Bank should circulate instructions 
imposing international accounting standards on a ll banks and the banks should 
be audited by independent CPAs for 1993 and after;
- the Government should sign the Structural Adjustment Loan, acceptable to the 
Bank, w ith at least two participating financial intermediaries (PFI);
- the PFI boards o f directors should pursue financial policies and a corporate 
strategy acceptable to the W orld Bank.
Another W orld Bank funding o f USD 100 m illion for water treatment and water 
supply has been arranged. Also, by the end o f February 1994 funds o f USD 50 m il- 
lion were agreed to for private sector farm lending (the project had been delayed 
due to d ifficu lty  in screening and selecting 3 commercial lending banks).
F inally, the Bulgarian government has asked the Bank for new loans o f USD 400 
m illion  to cover construction o f a new unit at the Maritsa Istok power station. In 
addition, the Bank has taken up the issue o f providing extra financing for the Lon- 
don Club private debt settlements (see above). The conditions are said to include 
strong specific targets for large-scale privatizations, including at least 70 projects 
and 5 liquidations. It is hoped that the Bank w ill make its decisions by mid-June 
1994.
IFC
Bulgaria is eligible for equity financing from the International Finance Corporation 
(IFC), which can take up to 30 per cent m inority shares in projects. The IFC annual 
report fo r 1992 listed no projects for either Bulgaria or Romania, while the report 
for 1993 lists one technical assistance project for Bulgaria, preparing the financial 
sector section o f the financial and enterprise adjustment loan.
VI. C. The EU  PHARE Program
After Bulgaria joined the IM F/W orld Bank, the EU (then EC) granted ECU 290 
m illion for restructuring the economy and boosting hard currency reserves as part 
o f its commitments w ith the G-24.
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In the period, 1990-1992, the only PHARE country treated better in terms o f 
commitments than Bulgaria according to size o f population was Albania.4 In 1991 
and 1992, a total o f ECU 197.5 m illion  had been appropriated by the PHARE pro- 
gram (including a project o f ECU 11.5 m illion  aimed at im proving safety at 
Kozlodui nuclear power station), but in October 1993 there remained to negotiate 
ECU 131 m illion  o f these funds. This included some small funds for technical 
assistance to the banking sector. Also included were grants fo r environmental proj- 
ects, beginning w ith ECU 3.5 m illion  in 1990, ECU 7.5 m illion  in 1991 and 1992, 
and ECU 7 m illion  in 1993. New environmental projects have been set up for 1994, 
as well, including USD 20 m illion  for a network o f regional environmental inspec- 
torates and laboratories, which was to be in place by the end o f 1994.5
Among the projects for 1993 is a planned ECU 4 m illion for the tourist industry. 
This project has been delayed because o f opposition o f Bulgarian interests to the 
possible sale o f prime tourist locations to foreign investors.
The PHARE program for 1993-1995 is to total ECU 300 m illion , o f which ECU 
90 m illion  was set fo r 1993 (covering the private sector (ECU 20.5 m illion), updat- 
ing and restructuring o f the power industry (ECU 29.5 m illion), human resources 
(ECU 27.5 m illion), institutional reform (ECU 8 m illion), miscellaneous (ECU 4 
m illion)). The EU Commission also announced that another ECU 62 m illion could 
have been given for privatization and agriculture i f  there had not been such slow 
progress in u tiliz ing  funds already granted for these areas.
One o f the problem areas has been a rather small sum o f ECU 7 m illion allocated 
for agriculture back in 1991. The purpose had been to enable emerging private 
farms and agro-industrial organizations to purchase imported inputs from EU 
countries through credit lines set up in commercial banks. Also involved were 
counterpart funds o f Leva 300 m illion. The funds were s till unused at the end o f 
1993 and were transferred to separate funds under the Council o f Ministers. Re- 
cently it was announced the funds would be used for privatization in the agricul- 
turai sector (ECU 2 m illion), land reform (over ECU 3 m illion ) and developing 
farm produce markets (over ECU 2 m illion). Use o f the funds have been art o f 
controversies w ith the M inister o f Agriculture, who complains that too much o f 
PHARE money in agriculture (he claims 65%) goes to pay foreign consultants.
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4 According to PHARE data in the period 1990-1992 the follow ing commitments (including 
food and humanitarian aid) were made (in ECU m illion): Poland 578, Hungary 306, 
CSFR 233, Romania 302, Bulgaria 219, Albania 120, Estonia 10, Latvia 15, and 
Lithuania 20.
5 Programs listed in The Compendium o f PHARE 1991 Operational Programmes are: Inte- 
grated SME/Regional Reconversion and Development Programme - 2.5 years (ECU 22.5 
m illion ); Telecommunications 11-18 months (ECU 3 m illion ); Agriculture - 2 years 
(ECU 10 m illion ); Health - 4 years (ECU 10.5 m illion ); Environment - 3 years (1991- 
ECU 7.5 m illion ; 1992-ECU 7.5 m illion ); Energy - 3 years (1991-ECU 2 m illion ; 1992- 
ECU 8 m illion ); Energy II - w inter 1992/93 (ECU 10 m illion ); Nuclear safety-по date 
(ECU 3.5 m illion).
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VI. D. The EU  Association Agreement
Negotiations began w ith the EU for associate membership in May 1992. An agree- 
ment fo r Association was signed in Brussels on 8 May 1993 w ith the Interim  
agreement expected to come into force in July 1993. The EU Council then unex- 
pectedly become involved in internal issues, iucluding how to set safeguards. After 
the EU Council settled its internal issues, an agreement announced that the Interim  
Agreement would fin a lly  come into force on 1 January 1994. In the meantime, the 
Bulgarian government claims to have suffered losses o f over USD 200 m illion  in 
lost trade.
V IE . The EBRD and the E IB
No EBRD and EIB financing took place in 1991. The EBRD entered Bulgaria in at 
the end o f 1991. On 24 March 1992 a loan o f ECU 114 m illion was approved for 
technical modernization o f Maritsa Istók II electric power station in which the 
EBRD provided ECU 40 m illion, the EIB ECU 45 m illion and the rest by the Bui- 
garian National Electric Company.
A second project was taken up for reconstruction and expansion o f the Bulgarian 
telecommunications system. The EBRD participation was ECU 32 m illion  and the 
EIB extended ECU 70 m illion (W orld Bank participation was also envisaged). 
Other projects studied in 1992 were for im proving the road system, on providing a 
credit line for SMEs, and participation in bank consolidation as well as capitaliza- 
tion o f some banks. By the end o f 1992 EBRD approved loans amounted to USD 
131.56 m illion , covering the Maritsa Istók II power station (USD 49.2 m illion), 
posts and telecommunications (USD 39.36 m illion ), and roadworks (USD 43 m il- 
lion).
A Bulgarian report then complained that not only were loans smaller than 
granted to neigbors, they also were restricted to public projects unlike other coun- 
tries (Bulgarian Economic Outlook, Jan 8-15, 1993).
Studies taken up in 1993 included reconstruction o f the railways, a Trans-Euro- 
pean highway, ecological sewerage systems, wholesale agricultural markets in 6 
cities, and an improved layout o f the Varna seaport.
In January 1994 the firs t equity stake by the EBRD was announced, 35 per cent 
in a new Bulgarian Investment Bank (having a capital base o f USD 5 m illion). 
Another ECU 85 m illion  were committed w ith the EIB for the new unit at the 
Maritsa Istok power plant (see above W orld Bank).
6 Reported in Finance East Europe, 4 February 1994. Also, see the 1 וז1ת1516ץ $ interview in 
the Bulgarian language newspaper, P ari, on 29 November 1993.
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Commitments o f ECU 200 m illion  for modernization o f the railroad in  1993-98 
and USD 43 m illion  for road rehabilitation in 1993-94 have been reported (the lat- 
ter is in conjunction w ith a EIB loan). The EBRD is also expected to support a proj- 
ect o f USD 85 m illion  fo r reconstruction o f the Sofia airport.
EIB
The EIB began in 1992 its Bulgarian financing w ith a feasibility study o f credits to 
Bulgarian commercial banks for investment in small- and medium-sized enter- 
prises, w ith a credit agreement signed in m id-1993 for ECU 30 m illion.
Under its co-financing facilities, EIB joined the Bulgarian National E lectricity 
Company in the EBRD supported coal power project in 1992 for ECU 115 m illion. 
Bulgaria had more support from the EIB in terms o f its size than did Poland, 
Romania, and the Czech and Slovak Republics.7
For 1993 it committed ECU 60 m illion  for installation o f a new air tra ffic  control 
system. As mentioned above (see W orld Bank), the EIB joined the EBRD and the 
W orld Bank in supporting a USD 300 m illion  project fo r digitalisation o f the tele- 
phone system over 4 years.
At the end o f 1993, a loan o f ECU 21 m illion  was agreed to fo r road moderniza- 
tion (together w ith the EBRD loan) which would be repaid between 1997 and 2009 
(partly through to ll charges).
VI. F. The O ther IF I (G-24, UN agencies, etc.)
The G-24
After conclusion o f the stand-by agreement w ith the IMF, the G-24 promised much 
funding that subsequently did not materialize. Bulgaria had requested USD 800 
m illion o f which USD 600 m illion  was pledged and only USD 200 m illion  dis- 
bursed in 1991. Disbursement o f the rest o f the pledged USD 400 m illion  was 
expected in 1992, but how much was actually forthcoming is unclear.
Some USD 290 m illion  were provided according to an agreement w ith the EU in 
August 1991 w ith the firs t tranche o f USD 150 m illion  disbursed then, and the sec- 
ond disbursed on 12 March 1992.
In 1992 bilateral agreements were signed w ith Norway, Finland, Sweden and 
Austria for credits to support balance o f payments needs (USD 23 m illion , ECU 
14.5 m illion , and ATS 210 m illion).
250 Marvin Jackson
7 For the period 1990-1992, the follow ing amounts, in ECU m illion , were committed: 
Hungary 305, Poland 290, Czech and Slovak Republics 85, Romania 25 and Bulgaria 
115.
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Remaining IF Is
After the IMF stand-by, UNIDO, F AO, and UNDP unblocked funds for specific 
technical assistance projects. No information has been collected on their activities 
in Bulgaria. Also, no inform ation has been gathered on bilateral assistance, fo r ex- 
ample from the US AID , or on export financing lines w ith country agencies.
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O lga  T en ev a
International Financial Organizations 
A Bulgarian Viewpoint ־
We are experiencing a unique historical epoch, the transition from a command and 
administrative system to a market economy in a large number o f countries. In view 
o f their increasing participation in the world economy, this is an event o f great 
concern for policy makers and researchers both in the East and in the West. In this 
complex situation, there are no ready formulae or models fo r attaining the preset 
goal o f transformation. Problems are complicated by the need to simultaneously 
advance both in the process o f political democratization and in the progress o f the 
economy. W hile in terms o f political democracy, based on the principles adopted by 
the world's developed democracies, Bulgaria can boast o f quite a few positive re- 
suits, we have to admit we face enormous difficulties in the economic sphere.
A ll the international financial institutions and organizations are analyzing the 
situation and discussing ways and means for our economy’ s transformation. The 
goal is clear, but how to attain it is a problem d ifficu lt to solve. Indisputably, the 
main benchmarks o f transformation are: structural reform, privatization, improve- 
ment o f the legislative framework, o f the fiscal policy, and o f banking.
No matter how sim ilar the conditions inherited from the former a rtific ia l social 
and economic structural framework developed under socialism, m ight be, in  each 
Eastern European country, they have specific characteristics ranging from eco- 
nomie and natural to psychological ones. Presently, the Bulgarian economy is in an 
intense crisis. The reform started early in 1991 by introducing a restrictive mone- 
tary policy, but GDP has been fa lling  in recent years -  by 11.7 per cent in 1991, by 
5.7 per cent in 1992, by 5.0 per cent in 1993. Even though w 2 managed to avoid 
hyperinflation, in flation is high -  79 per cent in 1992, 63 per cent in 1993. Unem- 
ployment is increasing and now includes approximately 16 per cent o f the active 
population.
The space for manoeuvering between the dangerous social and economic restric- 
tions is severely lim ited. Measures targeted at one problem have negative impacts 
on others - we often simultaneously step on the accelerator and on the brake, and it 
is only natural that the car moves ahead only w ith d ifficu lty. In such circumstances, 
structural policy faces many obstacles in its implementation. Privatization is d iffi- 
cult to effect and is going on at very unsatisfactory rate. Nevertheless, the officia l 
statistical data show that, at present, 18.5 per cent o f the economy is controlled by 
the private sector. The strict anti-inflationary policy requires cutting budget expen- 
ditures and grants and maintaining a high interest rate. This has, however, a nega- 
tive impact on investment. At the same time, Bulgaria lacks capital markets.
The improvement o f the organization o f tax administration is under way, and the 
tax reform has been set in motion. The VAT, applied in a ll European countries, was 
introduced on A pril 1, 1994.
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The consolidation o f the banking sector is almost complete. In 1993, 53 banks 
w ith state participation were consolidated into 5 universal bank groups. In 1994 
their number w ill increase to 6. The share o f private banks in the Bulgarian bank- 
ing system is increasing. The Central bank has licensed over 15 private banks, 
which are open to foreign capital. Austrian, Greek and American banks participate 
as shareholders or have opened branches in the Republic o f Bulgaria. The South 
Korean concern DAEWOO has bought 49 per cent o f the First Private Bank Ltd., 
and the EBRD has offered to acquire 11% o f the Bulgarian Investment Bank.
Foreign exchange policy has been relatively successful. The major objective is to 
achieve convertibility o f the national currency for a ll types o f payments. A  freely- 
floating exchange rate and a liberal foreign exchange regime, probably the most 
liberal among a ll Eastern European countries, e.g., exporters are not required to 
sell foreign exchange acquired through exports to the Central Bank, were adopted. 
Gold reserves have increased up to 38 t, i.e., 1,229,312 troy ounces in August,
1994. In less than two years, foreign exchange reserves increased 20 fold, but since 
the autumn o f 1993 they fe ll by one-half. The exchange rate has remained stable for 
almost three years at 22-25 levs to the USD, but at the end o f 1993 and the begin- 
ning o f 1994 the national currency was strongly devaluated owing to great exten- 
sive speculation.
The external debt is considerable for the country's size, USD 10.5 b illion . Follow- 
ing the moratorium on servicing the debt, announced by the Government in the 
spring o f 1990, Bulgaria's access to capital markets was, in practice, terminated. 
Negotiations were held and framework agreement concluded w ith the Paris Club, 
thus rescheduling our debt to the offic ia l creditors, who hold about 20% o f the total 
amount o f the Bulgarian foreign debt as o f A pril, 1994. An agreement w ith the 
London Club reducing Bulgaria’s foreign commercial debt by USD 8,124,933,263 
was signed in Sofia on June 29 1994.
After three-years o f hard bargaining, Bulgaria achieved an unprecedented debt 
reduction, and Bulgaria's foreign commercial debt was slashed to USD 4,300 m il- 
lion. According to M r. Peter T ils, the Chairman o f Bulgaria's Bank Advisory 
Committee, serving on behalf o f Deutsche Bank AG in its capacity as closing agent 
for the transaction, these are the most favourable terms that a debtor has ever 
received in a Brady plan transaction. The banks agreed to a buyback o f 12% o f the 
outstanding debt at a 75% discount on both principal and past due interest. This 
option is the deepest reduction not only in the package o f Bulgaria but also the 
cheapest price ever negotiated in a Brady deal. Sixty per cent o f the debt is set aside 
for settlment by collateralized discount bonds. The 50% discount on this option also 
results in an unprecedented amount o f global debt reduction.
The front-loaded interest reduction bonds further facilitate the servicing o f the 
transaction. The redemtion o f these securities, going far into the next century, w ill 
help assure the v iab ility  o f the package in the medium and long term. In this form, 
the deal allows the creditors to keep a reasonable portion o f their due receivables.
The Bulgarian Government chose Citibank NA o f the United States to act as fis- 
cal agent for Bulgaria's foreign debt agreement w ith its London Club creditors. 
C itibank’s offer was considerated best because it is a leading United States bank in 
capital size, standard o f service, and experience in dealing with debtors o f the same
Olga Teneva
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type. The bank does not require any special charges for its agency exept the fees for 
registration o f the bonds on the Luxembourg Stock Exchange.
Bulgaria has thus been readmitted to the international financial community. In 
practical terms, this new chapter in our economic relations w ill bring, we hope, 
fresh bank financing and investments.
Our foreign trade regime has been liberalized completely. Last year’s balance o f 
trade was negative, unlike in the previous three years o f the reform. The commodity 
and geographic structure o f foreign trade changed drastically. The collapse o f the 
market in the former socialist countries, the CMEA (Council fo r Mutual Economic 
Assistance), had a strong negative effect on the economy because decades it had 
been adapted to the specific requirements o f that market. There was a natural striv- 
ing to redirect the foreign trade flows to the industrial countries o f the OECD. 
Their trade barriers, however, are d ifficu lt to overcome in spite o f the agreement fo r 
association w ith the European Community signed in December, 1992. In the last 
three years, the Bulgarian trade balance was affected negatively by the M iddle East 
crisis and by the United Nations embargos on Iraq, Libya and Serbia-Montenegro, 
which we strictly observe.
The last embargo imposed by the United Nations cut o ff our basic trade routes to 
Europe, including the Danube and placed us in real commercial isolation. A  special 
Sanctions Commission founded to the Council o f M inisters estimated Bulgaria's 
losses at over $ 2 b illion . A t the in itia tive o f the UN, the International Monetary 
Fund estimated them at over $ 1 b illion . This amount exceeds the gap in the state 
budget o f our country.
Other Eastern European countries have sim ilar problems w ith their real incorpo- 
ration into the world economy. So far the assistance rendered by the industrialized 
countries for the reforms in Central and Eastern Europe has not come up to their 
expectations. This period coincided w ith the cyclic recession in western economies. 
The fa ll in production, the rising unemployment and the shrinking market, though 
not to the extent o f the m id 70-es and early 80-es, increased insecurity in interna- 
tional financial markets. Therefore, the difficulties that the reforms in the Eastern 
European countries face have been conditioned by the unfavorable combination o f 
simultaneously accumulated external and internal reasons.
The Republic o f Bulgaria is developing good relations w ith the international fi-  
nancial institutions, the International Monetary Fund, the W orld Bank, the Euro- 
pean Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the European Investment Bank, 
G-24, etc. The objective is to attract financial resources for the needs o f the reforms, 
for the stabilization economic program, the structural reform, for support o f the 
private sector development and technical assistance for various other sectors. It is 
in the overcoming o f a ll d ifficulties in the inter-related world economy outlined 
above that I see the s till growing role o f those institutions, in supporting and coor- 
dinating the efforts o f politicians and scientists from the West and the East to solve 
the global problems o f today's world economy. The past can give examples for sue- 
cessful and unsuccessful solutions that have to be reconsidered in the ligh t o f 
specific modern conditions.
For instance, the countries that after W orld War II became democratic market 
economies were at the very beginning even more ruined than the new democracies
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in  Central and Eastern Europe. O f course, there the market economy traditions 
were s till alive. The process o f revival, w ith a significant role for the state sector, 
was based on a system o f regulatory and control measures to hold inflation and 
wages at a low level, to maintain the exchange rate and to regulate interest rates. 
Some elements were gradually dropping out o f the system and at the same time 
there was an increasing trust in the capabilities o f the market forces to cope with 
the problems almost by themselves, but this constructive process would have been 
impossible without the help o f the United States through the Marshall Plan.
Jacques Delor, as President o f the Commission o f the European Communities, 
made a proposal to the European Parliament in Strasbourg in early 1990 that con- 
sidered the possibility o f g iving a sim ilar assistance to Eastern Europe. The 
Marshall A id Program provided 16 West countries w ith some $ 12.4 b illio n  over 
four years or $ 3.1 b illion  a year. In 1989 prices that are equivalent to S 65.4 b illion  
or $ 16.4 b illio n  a year. In terms o f Western GDP these are not very large numbers: 
$ 16.4 b illion  is about 0.3 per cent o f the US GNP or the European Communities' 
GDP. For the United States, the EC and Japan combined it would be just over 0.1 
per cent. M r. Delons proposal is fo r $23 b illion . It would amount to some 0.45 per 
cent o f the Community's GDP in 19891.
Actually, the important question for the Economic Commission for Europe in the 
UN is not so much whether West European countries could provide a Marshall 
Plan but rather whether Eastern European countries would be able to absorb and 
use it. The presumption is that, after the war, the ruined West European countries 
did not have to reconstruct their market economies from firs t principles. However, 
the absence o f some preconditions in East Europe is compensated by the presence 
o f others. For instance, the greatest wealth o f our country is its human potential, the 
highly qualified, for its greater part up to the world standards, labor force which is 
s till underpaid. Apart from the fertile land we have modern infrastructure and good 
traditional relations w ith the vast market o f the former Soviet Union and other 
Eastern European countries. The Law on Foreign Investment Protection, adopted 
by the Bulgarian Parliament on January 16, 1992, provides sweeping rights and 
guarantees for foreign investments. Those who see the future benefits and promptly 
make their investments w ill have an advantage in the follow ing periods o f inevita- 
ble economic revival.
On the other hand, there exists the negative example o f the mass assistance given 
for the recovery o f the so-called th ird  world in the last two or three decades. We 
should not be compared to these countries. The basic features and conditions differ. 
We can easily become an adequate economic partner and in this way assist w ith the 
development o f the optimum currency area that is so necessary for the industrial- 
ized countries. Essential is the fact that in the Republic o f Bulgaria both the popula- 
tion and the political forces are convinced o f the necessary development o f a real 
market economy.
Olga Teneva
1 Economic Reform in the East: a framework for western support. "Economic Survey o f 
Europe in 1989-1990", ECE, UN, A pril 1990, pp. 1-14.
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Financial sector developments in Romania are a rather complicated subject for 
somebody from the outside, the more so as it seems to be a rather complicated sub- 
ject for the Romanian government as well. In hardly any other sector is the conflict 
between economic needs and social considerations fe lt more, i.e., the conflict 
between the need for a restrictive monetary and fiscal policy in order to restructure 
and stabilize the economy versus the wish to avoid social unrest among the popula- 
tion. This dilemma has certainly led to various policy inconsistencies, and the 
reform process has often suffered from bureaucratic interventions and corrections 
by the government during the past four years.
1. The R om anian Econom y in  the B eg inn ing  o f 1994: A B r ie f O verview
Romania today seems to be the country in the former socialist block where reforms 
and the macroeconomic stabilization process have been making the slowest prog- 
ress and where the government is s till suspected o f not being convincingly devoted 
to reforms. But Romania, w ith its deeply rooted structural problems, is certainly 
also the country that was economically and po litica lly the worst equipped and pre- 
pared for comprehensive reforms.
Instead o f try ing to find  a balance between liberalization, stabilization, and insti- 
tutional change, vita l fo r a country in transition, the Romanian government, after 
the revolution o f December, 1989, started "reforms" w ith a number o f highly popu- 
listic measures in order to calm down the population. Although this is understand- 
able, since the Romanian population had the lowest liv in g  standard w ith in the 
former CMEA, the reduction o f the weekly working hours and the considerable 
increase in consumer goods imports, financed by drawing down foreign exchange 
reserves, certainly did not contribute to the necessary macroeconomic stabilization.
Only in  1991/1992 did the government slowly start an economic reform program, 
which, fo r the firs t time, focussed more on macroeconomic stabilization, including 
financial and monetary sector reforms.
However, until now the Romanian reform process has been characterized by a 
highly inconsequential gradualism, which often meant the method "two steps for- 
ward - one to three steps backward". One example o f this kind o f behavior was the 
reestablishment, in October 1993, o f price controls for food products. Such controls 
had been abolished only three months previously.
Thus the economic results o f this reform process have been disappointing. Roma- 
nian GDP started to shrink in real terms in 1988 with accelerating rates o f decline
Financial Sector Development in Romania
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in  each o f the fo llow ing four years.1 Compared to 1989, in 1992 the GDP had de- 
creased by almost one-third. Industrial production decreased to one-half o f 1989 
production, thereby reducing its real share in GDP from some 53% in 1989 to 40% 
in  1992.
Although prelim inary officia l statistics, contrary to most forecasts, surprisingly 
showed a halt to the continuous GDP decline in 1993, there seems to be some doubt 
about the truthfulness o f the reported growth figures according to which the overall 
GDP increased by 1%, industrial output by 1.3% and agricultural output by more 
than 12%. These doubts exist not only among OECD experts, who consider a nega- 
tive growth o f 4% more like ly, but also among some Romanian economists, who 
th ink it  possible that the positive growth rates are intended to draw a more positive 
picture o f the country in order to attract foreign investors. However, this is reported 
w ith a ll caution since there is no reliable confirmation for this opinion.
Annual inflation rates kept accelerating also in 1993; they rose from 5.1% in 
1990 to some 256% last year (295% on a December 1993 to December 1992 basis), 
instead o f only 70 - 80% as was forecast.2 Inflation in 1993, however, was particu- 
la rly influenced by certain measures strongly recommended by the IMF and the 
W orld Bank. Those being the elim ination o f consumer price subsidies in May, the 
introduction o f an 18% VAT in July and the elim ination o f ceilings on retail mar- 
gins fo r consumer goods also in July, the latter, as already said, having been 
meanwhile reimposed. Inflation was, o f course, fueled by a considerable deprecia- 
tion o f the leu vis-à-vis the dollar even though the government policies aimed at a 
real revaluation o f the leu in order to avoid an additional inflationary impact.
The offic ia l exchange rate, i.e., the rate that resulted from the o ffic ia l foreign 
exchange auctions under supervision o f the National Bank, more than doubled from 
the end o f 1992, when it was 460 Lei/$, to 1,074 Lei/S in November 1993. Much 
higher was the exchange rate on the so-called grey market, i.e., hard currency 
transactions directly carried out between enterprises, and at the private exchange 
offices, which also settle a larger part o f hard currency transactions than the Na- 
tional Bank. The private offices exchanged the Dollar for some 1,600 Lei in 
December 1993. The o ffic ia l rate quickly decreased quickly when the introduction 
o f fu ll convertibility by A pril, 1994 was announced. By the end o f January, 1994, it 
had depreciated to 1,480 Lei/$, thereby elim inating the temporary real apprécia- 
tion; by the beginning o f A pril, it had been brought in line, i f  not w ith black then 
w ith grey market rates, i.e., approx. 1,700 Lei/$.3
Real wages declined by an additional 15% in 1993, fin ishing at 50% o f their
1989 level. The unemployment rate reached 10.2% o f the workforce at the end o f 
1993. Although only some 25% o f these lost their jobs due to the closing down o f 
non-viable enterprises, further massive increases in unemployment figures w ill 
have to be expected i f  the government is to refrain from further subsidization o f
258 Petra Pissulla
1 Cf. P. Pissulla, G. Huny a: Romania - Macroeconomics, in: The W orld Bank et a l.: Ro- 
mania - A Strategy for the Transition in Agriculture, W orking Papers, Vol 1 o f 5, 
Washington, D.C. 1993, p. 33.
2 Cf. Neue Zürcher Zeitung (NZZ), No. 29, February 5, 1994.
3 Cf. NZZ, N0. 29, February 5, 1994 and Rompres, Press Release o f A pril 11, 1994.
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these state enterprises. By March, 1994, the unemployment rate had already in- 
creased to 11.3%, which was s till below the East European average.4
What can be regarded as last year's success is the development o f foreign trade 
w ith increasing exports and a shrinking trade deficit: exports increased by 5.6% to 
4,527 m ill. $, imports decreased by 4% to 5,676 m ill. $ (c if); the deficit reached 
1,149 m ill. $, i.e., a decline o f almost 30%.5 The current account deficit declined 
from 1.5 b ill. $ in  1992 to 0.9 b ill. $ last year. Nevertheless the foreign exchange 
situation remained precarious until very recently, i.e., the beginning o f A p ril, 1994, 
although foreign exchange reserves covered almost two months o f imports at the 
end o f 1993. On the interbank foreign exchange market, demand regularly ex- 
ceeded supply, and the private sector, which had almost no access to the interbank 
auctions, had to rely on its own foreign exchange earnings or on the above men- 
tioned private exchange offices.
No exact data are available on Romania's foreign debts, which were zero at the 
end o f 1989, since Ceauçescu, in an attempt to get rid  o f the influence o f Western 
banks and financial organizations, had completely repaid a ll credits. Medium and 
long term credit lines in m id-1993 were $4.3 b ill., one-third o f which were gov- 
ernment guaranteed credit lines to enterprises.
O f these $4.3 b ill., $2.8 b ill, were actually drawn by mid-1993. By the end o f
1993, outstanding gross foreign debts are estimated at $3.3 b ill.6 No IM F credits 
had been disbursed in 1993, after the standby arrangement had been suspended in 
early 1993, due to the non-fulfillm ent o f credit performance criteria.
At the end o f 1993, Romania had outstanding IMF credits o f 750.9 m ill. SDR, 
which is almost 100% o f the Romanian quota (754.1 m ill. SDR). Only in  December 
after nine months o f negotiations did Romania reach a new agreement w ith the 
Fund. The IMF memorandum generally demands a speed-up in  the reforms and an 
implementation o f a strict austerity policy, which w ill include the figh t against 
inflation by tigh t monetary and wage policies, and the restructuring and reorgani- 
zation o f state enterprises, o f the banking sector, and o f state finances. The deficit 
o f the central state budget may not be higher than 3.5 to 4% o f GDP. By a complete 
liberalization o f the exchange rate, exports are to be promoted.
Romania hopes that the new credit arrangement w ith the Fund w ill free up addi- 
tional financial sources from the W orld Bank and commercial banks up to the 
amount o f $1 b ill.. The W orld Bank, after having also suspended the last tranche o f 
a $400 m ill, structural adjustment loan in 1993 until agreement w ith the IM F had 
been reached, in  fact reacted by releasing a $175 m ill, credit for the modernization 
of Romania's o il and gas industry in A pril 1994.
The domestic debts o f the Romanian government reached 734 b ill. Lei in Dec.,
1993 (4.4% o f GDP) o f which the biggest parts originated from credits fo r the re- 
demption o f government-guaranteed bad assets in the accounts o f the four big state-
4 Cf. NZZ, No. 77, A pril 3/4, 1994.
5 Cf. G. Himya: The Romanian Economy in 1993: Economic Growth and Price Surge, Pa- 
per presented at the Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung, W ildbad Kreuth, March 1994, p. 7.
6 Cf. ECE: Economic Survey o f Europe in 1993 - 1994, p. 112.Roland Schönfeld - 978-3-95479-733-2
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 09:44:06AM
via free access
00063440
owned banks, and from credits for the financing o f the 1992 budget deficit.7 
Domestic debts increased by almost 30% in March, 1994, when the government 
transferred an additional 210 b ill. Lei o f non-performing credits from commercial 
banks’ portfolios to the public debt.8
These are some o f the basic features and problems o f the recent development of 
the Romanian economy w ith which monetary and fiscal policy has had to deal. 
Monetary and fiscal reforms were introduced rather late, i.e., not before 1991/92. 
From the beginning, monetary policy in particular suffered from a continuous 
struggle between soft and tight policy.
260 Petra PissuUa
2. M one ta ry  P o licy
Since in  socialist Romania the role o f financial planning was absolutely secondary 
to that o f physical planning, the lack o f a functioning financial system made an 
active monetary policy at the in itia l stage o f transition impossible. A two-tier bank- 
ing system was established, though far from functioning, in fa ll 1990; the law on 
the central bank (National Bank o f Romania, NBR) was passed in A pril 1991. The 
banking sector is s till rather monopolized, dominated by four big state banks and 
the Romanian Savings Bank (CEC). The total number o f legally-constituted banks 
was no higher than 20 by the end o f 1993, o f which four were private banks. Until 
today the banking sector cannot offer well-operating banking services.
Although monetary policy, together w ith budgetary and wage policies, has al- 
ways had the task o f keeping down the inflation that followed price and exchange 
rate liberalizations, it could fu lfill its task only to a lim ited extent due to such fac- 
tors as the underdeveloped financial sector, government interventions into NBR's 
credit policy, imprudent relations between banks and enterprises, and extremely 
bad payment discipline among enterprises.9
W hile the National Bank’s firs t attempts to influence overall economic develop- 
ments via monetary policy started in the second ha lf o f 1991 with an extremely soft 
policy, which was characterized by highly negative real interest rates and a real 
domestic credit expansion o f some 20%, the policy changed in early 1992. In order 
to figh t inflation, a tight monetary policy was introduced during the firs t six 
months o f year. This policy, however, was contravened in August 1992 when gov- 
emment interventions led to a selective relaxation o f credit policy.
Although the National Bank raised its refinancing rate almost constantly, to 80% 
in May 1992, in order to reach a positive real interest rate, this goal was achieved 
only temporarily, while producer prices were frozen for several months in 1992. 
The basic NBR refinancing rate, which was decreased in December 1992 to 70 % 
and valid through 1993, was far from being a positive real rate in 1993.
One o f the National Bank's major problems through 1992 and 1993 was that the 
refinancing rate did not determine the overall structure o f interest rates in the bank-
7 Cf. National Commission for Statistics: M onthly S ta tis tica l B u lle tin .No. 1, January 1994 ,־
1 Cf. Romanian Business News, March 1994, Banking-F inancial News.
9 Cf. P. Pissulla, G. Hunya, op.cit., p. 21. Roland Schönfeld - 978-3-95479-733-2
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ing sector, i.e., that the refinancing rate o f the National Bank was for most o f time 
the highest interest rate in the economy as a whole especially in 1992. The central 
bank lacked control over interest rates in the commercial banking sector for two 
reasons:
1. The Romanian Savings Bank, which was "saved" from the old times o f com- 
munism, is so far not subject to the banking law׳ and issued its own refinancing 
credits to state-owned banks at much lower interest rates than the National Bank. 
Its financial sources were the savings accounts o f the population, for which the 
interest rates through 1992/1993 were extremely low i f  compared to the annual in- 
flation. In 1992, for example, CEC interest rates for household sight deposits were 
27%, for deposits over one year 50%, while consumer prices rose by 210%.10 Since 
CEC had considerable savings accounts, being the only savings bank in the country 
that people knew and trusted, CEC became an important refinancing institute for 
the commercial banks. Only by the beginning o f 1994 did CEC start to lose impor- 
tance through increasing competition from commercial banks which offered much 
higher interest rates on deposits.
2. In 1992/1993 the government forced the National Bank to give preferential 
credits to certain priority sectors such as agriculture, transport, and later also pro- 
duction for exports, the refinancing rate o f which was 13.5%, meaning a 15% 
interest rate on lendings by commercial banks.
Only in the course o f 1993 did deposit and lending rates o f commercial banks 
slowly start to increase. Deposit rates o f the banking sector were in the range o f 10
- 85% with a weighted average o f 41.4% per year in November 1993. Short term 
lending rates to the non-banking sector ranged from 15 - 176% (weighted average 
84% )." However, even these rates were s till highly negative. Recently are there 
also credit auctions organized by the National Bank, where commercial banks 
compete for short term refinancing central bank credits. Interest rates increased up 
to 187% per year at these auctions.
Not only did the National Bank lack control over interest rates during the last 
two years, it also lacked control over credit and money supply for two additional 
reasons.
1. The financing o f the national budget deficits so far have remained outside the 
scope o f general credit policy. The deficits o f the national budget have largely been 
financed by interest-free credits granted by the National Bank.
2. A considerable amount o f uncontrolled credit emission occured through inter- 
enterprise arrears, which was the reaction o f state enterprises to increasing liqu id ity 
shortages, thereby, o f course, sharpening the problem. Since these arrears were in- 
terest-free through 1993, they were an extremely cheap source o f financing.
10 Cf. P. Pissulla, G. Hunya, op.cit. p. 23.
11 Cf. Romanian Business News, March 1994, p. 12. Roland Schönfeld - 978-3-95479-733-2
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Also after the second global compensation o f inter-enterprise arrears, i.e., the 
complete clearing o f net arrears by the government - under law 80 in December
1991, these arrears very quickly started to rebuild in the course o f the particulary 
tigh t monetary policy during the firs t six months o f 1992 above-mentioned. By 
October, 1992 gross inter-enterprise arrears amounted to 1,600 b ill. Lei (=  30% of 
the GDP).12 By the end o f 1993, payment arrears reached 4,200 b ill. Le i,13 which, 
however, was a reduction in relation to GDP (25%).
The government is only now undertaking firs t, although insufficient, steps in or- 
der to increase the financial discipline on enterprises. Since recent studies have 
shown that roughly 100 big state enterprises are responsible for most o f the arrears, 
some 25 o f these enterprises have been put under a surveillance regime o f financial 
discipline, which is coordinated by the National Commission o f Restructuring and 
which is part o f the restructuring process. Furthermore, a new regulation scheme 
was introduced, which specifies that invoices unpaid w ithin ten days w ill incur an 
interest rate o f 0.15% per day (= some 55% per year). However, it is easily seen 
that this interest rate w ill be negative, even i f  inflation is no higher than 70 - 80% 
in 1994, and w ill hardly hinder enterprises from accumulating additional arrears 
unless the government is w illin g  to strictly apply the bankruptcy procedure o f the 
old Commercial Code, which has recently been reactivated as an interim  regulation 
until a new and more efficient bankruptcy law can be put into force. However, so 
far, the Romanian Government has not applied this Code.
To sum up, it can be said that the major characteristic and problem o f the Roma- 
nian credit market in 1993 was its segmented nature and the National Bank’s lack 
o f control over money and credit supply. Market-clearing rates functioned together 
w ith highly subsidized interest rates and involuntary interenterprise crediting.
But despite these unfavorable developments, the renewed restrictive monetary 
policy o f the National Bank, which started last Fall and which went along w ith ris- 
ing interest rates, seems to have yielded fru it by the beginning o f 1994.
It obviously contributed to a decline in real credit to the non-governmental sector 
(156% in  current terms; December 1993/December 1992) as well as to the govern- 
ment sector (59% ),14 and brought down monthly inflation rates from two-digit 
numbers in the Fall o f 1993 to 7.4.% in December, 4.9% in January 1994 and 5.9% 
in February. For the entire year o f 1994, an inflation rate o f 70 - 80% is envisaged, 
which had been the forecast also for 1993. At these monthly rates, current real 
interest rates are fina lly  positive.
High interest rates on domestic currency deposits, part o f the increase o f which 
can be attributed to an increasingly noticeable shortage o f broad money in the 
economy,15 obviously persuaded enterprises and the population to cease hoarding 
foreign exchange outside the banking system. For the firs t time, the exchange rate
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was under less pressure in A pril, 1994, and for the firs t time the supply o f hard cur- 
rency at NBR's auctions exceeded the demand by $2 m ill, on A pril 8.16 However, 
the almost triumphant cry o f M. Cosea, Vice Prime M inister and President o f the 
Council fo r Economic Reforms: "The Leu is convertible!" seems to be a little  too 
optim istic.17 Too many s till existing constraints hinder free access to convertible 
currencies fo r private enterprises and private citizens, but i f  the National Bank 
maintains this form  o f tigh t monetary policy and i f  positive real interest rates on 
domestic currency accounts remain as incentives to move out o f the dollar, then a 
significant further depreciation o f the Leu might be avoidable. The exchange rate 
can then become an anchor, contributing to greater price stability
3. F is c a l and  B udgetary P o licy
Increasing strains on government expenditures led to rising budget deficits in the 
years 1990 through 1992. In 1992, the central government's o fficia l budget had a 
deficit o f 263 b ill. Lei, or 4.8% o f GDP.18
Very often, a considerably lower figure (1%) was mentioned by the Romanian 
government, which liked to present the so-called consolidated budget, including 
central and local budgets and extra budgetary funds, because there are research, 
health, education, unemployment, supplementary pension, and social security 
funds. Extra budgetary surpluses, mainly from the unemployment, social insurance 
and supplementary pension funds, were used to provide temporary means to finance 
the central budget deficit. On the other hand, additional off-budget funds w ith an 
overall deficit, mainly from the foreign asset revaluation fund, which are not in- 
eluded in the consolidated budget, had to be balanced by the central budget. Were 
these deficits included, the total consolidated deficit in 1992 would increase to 5% 
o f GDP. This exclusion o f off-budgetary spendings certainly makes the overall 
budget obligations very non-transparent.
Looking at these figures, it should be noted that revenues and expenditures o f the
1992 consolidated budget were accomplished under accounting conditions, which 
were rather favorable for the government The enterprise accounting system, for 
example, overstated profits by understating production costs as well as the costs o f 
depreciation o f fixed assets, the latter having been highly underestimated by the 
lack o f revaluation o f assets in the course o f inflation and by extremely long depre- 
ciation periods o f 32 years. Both factors led to rather high revenues from profit 
taxes (23% o f overall revenues) but also to a considerable decapitalization o f enter- 
prises.19 On the other hand, extrabudgetary expenditures fo r social purposes like 
unemployment allowances were far from reflecting the realistic number o f unem- 
ployed that would have burdened the consolidated budget i f  non-viable enterprises 
had not been subsidized but had been closed down.
16 Cf. Rompres, Press Release o f April 11, 1994 (Currency Market in the A pril 4-8 week).
17 Cf. Adevarul, A pril 11, 1994.
u Cf. P. Pissulla, G. Hunya, op.cit., p. 40.
19 Cf. Banca Nationala a Romania: Buletin a l S tatistic de in form are Publica  Nr. 1/1993.Roland Schönfeld - 978-3-95479-7 3-2
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Since these, from the view o f the state budget, rather favorable conditions were 
also true for 1993, it was not necessarily a surprise that the outcome o f the 1993 
budget was better than drafted in A pril 1992. W hile the central budget deficit was 
targeted at 4% o f GDP, the actual deficit reached only 336 b ill. Lei or 2% o f GDP 
due to revenues 9% higher and expenditures 1.6% lower than anticipated.20 The 
consolidated budget reportedly was balanced. Profit taxes were 22% higher than 
forecast, however, there seems to have been a downward adjustment for the ex- 
pected profit tax incomes during 1993; their share in overall revenues decreased to 
some 20% 21 Wage taxes, on the other hand, increased their share in budget reve- 
nues from 26% in 1992 to almost 35% in 1993, which seems to be surprising in so 
far as real wages declined while the number o f unemployed increased. Both should 
have reduced the taxable income base.
Very like ly the central budget suffered from the mentioned inter-enterprise ar- 
rears although they declined in relation to GDP in 1993. However, there were two 
main sources o f loss caused by payment arrears:
1. Delayed payments in a highly inflationary environment necessarily led to 
lower real profit taxes, since there was no indexation for receivables in 1993.
2. Payment arrears also caused arrears in payments o f turnover taxes, which are 
collected on an accrual basis.
It is not quite clear how far changes in the accounting system, introduced in 
January 1994, w ill eliminate these peculiarities. At least, an intended fu ll inflation 
correction o f the tax base w ill remove inflation-induced losses. On the other hand, 
there are legitimate apprehensions that enterprise profits could be more or less 
eliminated i f  the former accounting methods that used to overestimate profits are 
abolished. In the case o f an economy that w ill most like ly be stagnating at best i f  
austerity policy is strictly pursued, the 1994 budget could very well suffer from se- 
rious tax losses. A budget deficit higher than the 3.5 - 4% o f GDP allowed by the 
IMF could therefore be possible.
In order to protect the goal o f fiscal policy over the next years, the government 
intends to increase the VAT, profit tax and excise tax rates, and to reduce expendi- 
tures from social funds without affecting the most vulnerable groups o f the popula- 
tion.
These measures, however, most like ly w ill have only very lim ited effects in the 
short and medium run. The VAT rate increase, for example, would affect low in- 
come groups o f the population most, i.e., that greater direct income transfers to the 
vulnerable groups would be required. The present profit taxation already has con- 
tributed to a serious decapitalization o f enterprises; further taxation would sharpen 
the problem until the envisaged reform o f the accounting system reduced or even
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eliminated taxable profits. In this case, higher profit tax rates hardly would lead to 
noticeable revenue increases. Expenditures, on the other hand, could easily be 
higher than expected due to rising social and unemployment allowances in the 
course o f almost inevitable closures o f state enterprises.
Latest estimates on the growth o f bad assets in the banking sector and the burden 
o f the state budget by direct and hidden subsidies indicate that the government w ill 
have no other choice than to allow  bankruptcies. No financial room seems to be left 
to resort to further subsidies for large state enterprises. According to estimates, di- 
rect and, via government guaranteed bank credits, indirect subsidies to non-viable 
state enterprises amounted to some 25% o f GDP alone in 1993.22 Although the lat- 
ter do not burden the o ffic ia l national budget, the burden is high; subsidies are 
estimated to have accounted for up to 40% o f total budget expenditures last year 23 
Bank credits to non-viable state enterprises at negative real interest rates, on the 
other hand, have already accumulated a huge amount o f bad assets in the banking 
sector; it is assumed that they currently account for roughly 50% o f GDP. Since a 
large share o f these bad assets are government guaranteed, they w ill most likely 
raise public debts very shortly.
For the firs t time, in February, 1994 the M inistry o f Finance together with the 
National Bank decided to issue treasury b ills in order to finance at least part o f the 
expected state deficit. The government hopes that one-third o f the deficit can be 
covered; the rest w ill be financed from foreign credits, i.e., that foreign credits w ill 
be used for unproductive consumptive purposes. The public issue, amounting to 100 
b ill. Lei, w ill have a negotiable interest rate and w ill be redeemed in 3 to 6 months.
The issuance o f these bonds, which had originally been envisaged for 1993, fo l- 
lows two test bond issues placed in 1992, which had an interest rate o f 49% and 
were sold to the population exclusively by CEC. CEC, however, at the same time 
wanted to sell its own bonds at an even less attractive interest rate. Since this con- 
flic t, apart o f the rather low interest rate was one reason for the undersubscription 
o f those issues, the new bonds w ill be offered to banks, insurance companies, and 
the Private Ownership Trust Funds. The Romanian government obviously intends 
not to rely on interest-free credits o f the National Bank in order to finance its 
budget deficits any longer. One source o f uncontrolled and unrestricted credit 
expansion w ill thereby be eliminated.
4. O utlook
Romania is certainly in an extremely d ifficu lt situation. W hile financial and budg- 
etary strains w ill most like ly increase in the near future, in recent months major
22 Cf. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 290, December 14, 1993.
23 Cf. D ie Tageszeitung; No. 4239, February 14, 1994.
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strikes indicate that the population w ill hardly be w illin g  to bear additional burdens 
that are almost inevitably connected to an austerity policy as demanded by the IMF.
The offic ia l Romanian forecasts for industrial growth (2%) in 1994 which disre- 
garded the impact o f austerity policies were made in November, 1993. I f  this policy 
is strictly pursued, production w ill decrease. Most companies, in the wake o f 
increasing interest rates, are much less optim istic today about their production pos- 
sibilities than they were in the middle o f last year.
On the other hand, i f  the austerity policy is not pursued, the IM F and other credi- 
tors w ill hold back credits, which w ill have negative impact on imports, thereby 
also curtailing industrial production. In any case under the condition o f further 
GDP decline or only modest future increases fiscal constraints, the macroeconomic 
strategy o f the government w ill predominate.
Monetary policy, therefore, must become a reliable anchor fo r economic policy 
while brought into harmony w ith fiscal and structural policies. However, the scope 
for an active monetary policy, which, in the past, had been restricted seriously by 
setbacks in the liberalization process, particularly w ith regard to prices, exchange 
rates, interest rates and subsidies, has been widened. We can only wait and see and 
hope that this policy can be more consequently implemented in the next future.
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